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For my mother 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are two persons that cannot easily be repaid. What two? One’s Mother and father. 
Even if one should carry about one’s mother on one shoulder and one’s father on the 
other, and [while doing so] should have a life span of a hundred years…one still would 
not have done enough for one’s parents, nor would one have repaid them… 
For what reason? Parents are of great help to their children; they bring them up, feed 
them, and show them the world. 
 
—The Buddha 
Aṅguttara Nikāya, 2. IV. 33
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ABSTRACT 	
This dissertation is a work of multidisciplinary comparative philosophy of religion. It 
comprises a philosophical analysis and evaluation of Western traditions of philosophy 
and theology around the issue of religious anthropomorphism. More specifically, this 
study focuses on the tradition of Neoplatonic onto-theology in Western thought, and the 
divide in this tradition over the question of religious anthropomorphism and the divine 
nature. The dissertation frames this divide in terms of the distinction between an “anti-
anthropomorphic” conception of the divine nature on the one hand, and an “attenuated 
anthropomorphic” conception of the divine nature on the other. Chapters two and three 
analyze key figures and texts from the “attenuated anthropomorphic” and “anti-
anthropomorphic” traditions of Neoplatonic onto-theology. The fourth chapter considers 
a significant critique of this tradition as a whole leveled by Karl Barth and Martin 
Heidegger, among others, namely, that the onto-theological project as such constitutes a 
form of conceptual anthropomorphism. The fifth chapter provides an overview of the 
multidisciplinary scientific field known as the “bio-cultural study of religion,” which has 
yielded compelling evidence that anthropomorphic religious ideas are maturationally 
  x 
natural, culturally adaptive in certain past cultural contexts, and thus may reflect human 
cognitive limitations. The final chapter incorporates evidence from the BCSR (bio-
cultural study of religion) in a comparative philosophical evaluation of the debates within 
and around the traditions of Neoplatonic onto-theology. 
 
The central philosophical thesis of this dissertation is that evidence from the BCSR 
negatively impacts—without decisively undercutting—the plausibility of the “attenuated 
anthropomorphic” tradition relative to the “anti-anthropomorphic” tradition. It does so by 
demonstrating that the anthropomorphic attributions inherent to the attenuated 
anthropomorphic view are undergirded by hypersensitive cognitive mechanisms, which 
are prone to misfiring. However, the BCSR also indicates several important weaknesses 
of the anti-anthropomorphic tradition of Neoplatonic onto-theology with regard to the 
social viability of this tradition. The BCSR also erodes the plausibility of the critique that 
onto-theology is itself a form of gross conceptual anthropomorphism. It does so by 
demonstrating that abstract onto-theological concepts lack the conceptual and cognitive 
liabilities inherent to the type of religious anthropomorphism advocated by Barth and 
Heidegger. 
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Introduction 
 
This dissertation comprises a multidisciplinary comparative philosophical inquiry into the 
issue of religious anthropomorphism in Western philosophy and theology. Religious 
anthropomorphism may be defined as the attribution of human-like characteristics to the 
Divine, or to other non-human phenomena or events.1 While there are exceptions,2 
philosophers and theologians in the West have typically understood religious 
anthropomorphism to be a problem in some respect. The first known critique of 
anthropomorphic religious ideas in the West dates back to the early 6th century BCE 
Greek philosopher Xenophanes, and myriad philosophers and skeptics have elaborated on 
the problem of anthropomorphism since. Many of the subsequent critiques of 
anthropomorphism have had atheistic connotations, some of the most famous examples 
being that of Hume, Fichte, Feuerbach, and Freud. Yet numerous religious philosophers 
and theologians have issued their own critiques of anthropomorphism, and have 
formulated philosophical and theological strategies for negotiating the vexed issue of 
anthropomorphic representations of God. One thinks of figures from the early part of the 
Common Era such as Philo of Alexandria and Origen of Alexandria, and Islamic 
philosophers and theologians from the Middle Ages such as Avicenna and al-Ghazali. 
                                                                            
1 The Oxford English Dictionary defines anthropomorphism as follows: “Attribution of human form or 
character” and “Ascription of a human form and attributes to the Deity.” See "anthropomorphism, n.". OED 
Online. June 2019. Oxford University Press. 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/8449?redirectedFrom=anthropomorphism (accessed August 01, 2019). 
2 To give only a few examples, see for instance, Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/1, 222; Frederick Ferre, 
“In Praise of Anthropomorphism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1984), 
pp. 203-212; and Stephen H. Webb, Jesus Christ, Eternal God: Heavenly Flesh and the Metaphysics of 
Matter. 
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Indeed, as historian of philosophy Harry A. Wolfson has shown,3 the debate over 
anthropomorphic divine attributes in the Quran was central to the rise of orthodox 
theology (Kalam);4 theologians sought to reconcile the tension between Quranic verses 
that maintain that God is devoid of any likeness to humans (tanzīh) and those verses that 
suggest a likeness of God to human beings (tashbīh).5 
 Another salient example of the dispute over religious anthropomorphism is found 
in the Neoplatonic branch of the onto-theological tradition.6 This tradition identifies God 
with the philosophical category of Being-itself, or, “the One,” and thereby attenuates (to 
                                                                            
3 See Harry Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam. 
4 Furthermore, Merlin Swartz has shown this debate to be central not only to the discourse of Kalam 
theologians, but also jurists such as Ibn al-Jawzī'. See Swartz, A Medieval Critique of Anthropomorphism: 
Ibn al-Jawzī's Kitāb Akhbār aṣ-ṣifāt: A Critical Edition of the Arabic Text with Translation, Introduction 
and Notes. 
5 See Harry Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam, p. 8-9. See also, Diana Lobel, A Sufi-Jewish Dialogue: 
Philosophy and Mysticism in Baḥya Ibn Paqūda's Duties of the Heart, Chapter 5.  
6 Here I am drawing upon Wesley Wildman’s use of the term “the onto-theological tradition” in his 2010 
Religious Philosophy as Multidisciplinary Comparative Inquiry. Following Wildman, and many others in 
the Continental philosophy of religion, I employ the term “the onto-theological tradition” as a vague 
category that refers to traditions of Western philosophy and theology that employ the ontological category 
of “being” in attempting to conceive of God or ultimate reality (See Wildman: 2010, p. 248). While there 
are many streams of thought within the onto-theological tradition, this dissertation will home in on one 
stream in particular, viz., the identification of God with the metaphysical category of Being-itself in the 
Neoplatonic branch of the onto-theological tradition, and the consequences of this move with respect to the 
issue of anthropomorphism. As a result, I will not be able to give equal attention to other variants of the 
onto-theological tradition that employ ontological language in conceptualizing God and yet conceive of 
God as a self-caused being, or the most perfect being (rather than as Being-itself), e.g., figures such as 
Aristotle, Anselm, Duns Scotus, et al.  
Thus, my use of the term “the onto-theological tradition” in this dissertation is narrower in scope than 
that of Wildman, who addresses many variants of this tradition in his 2010 Religious Philosophy (supra). In 
this dissertation, I am moving the discussion of this tradition—or, a major branch of this tradition—in a 
new direction by seeking to evaluate debates within and around the Neoplatonic branch of the onto-
theological tradition in light of the bio-cultural study of religion. While the dissertation is (or aspires to be) 
an original contribution to knowledge in this respect, the background assumptions and philosophical 
convictions that guide the project—namely, that the study of cultural phenomena such as philosophical and 
religious traditions should not only draw upon the methods and insights of the human sciences, but should 
also draw upon what the natural sciences tell us about the evolved nature of our species—have been deeply 
influenced by Wildman’s conception of religious philosophy as multidisciplinary comparative inquiry. I’ve 
also been influenced by other religious studies scholars who contend that the human sciences should be 
informed by the natural sciences, and vice versa, see Edward Slingerland, What Science Offers the 
Humanities: Integrating Body and Culture, and Ann Taves, Religious Experience Reconsidered: A 
Building-Block Approach to The Study of Religion and Other Special Things. 
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varying degrees) the highly anthropomorphic images of God found in the Hebrew bible 
and Christian scriptures. Figures in this tradition as diverse as Plotinus, Maimonides, 
Thomas Aquinas, and Meister Eckhart have all sought to resist anthropomorphic 
representations of God in order to preserve the insight that ultimate reality is not a being, 
or supreme entity. Rather, this tradition conceives of ultimate reality (God) as Being-
itself, or, “the One”—an infinite principle beyond being and non-being. 
 However, the extent to which the onto-theological tradition’s identification of 
God with the category of Being-itself succeeds in avoiding anthropomorphism is a 
contested question. In fact, many contemporary theologians and philosophers of religion 
maintain that very project of conceptualizing God by way of ontological categories is 
itself a form of conceptual anthropomorphism.7 The present-day skepticism regarding 
this tradition has its roots in the famous critiques of the onto-theological project by 20th 
Century philosopher Martin Heidegger and 20th Century theologian Karl Barth. As a 
result, the term “onto-theology” has become something of a pejorative phrase in some 
academic circles today. 
 Moreover, there is a longstanding dispute within the Neoplatonic branch8 of the 
onto-theological tradition itself about the extent to which anthropomorphic conceptions 
of God can or should be resisted.9 On one side of this divide, eminent theologians such as 
                                                                            
7 Recent examples of this school of thought include Kevin Hector, Theology without metaphysics: God, 
Language, and The Spirit of Recognition; John Panteleimon Manoussakis, God after metaphysics: A 
Theological Aesthetic; Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being; Mark A. Wrathall, Religion After 
Metaphysics; and Merold Westphal, Overcoming Onto-theology: Toward a Postmodern Christian Faith. 
8 N.B. For the sake of brevity, in what follows I employ the term “the onto-theological tradition” to refer 
exclusively to the Neoplatonic wing of this rich and diverse tradition, unless otherwise specified. 
9 Diana Lobel highlights a similar debate among Islamic theologians in the Middle Ages. She writes, 
“Islamic theologians acknowledge that we must steer a delicate course between two equally dangerous 
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Augustine of Hippo, Maimonides, and Thomas Aquinas argue for what might be called 
an attenuated anthropomorphic conception of God. On this view, God is identified with 
the category of Being-itself—or “the One”—and as a result, the highly anthropomorphic 
images in the Biblical tradition are rejected as literal representations of the Divine and are 
instead interpreted metaphorically or allegorically. Yet, this view also preserves the 
anthropomorphic idea of God as an infinite agent possessing intentionality, and powers to 
act in the finite world. On the other side of the divide, religious philosophers such as 
Plotinus, apophatic mystical theologians such as Meister Eckhart, and Protestant 
theologians such as Friedrich Schleiermacher and Paul Tillich argue for what might be 
termed an anti-anthropomorphic conception of God. This view contends that God must 
transcend the categories and characteristics of the finite realm—including the 
characteristics of agency, mind, and personhood. Accordingly, these figures deny  that 
traditional anthropomorphic representations of God as an infinite reality possessing 
intentionality and agency can be interpreted as properly describing the Divine Nature. It 
is worth noting, if only in passing, that the debate over whether ultimate reality should be 
understood as possessing anthropomorphic characteristics such as intentionality and 
personhood is not particular to Western thought. Indeed, a strikingly similar debate exists 
within the Vedanta traditions of South Asia. The eighth century (CE) philosopher and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
poles: those of tashbīh, likening God to anything created; and ta'tīl, divesting God of all qualities. The 
Mu'tazilites-the most radically rationalist among the kalām theologians-avoid the danger of likening God to 
the created world by rejecting all positive descriptions of God. In response, the orthodox accuse 
Mu'tazilites of rendering God purely abstract, a something I know not what. They ask: How can one have a 
relationship with a nameless, faceless God, about whom we know nothing beyond the fact of mere 
existence? Don't we then lose any sense that this God is a real presence in human life?” A Sufi-Jewish 
Dialogue: Philosophy and Mysticism in Baḥya Ibn Paqūda's Duties of the Heart., p. 102.  
 In what follows, I conceive of this vexed issue as the divide between “anti-anthropomorphism” 
and “attenuated anthropomorphism.” 
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theologian Śankara famously articulated a mystical conception of ultimate reality as 
utterly bereft of any definite features and properties, what he termed nirguna Brahman 
(Brahman without attributes).10 On the other end of the spectrum, eleventh century (CE) 
philosopher and theologian Rāmānuja argued for a conception of ultimate reality as 
possessing intentionality and personhood, or saguna Brahman (Brahman with 
attributes).11 
 In the contemporary scene of philosophy of religion in the West, scholars 
continue to debate the extent to which onto-theological representations of God can and 
should do away with anthropomorphic elements. Philosophers and theologians also 
continue to debate whether the onto-theological project of conceptualizing God by way of 
the metaphysical category of Being is itself irremediably anthropomorphic. This 
dissertation will reevaluate the debates surrounding the onto-theological tradition’s 
attempt to negotiate the issue of anthropomorphism by placing this problematic into 
critical conversation with recent research from the bio-cultural study of religion 
(hereafter BCSR) on the evolutionary and cognitive provenance of anthropomorphic 
religious ideas. 
 The relatively young multidisciplinary field known as the BCSR draws upon the 
fields of evolutionary biology, biological anthropology, evolutionary psychology, 
neuroscience, and cognitive science, in order to investigate the way in which our 
evolutionarily stabilized cognitive and emotional architecture is enlisted in generating 
                                                                            
10 See Sudhakshina Rangaswami, The Roots of Vedānta: Selections from Śaṅkara's Writings. 
11 See Julius J. Lipner, The Face of Truth: A Study of Meaning and Metaphysics in the Vedantic Theology 
of Ramanuja. 
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and constraining religious representations in our species. What makes the BCSR 
especially relevant to the topic of this dissertation is a core hypothesis that is shared 
among most leading scholars in this field, namely, that our species’ evolutionary history 
has bequeathed modern human beings with various cognitive and emotional 
predispositions that function to bias human cognition toward adopting highly 
anthropomorphic religious representations. 
 The central thesis of this dissertation is that the BCSR indirectly impacts the 
relative plausibility of competing conceptions of ultimate reality within the Neoplatonic 
onto-theological tradition. More specifically, I argue that when evidence from the bio-
cultural study of religion is integrated into a comparative philosophical evaluation of the 
traditions of Neoplatonic onto-theology, it negatively impacts--without deciseily 
undercutting--the plausibility of the “attenuated anthropomorphic” view. 
The first chapter of the dissertation consists of a broad overview of the problem of 
religious anthropomorphism in Western philosophy and theology. The aim of this chapter 
is to provide a general sketch of the development of this problem by homing in on some 
of the classic critiques of anthropomorphism from the pre-socratics through the modern 
period. Beginning with Xenophanes’ famous critique of anthropomorphic gods in the 
sixth century BCE, I track the way in which the problem of anthropomorphism morphed 
from a philosophical and theological critique of popular religion in Ancient Greece to a 
primarily theological critique that was adopted by various Jewish and Christian 
intellectuals during the early centuries of the Common Era in order to contest certain 
representations of God in their sacred texts. I then consider some of the more well known 
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critiques of religious anthropomorphism from the Enlightenment and modern periods, 
most of which have had strongly atheistic connotations, namely, those of David Hume, 
J.G. Fichte, Ludwig Feuerbach, and Sigmund Freud.  
In the second chapter, I provide an analysis of the onto-theological conception of 
ultimate reality articulated by Plotinus in his Enneads. I subsequently explore the ways in 
which Plotinus’ conception of infinite, utterly simple One beyond being and nonbeing 
was appropriated and radically reconfigured by three key figures in Western philosophy 
and theology: St. Augustine, Maimonides, and St. Thomas. I go on to analyze the way in 
which each of these figures negotiates the problem of anthropomorphism with respect to 
their conception of God. In each case, I demonstrate the way in which Neoplatonic onto-
theology functioned as a bulwark against some anthropomorphic representations of God, 
while at the same time offering protection for other instances of religious 
anthropomorphism. 
In chapter three, I consider the anti-anthropomorphic tradition of Neoplatonic 
onto-theology as typified in the thought of Meister Eckhart, Friedrich Schleiermacher, 
and Paul Tillich. Although each of these figures articulated a unique theological approach 
to the paradoxical task of speaking of that which by definition is beyond language, they 
share in common a thoroughgoing anti-anthropomorphic approach to the divine nature. 
More specifically, Eckhart, Schleiermacher, and Tillich are united in affirming that the 
infinite, utterly simple divine nature must transcend all attributes—including those of 
intellect and agency. In this respect, these figures represent a radical return to the anti-
anthropomorphic, apophatic roots of Neoplatonic onto-theology. 
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Chapter four explores the argument that the onto-theological project as such 
constitutes a form of gross conceptual anthropomorphism. I begin with Karl Barth’s 
critique of the underlying theological premise of the onto-theological project: namely, the 
idea that extra-biblical ontological categories such as “being” should be given primacy in 
the formulation of the doctrine of God. I go on to explore Martin Heidegger’s 
philosophical critique of the onto-theological project as it was initially adumbrated in his 
1927 work Being and Time, and then more forcefully articulated in his well-known 1957 
lecture entitled “The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics." Finally, I 
consider Jean Luc Marion’s critique of onto-theology as articulated in his influential book 
God Without Being. 
In the fifth chapter I provide a detailed overview of some of the most important 
accounts of religious anthropomorphism stemming from the bio-cultural study of religion 
(hereafter: BCSR). The BCSR is an emerging multidisciplinary field of scientific inquiry 
that investigates religious beliefs and behaviors from the perspectives of evolutionary 
biology, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, anthropology, 
biological anthropology, sociology, and cultural evolution. I begin this chapter with a 
brief overview of the concept of maturational naturalness. I go on to explore the “religion 
as an evolutionary by-product” theory, with an eye to the central role of 
anthropomorphism in the religious representations under discussion. Finally, I consider 
recent research supporting the hypothesis that certain types of anthropomorphic religious 
beliefs have been culturally adaptive for our species in the past. 
In the sixth and final chapter, I mount a comparative philosophical evaluation of 
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the attenuated anthropomorphic and anti-anthropomorphic traditions of Neoplatonic onto-
theology that integrates evidence from the BCSR. I begin this chapter by considering two 
perspectives on the philosophical import of the BCSR, and go on to situate my own 
position in contrast to these views. I also provide a brief overview of the pragmatic 
philosophical framework within which the ensuing philosophical inquiry is carried out. In 
the second section of chapter six I mount a comparative philosophical argument that 
integrates evidence from the BCSR and demonstrates the way in which this evidence 
negatively impacts the relative plausibility of the attenuated anthropomorphic view in 
Neoplatonic onto-theology, without thereby decisively undercutting the plausibility of 
this position. This argument constitutes the central philosophical claim of this 
dissertation. In the third section, I explore the way in which the BCSR illuminates the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of Neoplatonic onto-theology as a practical strategy for 
resisting religious anthropomorphism, and as a socially viable theological perspective. 
Here I argue that although the BCSR surfaces some important weaknesses of Neoplatonic 
onto-theology as a whole, it also indicates that the anti-anthropomorphic wing of this 
tradition is weaker than the attenuated view in terms of its practical usefulness—both as a 
strategy for resisting anthropomorphism, and as a socially viable theological viewpoint in 
general. In the final section of this chapter, I argue that the BCSR erodes the plausibility 
of certain aspects of the critique of the onto-theological project as a form of conceptual 
anthropomorphism as expressed by Karl Barth and others. 
  
  10 
Chapter One: Tracing the Problem of Anthropomorphism in Western Thought 
 
Introduction 
Anthropomorphism may be defined as the ascription of human-like characteristics or 
attributes to non-human phenomena and events.12 With respect to religious ideas, 
anthropomorphism may be defined as the ascription of human-like characteristics or 
attributes to the Divine or to natural phenomena or events. Although there are important 
exceptions, the majority of philosophers and theologians in the West have understood the 
idea of religious anthropomorphism to be a problem for philosophical and theological 
discourse.13  
  This chapter traces the development of the problem of religious 
anthropomorphism in the traditions of Western philosophy and Jewish and Christian 
theology. As an exhaustive historical treatment of the problem of religious 
anthropomorphism in Western thought would require a large monograph in its own right, 
the aim of this chapter is to provide a general sketch of the development of this problem 
by homing in on some of the classic critiques of anthropomorphism from the pre-
socratics through the modern period. Beginning with Xenophanes’ famous critique of 
anthropomorphic gods in the sixth century BCE, we shall track the way in which the 
problem of anthropomorphism morphed from a philosophical and theological critique of 
                                                                            
12 The Oxford English Dictionary defines anthropomorphism as “The attribution of human form, character, 
or attributes to God or a god” and “The attribution of human personality or characteristics to something 
non-human, as an animal, object, etc.” 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/8449?redirectedFrom=anthropomorphism#eid 
13 To cite one example, philosopher Frederick Ferre takes exception to the mainstream position that 
anthropomorphic conceptions of the Divine are inherently problematic for theological discourse. See his 
article “In Praise of Anthropomorphism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 16, No. 3 
(1984), 203-212. 
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popular religion in Ancient Greece to a primarily theological critique that was adopted by 
various Jewish and Christian intellectuals during the early centuries of the Common Era 
in order to contest certain representations of God in their sacred texts. We shall then 
consider some of the more well-known critiques of religious anthropomorphism from the 
Enlightenment and modern periods, most of which have had strongly atheistic 
connotations, namely, those of David Hume, J.G. Fichte, Ludwig Feuerbach, and 
Sigmund Freud.14  
1.1 The critique of anthropomorphism in ancient Greek philosophy and theology 
 The critique of anthropomorphic religious ideas is older than monotheism in the 
history of Western thought. Most scholars cite sixth Century BCE poet and philosopher 
Xenophanes as the first figure in the Western tradition to formulate a critique of 
anthropomorphic religious ideas—this despite the fact that he never employed the word 
“anthropomorphism” in his writings. It’s important to note that Xenophanes’ trenchant 
critique of the anthropomorphic gods of Hesiod and Homer is as much a theological 
critique as it is a philosophical one. Another noteworthy aspect of Xenophanes’ critique 
is the fact that his work “On the Divine” has been handed down to us in the form of 
poetic verse. Xenophanes’ critique is thus a philosophical, theological, and poetic attack 
on the anthropomorphic and mythological religious ideas of Homer and Hesiod.  
  Xenophanes’ critique of anthropomorphism is not a full-fledged philosophical 
argument in the technical sense of the term. He does not begin with a core premise about 
                                                                            
14 The present chapter intentionally eclipses the traditions of Neoplatonism that grappled with the problem 
of religious anthropomorphism during late antiquity and the medieval era, as this topic is treated at length 
in the second chapter.  
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the nature of the Divine and then proceed to the conclusion that certain anthropomorphic 
conceptions of God are inadequate. Rather, his critique of anthropomorphism centers on 
an intuitive assumption concerning that which is and is not befitting of Divinity.15Far 
from making an attempt to substantiate his criteria for what is and is not befitting of 
Divinity, Xenophanes tries instead to show his audience the way in which popular 
conceptions of the Divine conspicuously reflect our “human all too human” image, and 
are therefore inadequate conceptions of the Divine.  
 In the surviving fragments of his discourse “On the Divine,” Xenophanes states, 
“Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the god / all sorts of things which are matters of 
reproach and censure among / men: / theft, adultery, and mutual deceit.”16He goes on to 
observe that “mortals suppose that gods are born, / wear their own clothes and have a 
voiced body.”17The problem with such anthropomorphic conceptions of God (or the 
gods) is made clear by Xenophanes’ next observation: 
But if horses or oxen or lions had hands / or could draw with their hands and 
accomplish such works as / men, / horses would draw the figures of the gods as 
similar to horses, / and the oxen as similar to oxen, / and they would make the bodies / 
of the sort which each of them had.18 
Here we have what is likely the first “projection” critique of anthropomorphic 
religious ideas in Western thought. Xenophanes suggests that in the same way that horses 
would likely conceive of horse-like gods, and oxen would conceive of oxen-like gods, so 
                                                                            
15 See Jaeger Ibid., 50. 
16 James H. Lesher and Xenophanes, Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments, (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto 
Press, 2001), 82.  Here and elsewhere in my citations I use the virgule slash (/) to register the line breaks in 
Xenophanes’ fragments. 
17 Lesher and Xenophanes, Xenophanes of Colophon., 85. 
18 Ibid., 89. 
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too the gods of Homer and Hesiod are no more than the projection of human 
characteristics onto the Divine. And so it is with most conceptions of Divinity the world 
over: “Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black; / Thracians that theirs are 
blue-eyed and red-haired.”19Xenophanes leaves the argument at that, inviting his reader 
to finish the thought, as it were. 
Here we may observe the way in which Xenophanes’ critique relies upon intuitive 
inferences. In juxtaposing the gods of Homer and Hesiod (who just so happen to 
resemble the Greeks in bodily form and immoral behavior) with the imagined gods of 
horses and oxen (who also happen to resemble horses and oxen) and the Ethiopian-
looking gods of the Ethiopians, and the Thracian-looking gods of the Thracians, 
Xenophanes shows the plausibility of the following inference: all such gods are merely 
projections that reflect the image of those beings who conceive them, be they human, 
Thracian, or horse. It may not amount to a formal philosophical argument, but it is a 
devastatingly powerful line of reasoning nonetheless. As classicist scholar Werner Jaeger 
observes of Xenophanes’ critique of anthropomorphism, “his own formulations are so 
striking that nothing is left for posterity but to quote his celebrated words and ring the 
changes upon them.”20 
The lines of Xenophanes cited above are among the most oft quoted from his 
work “On the Divine.” And the fact that these few sparse lines continue to be read, 
quoted and circulated today (e.g., in the writings of the so-called New Atheist movement) 
is a testimony to the power of this compact and incisive critique of anthropomorphism. 
                                                                            
19 Ibid., 90. 
20 Jaeger, Ibid., 50. 
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What is sometimes overlooked, however, is the way in which Xenophanes’ critique of 
anthropomorphic gods is inextricably bound up with his positive theology. In the twenty-
third fragment of “On the Divine” we read: “[Xenophanes of Colophon, teaching that god 
is one and without body, asserts:] One god is greatest among gods and men / not at all 
like mortals in body or in thought.”21 
It is not entirely clear whether Xenophanes is advocating here for monotheism or, 
what is more likely, a form of henotheism. Regardless, this much is evident: Xenophanes 
maintains that the vulgar anthropomorphic gods of Homer and Hesiod are to be 
repudiated precisely because they fall short of the transcendence of the One true god, 
who, being transcendent, is therefore not like human beings. Xenophanes goes on to say 
of the One true god: “…always he abides in the same place, not moving at all / nor is it 
seemly for him to travel to different places at different / times.”22 Again we see how 
Xenophanes’ core intuition about that which is befitting (or “seemly”) of the Divine 
nature functions to weed out undesirable anthropomorphic attributions. Whereas the 
lightning fast movement of the gods was, for Homer and Hesiod, a hallmark of their 
divinity,23 Xenophanes maintains that any movement—no matter how fast—is 
unbefitting of the Divine. After all, why should the One true god ever have need to move 
hither and thither? 
And yet, despite his vehement assertion that the One true god is “not at all like 
mortals in body or in thought,” Xenophanes nevertheless preserves some 
                                                                            
21 James H. Lesher and Xenophanes, 96—brackets Lesher’s. 
22 Ibid., 111. 
23 See Jaeger, Ibid., 45. 
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anthropomorphic attributes in his conception of the One true god, namely that of mind 
and agential power. Xenophanes writes of this god, “But effortlessly he sets all things 
astir / by the power of his mind alone.”24 As many scholars have noted, this notion of the 
Divine mind had a significant influence on Aristotle’s conception of God as “unmoved 
mover” and “thought thinking itself.”25 But what is especially interesting about 
Xenophanes’ view of god is its apparent inconsistency with respect to the issue of 
anthropomorphism. On the one hand, Xenophanes is unsparing in his critique of the 
anthropomorphic gods of the Greek pantheon. Yet, on the other hand, Xenophanes 
himself promotes a conception of the Divine that involves anthropomorphic attributes. 
As an intellectual, Xenophanes would have been familiar with monist 
philosophers such as Anaximander, who conceived of ultimate reality in terms of an 
eternal, infinite principle, which he termed the “Boundless.”26 This principle was 
understood to be the ultimate ground of the finite world, and as such, was identified with 
Divinity.27 This model of Divinity has the virtue of avoiding the problem of religious 
anthropomorphism insofar as it does not predicate any human-like attributes of the 
Divine. 
Interestingly, Xenophanes’ attempt at formulating a non-anthropomorphic 
theology clearly stops short of Anaximander’s monistic metaphysics of ultimate reality. 
Herein lies the apparent inconsistency in Xenophanes’ theology: if the One true god is, as 
                                                                            
24 Cited in Jaeger, Ibid., 45. 
25 See Jaeger, Ibid., 45. 
26 Jaeger, Ibid., 31-32. 
27  See Tim Whitmarsh, Battling the Gods: Atheism in the Ancient World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2015), 58. 
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he insists, “not at all like mortals in body or in thought,” then why predicate intentionality 
of the Divine nature? Does not Anaximander’s notion of the Divine Infinity provide a 
better model of Divinity that is “not at all like mortals in body or in thought”? As much 
as Xenophanes loathes the vulgar anthropomorphism of the Greek pantheon, he also 
cannot seem to do without some anthropomorphic attributes in his theology—otherwise, 
he would have ostensibly adopted a form of Anaximander’s non-anthropomorphic view 
of the Divine Infinity. It follows then that Xenophanes’ critique of anthropomorphism is 
ultimately one of degree: some forms of anthropomorphism are suggested to be beyond 
the pale—and thus unbefitting of the Divine—while other forms of anthropomorphism 
(i.e., intentionality and agential powers to act in the world) are explicitly preserved in his 
theology. Had Xenophanes written in a more philosophical idiom, this apparent 
inconsistency with regard to the problem of anthropomorphism might have been dealt 
with more explicitly. As we shall see in chapter two, the tension involved in resisting 
anthropomorphism in some respects and preserving anthropomorphism in other respects 
is a central theme in many traditions of theological reflection in the West. In this respect, 
Xenophanes could be considered to be the progenitor of what I will call “attenuated 
anthropomorphic” views of God in chapter two. 
 As regards the broader influence of Xenophanes on Jewish and Christian 
theology, classicist scholar Werner Jaeger observes that Xenophanes’ writings stimulated 
later Greek thinkers to devise “a special term to designate the theological category of 
‘that which befits the divine nature’—the θεοπρεπες (theoprepēs)”28The term itself was 
                                                                            
28 Jeager, Ibid., 50—parentheses mine. 
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probably invented by the Stoics, according to Jaeger. As we will observe in the following 
section, the concept of theoprepēs went on to have a monumental impact on early Jewish 
and Christian theology in the first centuries of the Common Era. First, we shall turn to 
consider Plato’s critique of religious anthropomorphism. 
 The critique of the anthropomorphic gods of Homer and Hesiod in Ancient Greek 
philosophy figures significantly in the works of Plato, most notably in the Republic.  For 
Plato, the chief problem with anthropomorphic religious ideas is that they produce 
deleterious moral and socio-political ramifications. In book II of the Republic, Socrates 
says of the great poets Homer and Hesiod that they “composed false stories which they 
told and still tell to mankind.”29Alluding to Hesiod’s story about Kronos castrating his 
own father, Socrates argues that even if such anthropomorphic accounts of the gods were 
true, they should not be written about or disseminated among the people. Socrates states, 
“I should not think that they ought to be thus lightly told to thoughtless young persons. 
But the best way would be to bury them in silence.”30 Plato’s issue with religious 
anthropomorphism is, then, a practical one: anthropomorphic depictions of Divinity and 
anthropomorphic myths about the supposed behaviors of the gods have the potential to 
negatively influence the moral formation of impressionable young adults. Thus, Socrates 
counsels that such myths should be abandoned altogether: 
Neither must we admit at all…that gods war with gods and plot against one another 
and contend—for it is not true either—if we wish our future guardians to deem 
nothing more shameful than lightly to fall out with one another. Still less must we 
                                                                            
29 Plato, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters., Republic, 377 d. 
30 Ibid., 378 a. 
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make battles of gods and giants the subject for them of stories and embroideries, and 
other enmities many and manifold of gods and heroes toward their kith and kin.31 
 The famous solution to the propagation of such stories is to banish the poets from 
the republic. Socrates proclaims that Homer’s famous verses about the disreputable 
actions of the gods must not be allowed in the ideal city, regardless of whether they are 
interpreted literally or allegorically; “for the young are not able to distinguish what is and 
what is not allegory, but whatever opinions are taken into the mind at that age are wont to 
prove indelible and unalterable.”32 
 In the end, Plato’s quarrel with anthropomorphism is not entirely political in nature--
there is also a theological element to his rejection of the anthropomorphic deities of the 
pantheon. Thus, like Xenophanes before him, Plato espouses a positive theology.33 In the 
Republic, for instance, he has Socrates argue for some guiding theological principles 
concerning what is and is not befitting of the Divine. It is on the basis of these theological 
principles—most of which concern the moral character of God (or gods)—that Plato rejects 
the anthropomorphic deities of Homer and Hesiod. Plato argues, for example, that God, as 
the source of goodness, cannot be the source of evil or harm.34 And like Xenophanes, Plato 
will not countenance the idea of God (or gods) undergoing change, movement, or engaging 
in dishonorable behaviors. Accordingly, Socrates contends that, “God is altogether simple 
and true in deed and word, and neither changes himself nor deceives others by vision or 
                                                                            
31 Ibid., 378 c. 
32 Ibid., 378 d-e 
33 A thorough treatment of Plato’s complicated and heterogeneous theological views is clearly beyond the 
scope of this chapter. But see, for example, Menn, Plato on God as Nous, and Riel, Plato’s Gods. 
34 Plato, Ibid., 379a-c 
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words or the sending of signs in waking or in dreams.”35 
Later in the Republic, Plato provides an additional reason for rejecting 
anthropomorphic representations of the Divine: such images are not worthy of our 
ultimate intellectual devotion and love. On this account, anthropomorphic conceptions of 
Divinity divert humans from engaging with the transcendent reality that is the proper 
object of ultimate devotion. Plato famously identities this transcendent ultimate reality 
with the Form of the Good, which is “beyond being and essence.”36  
 The realization and contemplation of ultimate reality (the Good) plays a central 
role in Plato’s famous allegory of the cave. Referring to the soul’s ascent out of the cave 
of illusory shadows flickering on the wall, Socrates states,  
the ascent and contemplation of the things above is the soul’s ascension to the 
intelligible region…in the region of the known the last thing to be seen and hardly 
seen is the idea of good, and that when seen it must need point us to the conclusion 
that this is indeed the cause for all things, of all that is right and beautiful, giving birth 
to the visible world to light, and the author of light and itself in the intelligible world 
being the authentic source of truth and reason, and that anyone who is to act wisely in 
private or in public must have caught sight of this.37 
 Thus, in the end, Plato’s critique of anthropomorphic religious ideas goes beyond 
the potentially deleterious moral and political consequences of such beliefs. He also 
suggests that anthropomorphic conceptions of Divinity are metaphysically false, 
imparting a distorted view of ultimate reality, like so many other shadows dancing on the 
                                                                            
35 Plato, Ibid., 382 e. 
36 Ibid., 509 b. 
37 Ibid., 517 b. 
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walls of the cave. And like the illusory shadows in the cave, anthropomorphic views of 
the Divine lead us astray in our spiritual engagement with the world. 
 
1.2 The problem of anthropomorphism in Early Jewish and Christian thought 
The critique of anthropomorphic religious ideas in Ancient Greek philosophy had 
a significant impact on Jewish and Christian theologians in the early centuries of the 
Common Era. In fact, the writings of Xenophanes were preserved over the ensuing 
centuries in large part because the early church father Clement of Alexandria (150-215 
CE) had cited with approval some of his poetic fragments in his work The Stromateis.38 
Given the widespread influence of Hellenistic thought during this time period, many 
educated Jewish and Christian writers formulated their religious beliefs in the categories 
of Ancient Greek philosophy. 
However, the Greek emphasis on abstract, metaphysical principles (e.g., 
Anaximander’s Infinite, Plato’s Form of the Good, and Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover) 
posed serious conceptual challenges for theologians attempting to formulate conceptually 
compelling theological interpretations of the Hebrew and Christian scriptures. In this 
respect, the plausibility structures of Ancient Greek philosophy placed considerable 
cognitive pressure on the mythological and anthropomorphic religious representations of 
God found in the biblical texts. At the same time, Greek philosophy also furnished 
resources for negotiating the problem of mythological and anthropomorphic religious 
ideas. Perhaps the most influential conceptual tool that theologians appropriated from 
                                                                            
38 Mark Sheridan, Language for God in Patristic Tradition: Wrestling with Biblical Anthropomorphism 
(Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP Academic, 2015), 18. 
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Greek philosophy was the aforementioned concept of theoprepēs, or that which is 
befitting of God. This concept became an indispensable hermeneutical principle for 
Jewish and Christian theologians, many of whom felt compelled to interpret the highly 
anthropomorphic images of God found in their scriptures in a way that was consistent 
with the plausibility structures of Hellenistic philosophy.39 In what follows, we shall 
consider the influence of this concept in the thought of 1st century CE Jewish exegete and 
philosopher Philo of Alexandria and 3rd Century CE theologian Origen of Alexandria. 
Philo of Alexandria was a Jewish Hellenistic philosopher who lived in the 1st 
century CE and was a contemporary of Jesus and the apostle Paul. Philo dedicated much 
of his writings to interpreting the Hebrew Scriptures in a way that made sense in the 
conceptual framework of Greek philosophy. In fact, his philosophically inspired 
interpretations of problematic texts in the Hebrew bible proved so valuable that 
subsequent Christian theologians made use of his writings down through the centuries.40 
The concept of theoprepēs—that which is befitting of God—does enormous work 
in Philo’s exegetical treatises.41 Most importantly, it provided him with a criterion for 
discriminating which biblical passages should be interpreted allegorically in order to 
maintain a philosophically coherent and properly reverent view of the transcendence of 
the Divine nature. God, according to Philo, is by necessity “superior to all the human 
conceptions of him.” Moreover, he insists that human conceptions of God are severely 
                                                                            
39 For a helpful treatment of this topic, see Werner Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers: 
The Gifford Lectures 1936, trans. Edward Schouten Robinson (London; New York: Oxford University 
Press., 2003)., and Mark Sheridan, Language for God in Patristic Tradition: Wrestling with Biblical 
Anthropomorphism (Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP Academic, 2015). 
40 Sheridan, Ibid., 65. 
41 Sheridan, Ibid., 66. 
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impaired by our embodied finitude:  
Since we have the greatest share in what is mortal, and since we are not able to 
conceive of any thing apart from ourselves and have no power to go beyond or to 
escape our own calamities, but since we have got into mortality as snails have into 
their shells…[we] have only the same opinions about the blessed and immortal God 
which we have about ourselves, avoiding all absurdity of assertion, such for instance 
as that God has the same form as man, but in reality being guilty of the impiety of 
attributing to him that he has the same passions as man; we do on this account fashion 
of him in our minds hands and feet, a coming in and a going out, hatred, aversion, 
alienation, and anger; parts and passions very inconsistent with the character of the 
Cause of all things.42 
 On Philo’s view, such anthropomorphic images are deployed in the scriptures not 
because they accurately describe the Divine nature, but rather because they are helpful in 
assisting simple human minds in the attempt to grasp that which transcends all finite 
characteristics. In other words, anthropomorphic images of God are, “a mere crutch for 
our weakness.”43 Elsewhere he suggests that the anthropomorphic representations of God 
in the bible are there “for the sake of admonishing those persons who could not be 
corrected otherwise.”44Here we may note the constraint placed on Philo’s critique of 
anthropomorphism by the authority of sacred scripture. Xenophanes and Plato could 
ridicule and even reject the anthropomorphic gods of Homer’s epic poems precisely 
because these texts were not taken to be Divine revelation in the cultural context of 
                                                                            
42 Philo, The Works of Philo: Complete and Unabridged, trans. Charles Duke Yonge (Peabody, Mass: 
Hendrickson Pub, 1993)., 106—brackets mine. 
43 Cited in Sheridan, Ibid., 67 
44 Philo, Ibid., 162. 
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Ancient Greece. And while Philo seems to have as little use for religious 
anthropomorphism as Xenophanes, he cannot simply expurgate the anthropomorphic 
representations of God from the Hebrew Scriptures.45 Rather, his task was to provide a 
theological interpretation of anthropomorphic images of God in such a way so as to 
render them rationally consistent with the background assumptions of Greek philosophy 
concerning the transcendence of the Divine, while still providing a rationale for why such 
images persist in the scriptures and in popular piety. 
Accordingly, much of Philo’s exegetical work comprises a balancing act between 
affirming the Greek intuition that God must be an eternal principle (rather than a divine 
person), while also affirming the practical necessity of the anthropomorphic depictions 
of Yahweh as a personal being in the Hebrew bible (since most people struggle to 
conceive of God in terms of an abstract principle). Philo’s philosophical and theological 
argument concerning anthropomorphism is also buttressed by supporting passages from 
the Hebrew Bible. 
There are two principal positions laid down with respect to the great cause of all 
things: one, that God is not as a man; the other, that God is as a man [Number 23:19]. 
But the first of these assertions is confirmed by the most certain truth, while the latter 
is introduced for the instruction of the many. In reference to which, it is said 
concerning them, “as a man would instruct his son [Deuteronomy 1:31].” And this is 
said for the sake of instruction and admonition, and not because he is really such by 
nature.46 
While his critique of anthropomorphism is certainly constrained in ways that 
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Xenophanes’ was not, it is interesting to note that Philo advocates for a more consistently 
anti-anthropomorphic view of God than did Xenophanes.47 For example, in his treatise 
titled “On The Unchangeableness of God,” Philo argues for a conception of the Divine 
nature that is bereft of person-like attributes. He argues that, “God, inasmuch as he is 
uncreated, and the Being who has brought all other things to creation, stood in need of 
none of those things which are usually added to creatures.”48 Philo goes on to laud those 
individuals who are capable of entertaining a view of God that does not involve 
anthropomorphic analogies and characteristics. Such individuals, says Philo, refuse to 
 …compare the living God to any species of created being; but, dissociating it with 
any idea of distinctive qualities (for this is what most especially contributes to [their] 
happiness…to comprehend his naked existence without any connection with figure or 
character) they, I say, are content with the bare conception of his existence, and do not 
attempt to invest him with any form…God, inasmuch as he is uncreated, and the 
Being who has brought all other things to creation, stood in need of none of those 
things which are usually added to creatures.49 
 In short, Philo maintains that anthropomorphic representations of God result from 
the inability of most people to conceive of ultimate reality as it truly is. Accordingly, the 
pervasive anthropomorphism in the bible is necessary in order to assist those who could 
not otherwise engage with the Divine. This theological interpretation of 
anthropomorphism had a major impact on early Christian theology. This is especially 
evident in the thought of Origin, to whom we now turn. 
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 Origen of Alexandria was an Egyptian-born systematic theologian and an exegete 
who lived in the 3rd century CE.50 Like Philo, Origen was deeply influenced by Greek 
philosophy. However, Origen’s thought was significantly more apologetic than that of 
Philo. Whereas Philo sought to render the religious wisdom of the Hebrew Bible 
consistent with the fundamental intuitions of Greek philosophy, Origen was primarily 
interested in demonstrating that his religious tradition (Christianity) possessed truth that 
was qualitatively superior to that of the Greeks, viz., the revelation of the Logos in time 
and history in the person of Jesus Christ. Nevertheless, Origen’s thought was 
significantly shaped by the categories and plausibility structures of Greek philosophy. 
And like Philo, he was acutely aware of the incongruity between the philosophical 
assumptions of his Hellenistic cultural context and the anthropomorphic imagery and 
language about God in the sacred scriptures.  
 Although his attempt to resolve the problem of anthropomorphic representations 
of God in the biblical tradition was in many respects derivative of Philo, Origen made an 
original contribution to this area by incorporating Philo’s strategy into a systematic 
theological framework. As with Philo, the concept of theoprepēs is central to Origen’s 
theological interpretation of religious anthropomorphism. Origen’s interpretation also 
places great emphasis on two key passages from the Hebrew Bible; the first from the 
Book of Numbers, the second from the book of Deuteronomy. These passages function as 
an exegetical touchstone with respect to the problem of biblical anthropomorphism.   
Origen translates these two passages as follows: “God is not as man to be 
                                                                            
50 As his name implies, Origen was born in the Egyptian city of Alexandria. 
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deceived nor as the son of man to be threatened” (Numbers 23:19).51 And, “As a man he 
takes on the manners of his son.” (Deuteronomy 1:31).52 Origen interprets the first 
passage as referring to the Divine nature as it is in itself, meaning that God bears no 
analogy to mortal humans. The second passage is construed as a rationale for why God is 
nevertheless depicted with human-like characteristics—viz., in order that frail human 
minds might be able to achieve some conception of God.  
 Origen elaborates on Philo’s interpretation by incorporating these two passages 
into a larger theological system that distinguishes between God’s nature a se (theologia), 
and God’s providential work in the world (oikonomia).53 Thus the passage from Numbers 
(“God is not as man…”) is taken to refer to the nature of God (theologia), and the 
passage from Deuteronomy (“As a man takes on the manners of his son”) refers to God’s 
providential act (oikonomia) of revealing God’s self to humans in a way that they would 
be capable of grasping. Origen contends that, “whenever the Scriptures speak 
theologically [theologōsi] about God in relation to himself and do not involve his plan for 
human matters [oikonomia], they say that he is not as a man.”54 In contrast, whenever the 
scriptures speak about God’s providential action in or purposes for human history 
(oikonomia), Origen claims that the language employed will be invariably 
anthropomorphic. He goes so far as to compare such passages to a parent using baby talk 
to communicate with their child: 
Whenever the divine plan involves human matters, it carries the human intellect and 
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manners and way of speaking…just as we, if we are talking with a two-year-old child, 
speak inarticulately because of the child—for it is impossible, if we observe what is 
fitting for the age of a full-grown man, and when talking to children, to understand the 
children without condescending to their mode of speech—something of this sort also 
seems to me the case with God whenever he manages the race of men…55 
 This leads to Origen’s notion of the Divine “condescension,” that is, God’s 
condescending to mankind in order to make Godself intelligible to finite and frail human 
comprehension.56 The notion of the Divine condescension is a crucial hermeneutical tool 
for Origen: it allows him to make a reasoned case for why God reveals Godself in 
anthropomorphic ways throughout the Hebrew and Christian scriptures. 
 One of the most troubling forms of anthropomorphism for Origen was the attribution 
of human emotions (such as anger or jealousy) to God throughout the Hebrew Bible. Like 
Philo, Origen flatly rejects the notion that God, being eternal and impassible, could be 
subject to emotional states such as anger or jealousy. Accordingly, his task in this domain of 
biblical interpretation is to provide a theological explanation for why anthropomorphic 
depictions of the Divine wrath—and other emotional states—recur so frequently in the 
Hebrew Bible. Simply stated, Origen holds that while such anthropomorphic representations 
are false with respect to the Divine nature (i.e., God is not actually subject to emotions), they 
nevertheless have an important practical function: namely, that of “correcting sinners.”57 
Origen explicates this view by citing and comparing a series of biblical texts concerning 
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Edward Schouten Robinson (London; New York: Oxford University Press., 2003)., 18.6.4; cited in 
Sheridan, Ibid., 30. 
56 See Sheridan, Ibid., 30-32. 
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God’s “anger.” According to Biblical scholar and historian Mark Sheridan, Origen maintains 
that, “by comparing these texts…one arrives at the conclusion that it [God’s ostensible anger] 
is a question of correction on the part of God. He pretends to be angry, as one does with 
children in order to make an impression.”58 
 Origen puts the matter as follows: “God is also said to be angry and wrathful in 
order that you can convert and become better.”59 He goes on to compare this Divine 
strategy with that of human parents: “Since we also use a fearful expression with children, 
not from an actual state of mind but because of a purpose to cause fear.”60 He concludes 
that, “if you hear of the anger of God and his wrath do not suppose that anger and wrath 
are passions of God.”61  
Origen also emphasizes the theological importance of resisting anthropomorphic 
representations of God.  
Therefore we do not attribute human passions [anthrōpopathos] to God, nor do we 
hold impious opinions about Him, nor are we in error when we produce explanations 
concerning Him from the scriptures themselves by comparing them with one another. 
The task of those of us who given an intelligent account of Christianity is simply to 
deliver our hearts from stupidity as well as we can and to make them sensible.62 
 For all its ingeniousness, Origen’s theological attempt to resolve the problem of 
anthropomorphic representations of God appears to have some conceptual problems. 
These conceptual issues stem from the fact that Origen—much more so than Philo—
                                                                            
58 Sheridan, Ibid., 35—brackets and italics mine. 
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places enormous weight on the concept of God’s providential purposes and action in 
human history (oikonomia). And while his distinction between theologia and oikonomia 
is supposed to help to resolve the problem of anthropomorphism by directing 
anthropomorphic representations away from the Divine nature itself and attributing such 
representations to the way in which God acts in the world, it really only succeeds in 
pushing the problem of anthropomorphism up to another level. For the emphasis on what 
God does in the world (oikonomia)—and the anthropomorphic representations that result 
from such ostensible divine action—sits awkwardly with the contrasting concept of the 
non-anthropomorphic aseity of the Divine nature (theologia). The crux of the issue lies in 
the conceptual coherence of Origen’s claim that the eternal, infinite Cause of all being 
also acts providentially in the world in ways that appear anthropomorphic (e.g., Origen’s 
notion of Divine baby-talk). Regardless of the degree to which this claim is conceptually 
coherent, the problem remains that Origen has simply moved the problem of religious 
anthropomorphism to a higher conceptual plane, involving the metaphysical relationship 
between the Divine nature and Divine action in the world. 
 Furthermore, the very notion of God “pretending” to be angry with the Israelites 
in order to instruct them is itself an instance of religious anthropomorphism par 
excellence. After all, is it really befitting of the Cause of all being to constantly sidle up 
alongside human beings and employ something like “baby-talk,” “pretending” to be 
angry, or jealous, in order to induce humans to attempt to change God’s mind? 
 These conceptual difficulties do not arise as sharply in the treaties of Philo 
discussed above. This is in large part due to the fact that Philo was more of a 
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philosophically minded theological exegete of the Hebrew bible than a systematic 
theologian. Philo was thus content to argue that the anthropomorphic representations of 
God in the Hebrew bible are 1) incorrect when taken literally, and 2) the result of our 
human frailty, and simply leave the matter at that. He apparently did not feel the need to 
specify whether anthropomorphism was introduced by the authors of the Hebrew bible in 
order to aid the Israelites in conceiving of God, or whether it was a case of God 
“condescending” to reveal Godself in ways that would be understandable to humans. In 
leaving this issue open-ended, Philo’s theological critique of anthropomorphism escapes 
the aforementioned problems in Origen’s account. 
As we shall see in the following chapter, the conceptual tensions at the heart of 
Origen’s selective account of religious anthropomorphism continued to surface in 
Western philosophy and theology for well over a millennium. This was especially true of 
the traditions of Neoplatonism, which began in the 4th century CE and carried on through 
the Middle Ages and into the 15th century. As this tradition comprises the main topic of 
the next chapter, we shall now skip ahead many centuries to explore the critique of 
anthropomorphism as it surfaced during the Enlightenment and Modern periods. 
 
1.3 The critique of anthropomorphism in Enlightenment thought: Hume and Fichte 
 One of the hallmarks of the Enlightenment era in was the decoupling of 
philosophical and scientific inquiry from the social context of religious institutions and 
the authority of religious traditions. The result of this shift was an emphasis on individual 
reasoning and argumentation, along with a distrust of arguments or beliefs that relied on 
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external authorities, such as Church orthodoxy. Immanuel Kant’s famous definition of 
the philosophical ethics of the Enlightenment captures this theme nicely:  
Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man’s 
inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-
incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of 
resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapper aude! ‘Have 
courage to use your own reason!’—that is the motto of enlightenment.63 
 The new morality of knowledge and inquiry brought about by the Enlightenment 
movement had significant consequences for the philosophical analysis of religious 
beliefs. One classic example is Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, which called into 
question the intellectual viability of theology as a proper discipline of human 
knowledge.64 Moreover, the general epistemological trends of the Enlightenment—e.g., 
suspicion of the external authority of tradition and religious dogma, and the elevation of 
autonomous, critical reason—resulted in an important shift in the philosophical 
evaluation of the problem of religious anthropomorphism. As we observed in the 
forgoing sections, the classic critiques of anthropomorphism in Ancient Greek 
philosophy and early Antiquity were typically both philosophical and theological in 
nature. We make this point again in order to underscore the fact that—with a few possible 
exceptions (e.g., Lucretius)—it is not until the Enlightenment and Modern era that we 
begin to see the critique of anthropomorphism decoupled from an alternate, preferred 
theological conception of ultimate reality.65 During this period, the critique of 
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anthropomorphism often extended into a critique of religious belief and theology tout 
court. This line of thought, what might be termed “the atheistic critique of 
anthropomorphism,” is often identified with the work of nineteenth and twentieth century 
thinkers such as Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud—the so-called “Masters of 
Suspicion.”  
These “atheistic” critiques of religious anthropomorphism are among the most 
well known in the present day, and we will examine some of these arguments in the final 
section of this chapter. In the present section we will consider two Enlightenment 
philosophers of great importance: David Hume and Johann Gottlieb Fichte—both of 
whom articulated exquisitely subtle and compact arguments against anthropomorphic 
conceptions of God, though their critiques are perhaps less well known than the famous 
“Masters of Suspicion.” And while neither Hume nor Fichte ever avowed full-blown 
atheism (and thus should not be included in the aforementioned “atheistic” group), it is 
not difficult to see why many of their contemporaries accused them of as much, and why 
many of their subsequent readers took their critiques of religious anthropomorphism in a 
more explicitly atheistic direction.  
The eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher David Hume is remembered today 
for his radical empiricist epistemology (which famously woke Kant from his “dogmatic 
slumbers”), and his critique of the concept of causality and the Cartesian view of the self. 
With respect to religion, Hume is perhaps best remembered for his criticism of the 
rationality of belief in miracles in his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 
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(1748). For the purpose of this chapter, we will focus more narrowly on his critique of 
religious anthropomorphism.  
In his 1757 The Natural History of Religion, Hume suggestively identifies the 
origins of religious belief in the frailty and finitude of humankind. In face of the 
vicissitudes of nature, the realities of hunger and lack, and unforeseen violence and 
suffering—the ultimate causes of which remain obscure to us—human beings tend to 
comfort themselves by conceptualizing the powerful forces at work in the world as 
intentional and agential forces. Hume refers to this predisposition as the, 
…universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves, and to 
transfer to every object, those qualities with which they are familiarly acquainted, and 
of which they are intimately conscious. We find human faces in the moon, armies in 
the clouds; and by a natural propensity, if not corrected by experience and reflection, 
ascribe malice or good-will to every thing, that hurts or pleases us.66 
In other words, human beings have a deeply ingrained predisposition to conceive of 
ambiguous phenomena or circumstances in terms of something more recognizable and 
understandable—something human-like. For Hume, this reflexive anthropomorphic 
predisposition of human nature is the key to understanding the origin of religious belief. 
He writes: 
the active imagination of men, uneasy in this abstract conception of objects . . . begins 
to render them more particular and, and to clothe them in shapes more suitable to its 
natural comprehension. It represents them to be sensible intelligent beings, like 
mankind; activated by love and hatred, and flexible by gifts and entreaties, by prayers 
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and sacrifices. Hence the origin of religion: And hence the origin of idolatry or 
polytheism.67 
Towards the end of The Natural History of Religion, Hume puts a darker spin on 
Xenophanes’ suggestion that the gods are projections that reflect the characteristics of 
humankind. Hume contends that if one were to consider the various religious ideas that 
have held sway in most of human history “you would scarcely be persuaded that they are 
anything but sick men’s dreams.”68  
It is not surprising that Hume’s contemporary audience took his “natural” account 
of the origins of religion as an atheistic assault on Christianity, despite the fact that he 
never explicitly rejected belief in “the Deity.” As a result of the backlash against his 
Natural History of Religion, Hume continued to write on the philosophy of religion, but 
chose not to publish his masterpiece on this topic until after his death. 
In his posthumously published Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), 
Hume opts for a more subtle, literary approach to the philosophical critique of religious 
anthropomorphism. Indeed, in respect of its literary artistry and philosophical acuity, the 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is one of the few treatises in Western philosophy 
of religion that could be safely placed alongside the works of Plato. Hume’s treatise is 
framed as a dialogue between three interlocutors: Cleanthes, Demea, and Philo—a 
strident personal theist, a mystical theist, and a skeptical agnostic, respectively. In the 
second part of the dialogues, Demea, the mystic, defines God in terms of classic Christian 
Neoplatonism: “He that is, or in other words, Being without restriction, All Being, the 
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Being infinite and universal.”69 To this view Philo, the skeptic, concurs, though perhaps 
with a somewhat wry smile: “The former truth, as you well observe, is unquestionable 
and self-evident. Nothing can exist without a cause; and the original cause of this 
universe (whatever it be) we call God; and piously ascribe to him every species of 
perfection.”70 Though he could have very well left things at that, Philo goes on to bait his 
other interlocutor Cleanthes—a fervent personal theist—with the following anti-
anthropomorphic caveat: “Let us beware, lest we think that our ideas any wise correspond 
to his perfections, or that his attributes have any resemblance to these qualities among 
men.”71  
Cleanthes takes the bait. He responds to Philo’s anti-anthropomorphic 
agnosticism with a version of the argument from design: Given the machine-like 
complexity of the universe, and given that the cause must by analogy resemble its effect, 
Cleanthes argues, we can infer that “the Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind 
of man.”72 Although the argument from design has fallen on hard times in recent decades, 
it is important to note that a nuanced version of Cleanthes position still enjoys support 
among some contemporary philosophers and theologians. These figures propose an 
analogical inference from the complexity of natural phenomena (such as the staggering 
complexity and mystery of human consciousness) to the hypothesis that the ultimate 
cause of the universe must be possessed of equal complexity (i.e., consciousness), albeit 
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to an infinitely greater degree.73  
Cleanthes shifts his emphasis over the course of the dialogue, but he persists in 
his contention that there must be an analogous relationship between creature (effect) and 
creator (cause). Philo in turn argues against the rational stability of drawing analogical 
inferences from created effect to ultimate cause: “But can a conclusion, with any 
propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all 
comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn anything 
concerning the generation of a man?”74 
Philo continues to press against Cleanthes’ strategy of drawing analogies from 
finite effects to an infinite Cause: for, if the Cause is necessarily beyond the reach of 
human experience, then how could we ever know if the analogy drawn from the effect 
actually holds true? Insofar as we lack access to the nature of the Cause, we are left 
without any robust source of feedback that could potentially confirm or disconfirm the 
accuracy of a proposed analogy. Hence, Philo suggests that Cleanthes’ proposed form of 
analogical inference is a specious intellectual leap from the nature of a known effect to 
the ostensible nature of an unknowable Cause. Moreover, Philo contends that the 
analogical reasoning of Cleanthes is fundamentally anthropomorphic in nature: 
But allowing that we were to take the operations of one part of nature upon another 
for the foundation of our judgment concerning the origin of the whole…yet why 
select so minute, so weak, so bounded a principle as the reason and design of animals 
is found to be upon this planet? What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the 
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rain which we call thought, that we must make it the model of the whole universe? 
Our partiality in our own favor does indeed present it on all occasions: But sound 
philosophy ought carefully to guard against so natural an illusion.75 
Here Hume is hearkening back (through the character of Philo) to a point he made 
in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: “…besides this I say, it must 
evidently appear contrary to all rule of analogy to reason from projects and intentions of 
men to those of a Being so different and so much Superior.”76 To put the point more 
sharply, we could say that analogical inference from the finite features of a known 
analogue to an unknowable analogate is, in effect, anthropomorphic projection. 
Eventually the mystical theist Demea steps into the debate and attempts to steer 
Cleanthes away from the ledge of excessive anthropomorphism. He advances a subtle 
critique of religious anthropomorphism that is at once philosophical and theological. It is 
worth quoting at length: 
The ancient Platonists, you know, were the most religious and devout of all the pagan 
philosophers: Yet many of them, particularly Plotinus, expressly declare, that intellect 
or understanding is not to be ascribed to the Deity, and that our most perfect worship 
of him consists, not in acts of veneration, reverence, gratitude or love; but in a certain 
mysterious self-annihilation…these ideas are, perhaps, too far stretched; but still it 
must be acknowledged, that, by representing the Deity as so intelligible, and 
comprehensible, and so similar to a human mind, we are guilty of the grossest and 
most narrow partiality, and make our selves the model of the whole universe.77 
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 Cleanthes, however, refuses to step back from the ledge of religious 
anthropomorphism. Instead, he attempts to turn the tables on Demea, arguing that his 
anti-anthropomorphic mysticism goes so far in denying any analogy between creator and 
creature that it ultimately becomes indistinguishable from the skepticism of Philo, or, 
worse still—atheism.  Cleanthes states:  
It seems strange to me…that you, Demea, who are so sincere in the cause of religion, 
should still maintain the mysterious, incomprehensible nature of the Deity, and should 
insist so strenuously, that he has no manner of likeness or resemblance to human 
creatures…how do you mystics, who maintain the absolute incomprehensibility of the 
Deity, differ from skeptics or atheists, who assert, that the first cause of All is 
unknown and unintelligible?”78 
 Demea, in turn, presses all the harder on Cleanthes’ anthropomorphic conception 
of a personal God who has powers of intellection analogous to our own, noting that 
intellection entails duality (subject/object distinction) and succession (temporality), 
neither of which are compatible with the traditional notions of the Divine simplicity and 
eternality.79 
Part of the genius of Hume’s Dialogues is the tension he creates for the dedicated 
theist. If one follows Cleanthes’ dogged personal theism, the result is a highly 
anthropomorphic conception of God that is at odds with many aspects of traditional 
Christian theism (e.g., the Divine simplicity and eternality). Moreover, Cleanthes’ 
anthropomorphic conception of God is shown to be philosophically inadequate as a 
candidate for the ultimate Cause of reality, as it naturally invites the charge of infinite 
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regress. Philo exploits this aspect of Cleanthes’ conception of God by juxtaposing it with 
a supposed school of Hinduism that maintains that the world came into being through the 
spinning of an infinite spider.80 While personal theists may balk at such a view, Philo 
points out that it is not different in principle from supposing the Cause of the universe to 
be an infinite complex, intentional agent. For in both cases, the solution to the problem of 
the one and the many is solved by way of a pseudo-solution: viz., by adding one supreme 
complex entity to the set of complex entities that require ontological grounding. Here the 
problem of infinite regress immediately presents itself: Who (or what) made spider? Who 
(or what) made the supreme intentional agent? To cite a well-known illustration, it could 
be the case that the universe rides on the back of a great turtle, and that turtle rides on the 
back of yet another turtle, and ultimately it’s just “turtles all the way down.” While this 
could be the case, the idea has little to recommend it as a metaphysical answer to the 
problem of the one and the many (or the ultimate cause of reality). As Demea has learned 
from Plotinus, the Source of all things cannot be a thing; the Ground of Being must 
infinitely and qualitatively transcend the complex, finite entities that it Grounds. Hume’s 
suggestion here is that the anthropomorphic God of Cleanthes is just as implausible a 
candidate for the answer to the problem of the one and the many as is the idea of an 
infinite spider weaving the cosmos into being.  
However, the blade of Hume’s argument cuts both ways for the theist: if one 
rejects the anthropomorphism of Cleanthes and instead follows the mystical Ground-of-
Being theism of Demea, one is left with a form of theism that, as Cleanthes shrewdly 
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points out, seems to evacuate the concept of God of any substantive content. Demea’s 
resistance to anthropomorphic views of God seems advisable on philosophical grounds, 
but in the end it leads to an impersonal conception of God that is bereft of any 
characteristics that could be religiously relevant to human concerns. Indeed, of what 
religious use is a God who is utterly incompressible and ineffable?  The dedicated theist 
is thus left asking, with Cleanthes: how does this conception of God differ from the 
skeptics and atheists, who also claim that the Cause of all things is unknowable? 
The general thrust of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion poses a 
considerable challenge to traditional understandings of God. Hume’s text underscores the 
philosophical inadequacies of anthropomorphic conceptions of God, and, at the same 
time, points out the practical and religious problems that result from purging the 
traditional anthropomorphic elements from conceptual representations of God. As we 
shall see in chapter two, this acute tension lies at the heart of the Neoplatonic branches of 
the onto-theological tradition.  
We now turn to the thought of German idealist philosopher J.G. Fichte, who 
issued one of the most provocative critiques of anthropomorphic ideas of God during the 
late Enlightenment era. Fichte began his intellectual career at the twilight of the 18th 
Century, amidst the wake of the philosophical revolution provoked by Immanuel Kant’s 
1781 Critique of Pure Reason. Unable to secure a teaching post in a university, Fichte 
initially made his living as a private tutor. Then in 1792, Fichte’s treatise Attempt at a 
Critique of All Revelation (which sought to delimit the concept of revelation in light of 
Kant’s Critical system) earned the attention of Kant himself, and eventually lead to a 
  41 
teaching position at the University of Jena.81 While his career as a philosophy professor 
at Jena was initially quite promising, his success was not to last. 
The trouble came with the publication of his 1798 essay “On the Ground of Our 
Belief in a Divine World-Governance,” wherein Fichte argued against the coherence of 
the anthropomorphic conception of God as an intentional, agent-like being. In place of 
this traditional view, Fichte advocated for a conception of God as the reality of the moral 
order in the universe.82 It would be something of an understatement to say that Fichte’s 
argument was widely construed to be heterodox. In fact, the publication of his essay was 
received with such hostility that it quickly escalated into a full-blown public controversy 
in Jena—what famously became known as the “Atheism dispute.” And despite the fact 
that Fichte never avowed atheism—or even agnosticism—in his 1798 essay, the 
controversy surrounding the so-called Atheism dispute was to have a devastating impact 
on his career in the Academy. In 1799, just one year after the publication of his “On the 
Ground of Our Belief in a Divine World-Governance,” Fichte was forced to resign his 
teaching post at Jena.  
Here we may pause to consider a question: If Fichte’s 1798 essay advocated for 
the belief in God as source of “the Divine World-Governance,” then whence the charge 
of atheism? Would such an idea be that controversial at this point in the history of the 
Enlightenment? Indeed, hadn’t Kant argued as much in his Critique of Practical Reason 
in 1788?  
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Kant did in fact made a similar case in his second Critique, wherein he argued 
that the concept of God should be understood as a postulate of practical reason, i.e., 
something that cannot be theoretically known or proven, but must nevertheless be 
assumed as a condition for the possibility of practical reasoning about morality.83 
Additionally, Kant employed a good deal of tact in the way he framed his theory, as it 
essentially displaced the idea of God as an object of theoretical knowledge. More 
importantly, Kant never went as far as to identify God with the moral order itself—a 
philosophical move that Fichte made with precious little subtlety. Consider Fichte’s 
account of God and the moral order in his 1798 essay: 
This is the true faith. This moral order is what we are assuming to be divine. It is 
constituted by right action. This is the only possible confession of faith: joyfully and 
calmly performing what duty commands at any time without doubting and without 
quibbling about consequences. In this way the divine becomes living and real to 
us…true atheism, genuine unbelief, and godlessness consist of quibbling about the 
consequences of one’s actions, in not being willing to obey the voice of one’s 
conscience until one believes oneself to have foreseen a good outcome.84 
 Fichte goes on to explicate the logical consequences of his position: “[The] living 
and active moral order is itself God; we require no other God and can grasp no other.”85 
Consider this statement in contrast with Kant’s gentle prelude to his demolition of the 
whole project of natural theology and scholastic metaphysics in his Critique of Pure 
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Reason: “Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.”86 
Iconoclast that he was, Fichte pressed his case further still. In the subsequent 
section of his essay, he attacks the idea of a personal God, which traditionally functioned 
as the ground of the moral order. With a tone that vacillates been cool equanimity and 
sheer brazenness, Fichte points out that the traditional idea of an infinite being that 
possesses the attributes of personhood and intellection is philosophically incoherent. 
Fichte’s argument against this anthropomorphic conception of God is worth quoting in 
full:  
This being is supposed to be distinct from you and the world. It is supposed to be 
active in the world by means of concepts. Consequently, it is supposed to be able to 
have conception, to possess personality and consciousness. What, then, do you denote 
as personality and consciousness? Perhaps what you have found within yourselves, 
have gotten to know about yourselves, and have labeled with these names? However, 
the least attention to your construction of these concepts can teach you that you 
simply do not and cannot think of personality and consciousness without limitation 
and finitude. Consequently, by attributing these predicates to this being you make it 
into something finite, into a being similar to yourselves; and you have not thought 
God, as you wished, but rather you have only multiplied yourselves in your thinking.87  
 In Hume’s Dialogues we saw how the idea of God as a complex, intentional agent 
was shown to be vulnerable to the problem of infinite regress. Here, Fichte puts his finger 
on a different aspect of the problem with conceiving of God as an infinite, personal, 
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intentional agent, viz., that such an idea suffers from conceptual coherence problems. 
Fichte notes that the attributes of personhood and consciousness entail finite contrasts and 
distinctions: to be a person or an “I” entails something other—the “not-I”—over and 
against which one differentiates oneself. Similarly, to possess intentionality or 
intellection involves the distinction between knowing subject and known object.88  
Next, Fichte asks his readers to consider the concept of infinity, which, by 
definition, is characterized by the total lack of limitations, distinctions, and contrasts—all 
of which derive from the realm of finite entities. Fichte proceeds to point out that many 
of the traditional divine attributes violate the logic of the concept of infinity. Insofar as 
personhood and consciousness necessarily entail finite contrasts and distinctions, it 
follows that predicating the attributes of personhood and consciousness of the Infinite is 
conceptually incoherent. Although the attributes of personhood and intentionality may be 
consistently predicated of a God that is identified as a being—and thus by definition, not 
infinite—these anthropomorphic attributes do not logically cohere with any conceptually 
rigorous definition of infinity. Fichte concludes that to attribute personhood and 
intentionality to God is ipso facto to render God finite. 
Although the primary concern of Fichte’s 1798 essay is, as indicated in the title, 
the conceptual ground for our belief in the moral order (or, “a Divine World-
Governance”), he persists in underscoring the logical incoherence of traditional 
anthropomorphic conceptions of God. Fichte does so not because he is an atheist, but 
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because he is convinced that such a specious conception of Divinity cannot possibly 
serve as the ground for the reality of the moral order in the universe. He writes, 
You can just as scarcely explain this moral world-order by appealing to this being as 
you can explain it by appealing to yourselves. It remains, as before, unexplained and 
absolute; and in using such words you have in fact not been thinking at all but rather 
have merely vibrated the air with an empty sound. You could have easily foreseen that 
you would fare this way. You are finite. How could that which is finite encompass 
and comprehend the infinite?89 
Fichte goes on to assert that insofar as our belief in the reality of the moral order, 
or, “a Divine World-Governance” is based upon the concept of an anthropomorphic God, 
“it becomes precarious, for the concept is impossible and full of contradictions.”90 
 Like many of the figures we have considered, Fichte’s critique of 
anthropomorphism is driven by philosophical and theological concerns. Indeed, Fichte’s 
argument against anthropomorphic divine attributes harkens back to an ancient 
philosophical and theological insight, viz., that ultimate reality, whatever else it may be, 
must transcend the characteristics and features of the finite world. In the beginning of this 
chapter, we saw Plato make a similar case when he argued that the eternal forms 
themselves require a transcendent, unifying principle, a Form of the forms, viz., the form 
of the Good, that is beyond being and essence.91 In the following chapter, we will find 
that the 3rd Century CE philosopher Plotinus expressed the essence of Fichte’s argument 
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against anthropomorphism—albeit, in a different idiom--in his Enneads, wherein he 
argues that the infinite One for the finite many must be utterly simple and transcendent, 
bereft of any attributes such as intellection.92 Unfortunately, the ancient precedent for 
Fichte’s critique of anthropomorphism did little to help his plight with his contemporary 
readers.  
Given the way in which his argument challenged the classical Christian 
conception of a personal God, the subsequent accusation of atheism is not surprising. 
Fichte may not have denied the reality of God as such, but he could not have been more 
explicit—or brazen—in his argument against the idea of a personal God: “The concept of 
God as a separate substance is impossible and contradictory; it is permissible to say this 
openly and to quash the babble of the schools, so that the true religion of joyous right 
action might arise.”93  
The “Atheism dispute” (1798-1799) that followed the publication of “On the 
Ground of Our Belief in a Divine World-Governance” was tragic, effectively putting a 
premature end to his career as a university professor.  
1.4 The critique of anthropomorphism in Modernity: Feuerbach and Freud 
The nineteenth century German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach formulated one of 
the most celebrated critiques of religious anthropomorphism in Western modernity. 
Feuerbach began his academic career in the early 1820’s as a student of theology. He 
attended the University of Berlin to study under Friedrich Schleiermacher, but upon 
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arriving quickly became taken with the lectures of G.W.F. Hegel. Feuerbach eventually 
transferred his studies from theology to philosophy.94 Over the course of his time at 
University, Feuerbach’s enthusiasm for philosophy in general and Hegelian speculative 
philosophy in particular began to wane. Religion, however, was to remain a lifelong 
intellectual preoccupation. As Feuerbach wrote in 1848, “All of my writings have only 
one aim, one design, one object. This is precisely religion, theology and anything 
connected with them.”95 
Today, Feuerbach’s work is mostly remembered by theologians and philosophers 
of religion. If his name is remembered by mainstream philosophers, it is largely due to 
Karl Marx’s 1845 essay entitled “Theses on Feuerbach,” which concluded with the now 
famous remark: “the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the 
point, however, is to change it.”96 His later criticism of Feuerbach’s theoretical project 
notwithstanding, Marx credited Feuerbach as the first German thinker to effectively 
“break the spell” of the Hegelian system. In a letter in 1843 Marx lionized Feuerbach’s 
philosophy as the essential antidote to the regnant speculative idealism of the age. 
Playing on the literal meaning of Feuerbach’s name in German (“fire-brook”), Marx 
wrote: 
To you, speculative theologians and philosophers, I give this advice: free yourselves 
from the concepts and prejudices of previous speculative philosophy if you wish 
really to discover things as they are, that is if you wish to discover the truth. And there 
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is no other way to truth and freedom than through the ‘river of fire.’ Feuerbach is the 
purgatory of the present time.97 
It is important to note that Feuerbach’s critique of religion naturally extended into 
a critique of philosophy as well. In contrast with the Enlightenment dichotomy between 
faith and reason, Feuerbach conceives of religion and philosophy as existing together on 
a spectrum of human thought. Moreover, he contends that both religion and philosophy 
are ultimately reducible to anthropology.  
Feuerbach diagnoses both traditional philosophy and religion as instances of the 
self-alienation of human consciousness. In the case of religion, human consciousness 
externalizes itself by projecting its own features onto the cosmos in the form of a 
supernatural divine being. As a result, the idea of a supernatural divine being who exists 
over and against human beings takes on a life of its own, and subsequently influences the 
thoughts and behaviors of the very human subjects that are (unconsciously) responsible 
for the projection of this being.  
According to Feuerbach, the same dynamic of externalization/alienation occurs in 
the case of philosophy. The fundamental difference is that philosophers substitute the 
concept of an anthropomorphic divine being with a more abstract concept: viz., Being, or, 
in the case of Hegel, Absolute Geist (which can be translated as “mind” or “spirit”).98 
Thus, both religion and speculative philosophy posit something ultimate over and against 
human consciousness, and thereby alienate human consciousness from itself by obscuring 
the fact that what is posited over and against humankind—whether it be God or Absolute 
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Mind—is in fact an abstract representation and hypostatization of humankind itself. 
Philosopher Stephen Thornton summarizes this point nicely: 
…this is why Feuerbach holds that ‘God’ and ‘Being’ are abstract images of the 
human species-consciousness—for him the human species-nature is precisely what in 
religious and metaphysical contexts is taken as ‘God’ or ‘Being’. This is the key to an 
understanding of Feuerbach’s assertions that ‘the secret of philosophy is theology’ 
(i.e, philosophy is an esoteric or abstract form of theology) and that ‘the true sense of 
theology is anthropology’ (i.e. Theology is an esoteric or abstract form of 
anthropology).99 
Let us now turn to Feuerbach’s critique of religion as anthropomorphic projection. 
In his most famous work, The Essence of Christianity (1841), Feuerbach defines religion 
as the self-alienation of human consciousness. He argues that the idea of God is the result 
of the anthropomorphic projection of humanity and its subjective features onto the 
cosmos. Religion, therefore, is the phenomenon of humankind creating God in its own 
image. The problem with this activity is that by projecting itself onto the cosmos, 
humankind negates itself by locating the infinite “out there,” rather than within humanity 
itself:  
Religion is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the 
antithesis of himself. God is not what man is—man is not what God is. God is the 
infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man 
temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are 
extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely 
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negative, comprehending all negations.100 
Feuerbach argues that human religion in general, and Christianity in particular, 
must be overturned if humankind is to overcome this form of self-alienation.  
  Here we may note the way in which the critique of religion as self-alienating 
projection turns on the issue of anthropomorphism. Feuerbach maintains that for most 
humans, what is truly important about Divinity are the predicates that are ascribed to the 
divine subject (i.e., God). Moreover, the preeminent predicates traditionally ascribed to 
the divine are human-like predicates, e.g., personhood, knowledge, goodness, love, etc. 
Feuerbach writes, “when it is shown that what the subject is lies entirely in the attributes 
of the subject; that is, that the predicate is the true subject; it is also proved that if the 
divine predicates are attributes of the human nature, the subject of those predicates is also 
of the human nature.”101 The divine subject—God—turns out to be a hypostatization of 
the divinized predicates of the human subject. 
 But what of the traditional metaphysical attributes of God, such as the divine 
simplicity, infinity, eternality, and aseity? As we have seen in the foregoing sections of 
this chapter, these attributes have traditionally functioned to balance the more 
anthropomorphic attributes in most traditional formulations of the doctrine of God. 
Feuerbach does acknowledge that many of the traditional divine attributes are non-
anthropomorphic in nature; however, he deliberately downplays the religious significance 
of such attributes. Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that the non-anthropomorphic 
divine attributes are wholly superfluous to religion: 
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…the divine predicates are partly general, partly personal. The general predicates are 
the metaphysical, but these serve only as external points of support to religion; they 
are not the characteristic definitions of religion. It is the personal predicates alone 
which constitute the essence of religion—in which the Divine Being is the object of 
religion. Such are, for example, that God is a Person, that he is the moral Lawgiver, 
the Father of mankind, the Holy One, the Just, the Good, the Merciful.102 
On Feuerbach’s account, the non-anthropomorphic divine attributes can simply be 
dismissed as the speculative husk of traditional religion. Anthropomorphic divine 
attributes, on the other hand, are taken to be the very kernel of religious ideas. Feuerbach 
suggests that anthropomorphism is so vital to and pervasive in the religious imagination 
that believers for the most part remain completely unaware of the fact that what they 
cherish most about the Divine is, in fact, the human—i.e., God’s human-like attributes. 
He writes, “Religion knows nothing of anthropomorphisms; to it they are not 
anthropomorphisms. It is the very essence of religion, that to it these definitions express 
the nature of God…to the religious sentiment God is a real Father, real Love and Mercy; 
for to it he is a real, living, personal being, and therefore his attributes are also living and 
personal.”103 
 Feuerbach goes on to argue that the valorization of anthropomorphic divine 
attributes in religion is in fact the divination of humanity itself: 
…he who defines God as an active being, and not only so, but as morally active and 
morally critical,—as a being who loves, works, and rewards good, punishes, rejects, 
and condemns evil,—he who thus defines God only in appearance denies human 
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activity, in fact, making it the highest, the most real activity. He who makes God act 
humanly, declares human activity to be divine; he says: a god who is not active, and 
not morally or humanly active, is no god; and thus he makes the idea of the Godhead 
dependent on the idea of activity, that is, of human activity, for a higher he knows 
not.104 
 Differently stated, the “essence of Christianity”—and indeed all “religion”—is 
humanity itself. Given this definition of religion, it is hardly surprising that Feuerbach 
dismisses out of hand all non-anthropomorphic conceptions of God (e.g., that of Spinoza 
or Schleiermacher) as mere speculative “pantheism;” or, in an oblique reference to the 
Advaita Vedanta tradition of Hindu theology, “Oriental nihilism.”105 
God as God—the infinite, universal, non-anthropomorphic being of the 
understanding, has no more significance for religion than a fundamental general 
principle has for a special science…the consciousness of human limitation or 
nothingness which is united with the idea of this being, is by no means a religious 
consciousness; on the contrary, it characterizes skeptics, materialists, and pantheists. 
The belief in God—at least the God of religion—is only lost where, as in skepticism, 
pantheism, and materialism, the belief in man is lost…to deny man is to deny 
religion.106 
Feuerbach concludes: “Man is the beginning of religion, Man is the centre of 
religion, Man is the end of religion.”107 
In the second part of The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach deals with what he 
takes to be the inescapable conceptual contradictions that are inherent to traditional 
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Christian theology. In a chapter titled “The Contradiction in the Nature of God in 
General,” Feuerbach places his finger on a contradiction at the core of the traditional 
Christian doctrine of God. It is in fact the same conceptual problem that we saw 
addressed by Fichte above. Feuerbach articulates the problem as follows: “God is 
universal, abstract Being, simply the idea of Being; and yet he must be conceived as a 
personal individual being;—or God is a person, and yet he must be regarded as God, as 
universal, i.e., not as a personal being.”108 
Concerning this traditional definition of God, Feuerbach maintains that, “one half 
of the definition is always in contradiction with the other half: the statement of what must 
be held always annihilates the statement of what is.”109 He goes on to write, 
A God who does not trouble himself about us, who does not hear our prayers, who 
does not see us and love us, is no God; thus humanity is made an essential predicate 
of God; —but at the same time it is said: A God who does not exist in and by himself, 
out of men, above men, as another being, is a phantom: and thus it is made an 
essential predicate of God that he is non-human and extra-human. A God who is not 
as we are, who has not consciousness, not intelligence, i.e., not a personal 
understanding, a personal consciousness (as, for example, the ‘substance’ of Spinoza), 
is no God. Essential identity with us is the chief condition of deity; the idea of deity is 
made dependent on the idea of personality, of consciousness…but it is said in the 
same breath, a God who is not essentially distinguished from us is no God.110 
Feuerbach summarizes the matter as follows: “the fundamental idea is a 
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contradiction which can be concealed only by sophisms.”111 
While there is undoubtedly an atheistic element to Feuerbach’s critique of religion 
in The Essence of Christianity, it is nevertheless a kind of theological atheism. Indeed, 
one of the core premises of his theory is that of the transcendence and divinity of 
humanity itself. Feuerbach writes, “Religion, expressed generally, is consciousness of the 
infinite; thus it is and can be nothing else than the consciousness which man has of his 
own—not finite and limited, but infinite nature.”112 
Feuerbach’s project is thus deeply theological in some respects. His goal is to 
replace a self-alienating form of religion that fundamentally negates humanity with a new 
form of religion that locates divinity within humanity. What’s more, Feuerbach roundly 
rejects the accusation of atheism with respect to his theory. He writes:  
He who says no more of me than that I am an atheist, says and knows nothing of 
me…I deny God. But that means for me that I deny the negation of man…the 
question concerning the existence of non-existence of God is for me nothing but the 
question concerning the existence or non-existence of man.113 
Similarly, in the introduction to The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach suggests 
that his project is not so much an argument for atheism as it is an argument about the 
proper object of human religious reverence. Far from attempting to extirpate the religious 
impulse in humans all together, Feuerbach endeavors to shift its fundamental locus: “I, on 
the contrary, while reducing theology to anthropology, exalt anthropology into 
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theology.”114 In his 1957 introductory essay to The Essence of Christianity, the Swiss 
Reformed theologian Karl Barth confirmed the fundamentally theological nature of 
Feuerbach’s project: 
We misinterpret Feuerbach if we see in [him] a depreciation of religion and theology: 
it is the essence of man that he emphatically and enthusiastically affirms, against 
theology and idealistic philosophy. When he identifies God with the essence of man, 
he thereby pays God the highest honor that he can confer; indeed, this is the strange 
Magnificat that Ludwig Feuerbach intones for ‘the good Lord.’115 
It follows from Feuerbach’s account of “true religion” (the realization of the 
identity of God and humankind—or the divinity of humanity) that atheism must be 
paradoxically redefined as the denial of humanity, not God. Atheism, for Feuerbach, is 
the negation of the transcendence of the human characteristics that are projected onto 
God, rather than the negation of the idea of a Divine being: 
Not the attribute of the divinity, but the divineness of deity of the attribute, is the first 
true Divine Being. Thus what theology and philosophy have held to be God, the 
Absolute, the Infinite, is not God; but that which they have held not to be God is God: 
namely, the attribute, the quality, whatever has reality. Hence he alone is the true 
atheist to whom the predicates of the Divine Being—for example, love, wisdom, 
justice,—are nothing; not he to whom merely the subject of these predicates is 
nothing.116 
 Unlike Friedrich Nietzsche, arguably the most famous critic of religion in the 19th 
century, Feuerbach had no positive use for the concept of atheism. Rather, Feuerbach 
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conceived of his philosophical task as the attempt to change “the friends of God into 
friends of man, believers into thinkers, worshippers into workers, candidates for the other 
world into student of this world, Christians, who on their own confession are half-animal 
and half-angel, into men—whole men, theologians into anthropologians [sic].”117  
 Despite his protestations to the contrary, Feuerbach’s critique of religion as 
anthropomorphic projection was generally understood to be atheistic in nature. This 
atheistic reading of Feuerbach continues to hold sway today, as he is regularly lumped 
together with figures who did advocate for atheism, such as Nietzsche and Freud. It is to 
Freud’s critique of religion that we now turn. 
Austrian neurologist Sigmund Freud wrote his most influential works during the 
early decades of the twentieth century. Freud developed many influential psychological 
ideas, such as the Oedipus complex, the libido, and repression, and he is considered to be 
the founder of psychoanalysis. One of his most significant contributions to the social 
sciences was his theory of the unconscious. Freud theorized that the human psyche is 
comprised of three basic levels: the unconscious “id,” consisting of the animalistic drives 
(e.g., pleasure seeking and pain avoidance) that motivate human behavior at a level of 
which we are for the most part unaware; the “super-ego,” which reflects the internalized 
ideas and mores of one’s society; and the conscious “ego,” which mediates between the 
competing drives of unconscious bodily instincts and the internalized mores of society.118 
The radical nature of Freud’s theory comes into view more clearly when we 
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consider the central role that the human subject played in the development of 
Enlightenment thought, as seen in Descartes’ cogito, Kant’s transcendental unity of 
apperception, and Fichte’s self-positing “I.” The disturbing philosophical implication of 
Freud’s view is that the conscious self, far from being the “seat of reason,” is in fact a 
dynamic psychological phenomenon that constantly mediates between and furnishes 
rationalizations on behalf of the various conscious and unconscious pressures exerted 
upon the psyche from moment to moment. On this account, the conscious self is 
something like an errand boy, constantly shuttling back and forth between powerful 
psychic forces of deep animalistic drives on the one hand, and domineering societal 
norms on the other. Twentieth century French philosopher Paul Ricœur fittingly 
described Freudian psychoanalysis as an “archeology of the subject,” that is, an attempt 
to delve beneath the surface level rationalizations and dissimulations of the conscious 
self, and thereby attempt to glimpse the underlying, unconscious wellspring of human 
thought and behavior.119 It is thus for good reason that Freud has been included among 
the “Masters of suspicion,” along with Feuerbach, Nietzsche and Marx. 
Freud also cast his suspicious gaze on the phenomenon of religion, first in his 
book Totem and Taboo (1913), and then later in The Future of an Illusion (1927), 
Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), and finally in his last work, Moses and 
Monotheism (1937). Although his perspective shifted over the course of these works, 
Freud’s basic interpretation of religion remained more or less the same: religion is a 
psychological phenomenon whereby human beings project infantile desires for comfort 
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and attachment figures onto the world as a means of protecting themselves against a cold 
and indifferent universe.  
Whereas Feuerbach called attention to the fact that what most believers truly value 
about God is the human-like (anthropomorphic) predicates that are traditionally attributed 
to the divine, Freud calls attention to the often unconscious, emotional motivations for 
projecting a humanlike father figure (God) onto the cosmos in the first place. And where 
Feuerbach’s chief objection to religious anthropomorphism was that it resulted in the 
alienation of humanity from itself, Freud’s main objection to anthropomorphic religious 
beliefs is that such beliefs are unhealthy, infantile delusions. In characterizing religion as 
a delusion, Freud implied that human beings do not adopt religious beliefs on the basis of 
evidence, but rather because these beliefs provide psychological comfort and emotional 
security. Additionally, Freud argued that anthropomorphic religious beliefs (e.g., belief in 
God as a heavenly Father) are psychologically unhealthy because they function to mask 
and thereby exacerbate infantile fears and attachments, rather than moving individuals to 
come to terms with reality as it is, and confront their fears accordingly. Thus, 
anthropomorphic religious beliefs are, on Freud’s view, nothing more than projections of 
our infantile desires for comfort and safety—a refusal to grow up, in other words.  
In his first book devoted to the topic of religion, Totem and Taboo, Freud 
interpreted the religious beliefs of aboriginal peoples in terms of the unconscious Oedipal 
dynamics between father and son. On this view, the gods are understood to be a 
projection of the father figure, who the child both fears and longs for.120 In his subsequent 
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work, The Future of an Illusion, Freud shifted his interpretation of religion away from the 
Oedipus complex and focused more on the reality of human helplessness, which is most 
clearly exemplified in the situation of the young child. Religion, argues Freud, has an 
infantile prototype, of which it is in fact only the continuation. For once before one 
has found oneself in a similar state of helplessness: as a small child, in relation to 
one’s parents. One had reason to fear them, and especially one’s father, and yet one 
was sure of his protection against the dangers one knew.121 
 On this account, it is the powerful forces of nature, and nature’s complete 
indifference to human wellbeing that stirs up our largely unconscious infantile feelings of 
fear and helplessness. However, there is nothing inherently religious about the experience 
of one’s utter dependence (pace Schleiermacher) and helplessness in face of an 
indifferent universe. Religion, rather, consists in the response to this state of helplessness: 
individuals anthropomorphize the natural world as a means of protecting themselves 
against infantile feelings of insecurity.  
When the growing individual finds that he is destined to remain a child forever, that 
he can never do without protection against strange superior powers, he lends those 
powers the features belonging to the figure or his father; he creates for himself the 
gods whom he dreads, whom he seeks to propitiate, and whom he nevertheless 
entrusts with his own protection. Thus his longing for a father is a motive identical 
with his need for protection against the consequence of his human weakness.122 
 Freud concludes that, “the primal father figure was the original image of God, the 
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model on which later generations have shaped the figure of God.”123 The emotional and 
psychological effects of such anthropomorphic religious ideas are considerable. The 
concept of a personal, parent-like God who watches over human beings functions to 
assuage human feelings of existential insecurity, helplessness, and our fear of death. 
Freud contends that anthropomorphic religious beliefs comfort the individual with the 
promise that, 
Over each one of us there watches a benevolent Providence which is only seemingly 
stern and which will not suffer us to become a plaything of the over-mighty and 
pitiless forces of nature. Death itself is not extinction, is not a return to inorganic 
lifelessness, but the beginning of a new kind of existence which lies on the 
development to something higher.124 
 In the end, Freud understands religion to be as much about infantile fears and 
attachments as it is a matter of wish fulfillment. “[We] tell ourselves,” Freud writes, “that 
it would be very nice if there was a God who created the world and was a benevolent 
Providence, and if there was a moral order in the universe and an after-life; but it is a 
very striking fact that all this is exactly as we are bound to wish it to be.”125 
 In one of his most famous works, Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud shifts his 
analysis of religion to explore the social function of anthropomorphic religious beliefs.  
He observed that insofar as religious belief operates as a sort of psychological security 
blanket to help humans cope with their infantile fears, it thereby functions to provide 
civilization with a more or less pacified citizenry. Religion, Freud writes, 
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…circumscribes these measures of choice and adaptation by urging upon everyone 
alike its single way of achieving happiness and guarding against pain. Its methods 
consist in decrying the value of life and promulgating a view of the real world that is 
distorted like a delusion, and both of these imply a preliminary intimidating influence 
upon intelligence. At such a cost—by the forcible imposition of mental infantilism 
and inducing a mass-delusion—religion succeeds in saving many people from 
individual neuroses.126 
 The last clause of this passage is in fact one of Freud’s more charitable statements 
regarding the nature and function of religious belief.   
 Like Feuerbach, Freud had little respect for critically minded, non-
anthropomorphic forms of religious belief, which he termed “rational religion.” He was 
quick to point out that “rational religion” is almost exclusively confined to the bourgeois 
intelligentsia. Freud saw rational religion as an attempt on behalf of educated elites to 
preserve religious ideas (such as God), while purging these ideas of the anthropomorphic 
elements that make them appealing to most ordinary people. Rational religion thus 
blithely papered-over the fact that religious ideas (for most people) are about coping with 
and assuaging infantile fears. Freud seemed to have had nineteenth century liberal 
theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher in mind when he wrote of those intellectuals who 
“persist in describing as ‘deeply religious’ anyone who admits to a sense of man’s 
insignificance or impotence in the face of the universe, although what constitutes the 
essence of the religious attitude is not this feeling but only the next step after it, the 
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reaction to it which seeks a remedy for it.”127 And for Freud, it goes without saying that 
the “remedy” proffered by popular religion will inevitably involve an anthropomorphic, 
parent-like deity. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter we’ve attempted to trace the development of the problem of 
anthropomorphism in Western thought by touching upon some of the classic 
philosophical and theological critiques of religious anthropomorphism over the centuries. 
Let us briefly consider some of the broad themes that have emerged from the foregoing 
study. One key idea we observed in this chapter was the Greek concept of theoprepēs: 
that which is befitting or unbefitting of the Divine. Xenophanes’ critique of the Greek 
gods of Homer and Hesiod operated with something like an unarticulated equivalent of 
this idea—a deep intuition that some human-like attributes are unbefitting of Divinity. 
We also saw how the concept of theoprepēs was central to the critiques of religious 
anthropomorphism in the work of Philo and Origen.  
 A second, related theme that emerged in our study was the fact that the critique of 
religious anthropomorphism in Classical Antiquity was, for the most part, a qualified 
critique. In the writings of both Xenophanes and Origen, some forms of religious 
anthropomorphism are rejected (e.g., the attribution of emotions and bodily 
characteristics to the Divine), while other forms of anthropomorphism are embraced (e.g., 
the attribution of mind, will, and a humanly relevant moral character to the Divine). The 
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principle of theoprepēs therefore appears to be a relative criterion: which 
anthropomorphic features are deemed to be befitting or unbefitting of the Divine changes 
depending on which individual philosopher or theologian one considers. Hence, 
Xenophanes saw the attribute of mind as befitting of the Divine, while Philo rejected this 
attribute as unbefitting of God. 
 A third theme that surfaced in this chapter concerns the conceptual problems that 
result from the attribution of anthropomorphic characteristics to certain metaphysical 
conceptions of God. Hume, Fichte, and Feuerbach all pointed to a deep conceptual 
incongruence—if not outright “contradiction” as Fichte and Feuerbach argued—between 
the anthropomorphic attributes of personhood, mind, and agency, on the one hand, and 
the metaphysics of the Divine infinity, simplicity, and eternality, on the other. In the 
following chapters, we shall see the way in which these themes recur in the traditions of 
Neoplatonic onto-theology. 
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Chapter Two: Neoplatonic Onto-theology as A Bulwark against Anthropomorphism 
 
Introduction 
Some of the most important figures to address the problem of religious 
anthropomorphism in the history of Western thought drew upon a shared metaphysical 
framework for contemplating the ontology of ultimate reality, or God. In what follows I 
refer to this framework as “Neoplatonic onto-theology,” or the “Neoplatonic branch of 
the onto-theological tradition.”128 The core insight of this tradition is that ultimate 
reality—whatever else it may be—cannot be construed in terms of a being, or supreme 
determinate entity. Rather, ultimate reality must be the very Whence of all determinate 
being, the Infinite “One” for the finite many, the Ground of Being, or, Being-itself.  
 Neoplatonic onto-theology, however, is a tradition divided. The fault line within 
this tradition consists of a philosophical and theological dispute over the question of 
religious anthropomorphism with respect to the ontology of God. On the one side of this 
dispute, figures such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas conceive of God as both the 
infinite ground of being, or ipsum esse, and a personal reality possessed of intentionality 
and agential capacities. The idea that God is not a being but rather infinite being-itself 
functions for these thinkers as a bulwark against anthropomorphic depictions of God as 
having bodily features, emotions, changes of heart, etc. Figures in this tradition worked to 
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Basic Writings, 2007). Anselm thus eschewed the metaphysics Neoplatonism and conceived of God as a 
being—albeit, a perfect and necessary being—rather than being-itself. Hence the need to qualify the terms 
“onto-theology” and “the onto-theological tradition” with the adjective “Neoplatonic.” 
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interpret most instances of anthropomorphism in the biblical tradition in a way (e.g. as 
being allegorical, metaphorical, or symbolic) that rendered it metaphysically consistent 
with the idea of God as an infinite transcendent reality. However, figures in this tradition 
also preserve in their ontology of God several anthropomorphic attributes, most notably 
that of Divine knowledge and providential action in the world. Consequently, this branch 
of Neoplatonic onto-theology exemplifies an attenuated anthropomorphic view of God: it 
rejects most forms of religious anthropomorphism, while also working to preserve some 
anthropomorphic attributes of God.  
 On the other side of the divide within Neoplatonic onto-theology, figures such as 
Meister Eckhart, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and Paul Tillich conceive of God as the 
infinite wellspring of finite being, which by definition must be beyond the categories of 
being and non-being. What is distinctive about these figures is that they follow Plotinus 
in rejecting the claim that the infinite ground of being is possessed of anthropomorphic 
attributes such as intentionality and capacities for agency in the world. Accordingly, 
philosophers and theologians in this subclass of Neoplatonic onto-theology exemplify an 
anti-anthropomorphic view of God: they reject the idea that the divine nature possesses 
any human-like attributes, including capacities for intentionality and agency. Instead, 
they conceive of God as an unconditioned, infinite reality that is utterly bereft of 
attributes. 
This chapter will focus chiefly on the “attenuated anthropomorphic” wing of 
Neoplatonic onto-theology, and chapter three will consider the “anti-anthropomorphic” 
branch of this tradition. I begin the present chapter by exploring the origins of 
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Neoplatonic onto-theology in the work of Plotinus. I go on to consider the ways in which 
Plotinus’ mystical ontology of the “One” was absorbed and reinterpreted by three 
towering figures in the traditions of Jewish and Christian theology: Augustine, 
Maimonides, and Thomas Aquinas. I analyze the way in which each of these figures 
negotiates the problem of anthropomorphism with respect to their conception of God. In 
each case, I will demonstrate the way in which Neoplatonic onto-theology functioned as a 
bulwark against some anthropomorphic representations of God, while at the same time 
offering protection for other instances of religious anthropomorphism.  
2.1 The Onto-theological Vision of Plotinus: The One Beyond Being 
 The mystical philosopher Plotinus taught and wrote in the middle part of the 3rd 
century CE. Originally born in Egypt, Plotinus received his philosophical education in 
Alexandria, and eventually immigrated to Rome, where he wrote the fifty-four treatises 
that his student Porphyry latter compiled as the Enneads. Like most philosophers of his 
day, Plotinus developed his ideas against the intellectual backdrop of Platonic, 
Aristotelian, and Stoic philosophy. In terms of his own philosophical commitments, 
Plotinus identified as a Platonist,129 and he endeavored to elaborate and in some areas 
improve upon Plato’s metaphysics.  
 Undoubtedly, Plotinus’ most important and original contribution to the history of 
Western philosophy was his solution to the problem of the One and the Many. Drawing 
upon the metaphysical insights of Anaximander, Parmenides, and Plato, Plotinus 
                                                                            
129 In this sense, the epithet “Neoplatonism,” which is commonly used to refer to both Plotinus’s 
metaphysical system and its influence on subsequent thought traditions (e.g., “Christian Neoplatonism”), is 
somewhat misleading. As one scholar observes, “Plotinus thought of himself simply as a disciple of Plato. 
He probably would have been deeply disturbed to be characterized as the founder of something called 
‘Neoplatonism.’” (The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, p. 3.). 
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conceived of ultimate reality as an infinite, eternal principle beyond all duality, which he 
termed “the One,” or “the Good.”130 The “One” is understood to be the ground of 
ontological unity upon which all complex, finite particulars (i.e., the many) depend. It 
follows from this view that the material world of discrete entities has being only insofar 
as it ontologically participates in the One. 
 Despite his emphasis on the absolute unity and simplicity of the One, Plotinus 
was very aware of the problems associated with ontological monism. Parmenides, for 
example, had famously argued that the experience of flux and change in the world is 
ultimately illusory, since any actual change in the world would compromise the 
ontological unity of reality. This monistic solution to the problem of the One and the 
Many has parallels in South Asian philosophy, where the conventional reality of duality, 
flux, and change are taken to be illusions masking the ultimate oneness of Brahman, or 
ultimate reality.131 While such monistic solutions to the problem of the One and the Many 
may be parsimonious, they come at a high cost: namely, the denial of our everyday 
experience of the particulars of the empirical world.  
 Plotinus sought to provide a solution to the problem of the One and the Many that 
preserved the simplicity and unity of ultimate reality while also doing justice to the 
experience of multiplicity and change in the finite world. In the Enneads, he set forth a 
highly original theory of derivation (or emanation) of the complex many from the utterly 
                                                                            
130 Plotinus uses the terms “the One” and “the Good” more or less interchangeably throughout the 
Enneads. 
131 See Śaṅkarācārya and Sudhakshina Rangaswami, The Roots of Vedānta: Selections from Śaṅkara’s 
Writings (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2012). See also Daniel Regnier, “One and the Possibility of Many in 
Greek and Indian Philosophy: Plotinus and Rāmānuja,” Philosophy East and West 67, no. 3 (July 2017): 
825–40. 
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simple One. Following Plato, Plotinus conceived of finite multiplicity (the many) as 
inhabiting different levels of being in an ontological hierarchy, or “chain of being,” (often 
associated with Porphyry’s tree). At the top of the ontological hierarchy lies the One—the 
utterly simple principle of unity from which all finite multiplicity is derived. “Before the 
manifold,” Plotinus writes, “there must be The One, that from which the manifold 
rises.”132 But how does the manifold arise from that which is eternal and purely simple? 
Accordingly to Plotinus, the One emanates—or “boils over” as it were—into determinate 
multiplicity. “This, we may say, is the first act of generation: the One, perfect because it 
seeks nothing, has nothing, and needs nothing, overflows, as it were, and its 
superabundance makes something other than itself.”133 Plotinus offers several analogies 
for this ontological singularity: just as the Sun gives off light, the snow gives off cold, 
and fire emanates heat, so too, the One inexplicably overflows, giving rise to something 
other than itself: the Intellect, or Nous.134 The logical movement of the indeterminate One 
giving rise to determinate being is often referred to as Theogony, or God-birthing. 
 The Intellect (Nous) is the second so-called hypostasis of being (or divine 
principle) in the Plotinian system. Intellect is considered to be divine in that it is the 
condition for the possibility of intelligibility in the world. While the One is beyond all 
determination and thus, strictly speaking, unknowable,135 the Intellect is the eternal, 
                                                                            
132 Plotinus, The Enneads: A New, Definitive Edition with Comparisons to Other Translations on 
Hundreds of Key Passages, trans. Stephen Mackenna, (Burdett, New York: Published for the Paul Brunton 
Philosophic Foundation by Larson Publications, 1992).,V. 3. 16. 
133 Enneads, trans Armstrong, V. 2. 1.  
134 See Enneads, trans. Mackenna, V.4.2. 27-33; V.1 .6. 28-35 
135 “The awesome Prior, the Unity, is not a being, for so its unity would be vested in something else: 
strictly no name is apt to it, but since name it we must there is a certain rough fitness in designating it as 
unity with the understanding that it is not the unity of some thing.” Enneads., V. 9. 5. 
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“determinate, manifold expression of the One.”136 It is through the light of the Intellect 
that we are able to gain knowledge of all other levels of reality, including its ineffable 
source: the One. From the Intellect there derives the next level or hypostasis of being—
the Soul. For Plotinus, Soul is the animating principle that organizes the body of each 
living thing when they come into being. 
Soul: we must place at the crest of the world of beings, this other Principle, not merely 
the Soul of the Universe, but, included in it, the Soul of the individual: this, no mean 
Principle, is needed to be the bond of union in the total of things, not itself a thing 
sprung like things from life-seeds, but a first-hand Cause, bodiless and therefore 
supreme over itself, free…137 
Matter lies at the lowest reaches of the Plotinian ontological hierarchy, and is 
associated with change, corruption, and evil.138 Although matter may be said to be “evil,” 
in respect of its being furthest removed from the One, it is important to note that matter 
and evil cannot be properly thought of as metaphysical realities in the Plotinian system. 
This is because matter, for Plotinus, is characterized by non-being, or privation; matter is 
the absence of form, measure, and intelligibility, and is therefore associated with the 
privation of the Good (evil). 
Whereas Manichaeism conceived of evil as a fundamental metaphysical reality 
that was locked in eternal struggle with the Good, Plotinus saw matter and evil as 
inhabiting the lowest level of reality, and characterized by privation and total ontological 
dependence. Differently stated, matter and evil have no substantial being of their own; 
                                                                            
136 Dominic J. O’Meara, Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005)., 64-5. 
137 Enneads, III.1.8.     
138 Enneads, I. 8. 3. 
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without the animating principle of Soul, matter would remain utterly formless and 
indeterminate—it would not be anything.  However, insofar as matter does come to be 
animated by the Soul, and by extension, Intelligibility, it may said to be ontologically 
dependent upon, and hence ultimately derived from the One, albeit remotely.139 
Since Soul depends on Intellect and Intellect on the Good, in this way all things depend 
on the Good through intermediaries, some of these being close and some of these being 
neighbors of those things which are close, and sensibles at the farthest distance being 
dependent on Soul.140 
Plotinus’ hierarchy of being allowed him to acknowledge the reality of flux, change, 
and evil in the material world in a way that the monistic ontology of Parmenides was 
unable to achieve. Moreover, the Plotinian system furnished one of the most powerful 
solutions to the problem of evil in Ancient philosophy: matter and evil are what they are 
in virtue of their privation of Soul, Intelligibility and the Good. At the same time, insofar 
as matter and evil come to exist at all, they have been animated by Soul, and are thereby 
caught up in the great chain of being that ultimately flows out of the One. For Plotinus, 
all of reality participates in an endless ontological dance, a procession from (exitus) and 
eventual return (reditus) to the One. It follows then that all things may be said to be good 
in the qualified sense that all things ultimately derive from and return to the Good.  
 In respect of his onto-theological conception of ultimate reality, Plotinus both 
draws upon and radicalizes the ontology of Plato. In the Enneads, Plotinus argues that 
                                                                            
139 “The nature of matter, then, either existed forever, and it was not possible for it, since it existed, not to 
partake of that which grants to all things as much of the Good as each is able to have; or else, the 
generation of it followed by necessity from the causes prior it, and as such it did not have to be separate for 
the reason that that which gave it being in a way as a gracious gift stood still before coming to it owning to 
a lack of power.” Enneads, IV.8.6.18-23, cited in Gerson, From Plato to Platonism, p. 251. 
140 Enneads, VI. 7. 42. Translation by Gerson, Cited in Gerson, 240. 
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each particular thing must have a form (what he terms “a One”) in which it participates. 
Like Plato, Plotinus maintains that the forms of the particular things must themselves be 
unified by and participate in a transcendent Form of all forms, what Plato referred to as 
“the Good.” Plotinus writes, “Every particular thing has a One…to which it may be 
traced; the All has its One, its Prior, but not yet the Absolute One; through this we reach 
that Absolute One, where all such reference comes to an end.”141 The Plotinian concept 
of the One derives from the ontology of Plato’s Republic, wherein the ultimate cause of 
all reality is an axiological principle, referred to as “the Good.” It is this principle that 
bestows being and value on all finite particulars. Furthermore, there is an infinite, 
qualitative difference between finite reality and the ultimate reality in which finite things 
participate, and upon which they ontologically depend. Thus, we read in the Republic that 
the Good is “beyond being and essence.”142 Plotinus clearly has this Platonic ontological 
vision in mind when he writes that, "The One is all things and not a single one of them: it 
is the principle of all things…the One is not being, but the generator of being."143 
 Indebted though he was to Platonic metaphysics, Plotinus’s Enneads probed the 
onto-theological implications of a radically transcendent ultimate reality in greater 
conceptual detail and with more metaphysical precision than was ever attempted by 
Plato, or arguably any other philosopher of Ancient Greece. In the Republic, for example, 
Plato was more or less content to assert the transcendence of ultimate reality—“the Good, 
beyond being and essence”—and leave the matter at that. Aristotle, on the other hand 
                                                                            
141 Enneads, III. 8. 10. 
142 Plato, Republic, 509 b. 
143 Enneads, V.2.I.1-7. 
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famously jettisoned his teacher’s idea of an ultimate principle in which all particular 
things participate, and instead conceived of God as an immaterial, intellective being—
Nous, or “Thought thinking itself”—who functioned as the first and final cause of 
intelligible motion and purposive striving among particular things in an eternal, self-
caused universe.144  
Platonist that he was, it is not surprising that Plotinus rejected Aristotle’s 
conception of God as Nous. However, his succinct critique of Aristotle’s position 
provides an excellent window into Plotinus’ theory of the absolute unity, simplicity, and 
transcendence of the One. Referring to Aristotle’s Metaphysics Plotinus writes, “Later, 
Aristotle, makes the first principle separate and intelligible, but when he says that it 
knows itself, he goes back again and does not make it the first principle…”145 Plotinus’ 
claim here is that Aristotle’s conception of God as Nous disqualifies itself as a genuine 
candidate for the first principle because it entails multiplicity. Anticipating a fundamental 
idea in the tradition of phenomenology by many centuries, Plotinus observes that thought 
necessarily entails duality: the distinction between the act of intellection itself, and the 
object of the intellective act.146 Even in the case of the Divine Nous (Thought thinking 
itself) a distinction arises between the act of thinking and the object of thought. “The 
thinking principle, then, when it thinks, must be in two parts,” Plotinus observes.147 It 
follows from this that the Nous cannot be identified with God, or the first principle. This 
                                                                            
144 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII., chapters 7 & 9. 
145 Enneads, trans. Armstrong, V. 1. 9. 
146 This is what Edmund Husserl would later describe in terms of noesis (the intentional act) and noema 
(that toward which the intentional act is aimed), which are constitutive of every act of intellection. See 
Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New 
York, NY: Collier Books, 1962). 
147 Enneads, trans. Armstrong, V. 3. 10. 
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is because on Plotinus’ view, the ultimate principle of things (the One) must be a simple 
unity in order to provide an ontological ground for the myriad complex entities in the 
world. “It was necessary that the First be utterly without multiplicity, for otherwise it 
must be again referred to a prior.”148 In other words, the One cannot contain multiplicity 
because it is multiplicity itself that requires ontological grounding in a simple, principle 
of unity (a “One”).  
Plotinus thus concludes that, “Intellection, then, does not exist in the 
Good…immune from intellection the Good remains incontaminably what it is, not 
impeded by the presence of the intellectual act which would annul its purity and 
unity.”149 Hence Plotinus’s claim that when Aristotle attributes thought (and the 
multiplicity entailed by thought) to the first principle “he goes back again and does not 
make it the first principle.” For in order to be the simple One for the complex Many, the 
One must completely transcend the multiplicity that characterizes the Many: 
The First must be without form, and, if without form then it is no Being; Being must 
have some definition and therefore be limited; but the First cannot be thought of as 
having definition and limit, for thus it would be not the Source but the particular item 
indicated by the definition assigned to it.150 
As we have seen, Plotinus maintains that any supposed first principle that 
possesses attributes (and hence, multiplicity) would ipso facto not be the One for the 
Many—it would necessarily be one complex thing among the set of complex entities (the 
many) that require a unified ontological ground. Plotinus pursues this line of reasoning 
                                                                            
148 Ennedads, trans. Mackenna, VI. 7. 18 
149 Ennedads, trans. Mackenna, VI. 7. 40. 
150 Enneads, trans. MacKenna, V. 5. 6. 
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further: 
But a universe from an unbroken unity, in which there appears no diversity, not even 
duality? It is precisely because [there] is nothing within the One that all things are from 
it: in order that Being may be brought about, the source must be no Being, but Being’s 
generator, in what is to be thought of as the primal act of generation.151 
Here we come to the austere pinnacle of Plotinus’ onto-theology: his insistence 
upon the utter unity, simplicity, indeterminacy, and ultimate unknowability of the One: 
The One is in truth beyond all statement: any affirmation is of a thing; but the all 
transcending resting above even the most august divine Mind, possesses alone of all 
true being, and is not a thing among things; we can give it no name because that would 
imply predication: we can but try to indicate, in our own feeble way, something 
concerning it.152 
In his attempt to clarify the Platonic concept of an absolutely transcendent 
ultimate reality (the Good beyond being and essence), Plotinus transformed Plato’s view 
beyond recognition in many respects. For Plato, ultimacy was a transcendent reality 
whose nature was in some respects determinate and knowable as the Good—the 
axiological source of all value in the world. In contrast, Plotinus argues that ultimate 
reality (the One) is bereft of attributes and must therefore transcend all predication, even 
that of “Goodness Itself.” This is the genius of Plotinus’s ontology: the insight that the 
transcendent ground of being cannot contain any of the characteristics or features of the 
finite beings that it grounds. Plotinus writes, “We know the divine Mind…that which 
gives Being and all else of that order; but we know, too, that other, know that it is none of 
                                                                            
151 Enneads, trans. MacKenna V. 2. 1. 
152 Enneads, V. 3. 13. 
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these, but a nobler principle than any-thing we know as Being; fuller and greater; above 
reason, mind and feeling; conferring these powers, not to be confounded with them.”153 
One serious point of confusion surrounding the topic of the absolute simplicity of 
the One derives from the fact that that Plotinus himself uses the terms “the One” and “the 
Good” interchangeably throughout the Enneads. However, it is important to note that 
while he often refers to ultimate reality as “The Good,” Plotinus is also careful to point 
out that this name is a useful figure of speech, not an axiological attribute of the One. 
“We may not call it [the One] ‘the Good,’ if ‘the Good’ is to be taken in the sense of 
some one member of the universe; if we meant that which precedes the universe of 
things, the name may be allowed.”154 The epithet “the Good” is thus to be interpreted as a 
symbol that functions to point, “in our own feeble way,” as Plotinus puts it, toward the 
ineffable One that is beyond being and non-being: 
Certainly this Absolute is none of the things of which it is the source—its nature is that 
nothing can be affirmed of it—not existence, not essence, not life—since it is That 
which transcends all these. But possess yourself of it by the very elimination of Being 
and you hold a marvel.155 
 However, the radical transcendence and simplicity of the One appears to give rise 
to a paradox: if the One is utterly simple, and therefore bereft attributes, then how can we 
make any claims about it? Likewise, if the One is beyond all attribution and predication, 
then how can we ever know anything about it? Indeed, what is there to be known about 
                                                                            
153 Enneads, trans. Mackenna, V. 3. 14—italics mine. 
154 Enneads, trans. Mackenna, V. 3. 11; Elsewhere Plotinus writes, “The word ‘good’ used of him is not a 
predicate asserting his possession of goodness…” Enneads. VI. 7. 38 
155 Enneads, trans. Mackenna, III. 8. 10. 
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an infinite, featureless divinity? The question of how one can say something about that 
which is beyond all saying and knowing—how to “eff the ineffable”—is an enduring 
philosophical and theological issue, one that surfaces across the religious traditions of the 
Axial Age. In the West, Plotinus is arguably the first religious philosopher to come fully 
to grips with the paradoxical trajectory of apophatic theology. Indeed, in some passages 
of the Enneads, Plotinus appears to stagger along the tortuous apophatic path he’s laid 
out for himself: 
We are in agony for a true expression; we are talking of the untellable; we name, only 
to indicate for our own use as best we may. And this name, The One, contains really no 
more than the negation of plurality…if we are led to think positively of The One, name 
and thing, there would be more truth in silence: the designation, a mere aid to enquiry, 
was never intended for more than a preliminary affirmation of absolute simplicity to be 
followed by the rejection of even that statement: it was the best that offered, but 
remains inadequate to express the Nature indicated. For this is a principle not to be 
conveyed by any sound; it cannot be known on any hearing, but, if at all, by vision; and 
to hope in that vision to see a form is to fail of even that.156 
 Elsewhere in the Enneads, Plotinus appears less wracked “in agony for a true 
expression,” and even manages to adduce several means by which we can attain 
knowledge about the ineffable One. He writes, “we are taught about it by comparisons 
and negations and knowledge of the things which come from it and certain methods of 
ascent by degrees, but we are put on the way to it by purifications and virtues.”157 As we 
will see in the following sections of this chapter, the idea that we can attain qualified 
                                                                            
156 Enneads., V. 5. 6. 
157 Enneads., trans. Armstrong, VI. 7. 36.  
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knowledge of a (mostly) unknowable, transcendent God by way of comparisons (or 
analogies), negations, and knowledge of created things, was taken up by many 
subsequent philosophers and theologians in late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. 
 One of the most philosophically and theologically significant aspects of Plotinus’ 
onto-theology is its thoroughgoing anti-anthropomorphism. The idea of ultimate reality 
as the utterly simple One beyond all duality and predication functions to expose all 
ostensible divine attributes—whether they be anthropomorphic (Mind) or axiological (the 
Good)—as metaphysically inadequate and thus unbefitting of ultimate reality. As we’ve 
seen, the very idea of ultimate reality possessing discrete attributes such as mind or will is 
a category mistake on Plotinus’ view.158 For to assert that the utterly simple One 
possesses attributes is by necessity to introduce multiplicity to the One, and thereby 
violate the logical distinction between unity and multiplicity, and the simple and 
complex. This metaphysically austere insistence upon the simplicity, unity, and infinity 
of the One amounts to something like a conceptual barricade against any attributions or 
predicates that one might ascribe to it. 
 Accordingly, for Plotinus, onto-theological speculation on the Divine nature 
inevitably leads to apophatic silence, what he terms “vision.” And in the end, even the 
most fitting (or perhaps we should say, least misguiding) term for ultimacy, “The One” 
must be unsaid in order to achieve a theologically adequate, apophatic “vision” of this 
ineffable reality.  
                                                                            
158 "All that has self-consciousness and self-intellection is derivative [from the First, the Good]; it observes 
itself in order, by that activity, to become master of its Being: and if it studies itself, this can mean only that 
ignorance inheres in it and that it is of its own nature lacking and is to be made perfect by Intellection. All 
thinking and knowing must, here, be eliminated: the addition [of these] introduces deprivation and 
deficiency." (Enneads, trans. Armstrong, III.9.8-9) 
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And this is the true end set before the Soul, to take that light, to see the Supreme by the 
Supreme and not by the light of any other principle—to see the Supreme which is also 
the means to the vision; for that which illumines the Soul is that which it is to see just 
as it is by the sun’s own light that we see the sun.  
But how is this to be accomplished?  
Cut away everything.159 
To put Plotinus’ view in a more Jewish or Christian idiom, one could say that to 
strive for anything less than this apophatic vision of the One is to settle for an idol. 
Another noteworthy aspect of Plotinus’ onto-theological vision is his insistence 
upon the religious and spiritual relevance of an impersonal, and ultimately ineffable 
Divinity. While the infinite, incomprehensible One is in one sense utterly unscaled to 
human interests (e.g., The One does not answer prayers, or intervene in human history), 
there is an important sense in which the One is profoundly relevant to human concerns: it 
is the Whence and Wither of all finite reality—including us. Moreover, human beings 
possess the capacity to discern that God—the source from which we emerge (exitus), and 
to which we inevitably return (reditus)—is this way rather than some other way. We can 
come to understand that the ground of our being is not Zeus, or some other divine person, 
but rather the blindingly simple, infinite One. This is religiously and spiritually 
significant because, unlike other finite creatures, humans have the capacity to 
intellectually recognize and spiritually orient themselves toward the ontological source of 
their being: 
‘Let us flee then to the beloved Fatherland’: this is the soundest counsel. But what is 
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this flight? How are we to gain the open sea? For Odysseus is surely a parable to us 
when he commands the flight from the sorceries of Circe and Calypso—not content to 
linger for all the pleasure offered to his eyes and all the delight of sense filling his 
days…The Fatherland to us is There whence we have come, and There is The 
Father…What then is our course, what the manner of our flight? This is not a journey 
for the feet; the feet bring us only from land to land…all this order of things you must 
set aside and refuse to see: you must close the eyes and call instead upon another vision 
which is to be waked within you, a vision, the birth-right of all, which few turn to 
use.160 
Near the very end of the Enneads, Plotinus speaks again of this mystical vision: 
“God,” Plotinus writes, “is outside of none, present unperceived to all; we break away 
from Him, or rather from ourselves; what we turn from we cannot reach; astray ourselves, 
we cannot go in search of another; a child distraught will not recognize its father; to find 
ourselves is to know our source.”161  
The anti-anthropomorphic, apophatic thrust of Plotinian onto-theology—what 
later became known simply as “Neoplatonism”—was highly influential on the 
development of Jewish and Christian theology, providing a critical check against the 
highly anthropomorphic depictions of God in the Hebrew bible and Christian scriptures. 
Yet, the tradition of Neoplatonic onto-theology split over the question of 
anthropomorphism with respect to the ontology of God. Over the centuries a small but 
persistent minority of philosophers and theologians followed Plotinus to the anti-
anthropomorphic limit, as it were, asserting that the divine nature must transcend the 
                                                                            
160 Enneads, I. 6. 8—emphasis mine. 
161 Enneads., VI. 9. 7--emphasis mine. 
  80 
attributes of personhood, intentionality, and agency. However, the view that finally won 
out in terms of adherence was an attenuated form of anthropomorphism with respect to 
the ontology of God. This metaphysical outlook collapsed the upper level of Plotinus’ 
ontological hierarchy by merging the transcendent simplicity and unity of the One with 
the first hypostasis of the One—the Nous, or Mind (despite the fact that Plotinus took 
great pains to establish that Nous cannot be identified with the One). This metaphysical 
move opened up the conceptual space necessary for the “attenuated anthropomorphism” 
tradition to claim that ultimate reality is at once a simple, infinite unity beyond being and 
nonbeing and an intentional, agential, and loving reality. In the following sections of this 
chapter, we will consider three of the most important representatives of this position in 
Jewish and Christian thought. 
 
2.2. Augustine on God as Being-itself and Trinity 
The theological corpus of Augustine of Hippo represents one of the earliest 
systematic attempts to appropriate Neoplatonism for the purpose of formulating a 
metaphysical framework for Christian theology. Augustine was born in the middle of the 
4th Century C.E. North Africa. His mid-life conversation to Christianity is documented in 
his renowned spiritual autobiography, The Confessions. Augustine was highly educated 
as a young man, and upon converting to Christianity, he sought to make philosophical 
sense of his newfound faith tradition. In fact, Augustine recounts in his Confessions that 
it was his exposure to “the Platonists”—especially Plotinus—that eventually led him 
toward giving intellectual assent to the Christian faith. For Augustine and many early 
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Church Fathers, Platonic philosophy (i.e., the works of Plato, Middle Platonism, and 
Neoplatonism) occupied a somewhat ambiguous epistemological territory between the 
revealed knowledge of God in the biblical tradition and the ostensibly corrupt knowledge 
of “pagan” philosophy, about which St. Paul famously warned in his letter to the 
Colossians (Colossians 2: 8). For Augustine, Platonic philosophy appears to fall under the 
domain of “natural theology” or “general revelation,” that is, knowledge about God that 
is derived exclusively from human reason or inferences from the natural order, and is 
therefore available to all humans, regardless of their historical or cultural context.162 
Consider the way in which Augustine emphasizes the theological value of Platonic 
philosophy in his Confessions: 
I went, then, to Simplicianus…of Ambrose…to him I recounted the winding ways of 
my errors. When I recorded how I had read certain books of the Platonists…he 
congratulated me because I had not fallen in with the writings of other philosophers, 
full of fallacies and deceits according to the elements of this world, whereas in the 
works of the Platonists God and his Word are introduced in all manners.163 
Platonism is thus distinguished from other traditions of philosophy as a form of 
human knowledge that, while not directly revealed from God, can nevertheless lead one 
toward divine, eternal truth. Platonic philosophy not only served as a crucial stepping-
stone in Augustine’s spiritual journey toward Christian faith, it also provided an all-
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important theoretical tool for Augustine—qua theologian—in his attempt to formulate a 
systematic and philosophically robust account of the teachings of the Christian church. 
Following Plotinus, Augustine conceived of God as the infinite principle in which all 
things ontologically participate. Throughout his major treatises, such as The City of God 
and The Trinity, Augustine frequently identifies God with “Being,” or “Being-itself.”164 
Even in his Confessions, which was written as an extended prayer to God, we find 
Augustine waxing Neoplatonic on the Divine Nature: 
And whence would it have any kind of being, if not from you, from whom derive all 
things, which to any degree have being? They are from you, not by any spatial 
distance, but in the measure that they are unlike you; for it is you, Lord, you who vary 
not from one time to another, but are Being-itself, ever unchanging, ever the 
selfsame.165 
The echoes of Plotinus are unmistakable here: Far from being a being alongside 
others, or even the highest, most perfect being, Augustine understands God to be the very 
ground of being—the infinite, ontological wellspring from which all finite things arise, 
and in whom they “live, move, and have their being” (Acts 17:28). 
Being well-versed in Greek philosophy, Augustine was likely skeptical of 
anthropomorphic deities long before his conversion to Christianity. Yet, despite his 
education in Hellenistic philosophy, Augustine’s intellectual path to the Neoplatonic 
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conception of God as infinite, immutable, immaterial being-itself was an extended, and 
circuitous one. He recounts this spiritual-theological journey in his Confessions: “…From 
the time that I first began to learn anything of wisdom I did not think of you, O God, as 
being in the shape of the human body. Such a conception I always shunned, and I 
rejoiced to find that the faith of our spiritual mother, your Catholic Church, likewise 
shunned it. But what more I should think you to be, I did not know.”166 Augustine goes 
on to recall how despite having avoided the Scylla of religious anthropomorphism, he 
nevertheless grappled with the Charybdis of Manichaeism in his thinking about the nature 
of ultimate reality. 
My heart cried out violently against all my phantasms and with one blow I tried to beat 
off the throng of unclean images fluttering before my mind’s eye. Yet they had 
scarcely been driven off, when, lo, in the twinkling of an eye, they came thronging 
back again, rushed before my sight, and clouded it over. Hence, although I did not 
think of you as being in the shape of a human body, I was forced to think of you as 
something corporeal, existent in space and place, either infused into the world or even 
diffused outside the world through infinite space. Even thus did I think of that very 
incorruptible and inviolable and immutable being which I set above the corruptible, the 
violable, and the mutable.167  
Continuing his prayer to God, Augustine recalls his fortuitous encounter with 
Platonism, and the near-revelatory impact that this philosophy had on his nascent 
spiritual and theological imagination: “At that time, after reading those books of the 
Platonists and being instructed by them to search for incorporeal truth, I clearly saw your 
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invisible things which are understood by the things that are made…I was made certain 
that you exist, that you are infinite, although not diffused through spaces, either finite or 
infinite, that you are truly he who is always the same, with no varied parts and changing 
movements, and that all other things are from you.”168  
 Augustine’s commitment to this onto-theological framework had significant 
consequences for his interpretation of the myriad anthropomorphic depictions of God in 
the Bible. For example, in book II of his On The Trinity, Augustine addresses the 
problem of theophany in the Hebrew Bible. Like Philo, Origen, and others before him, 
the issue of theophany was a theological problem precisely because of the clash between 
the Biblical depictions of God appearing with human-like features, and the background 
metaphysical assumptions (Platonic and Neoplatonic) about what is unbefitting 
(theoprepes) of the Divine. Augustine considers several instances of theophany in the 
Hebrew Bible, including Exodus 33:22, where Yahweh is said to hide “his face” from 
Moses, and subsequently allows him to glimpse “his back.” How are we to interpret such 
passages? Should we conceive of God as literally possessing a physical face and back? 
Or, should we follow the early Church Fathers and interpret such anthropomorphic 
theophanies as revealing the Son of God (and therefore, as a foreshadowing of the 
incarnation), or even the Holy Spirit? Augustine withholds final judgment on the latter 
questions, but he is unequivocal in his judgment about how such anthropomorphic 
descriptions must be interpreted with respect to the Divine Nature itself: “All these 
visions…were produced through the changeable creation subject to the changeless God, 
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and they did not manifest God as he is in himself, but in a symbolic manner as times and 
circumstances required.”169   
 Of course, anthropomorphic depictions of God in the Bible are not limited to the 
various theophany accounts. And throughout his theological treatises and biblical 
commentaries, Augustine sought to clarify and combat anthropomorphic depictions of 
God by interpreting such images figuratively or symbolically.170 On Augustine’s account, 
“all symbols seem in some way to personify the realities of which they are symbols.”171 
That is to say, symbols often use human-like—often “personal”—images to help us 
imagine, or gesture toward that which necessarily transcends human characteristics. 
Commenting on Genesis 1:4 (“And God saw that the light was good.”), Augustine writes: 
We should understand that this sentence does not signify joy as if over an unexpected 
good, but an approval of the work. For what is said more fittingly of God—insofar as it 
can be humanly said—than when Scripture puts it this way: “He spoke,” and “It was 
made,” “It please him.” Thus we understand in “He spoke” his sovereignty, in “It was 
made” his power, and in “It pleased him” his goodness. These ineffable things had to be 
said in this way by a man to men so that they might profit all.172 
Likewise, in his commentary on Psalm 6:1 (“Reprove me not, O Lord, in your 
anger”), Augustine contends that this passage must be interpreted symbolically, since the 
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170 Referring to Augustine’s theological interpretation of anthropomorphic portrayals of God within the 
biblical text, Griffin and Paulsen note, “The principle at work here is common to the whole of precritical 
exegesis—any passage of scripture which, literally understood, is not worthy of God (theoprepes/ deo 
dignum) must be understood figuratively.” Carl W. Griffin and David L. Paulsen, “Augustine and the 
Corporeality of God,” The Harvard Theological Review 95, no. 1 (January 2002): 111. 
171 Augustine, The City of God, 18. 46. 
172 Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis in Augustine, On Genesis Two Books: On Genesis 
against the Manichees ; And, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis : An Unfinished Book, trans. Roland J 
Teske (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2001)., 5. 22. 
  86 
anthropomorphic attribute of anger—or any emotion for that matter—cannot be literally 
ascribed to God, who, being eternal and immutable, is impassible. Instead, Augustine 
contends that we should interpret the emotional attribute of “anger” as referring to the 
earthly instantiations of Divine law by human representatives of God: 
Yet this emotion [anger] must not be attributed to God, as if to a soul, of whom it is said, 
‘but You, O Lord of power, judgest with tranquility.’ Wisdom 12:18 Now that which is 
tranquil, is not disturbed. Disturbance then does not attach to God as judge: but what is 
done by His ministers, in that it is done by His laws, is called His anger.173 
 As these passages make clear, Augustine’s commitment to the Neoplatonic 
ontology of God functioned as a hermeneutical touchstone in his commentaries on the 
Bible, and the numerous anthropomorphic representations of God contained therein. The 
onto-theological emphasis on the transcendence, simplicity, unity, and infinity of the 
Divine nature led Augustine to resist the anthropomorphic representations of God found 
in the Biblical literature—up to a point, anyway. Unlike Plotinus, Augustine detected no 
problem with the idea of an infinite, ontological principle beyond all duality that is also 
personal, intentional, agential, triune in nature, and disposed to acting in human history. 
Accordingly, Augustine established an attenuated form of resistance to anthropomorphic 
representations of God: he rejected some depictions of God as possessing human-like 
features (e.g., corporeality, emotions, instances of God changing God’s mind, or 
regretting past decisions, etc.) as unbefitting of ultimate reality while simultaneously 
embracing other human-like features attributed to the Divine nature (knowledge, 
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personhood, goodness, agential capacities, etc.) We can observe this approach in 
Augustine’s account of God’s knowledge. 
Unlike Plotinus, who rejected the idea that the One could possess the capacity of 
intellection (Nous) on the grounds that this would violate the divine unity and simplicity, 
Augustine contends that eternal divine knowledge is not beneath the divine nature (as in 
the Plotinian ontological hierarchy), but rather is included within it. In the City of God, 
Augustine explores how it is that an infinite, eternal God can be said to possess the 
capacity for knowledge of finite temporal things. Here Augustine provides us with an 
instance of attenuated anthropomorphism par excellence: he asserts that God does 
possess the capacity to know things, but also insists that God’s knowledge is qualitatively 
different from ours. Augustine claims that God, being eternal, possesses knowledge of 
things in a non-temporal manner: unlike human knowledge, God’s knowledge is not 
limited by the temporal modes of past, present, and future: 
…Rather he sees events in another way, far and profoundly different from any 
experience that is familiar to our minds. For he does not variably turn his attention 
from one thing to another. No, there is no alteration whatsoever in his contemplation. 
Hence all events in time, events that will be and are not yet, and those that are now, 
being present, and those that have passed and are no more, all of them are apprehended 
by him in a motionless and everlasting present moment. Nor does he see them in one 
way with his eyes and in another way with his mind, for he is not a compound of mind 
and body. Nor does it make any difference whether he looks at them from present, past 
or future, since his knowledge, unlike ours, of the three kinds of time, namely present, 
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past and future, does not change as time changes…174   
Augustine goes on to make a connection between God’s eternal knowledge and 
God’s eternal agency in the world. Just as God’s knowledge is not constrained by time, 
so too, divine action is not carried out over a sequence of temporal moments; rather, the 
action of God is eternal: “For he knows events in time without any temporal acts of 
knowing of his own, just as he sets temporal things in motion without any temporal 
movements of his own. Consequently there was no distinction between his seeing that 
what he made was good and his seeing that it was good for him to make it.”175 
But how, we might ask, does Augustine square the reality of divine attributes such 
as knowledge and providential agency with the absolute simplicity, unity, and infinity of 
the divine nature? This leads us to Augustine’s all-important concept of the divine 
simplicity. 
Augustine simultaneously affirms two seemingly contradictory propositions 
regarding the nature of God: 1) the absolute simplicity of the divine nature, and 2) the 
reality of divine attributes, such as divine knowledge, omnipotence, goodness, justice, 
etc. Plotinus would doubtlessly agree with the first proposition and shake his head in 
bewilderment at the second. However, it is important to note that while Augustine 
inherited the idea of the divine simplicity from Plotinus, he essentially revolutionizes the 
meaning of this concept for the purposes of his own theological program. For Plotinus, 
the divine simplicity referred to the idea that the One possesses no parts or distinct 
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attributes; in other words, the divine simplicity is another way of asserting that there is no 
multiplicity within the One. Augustine, however, redefines the divine simplicity to refer 
to the idea that the divine does in fact possess attributes, but that they are of the same 
essence with the divine nature, and therefore do not introduce multiplicity to God. In 
other words, the divine attributes are identical with the divine nature. In Book XI of his 
City of God, Augustine addresses this idea by contrasting the unity of the divine nature 
and the divine attributes with the way in which finite predicates are attributed to finite 
subjects in the everyday world. 
Now the reason why something is called a simple substance is this, because it does not 
possess anything that it can lose, or, to put it another way, because it is not different 
from what it has, for example, a jar has some liquid in it, a body has colour, the air 
light or heat and the soul wisdom. Now none of these is what it has, that is, the jar is 
not the liquid, nor is the body colour, nor is the air light or heat, nor is the soul wisdom. 
This is why these things can also suffer loss of the things that they have and may be 
converted and changed to take on other conditions or qualities; for example a jar may 
be emptied of the liquid that fills it, the body may lose its colour, the air may become 
dark or cold and the soul may lose its wisdom.176 
Elsewhere in Book XI Augustine offers a remarkably concise definition of his 
view of the divine simplicity: “he [God] is what he has.”177  
In Book VI of his seminal work The Trinity, Augustine returns to the concept of 
the divine simplicity in order to further clarify how it is that attributes can be predicated 
of the divine nature without introducing any multiplicity thereto. Augustine writes,  “God 
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however is indeed called in multiple ways great, good, wise, blessed, true, and anything 
else that seems not to be unworthy of him; but his greatness is identical with his wisdom 
(he is no great in mass but in might), and his goodness is identical with his wisdom and 
greatness, and his truth is identical with them all; and with him being blessed is not one 
thing, and being great or wise or true or good, or just simply being, another.”178  
In another section of Book VI of The Trinity, Augustine contrasts the divine 
attributes with human virtues, which are attributes that can be predicated of an individual, 
yet are conceivable apart from the individual human: “For the human spirit is not of 
course the same thing to be…courageous or sagacious or just moderate; it can be a 
human spirit and have none of these virtues. But for God it is the same thing to be as to 
be powerful or just or wise or anything else that can be said about his simple multiplicity 
or multiple simplicity to signify his substance.”179  
What becomes apparent in reading Augustine’s account of the divine simplicity is 
that it is less of a philosophical argument than it is a theological pronouncement. 
Augustine never provides a conceptual explanation that resolves the prima facie logical 
incoherence of asserting that God is both 1) utterly simple, and thus bereft of multiplicity, 
and 2) possessed of numerous, distinct attributes (e.g., knowledge and omnipotence)—
which entails multiplicity. Furthermore, his assertion that the divine attributes are 
identical with the divine nature does not do any explanatory work—it does not provide an 
account of how this position can be rendered logically coherent. Rather, Augustine’s 
conception of the divine simplicity seems to simply assert by fiat that it is so—i.e., that 
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the divine attributes are in fact identical with the divine nature, and that the logic must 
work out in the end. 
 To his credit however, Augustine does acknowledge the reality of the conceptual 
difficulties surrounding this topic. In Book VII of The Trinity, Augustine claims that any 
conceptual problems that arise from attempting to conceive of the unity of the divine 
attributes with the divine being are the result of the inadequacy of human language and 
thought.180 While Augustine’s novel conception of the divine simplicity may appear 
mysterious—or even contradictory—from the human vantage point (after all, Augustine 
agrees with Paul that “now we see through a glass darkly” 1 Corinthians 13:12), the 
reality of human confusion about this matter does not entail that the metaphysical 
postulation itself is false. On the contrary, Augustine contends that the frailty and 
limitations of the human mind—and metaphysical conundrums that result therefrom—do 
not change the fact that within the divine nature itself the divine attributes really are 
identical with the divine being. For Augustine, the only “problem” with this position is 
the limitations of human thought and language, which make it impossible for us to fully 
comprehend the divine nature as it most truly is. He writes, “the total transcendence of 
the godhead quite surpasses the capacity of ordinary speech. God can be thought about 
more truly than he can be talked about, and he is more truly than he can be thought 
about.”181 
 This leads us to an important aspect of Augustine’s thought, namely, the role of 
authority in theological reflection upon the nature of God. Augustine readily 
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acknowledges that human reason can only take us so far in our attempt to understand the 
divine reality. At a certain point, he maintains, we must submit to the supernaturally 
authorized teachings of Catholic Church if we wish to come to the fullest understanding 
of God: 
But how are we to follow after Him whom we do not see? And how are we who are not 
only men but foolish men to see? …This is as far as reason can take us. For in human 
things, reason, although lacking the certitude of truth, is thought secure. But when it 
approaches divine things, it turns away unable to behold...Ineffable Wisdom has so 
arranged it, therefore, that when we seek to retreat into the darkness, authority comes to 
our aid and appeals to us with the wonderful deeds and utterances of its sacred books, 
which like shadows make attractive the brightness of truth.182 
 This understanding of the indispensable role of authority in theological reflection 
frees Augustine to admit that his account of the divine nature is not entirely 
comprehensible by reason alone, and therefore will give rise to various conceptual 
aporias. Thus, if the doctrine of the divine simplicity defies human reason, this fact does 
not pose a major problem for Augustine’s theology. 
We see this same line of reasoning come to the fore in his discussion of the 
bewildering logic of the trinity in Book VII of The Trinity. On the orthodox formulation 
of this central doctrine, God is said to be triune in personhood and one in essence: “three 
persons, one being or substance.”183 Augustine proceeds in his analysis by considering 
the natural questions that arise from this formulation: “But the Father is God, and the Son 
                                                                            
182 Augustine, The Catholic and Manichaean Ways of Life = (De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae et de 
Moribus Manichaeorum), trans. Donald Arthur Gallagher and Idella J Gallagher (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2008)., p. 11. 
183 Augustine, The Trinity, VII. 8, 229. 
  93 
is God and the Holy Spirit is God, so why not three Gods? If on other hand these three 
are together one God because of their inexpressible mutuality, why are they not one 
person or the same reason?”184 Augustine’s response to these questions follows the same 
line of reasoning we saw above in the discussion of the inscrutable logic of the divine 
simplicity: the paradoxical metaphysics of the trinity is understood to be the result of the 
limitations of human reason and the frailty of human speech with respect to the divine 
nature. He summarizes this less than ideal conceptual situation thusly: 
What are we left with then? Perhaps we just have to admit that these various usages 
were developed by the sheer necessity of saying something, then the fullest possible 
argument was called for against the traps or the errors of the heretics. Human 
inadequacy was trying by speech to bring to the notice of men what it held about the 
Lord God its creator, according to its capacity, in the inner sanctum of the mind…it 
was afraid of saying three beings, in case it should be taken as meaning any diversity in 
that supreme and ultimate equality. On the other hand it could not say that there are not 
three somethings, because Sabellius fell into heresy by saying precisely that. For it is 
known with complete certainty from the scriptures and is thus to be devoutly believed, 
and the mind’s eye can also achieve a faint but undoubted glimpse of the truth, that the 
Father is and the Son is and the Holy Spirit is, and that the Son is not the same as the 
Father is, nor is the Holy Spirit the same as the Father or the Son. So human 
inadequacy searched for a word to express three what, and it said substances or 
persons.185 
Augustine concludes his treatment of the metaphysics of the trinity with the 
following statement: “If this cannot be grasped by the understanding, let it be held by 
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faith, until he shines in our minds who said through the prophet, Unless you believe, you 
will not understand. (Is 7:9)”186  
 In articulating the core doctrinal teachings of the Church in the categories of 
Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy, Augustine’s “attenuated anthropomorphic” 
adaptation of the onto-theological tradition served an essential theological and 
institutional function. At the same time, Augustine’s view also introduced to the onto-
theological tradition numerous nontrivial conceptual problems with respect to the 
ontology of the Divine nature—problems that were avoided in the more thoroughly anti-
anthropomorphic onto-theology of Plotinus.187  
The 16th century mathematician and religious philosopher Blaise Pascal famously 
stressed the difference between “the God of the philosophers” and “the God of Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob.”188 And many other influential philosophers and theologians have 
echoed and elaborated on Pascal’s point concerning the prima facie incongruity between 
these two conceptions of God. Interestingly enough, Augustine did not appear to see any 
problem with splicing the God of the Bible together with Plotinus’ mystical-philosophical 
ontology of the One. His silence around this issue is surprising, given the radical manner 
in which he saw fit to alter, and in many ways, redefine Neoplatonic onto-theology. More 
specifically, Augustine’s novel reformulation of the concept of divine simplicity 
essentially collapsed the uppermost level of Plotinus’ ontological hierarchy by 
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amalgamating the absolute unity and simplicity of infinite the One together with the first 
hypostasis of the One, i.e., Mind or Nous. Augustine’s innovative onto-theology also 
included the implicit postulation that ultimate reality possesses a humanly relevant moral 
character, and agential capacities to intervene providentially in human history.189  
 These radical alterations to Plotinus’ onto-theology make comprehensible the 
judgment attributed to Etienne Gilson that, “Augustine inhibited Neoplatonic influence in 
the West rather than transmitted it.”190 We may leave aside the historical question of the 
extent to which Augustine’s thought did in fact hinder the influence of Neoplatonism in 
the West, and still appreciate Gilson’s point that he radically altered rather than simply 
transmitted the onto-theological system of Plotinus. 
 Here it is important to note the significance of the social and institutional contexts 
in which philosophers and theologians pursue their intellectual work. Plotinus’ social 
context was a highly pluralized one, and as a teacher of philosophy, he did not commit 
himself to any institutional authority that adjudicated philosophical and theological 
claims, or exercised authority over the writing of onto-theological treatises such as the 
Enneads. This dearth of external authority did not entail the absence of tradition however; 
as we have seen, Plotinus’ thought was profoundly shaped and guided by the tradition of 
Platonic philosophy. Yet, when we contrast Plotinus’s thought with that Augustine, it 
becomes clear that his social context, as well as the guidance or “authority” of his 
tradition, were flexible realities that significantly influenced without regulating the 
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trajectory of his onto-theological speculation. 
 In a general sense, Augustine also wrote his theological treatises in a historical 
and cultural context that was highly pluralized. The crucial difference in the case of 
Augustine was that he located himself within a religious subculture and committed 
himself to an institutional context wherein the Church’s authority over theological 
doctrine was comprehensive. Moreover, Augustine understood the authority of the 
Church to be a blessing, because unlike all other earthly institutions, the authority of the 
Catholic Church was, on his view, supernaturally established and guided by the Divine. 
Accordingly, Augustine’s radical retailoring of Neoplatonism was not done on a whim. 
Rather, it was a necessity: the project of combining Plotinus’ metaphysical system with 
teachings of the Church required him to significantly alter the former in numerous ways, 
so as to accommodate the supernaturally authorized truths of the latter. As the Thomist 
philosopher W. Norris Clarke observes of Augustine and the other early Christian 
Neoplatonists: 
Christian thinkers simply had to do this to do justice to their own revelation, and they had 
no hesitation, but rather took pride in doing so. The metaphysical repercussions, 
however, of making...changes in Neoplatonic tradition were of seismic proportions, and 
did not seem to be recognized very clearly for some time in their full philosophical 
implications…it was one thing for Christian thinkers to assert that the world of ideas 
must be within the divine Mind…in order that God may personally know and love his 
creatures. But it is another thing to come to grips successfully with the metaphysical 
problems involved in thus adapting the Neoplatonic doctrine...191  
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 If Augustine in all of his voluminous theological output nevertheless failed to 
adequately address the conceptual problems involved in wedding a Neoplatonic onto-
theological conception of the divine with the God of the Bible, the work of Jewish Rabbi 
and philosopher Moses Maimonides represents a substantial development in this regard. 
2.3. Moses Maimonides’ (Almost) Unknowable God 
 Moses ben Maimon, also known as “Rambam” or “Maimonides,” was a 
Renaissance man who lived (1138-1204 CE) approximately two centuries before the 
Renaissance period. In addition to being one of the preeminent Torah scholars of the 
Middle Ages, Maimonides was also an important philosopher, a practicing physician, and 
an astronomer.192 As a philosopher and theologian, Maimonides, like Augustine, sought 
to reconcile the insights of Greek philosophy with the revealed teachings of his religious 
tradition. The key difference, aside from their respective religious traditions, was that 
Maimonides placed a good deal more trust in the wisdom of Greek philosophy than did 
Augustine. In fact, some of Maimonides’ commentators argued that he went too far in 
this respect, essentially subordinating the revealed teachings Torah to the ostensible 
truths of Aristotelian philosophy.193 Regardless of the soundness of such criticisms, it is 
undeniable that Maimonides radically revised and reinterpreted large portions of the 
Hebrew Bible in order to render them consistent with an Aristotelian worldview. Indeed, 
Maimonides’ appraisal of the philosophy of Aristotle could not have been more 
favorable: “Aristotle reached the highest level of knowledge to which man can ascend, 
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with the exception of one who experiences the emanation of the Divine Spirit, who can 
attain the degree of prophecy, above which there is no higher stage.”194  
 So why include Maimonides within the Neoplatonic branch of the onto-
theological tradition? Aristotelian though he was, Maimonides parted company with the 
great philosopher when it came to his metaphysics of the divine nature. Although he was 
famously equivocal on the issue of the eternality of the world (a position defended by 
Aristotle), Maimonides eschewed Aristotle’s conception of God as an intellective being 
which, rather than creating all finite being, simply played an essential causal and 
teleological role within an eternal universe.195 Instead, Maimonides embraced a 
Neoplatonic conception of God as the infinite ontological source of all finite reality.196 
 Maimonides lays out this view clearly in the Pereq Heleq section of his 
Commentary on the Mishnah. Here Maimonides set out thirteen principles of faith, all of 
which he considered to be binding upon all Jews. The first five principles pertain to the 
metaphysics of the Divine Nature; the first principle states that, “there exists a God who 
is the cause of all existence but that He Himself is beyond existence and not dependent on 
it.”197 The other four principles in this text stipulate the unity of God, the incorporeality 
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of God, the preexistence of God and the fact that God alone is the proper object of 
worship.198 
 This onto-theological conception of God placed profound pressure upon the 
highly anthropomorphic depictions of God found throughout the Hebrew Bible, just as it 
did for Augustine. Maimonides, however, was far more zealous and conceptually incisive 
in his confrontation with the problem of religious anthropomorphism. Accordingly, 
Maimonides dedicates the bulk of the first part of his magnum opus Guide of the 
Perplexed to addressing the religious and philosophical problems that arise from 
anthropomorphic religious language. He even went so far as to claim that 
anthropomorphic depictions of God possessing corporeal features are worse than idolatry: 
Know, accordingly…that when you believe in in the doctrine of the corporeality of 
God or believe that one of the states of the body belongs to Him, you provoke His 
jealousy and anger, kindle the fire of his wrath, and are a hater, an enemy, and an 
adversary of God, much more so than an idolater.199 
 It follows from this claim that anthropomorphic depictions of God possessing 
corporeal features in the biblical narrative cannot be interpreted in a literal fashion. Thus, 
Maimonides devotes a considerable portion of part I of the Guide to addressing some of 
the most well-known instances of religious anthropomorphism in the Hebrew Bible. In 
each case, Maimonides insists upon a metaphorical interpretation in place of a literal 
reading. For example, when the biblical text refers to God “sitting” in heaven (“O Thou 
who sittest in the heaven” Psalm 123:1), this is to be interpreted metaphorically, as 
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referring to eternal changelessness of the divine.200 Similarly, Maimonides interprets 
biblical texts referring to God “seeing” as a metaphor for God’s omniscience.201 
Furthermore, Maimonides does not hesitate to apply a metaphorical interpretation to 
decisive texts, such as God’s self-revelation to Jacob.202 
 The metaphorical interpretation of anthropomorphic religious language extends 
well beyond the corporeal domain for Maimonides. He also maintained that the learned 
reader must interpret religious language describing God’s anger, jealousy, etc., 
metaphorically.203 This position provokes a natural question: If the Torah is Divine 
Revelation, why does it consist of so many anthropomorphic depictions of God that are 
both erroneous and idolatrous when taken at face value? In one of the early chapters of 
the Guide, Maimonides answers this question with great candor. The Torah, he contends, 
“speaketh in the language of the sons of Man.” He continues: 
This is so because it is presented in such a manner as to make it possible for the young, 
the women, and all the people to begin with it and to learn it. Now it is not within their 
power to understand these matters as they truly are…on this account one ought not to 
begin to teach this subject to anyone unless it be according to his capacity…204  
 The elitism and sexism of this position is likely to be scandalous to the modern 
reader. While the issue of sexism and God-talk is beyond the scope of this chapter, the 
problems with this type of patriarchal theological discourse have been extensively 
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diagnosed and criticized by well-known feminist philosophers and theologians such as 
Mary Daly, Judith Plaskow, Rosemary Radford Ruether, and many others.205 Similarly, 
for the purposes of the present study, we will also need to prescind from a moral 
evaluation of Maimonides’ elitism and simply note its role in his thought. From the first 
pages of the Guide, Maimonides is explicit and unabashed about the necessarily small 
and elite audience that could potentially profit from his treatise. The central purpose of 
the Guide is to help those individuals who have enjoyed the benefits of an extensive 
scientific and philosophical education and also endeavor to be observant Jews, but are 
nevertheless “perplexed” by the myriad anthropomorphisms and various philosophical 
conundrums that pervade this tradition. It is precisely such an elite, “perplexed” 
individual for whom Maimonides writes. As he states in the introduction to the Guide: 
To sum up: I am the man who when the concern pressed him and his way was 
straightened and he could find no other device by which to teach a demonstrated truth 
other than by giving satisfaction to a single virtuous man while displeasing ten thousand 
ignoramuses—I am he who prefers to address that single man by himself, and I do not 
heed the blame of those many creatures. For I claim to liberate that virtuous one from 
that into which he has sunk, and I shall guide him in his perplexity until he becomes 
perfect and finds rest.206  
 As noted above, the fundamental hermeneutical principle that Maimonides 
employs in order to help guide those perplexed by religious anthropomorphism is 
encompassed in his view that the Torah “speaketh in the language of the sons of Men.” 
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However, it is not only the case that the Torah employs anthropomorphic images of God 
in order to make God comprehensible to the masses. Maimonides also contends (echoing 
Plato’s famous notion of the “noble lie”) that anthropomorphic depictions of Divine 
jealousy, anger, and vengeance are also necessary in order to control the masses.  
Maimonides held the view that most ordinary believers would not abide by the 
Torah without the threat of Divine anger, wrath, and retribution.207 Anthropomorphic 
religious ideas therefore serve an indispensable social function: namely, to reinforce the 
legitimacy of moral norms and inspire devotion thereto. Here Maimonides anticipates one 
of the core insights of the sociology of religion by nearly eight centuries. But unlike the 
theories of Emile Durkheim and Peter Berger, Maimonides’ view centers on a stark 
theological claim: anthropomorphic religious beliefs are necessary because there is a 
serious incongruity between the nature of ultimate reality and the types of beliefs that are 
capable of furnishing ordinary individuals with a robust sense of moral orientation and 
providing stability to society. On Maimonides view, God is not the type of reality that 
rewards people for good behavior or becomes angry and punishes people for sinful 
behavior. Nevertheless, he was highly skeptical that most ordinary people would continue 
to observe the Law if they were not motivated to do so by way of anthropomorphic 
images of a parent-like God who is always monitoring human behavior. Hence the need 
for religious anthropomorphism. As Maimonides scholar Moshe Halbertal puts it, 
Maimonides shrewdly perceived that, “society in general cannot survive under conditions 
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of metaphysical transparency.”208  
 This leads us to Maimonides famous distinction between “necessary beliefs” and 
“true beliefs.” The former are religious beliefs based in the Torah or tradition that are 
embraced in virtue of their practical utility; such beliefs often serve an essential role in 
regulating individual behavior and promoting social cohesion and political stability. In 
contrast, the idea of “true beliefs” refers to beliefs that are maintained on the basis of 
their philosophical merit, irrespective of their potential social consequences. Maimonides 
summarizes his distinction between necessary beliefs and true beliefs as follows:  
…the Law also makes a call to adopt certain beliefs, belief in which is necessary for the 
sake of political welfare. Such, for instance, is our belief that He, may He be exalted, is 
violently angry with those who disobey Him and that it is therefore necessary to fear 
Him and to dread Him…In some cases a commandment communicates a correct belief, 
which is the one and only thing aimed at—as, for instance, the belief in the unity and 
eternity of the deity and in His not being a body. In other cases the belief is necessary 
for the abolition of reciprocal wrongdoing or for the acquisition of a noble moral 
quality—as, for instance, the belief that He, may He be exalted, has a violent anger 
against those who do injustice…and as the belief that He, may He be exalted, responds 
instantaneously to the prayer of someone wronged or deceived: And it shall come to 
pass, when he crieth unto Me, that I will hear; for I am gracious.209 
 Though Maimonides never says so explicitly, the trajectory of his argument in the 
Guide suggests that he interprets religious language on a spectrum of theological 
adequacy. At the farthest (i.e., least adequate) end of this spectrum we find corporeal 
anthropomorphic depictions of God (images of God possessing bodily features). As 
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we’ve seen, Maimonides judges this type of anthropomorphism to be anathema, and 
coterminous with idolatry when interpreted literally. In contrast, emotional and personal 
anthropomorphic depictions of God (images of God as possessing emotional states such 
as anger, jealousy, etc., and personal interactions with humans, such as listening to and 
directly answering prayers) would likely fall somewhere near the middle of the spectrum 
of adequacy. This type of religious anthropomorphism is problematic, but only for those 
who possess philosophical training, and are thus perplexed by the attribution of emotional 
and personal characteristics to an infinite, eternal, impassible God. As noted above, the 
Guide was written in order to assist such perplexed persons by demonstrating that this 
type of anthropomorphic religious language is, properly understood, strictly metaphorical 
in nature. 
Yet, this second type of religious anthropomorphism is highly ambiguous, 
because while it is essential that educated individuals interpret such language 
metaphorically, it is equally—if not more—important that the masses persist in 
interpreting such instances of religious anthropomorphism literally, so as to ensure the 
social stability of society. Accordingly, instances of this second type of religious 
anthropomorphism fall under the domain of “necessary beliefs,” for Maimonides. 
 Intriguingly, toward the end of part one of the Guide, Maimonides suggests that 
even those theological beliefs that fall along the most adequate side of the spectrum of 
religious language—what he refers to as “true beliefs”—may contain misleading, 
potentially anthropomorphic elements. He goes on to argue that even the abstract, 
metaphysical attributes of God (e.g., omniscience and omnipotence) are ultimately 
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anthropomorphic insofar as they are interpreted literally, or univocally. Consider, for 
example the attribute of divine knowledge. To predicate “knowledge” of God univocally 
would mean that God knows things in more or less the same way that humans know 
things (even if God knows more than humans ever could). This, for Maimonides, is the 
quintessence of religion anthropomorphism. Hence, he argues that we cannot attribute 
knowledge to God in a univocal sense. Furthermore, Maimonides was also suspicious of 
interpreting the Divine attributes analogously. To predicate knowledge of God is 
analogous manner would mean that divine knowledge is substantively different from 
human knowledge, but also similar to human knowledge in some respect. Maimonides 
seemed to worry that interpreting the divine attributes analogously would still leave an 
open door through which some trace of religious anthropomorphism might enter. As a 
result, he argued that the divine attributes must be interpreted in a purely equivocal sense. 
On an equivocal account of predication, there is no semantic relationship between the 
attribute “knowledge” when it is applied to humans and when it is applied to God. 
Maimonides writes, 
Similarly it behooves those who believe that there are essential attributes that may be 
predicated of the Creator—namely, that He is existent, living, possessing power, 
knowing, and willing—to understand that these notions are not ascribed to Him as to 
us in the same sense…the term ‘existent’ is predicated of Him, may He be exalted, and 
of everything that is other than He, in a purely equivocal sense. Similarly the terms 
‘knowledge,’ ‘power,’ ‘will,’ and ‘life,’ as applied to Him…and to all those possessing 
knowledge, power, will, and life, are purely equivocal, so that their meaning when they 
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are predicated of Him is in no way like their meaning in other applications.210  
 The somewhat counterintuitive consequence of interpreting the divine attributes 
equivocally is that they cease to deliver any information whatsoever about the Divine 
nature. In the same way that the concept “bank” can be used equivocally to refer either to 
the land along the edge of a river or a financial institution, the word “knowledge” can be 
applied equivocally in referring to humans or to God, but there is no semantic connection 
between these two usages of the term. And since humans have no empirical access to 
God’s “knowledge,” this attribute—understood equivocally—cannot provide us with any 
information about what it means to assert that God “knows” something.  
 Maimonides' insistence upon the equivocal interpretation of the divine attributes 
leads to his famous discourse on negative theology in part one of the Guide. Here he 
argues that the conceptual/linguistic mode that brings us closest to the divine nature is 
that of negation. Maimonides writes, “know that the description of God, may He be 
cherished and exalted, by means of negations is the correct description.”211 Although he 
does not mention Plotinus in this discussion, Maimonides’ exposition on negative 
theology is perhaps the most distinctly Neoplatonic moment in the entirety of the Guide. 
Here Maimonides insists, in good Plotinian fashion, that to predicate distinct attributes of 
God is to abrogate the qualitative distinction between finite beings and the infinite ground 
of being. Finite entities can be said to possess this or that attribute, but to say that God 
possesses attributes would be to drag the transcendent and infinite down to the level of 
finite entities: “everything in these attributes that you regard as a perfection is a 
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deficiency with regard to Him…as long as it belongs to a species to which the things that 
are with us belong.”212 
Discussing the ontology of the divine nature, Maimonides refers to, “God’s being 
One by virtue of a true Oneness, so that no composition whatever is to be found in Him 
and no possibility of division in any way whatever…He…has in no way and in no mode 
any essential attribute, and that just as it is impossible that He should be a body, it is also 
impossible that He should possess an essential attribute.”213 More importantly, 
Maimonides suggests that to ascribe positive attributes to the infinite, utterly simple 
divine nature is a contradiction in terms: “If, however, someone believes that He is one, 
but possesses a certain number of essential attributes, he says in his words that He is one, 
but believes Him in his thought to be many.”214 Maimonides goes on to write: 
It has accordingly become manifest to you that in every case in which the 
demonstration that a certain thing should be negated with reference to Him becomes 
clear to you, you become more perfect, and that in every case in which you affirm of 
Him an additional thing, you become one who likens Him to other things and you get 
further away from the knowledge of His true reality.”215 
In the following section, Maimonides goes a step further down the path of the via 
negativa, claiming that the individual who affirms that God possesses positive attributes 
“has abolished his belief in the existence of the deity without being aware of it.”216  
The via negativa functions for Maimonides as a linguistic strategy to undo the 
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conceptual knots that inevitably result from predicating positive attributes of an infinite, 
simple God by opting instead to deny all such attributions. This leads us to the zenith of 
Maimonides’ discourse on negative theology. Whereas earlier in the Guide, he sought to 
combat anthropomorphism by interpreting the divine attributes equivocally, Maimonides 
now argues that even equivocal language about the divine nature should be abandoned in 
the name of reverent, apophatic silence. 
The most apt phrase concerning this subject is the dictum occurring in the 
Psalms…silence with regard to You is praise. This is a most perfectly put phrase 
regarding the matter. For of whatever we say intending to magnify and exalt, on the one 
hand we find that it can have some application to Him, may He be exalted, and on the 
other we perceive in it some deficiency. Accordingly, silence and limiting oneself to the 
apprehensions of the intellect are more appropriate…217  
 In the end, however, Maimonides’ strident apophaticism turns out to be one 
theological moment among many in the Guide. Of course, the fact that Maimonides 
continues his discourse after having made the apophatic remarks above is not in itself an 
indefensible self-contradiction on his part. After all, negative theology traditionally exists 
in dialectical tension with kataphatic theology. What is more troubling is the fact that 
Maimonides goes on to present arguments for divine attributes that, at first blush, appear 
to directly contradict his negative theology. 
In chapter 68 of part I of the Guide, Maimonides defends the attribution of mind 
or intellect to the divine nature. Maimonides’ aim in this chapter is to demonstrate how 
                                                                            
217 Guide, I: 59, pp. 139-140. 
  109 
the attribution of intellect to God does not introduce multiplicity to the divine nature.218 
Drawing upon Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Maimonides argues that the divine intellect 
abides in pure actuality (what he refers to as “in actu”). He further claims that the divine 
intellect is simple, in that the knowing subject, the act of knowing, and object known are 
one within the divine: “Whenever, therefore, you assume that an intellect exists in actu, 
that intellect is identical with the apprehension of what has been intellectually 
cognized…consequently the intellect, the intellectually cognizing subject, and the 
intellectually cognized object are always one and the same thing in the case of everything 
that is cognized in actu.”219 Maimonides elaborates on this point further: 
Now when it is demonstrated that God…is an intellect in actu and that there is 
absolutely no potentiality in Him…it follows necessarily that He and the thing 
apprehended are one thing, which is His essence. Moreover, the act of apprehension 
owing to which He is said to be an intellectually cognizing subject is, in itself the 
intellect, which is His essence…it is accordingly also clear that the numerical unity of 
the intellect, the intellectually cognizing subject, and the intellectually cognized object, 
does not hold good with reference to the Creator only, but also with reference to every 
intellect.220 
 At the end of this chapter, Maimonides reiterates his doctrine of the unity of the 
divine intellect with the divine essence and even acknowledges the rather counterintuitive 
logic of this position: “Thus His essence is the intellectually cognizing subject, the 
intellectually cognized object, and the intellect, as is also necessarily the case with regard 
to every intellect in actu. We have repeated this notion several times in this chapter because 
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the minds of men are very much strangers to this way of representing the thing to 
oneself.”221  
 Maimonides takes up the issue of divine knowledge again in part III of the Guide. 
Here he reaffirms the absolute simplicity of the divine intellect and, for a second time, 
acknowledges the attendant conceptual conundrums that this metaphysical postulation 
engenders: “Although we do not know the true reality of His knowledge because it is His 
essence, we do know that He does not apprehend at certain times while being ignorant at 
others. I mean to say that no new knowledge comes to Him in any way; that His 
knowledge is neither multiple nor finite; that nothing among all the beings is hidden from 
him; and that His knowledge of them does not abolish their natures…all the 
contradictions that may appear in the union of these assertions are due to their being 
considered in relation to our knowledge, which has only its name in common with His 
knowledge.”222 Maimonides goes on to clarify that the term “knowledge” is predicated of 
God in a purely equivocal sense. He writes, “It is accordingly true that the meaning of 
knowledge, the meaning of purpose, and the meaning of providence, when ascribed to us, 
are different from the meanings of these terms when ascribed to Him.”223  
 The prima facie contradiction between Maimonides’ positive account of the 
divine intellect and his negative theology has garnered much attention among scholars. 
For example, in the introductory essay to his seminal translation of the Guide, Shlomo 
Pines observes, “it is evident that the statement that God cognizes and the consequent 
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assertions that He cognizes Himself…are positive statements and as such in contradiction 
with the spirit and tendency of negative theology.”224 
What’s more, Maimonides’ account of the divine intellect also appears to violate 
the principle of equivocal predication. As we saw above, Maimonides insists that the 
divine attributes must be interpreted equivocally, so as to avoid introducing 
anthropomorphic elements to the divine nature. Yet, in his exposition of the divine 
intellect, Maimonides draws an explicit analogy between the trifold unity of divine 
intellection and that of human intellection. Recall Maimonides’ statement that,  “the 
numerical unity of the intellect, the intellectually cognizing subject, and the intellectually 
cognized object, does not hold good with reference to the Creator only, but also with 
reference to every intellect.”225 It follows from this that the divine intellect is analogous 
to the human intellect in respect of this trifold unity (the analogy holds even if we grant 
that the divine intellect transcends the finite nature of human intellection).226 Elsewhere 
in the Guide, Maimonides claims that God knows and providentially “watches over” 
human beings.227 Implicit in this claim is a conception of divine knowledge that is clearly 
analogous to human knowledge (even if it vastly transcends human knowledge). For 
example, on this view, the divine is consciously aware of objects other than itself. 
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Moreover, God is capable of intentionally directing conscious awareness to some 
phenomena (humans) rather than others (all other creatures).228 It follows that the divine 
intellect is analogous to the human intellect in these respects. Consequently, it seems that 
Maimonides account of the nature of the divine intellect runs afoul of his previous claim 
that the term “knowledge” is predicated of God in a purely equivocal fashion. 
 In summary, Maimonides account of the divine intellect appears to contradict 
both his negative theology and his doctrine of equivocal predication. What are we to 
make of these apparent contradictions? Some Maimonides scholars, such as Shlomo 
Pines, suggest that these contradictions are in fact intentional on the part of Maimonides. 
Pines writes: “it may be recalled…that in his Introduction to the Guide Maimonides 
states that for reasons given by him he deliberately inserted into this work contradictory 
theses (one false and one correct). Is this an instance of this didactic method, and if so, 
which of the two doctrines [i.e., the divine intellect or the via negativa] represents 
Maimonides’ real opinion? Prima face either of them is admissible.”229 Ultimately, Pines 
declines to comment on which of the two doctrines he believes to represent Maimonides’ 
“real” position on the divine nature. However, many scholars go further in trying to make 
sense of the contradiction between these two elements of Maimonides’ thought. 
For example, Ehud Benor argues that the account of the divine intellect—when 
taken at face value as an ontological feature of the divine reality—is irremediably 
anthropomorphic and therefore untenable in light of Maimonides’ extreme antipathy 
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toward religious anthropomorphism and his negative theology.230 Thus, Benor contends 
that the divine intellect should be understood as a symbol that points to the divine nature, 
rather than describing some feature (intellect) thereof.231 On this view, the divine intellect 
would fall under the domain of “necessary beliefs.” It would follow from this reading that 
Maimonides introduced the doctrine of the divine intellect to the Guide not because it is a 
“true belief” about the ontology of God, but rather because the idea serves an essential 
practical role within the religious community. As with other so-called necessary beliefs, 
the educated individual will reject the popular, literal interpretation of this teaching and 
instead interpret it figuratively, or symbolically. 
Other Scholars maintain that, far from being a smokescreen that functions to veil 
Maimonides’ actual position on the divine nature, the contradictions surrounding the 
divine intellect and the via negativa are the result of two fundamental theological 
convictions that Maimonides could not do without. Hannah Kasher describes this 
problem as “the contradiction between the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic concepts of God 
in Maimonides’ teachings.”232 Kasher argues that while the contradiction between these 
two conceptions of God may never be completely resolved—this perhaps due to the 
limitations of human language—one may nevertheless strive to hold them together in 
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Review 88, no. 3 (1995): 339–60. 
231 Benor writes, “As he invokes the notion of the intellect, Maimonides reminds the student not to believe 
that the comparison denotes what God is. Maimonides uses the notion of the human intellect as a symbol 
for God's mode of being. Thinking of God as an intellect makes it easier for our mind to accept the reality 
of God's immaterial mode of being, but thinking about God and knowing are separate things. The 
distinction between them is secured by the demand of negative theology that human beings deny of God 
everything that God is not, everything that does not share God's unique mode of necessary existence the 
intellect included.” Benor, (1995): 356-357. 
232 Hannah Kasher, “Self-Cognizing Intellect and Negative Attributes in Maimonides’ Theology,” Harvard 
Theological Review 87, no. 4 (1994): 462. 
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dialectical tension, as does Maimonides in the Guide.  
In his book Method and Metaphysics in Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed, 
Daniel Davies argues that the aforementioned contradictions in Maimonides’ concept of 
the divine are in fact only surface level. He contends that a nuanced interpretation of the 
divine intellect—understood as an absolute perfection of the divine nature—is in fact 
completely compatible with Maimonides’ negative theology.233 
Diana Lobel has argued that the apparent contradiction between these aspects of 
Maimonides’ thought can be reconciled by interpreting the divine intellect as an attribute 
of divine action, as opposed to an attribute of the divine essence.234 She further argues 
                                                                            
233 See , esp. Chapters 4-6. I find Davies’ reading of this apparent contradiction in Maimonides thought to 
be interesting, though ultimately unsatisfying. For even if the divine intellect is understood as an “absolute 
perfection” of God (rather than as an attribute that is “tacked on,” as it were, to the divine nature) there still 
remains the problem of the trifold structure of the divine intellect, and the fact that this structure of the 
divine intellect entails multiplicity. Merely stipulating that the trifold structure of the divine intellect is one 
with the divine essence (and thus does not entail multiplicity) is not an argument so much as an assertion: it 
does nothing to address the prima facie logical contradiction inherent to the idea of a purely simple, 
tripartite unity. What’s more, the claim that the divine intellect is an “absolute perfection” of the divine 
nature also runs into the problem that Plotinus pointed out so clearly in the Enneads: namely, to identify 
anything with the One—whether it be a moral attribute, the attribute of intellect, or even the idea of the 
divine intellect as “an absolute perfection”—is ipso facto to introduce multiplicity to that which is by 
definition bereft of multiplicity. This is because the only “perfection” of the One is its absolute simplicity; 
to paraphrase Plotinus, the One “has nothing,” and this is what makes it the simple ground of all things. 
Consequently, the contradiction between the divine intellect and Maimonides negative theology still 
remains, even if the former is understood to be an “absolute perfection” of the divine nature. 
In contrast to Davies’ position, Ehud Benor’s argument (Benor, 1995) for a symbolic 
interpretation of the divine intellect has the virtue of avoiding this problem all together. Insofar as the 
divine intellect is understood as a symbol that functions to point to—rather than describing an ontological 
feature of—the divine nature the absolutely simple, ineffable divine reality, then this view preserves the 
divine simplicity. Accordingly, Benor’s symbolic interpretation of the divine intellect contradicts neither 
the doctrine of equivocal predication nor Maimonides negative theology. The weakness of Benor’s 
position, as I see it, is that unlike Davies’ argument, which is a strictly philosophical analysis of and 
argument for the coherence of Maimonides account of the divine intellect and his negative theology, Benor 
seems to argue as if one can infer from various passages in the Guide that Maimonides himself did in fact 
conceive of the divine intellect in a symbolic fashion. Yet, however plausible a symbolic interpretation of 
the divine intellect may be on its own terms, it is by no means clear that this was in fact Maimonides actual 
position on the matter. This is borne out by the sheer number of interpretations of the divine intellect 
among Maimonides scholars. 
234 Diana Lobel, “‘Silence Is Praise to You’: Maimonides on Negative Theology, Looseness of Expression, 
and Religious Experience,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 76, no. 1 (2002): 36.  Lobel cites 
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that Maimonides’ account of the divine intellect does not run afoul of the doctrine of 
equivocity, as his teachings on the divine intellect fall under the rubric of his concept of 
“looseness of expression.”235 On this account, the various analogies Maimonides draws 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Guide I: 53, where Maimonides states “every attribute that is found in the books of the deity, may He be 
exalted, is therefore an attribute of His action and not an attribute of His essence.” Maimonides’ goal here 
is to direct theological language away from the divine essence and toward the God-world relationship vis-a-
vis the divine act of creation. Yet insofar as divine action (i.e., creation) is understood by Maimonides to be 
the result of divine providential knowledge (Guide III: 17), the above move only seems to only defer the 
problem of the divine intellect; it leaves unresolved the issue of the relationship between providential, 
intellective divine action and the divine essence that necessarily grounds this action. Plotinus provides a 
helpful contrast here. While one could speak of divine action in the case of the Plotinian One, it would refer 
to creation via emanation—the spontaneously overflowing of the One into multiplicity. However, one 
could not properly assign intellection (or providence) to divine action in this case, because the One does not 
possess intellect to begin with. For Plotinus, intellect is neither a feature of the divine nature, nor of divine 
action; rather it is a created product of divine action (emanation)—that is, the first so-called hypostasis of 
the One. In the case of Maimonides, then, the attribution of divine intellect to divine action appears to 
logically entail that the divine essence is intellective: insofar as divine action flows out of the divine nature 
(which he explicitly affirms in Guide III: 17, p. 473-474), it seems to follow that intellective divine action 
is possible only because the divine nature itself is intellective. (Indeed, to argue the opposite would lead to 
the bewildering metaphysical position that a non-intellective divinity acts in the world in an intellective 
manner.) Consequently, Maimonides’ strategy of attributing the divine intellect to divine action succeeds 
only in preserving apophatic silence with respect to the divine essence. Nevertheless, the claim that divine 
action is intellective logically entails—without explicitly claiming—that the divine nature is also 
intellective. If this line of reasoning is correct, then the contradiction between the Maimonides’ account of 
the divine intellect and his negative theology is not resolved by the aforementioned strategy, rather, it is 
merely evaded. 
235 Lobel, Ibid., p. 41. I agree that interpreting the divine intellect in a purely equivocal manner would 
resolve the contradiction between this doctrine and Maimonides’ negative theology. What gives me pause, 
however, is that (at least by my lights) it seems difficult to square some of what Maimonides says about the 
divine intellect with a purely equivocal interpretation of this attribute. In some cases, Maimonides does use 
the term in what appears to be a genuinely equivocal fashion, as in Guide 1: 58, wherein the divine intellect 
is ultimately understood as referring to the life of the divine reality itself. In this case, I think we have a 
genuine instance of equivocal predication. Accordingly, this account does not appear to contradict 
Maimonides negative theology, as the stated meaning of the divine intellect is in no way analogous to 
human intellection, but rather functions as an indirect way of speaking of the dependence of creation upon 
the life of the divine. 
 In other places, however, Maimonides makes substantive knowledge claims about the divine 
intellect that appear to violate the principle of pure equivocity. For example, in Guide 1: 68, Maimonides 
explicitly affirms that the trifold structure of the divine intellect “does not hold good with reference to the 
Creator only, but also with reference to every intellect.” I find it somewhat counterintuitive to interpret 
such a clear case of analogy as representing the complete opposite form of predication, viz., as an instance 
of pure equivocity. For, if Maimonides wanted to maintain a purely equivocal conception of the divine 
intellect, why introduce any analogies between the divine and human intellect to begin with? If the purpose 
of such analogies is in fact strictly pedagogical, as Lobel argues, and they are therefore understood in a 
purely equivocal sense (i.e., they function to point us toward—rather than describing a fundamental feature 
of—the divine nature), then I am in agreement that such a reading would resolve the aforementioned 
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between divine and human intellection are not to be taken literally (as actual analogies), 
but rather as “loose expressions” that are employed for pedagogical reasons— something 
akin to the concept of upāya kauśalya, or “skillful means” in Mahayana Buddhist 
philosophy.236  
To sum up: at present there does not appear to be any scholarly consensus 
concerning the interpretation of Maimonides’ doctrine of the divine intellect in light of 
his negative theology. Nevertheless, there is a significant sense in which the ambiguity—
if not outright contradiction—in Maimonides thought on this matter both problematizes 
and complements our distinction between the “attenuated anthropomorphic” and “anti-
anthropomorphic” branches of Neoplatonic onto-theology. In one sense, Maimonides’ 
onto-theology problematizes this distinction because one could readily conceive of good 
arguments for including him in either the attenuated anthropomorphic branch or the anti-
anthropomorphic branch of this tradition.  
What’s more, one could follow Pines’ agnosticism on the matter, and say that 
Maimonides belongs to neither of these sub-traditions. This line of reasoning might go 
something like this: parts of the Guide reflect an attenuated anthropomorphic viewpoint 
(the account of the divine intellect), and other parts reflect an anti-anthropomorphic 
viewpoint (the doctrine of equivocity and negative theology); the contradiction between 
these doctrines is never reconciled within the text itself, and we will never know what 
Maimonides himself really thought about the matter. Therefore, Maimonides’ thought 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
contradiction in Maimonides’ thought—indeed, in very much the same way that Benor’s reading would 
resolve this issue.  
236 See Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990)., p. 92. 
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cannot be encapsulated in either branch of Neoplatonic onto-theology. 
There is clearly something to this argument. However, it is ultimately 
unsatisfying, because it papers over a simple, yet crucial fact: namely, that unlike 
Plotinus, Schleiermacher, or Tillich, Maimonides saw fit to promulgate arguments in 
defense of the divine intellect as an ontological feature of the divine nature. It is true that, 
given the diversity of scholarly opinions on the matter, we may never know how 
Maimonides intended for this doctrine to be interpreted. But there is no denying the 
simple fact that the Guide includes arguments defending the reality of the divine intellect. 
It seems best then to take Maimonides at his word: insofar as he saw fit to include 
within the Guide arguments on behalf of the divine intellect, his thought should be 
provisionally included within the “attenuated anthropomorphic” branch of Neoplatonic 
onto-theology. I use the word “provisionally” quite deliberately. Let us imagine a 
hypothetical scenario in the future wherein there was significant new evidence (or an 
emerging scholarly consensus) suggesting that Benor’s reading is correct, and that the 
most accurate interpretation of Maimonides’ view of the divine intellect is a symbolic 
account (i.e., the concept of the divine intellect functions to point toward—rather than 
describing a fundamental feature of—the divine nature). In this scenario, Maimonides’ 
ontology of God would no longer be properly described under the label of “attenuated 
anthropomorphism;” rather, it would fall under the domain of “anti-anthropomorphic” 
Neoplatonic onto-theology. 
The aforementioned conceptual ambiguity in Maimonides’ thought helps to 
isolate precisely what is at stake in the divide within Neoplatonic onto-theology. Insofar 
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as Maimonides’ account of the divine intellect is interpreted as referring to a fundamental 
feature of the divine nature, his thought can be understood as instance of an attenuated 
anti-anthropomorphic view of God—it denies most anthropomorphic attributions to the 
divine nature, but preserves others, such as the capacity of intellection. But insofar as 
Maimonides’ account of the divine intellect is interpreted symbolically, as pointing 
toward (rather than describing) the utterly simple, featureless divine nature, his position is 
best understood as an anti-anthropomorphic view of God—it denies that any 
anthropomorphic attributes can be said to describe the divine nature, which, by definition 
is bereft of attributes and features.  
 All in all, Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed comprises one of the most 
important analyses of the problem of religious anthropomorphism in the history of 
Western thought. And far from being a shortcoming of the book, the aforementioned 
conceptual difficulties and ambiguities within the Guide function as an invitation for 
readers to carefully think through what is at stake—both logically and theologically—in 
the vexed question of religious anthropomorphism with respect to the ontology of God. 
Perhaps this is just what Maimonides had in mind.  
We now turn to the last figure under consideration in this chapter: Dominican 
philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas, who was deeply influenced by 
Maimonides’ thought. 
2.4 Thomas Aquinas on God as Ipsum Esse  
 By many accounts, the Christian adaptation of the onto-theological tradition 
reaches its zenith during the high Middle Ages in the figure of Thomas Aquinas (1225-
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1274 CE). Although Thomas lived less than century after the death of Maimonides, his 
theological inquiry occurred in a markedly different social context. While both figures 
theorized on behalf of active religious traditions and institutions, the institutional context 
in which Thomas taught and wrote his theological treatises—the Roman Catholic 
Church—was at that time was the most socially and politically powerful institution in all 
of Europe. This social and institutional context functioned both to nurture and constrain 
theological inquiry. In sharp contrast to the social context of the pre-Socratics or that of 
Plotinus, most of the onto-theological speculation that took place in the Middle Ages was 
both supported and policed by institutional religious authorities. Theological speculation 
that failed to line up with Catholic orthodoxy could land one in serious trouble. A classic 
example (to be discussed in the following chapter) is Dominican philosopher, theologian, 
and preacher Meister Eckhart (1260-1328 CE), whose mystical writings were condemned 
as heretical by the church magisterium.237 In fact, before Thomas was canonized as a 
Sacred Doctor of the Catholic Church, several of his treatises were scrutinized by Church 
officials who suspected him of heresy. Ultimately, Thomas’ work was vindicated by 
Church authorities, and today he is remembered as the premier Catholic theologian of the 
Middle Ages.238 
 Like the other two figures discussed in this chapter, Thomas sought to employ the 
best insights of Greek philosophy as a conceptual framework for explicating and 
                                                                            
237 See Eckhart, The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises and Defense (New York: Paulist Press, 
1981)., part one. 
238 For an intriguing account of the relationship between Thomas’ writing and the institutional authorities 
of the Catholic Church, see Mark D. Jordan’s essay “St. Thomas and the Police,” in Mark D. Jordan, 
Rewritten Theology: Aquinas after His Readers, Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Malden, MA ; 
Oxford: Blackwell Pub, 2006). 
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reflecting upon the ideas of God revealed in the sacred texts of his tradition. For the most 
part, Thomas looked to Aristotle as his primary philosophical guide. With respect to the 
divine nature however, Thomas, like Maimonides, jettisoned the Aristotelian conception 
of God as First and Final Cause and instead adopted a Neoplatonic view of God as the 
ontological source of all finite being. 
Thomas’ most systematic treatment of the divine nature appears in his monumental 
Summa Theologiae (hereafter ST). In this work, Thomas takes great care to distinguish 
between what we can know of God by means of human reason and those aspects of the 
divine nature that can only be known to us by faith and divine revelation. Thomas 
arranged his doctrine of God in the Prima Pars of the ST to begin with what can be 
known of God by way of philosophical reasoning and natural theology (e.g., his famous 
“five ways”). He goes on for several hundred pages, analyzing the Divine simplicity, 
eternality, unity, and goodness—all classic issues in the Neoplatonic onto-theological 
tradition—before finally introducing the uniquely Christian doctrine of the Trinity.239 
And yet, at the outset of the ST Thomas claims that philosophy is a “handmaiden to 
theology,” and he identifies theology as the “queen of the sciences.”240 However, if this is 
the case, why did he not begin his Summa with the uniquely Christian doctrine of the 
Trinity, instead of philosophical arguments proving the existence of a First Cause? On 
Thomas’s outlook, there are certain truths, such as the reality of the Trinity, which are 
beyond powers of human reason, and must be revealed to us by God (via sacred scripture 
                                                                            
239 Thomas., Summa Theologiae,  I. Q. 27. 
240 Thomas., ST, I, Q. 1, a. 5, ad 1. 
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and tradition).241 Consequently, he begins his Summa with those aspects of the Divine 
nature that we can know by way of philosophical reflection and inferences from the 
natural world. After having discussed all that can be known of God through reason alone, 
Thomas goes on to explore those aspects of the divine nature that surpass human 
knowledge (unaided by special revelation), but are nevertheless knowable through special 
revelation, e.g., the Trinity.  
At the heart of Thomas’ doctrine of God is the assertion that God is the infinite, 
utterly simple ontological principle upon which all finite reality depends. In Thomas’ 
words, God is Ipsum Esse (Being-itself) or Actus Purus (Pure Act).242 As we have seen in 
our discussion of Augustine and Maimonides, this Neoplatonic onto-theology 
problematizes many of the anthropomorphic depictions of God in the Hebrew and 
Christian scriptures. But whereas Maimonides dedicated numerous pages to the problem 
of religious anthropomorphism in the bible, Thomas’ primary objective in the Summa is 
the construction of a philosophical and theological system. Accordingly, Thomas 
dedicates two relatively brief articles to the problem of anthropomorphic language in the 
bible at the outset of the Summa, and then moves on to other theological issues. If we 
compare this account with that of the Guide of the Perplexed, it becomes clear that the 
problem of religious anthropomorphic language in the scriptures is far less agonizing an 
issue for Thomas than it was for Maimonides. Indeed, Thomas’s handling of the issue of 
biblical anthropomorphism is compact and rather subdued:  
                                                                            
241 Thomas., ST, I, Q. 1, a. 1. 
242  See Thomas, ST: 1 Q. 3, a. 2; 1 Q 4, a. 2; 1 Q. 8, a. 1.; and 1 Q. 44, a.1. 
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It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and spiritual truths by means of 
comparisons with material things. For God provides for everything according to the 
capacity of its nature. Now it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through 
sensible objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy Writ, 
spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of material things.243  
He goes on to enumerate various linguistic devices by means of which scripture 
depicts the Divine. According to Thomas, the bible’s various linguistic modes of 
reference range from the literal, historical, and etiological, to the spiritual, allegorical, 
and parabolical, among others. Thus, Thomas contends that we must interpret the 
numerous instances of anthropomorphic depictions of God in the scriptures in a non-
literal fashion. Citing the example of the biblical reference to God’s “mighty arm,” 
Thomas writes, “when Scripture speaks of God’s arm, the literal sense is not that God has 
such a member, but only what is signified by this member, namely operative power. 
Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ.”244 
For Thomas, this hermeneutical principle applies to many other instances of religious 
anthropomorphism in the bible, including, for example, depictions of God’s anger and 
wrath.245 
Having addressed with the issue of anthropomorphic depictions of God in the 
scriptures, Thomas goes on to consider the reality and nature of God as such. He begins 
this discussion on an apophatic note, arguing that we have no direct, positive knowledge 
of the divine nature itself—rather, we can only know what God is not. 
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244 Thomas, ST, 1. Q. 1, a. 10. 
245 Thomas, ST, 1. Q. 3, a. 2. 
  123 
Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no 
means for considering how God is, but rather how He is not…Now it can be shown 
how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. 
composition, motion, and the like.246 
On this view, the classic attributes of God are to be understood as negations with 
respect to the divine nature. Accordingly, the divine simplicity is the principle “whereby 
we deny composition in Him.”247 Similarly, the divine infinity is to be interpreted 
negatively as the denial of finitude in God; the divine immutability is understood as the 
denial of change in the divine nature; the divine eternity is the denial of temporality in 
God; and the divine unity is the denial of duality within the divine nature.  
Though Thomas tends toward a negative theology with respect to the Divine essence, 
he ultimately strikes a balance between the via negativa and the via positiva. On his view, 
all negations with respect to the nature of God are derivative, and thus must be based 
upon some prior positive statement about the Divine nature. In good Neoplatonic fashion, 
Thomas contends that the only affirmation about the Divine nature that is not essentially 
a negation is that God, as Ipsum Esse, is the “cause of everything;” that is to say, the 
ontological ground of all finite reality.248 Consequently, the relationship between God 
and creatures is to be understood primarily in terms of ontological dependence and 
participation: God is the infinite ground upon which all finite things (creatures) depend, 
and the ontological plenitude in which all finite things participate insofar as they have 
any being whatsoever. This onto-theological view of the divine nature rules out 
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anthropomorphic conceptions of divine creation wherein God is conceived of as an agent 
who forms things out of pre-existing matter. Rather, Thomas understands divine creation 
in a fundamentally ontological sense: 
Now since God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper 
effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this effect in things not 
only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being…therefore 
as long as a thing has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being. 
But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things 
since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing…hence it must be that God 
is in all things, and innermostly.”249 
As ipsum esse, God is the very power of being in all things. Thomas goes on to 
state that, “God is above all things by the excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in 
all things as the cause of being of all things.”250  
With this ontology of the Divine nature set in place, Thomas is forced to confront 
the fundamental predicament of Neoplatonic onto-theology, viz., how does one say 
anything about the nature of an infinite, simple, transcendent divinity without descending 
into gross anthropomorphism on the one hand, or lapsing into total silence, on the other? 
This fraught issue is addressed at length in question 13 of the Prima Pars, which focuses 
on the problem of how names and attributes that derive from the finite realm of creatures 
(i.e., humans) can also be attributed to the infinite ground of Being. Here Thomas appears 
to back away from the apophatic stance of question 3 of the Prima Pars, in which he 
claims that we only possess negative knowledge of the divine essence (i.e., one can only 
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know what God is not). In contrast, in question 13 we find Thomas insisting that one can 
in fact gain positive knowledge about the nature of the divine being. How? In short: by 
analogy. 
 Thomas argues that names (or attributes) derived from the creaturely realm (e.g., 
goodness) can be predicated of the divine nature in a positive, albeit qualified sense. The 
qualification stems from the fact that human beings only have direct knowledge of finite 
things (or, “creatures” to use Thomas’ language). Hence humans draw inferences about 
the divine Goodness on the basis of what we finite beings know of finite goodness. 
Crucially however, the proper inference about the divine Goodness is not that it is like 
human goodness only much greater. Rather, it is that whatever goodness we experience 
as humans must be ontologically grounded in the nature of God, where it exists in an 
infinitely greater way. Thomas writes: 
These names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect 
knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him…Therefore 
the…names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures 
represent it imperfectly. So when we say, ‘God is good,’ the meaning is not, ‘God is 
the cause of goodness,’ or ‘God is not evil’; but the meaning is, ‘Whatever good we 
attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God,’ and in a more excellent and higher way. 251 
The question of how creaturely names or attributes can be said to apply to God 
“in a more excellent and higher way” leads directly to Thomas’ famous account of 
analogous predication. This idea—later dubbed the analogia entis, or the analogy of 
being—went on to become a central doctrine in Catholic theology, and there exists an 
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enormous and still-growing secondary literature on this topic.252 In what follows, I limit 
myself to what Thomas himself says about analogical predication.  
Thomas begins his account of analogous predication with the claim that, 
“univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures.”253 Here Thomas is in 
complete agreement with Maimonides (whose account of divine predication had a 
significant impact of his thought). Both figures maintain that predicating attributes of 
God in a univocal sense leads to excessive anthropomorphism, essentially implying that 
God is good, wise, and powerful (or whatever the attribute may be) in the same sense that 
humans are good, wise, and powerful. But there is an important metaphysical component 
to Thomas’ rejection of univocal predication. Insofar as God is understood to be the 
ultimate ontological cause of finite reality, it follows that there exists an infinite 
qualitative difference between the characteristics of finite beings and the nature of Being-
itself (or Ipsum Esse). Consequently, Thomas rejects univocal predication between God 
and creatures not only on the grounds of excessive anthropomorphism, but, more 
fundamentally, because he believes the position amounts to a metaphysical confusion: the 
claim that God and creatures share attributes in a univocal sense violates the qualitative 
distinction between the finite and the infinite.  
Yet, despite his outright rejection of univocal predication, Thomas is unwilling to 
accept Maimonides’ position that the divine attributes must be understood in a purely 
                                                                            
252 For a recent overview of contemporary theological treatments of the analogia entis, see Thomas Joseph 
White, ed., The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or the Wisdom of God? (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: Eerdmans, 2011). For one of the most influential accounts of the analogia entis in the early 20th 
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equivocal sense. He writes, 
It is evident that this term ‘wise’ is not applied in the same way to God and to man. 
The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God 
and of creatures. Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to god and creatures in 
a purely equivocal sense, as some has said. Because if that were so, it follows that from 
creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning 
would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation…Such a view is against the 
philosophers, who proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle 
says: ‘the invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that 
are made’ (Rom. 1:20). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and 
creatures in an analogous sense, i.e., according to proportion.254 
Thomas clarifies what is meant by “analogy according to proportion” by way of 
example: the word “healthy” can be predicated analogously of either medicine or urine. 
In both cases, the word is being used in proportion to the health of the human body. The 
former (medicine) is the cause of health in the body, and the latter (urine) is a sign or 
indication of the body’s health. The term “healthy” is clearly not being employed 
univocally, because of the obvious difference between a healthy urine sample and a 
healthy medicinal substance; both may said to be “healthy,” but in very different respects; 
e.g., most people would not want to imbibe a urine sample, no matter how “healthy” it is 
deemed to be by a physician. Yet, despite the different meanings of the term “healthy” in 
each instance, this is not a case of equivocal predication, because there is a clear semantic 
overlap between the two usages of the term. Different as urine and medicine may be, the 
term “healthy” is in both cases being predicated of them analogously in proportion to the 
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overall health of the human body. In other words, it is the meaning of the term “healthy” 
with respect to the human body that stabilizes the analogous predication of the term when 
it is applied to urine and medicine.255  
In a similar way, we humans employ attributes derived from the creaturely realm 
in order to speak analogously about the nature of the creator: 
And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a 
purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from 
creatures…Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation 
of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-
exist excellently.256 
For Thomas, analogous predication represents a middle path between the Scylla 
of gross anthropomorphism and the Charybdis of total agnosticism regarding the divine 
nature. As we’ve seen, predicating creaturely attributes of God (e.g., goodness or 
knowledge) in a univocal sense is open to the charge of excessive anthropomorphism on 
Thomas’s outlook. However, the alternative of equivocal predication leads to a view of 
the divine nature that is utterly bereft of any determinate content, insofar as purely 
equivocal attributes cannot deliver any positive information about the nature of God. As 
we saw above, Maimonides advocated for equivocal predication in principle (as a means 
of guarding against anthropomorphism), but in practice he was unable to abide the strict 
agnosticism vis-à-vis the divine nature that this view logically entails. Thomas was 
nothing if not a practical philosopher and theologian. And whereas Maimonides wrote his 
Guide for the elite, educated individual perplexed by the seemingly irrational elements of 
                                                                            
255 See Thomas, ST, 1. Q. 13, a. 5 
256 Thomas, ST, 1.Q. 13, a. 5. 
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their religious tradition, Thomas composed his Summa as a practical guide for the 
training of Catholic priests—individuals charged with interpreting and preaching a 
theologically coherent account of the Catholic faith. It is thus perhaps not surprising that 
the idea of equivocal predication was a non-starter for Thomas. After all, how does one 
preach about God if God’s nature is utterly unknowable?  
Of course, Plotinus was happy to adopt something like equivocal predication257 
(though he never used the actual term) in arguing for a conception of the divine nature 
bereft of any definite characteristics or determinate features—thus effectively ruling out 
univocal and analogous predication a priori. But then again, Plotinus was a mystic 
philosopher, not a teacher of preachers and priests situated within a major religious 
institution. And while it is true that Thomas’ ontology of God is essentially Neoplatonic, 
the doctrine of God laid out in the Summa goes much, much further than did Plotinus in 
specifying and describing the divine nature. The reason for this is relatively 
straightforward: The arid ontology of the Plotinian One, while providing a simple 
ontological ground for world of finite being, does not appear to be congruent prima facie 
with the all-knowing, loving, Triune God of orthodox Christianity. 
 Consequently, one of Thomas’ primary concerns in the Prima Pars of the Summa 
is to introduce a host of divine attributes to the arid onto-theological conception of God 
as being-itself, so as to render this view compatible with the personal God of the Catholic 
faith. To be clear, this is not to suggest that Thomas was not also concerned about 
                                                                            
257 Recall Plotinus’ statement in the Enneads that even his favorite name for the One, viz., “The Good” 
cannot be interpreted as actually predicating Goodness of the One as a proper attribute. Rather this name is 
simply a way for humans to gesture toward that which lies beyond all distinctions and characterization. 
Thus, Plotinus’ use of the term “the Good” in the Enneads is essentially an equivocal predicate.  
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mitigating religious anthropomorphism. As we have seen above, he disavows a literal 
interpretation of religious anthropomorphism in the bible (e.g., God possessing bodily 
features, God possessing emotions, etc.), and rejects all univocal predication of creaturely 
attributes to the divine nature on the grounds of excessive anthropomorphism. 
Nevertheless, Thomas’ concept of analogy (or the analogia entis)258 essentially functions 
to preserve religious anthropomorphism by providing a rational basis for the predication 
human-like attributes (e.g., knowledge, will, agential power) of the infinite, simple divine 
being. Accordingly, it is only after his account of analogous predication in question 13 of 
the Prima Pars that Thomas goes on to explicate the other classic attributes of God, such 
as divine knowledge (1.q 14, a. 1), divine agency and will (1.q. 19. a. 1), divine love (1. 
q. 20, a. 1), the divine providence (1. Q. 22, a. 1), and others.  
All of these attributes are drawn together in question 29 of the Prima Pars, where 
Thomas considers whether the anthropomorphic attribute of “personhood” can be 
predicated of God. He answers this question in the affirmative:  
I answer that, ‘Person’ signifies what is most perfect in all nature—that is, a subsistent 
individual of a rational nature. Hence, since everything that is perfect must be 
attributed to God, forasmuch as His essence contains every perfection, this name 
‘person’ is fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a 
more excellent way; as other names also, which, while giving them to creatures, we 
attribute to God.259 
Thus for Thomas, God is both infinite, simple Ipsum Esse and fundamentally 
                                                                            
258 Henceforth I will refer to Thomas’ account of analogous predication and the “analogia entis” 
interchangeably.  
259 Thomas, ST, 1. Q. 29, a. 3. 
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personal in nature. He rightfully underscores the fact that the creaturely attribute “person” 
cannot be predicated of God in a univocal sense: God is not a person in the same way that 
we humans are persons. Instead, Thomas’ claim is that the attribute of “personhood,” 
which refers to the most complex (or “perfect”) phenomenon in the finite world of which 
we are aware (i.e., we humans), must pre-exist within the infinite ground of being, “but in 
a more perfect way.” This rules out a purely equivocal interpretation, which would 
require complete agnosticism on the question of whether the divine personhood is in any 
way like human personhood. For Thomas, the attribute of personhood must be predicated 
of God in an analogous sense precisely because this view entails that human personhood 
and divine personhood have in enough in common such that the former can be said to 
ontologically pre-exist in the latter, albeit “in a more perfect way.” Hence the term 
“analogia entis”: there is an analogous relationship between certain characteristics of 
finite being and the infinite being of God. 
Given the ontological implications of analogous predication, it would be just as 
mistaken to conceive of the divine personhood univocally (God is a person in the same 
way that we are persons), as it would be to conceive of it equivocally (we cannot know if 
the divine personhood is in any way analogous to human personhood). 
Thomas’ ingenious theory of analogy is not without its problems, however. Most 
notably, there is a conceptual difficulty involved in employing analogous predication 
across the domain of the finite to the infinite, as opposed to analogous predication within 
the domain of finite being, as in Thomas’ example of the analogous use of the term health 
to refer to various aspects of bodily health. To predicate a term analogously (e.g., 
  132 
“healthy”) within the finite domain usually allows for the semantic scope of the term to 
be relatively stabilized, since we possess some knowledge about both items in the 
analogy (e.g., urine and medicine). However, when we employ analogous predication 
across the finite domain to the infinite, there arises a problem: we only possess 
knowledge of one side of the analogy. While we know something about what “goodness” 
means in the finite realm, we possess no experience or knowledge of the infinite. How 
then can we know if the attribute of goodness applies to the infinite in a way that is in 
fact analogous? Indeed, it is quite possible that the nature of the infinite is such that the 
attribute of “goodness” does not apply to it in a way that is analogous to finite 
goodness—in this case, the attribution would be an instance of equivocal predication.  
It seems then that there is no built-in principle by which one can stabilize the 
semantic scope of a finite attribute when it is predicated of the infinite, so as to ensure 
that the attribute is in fact analogous rather than equivocal. Here we may recall from 
chapter one that Hume made a similar point in his Dialogues, wherein his character Philo 
argues that analogous inferences from the finite to the infinite are always dubious, as we 
have no way of knowing whether a given analogy holds true of the infinite.260  
Many centuries before Hume, the 13th century scholastic philosopher and 
theologian John Duns Scotus raised an important objection to the doctrine of the analogia 
entis. Crucially, Scotus did not reject analogous predication tout court. Rather, he argued 
than any analogy between creatures and God must be based upon some fundamental 
concepts that are univocal. Without a univocal basis, analogous predication logically 
                                                                            
260 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman Kemp Smith (New York; London: 
Macmillan Pub. Co., 1947)., pp. 146 ff. 
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collapses into equivocity.261 Thus philosopher Anthony Kenny has observed that for 
Scotus, Thomas’ account of the analogia entis amounts to a conceptually muddled 
“halfway house between univocity and equivocation.”262 
 Interestingly, Thomas himself indirectly broaches the potential slippage from 
analogy to equivocity in his discussion of analogous predication. He writes: 
Thus also this term ‘wise’ applied to man in some degree circumscribes and 
comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; 
but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification 
of the name.263  
 Notice here that Thomas acknowledges that in any analogy between creatures and 
God we only possess experiential and epistemic access to one side of the analogy—the 
infinite side remains “incomprehended” by us. But no sooner does Thomas acknowledge 
this troubling feature of the analogia entis than he stipulates that the term “wise” does in 
fact apply to the infinite in an analogous sense, (though qua infinite, the term “wise” 
exceeds the finite, creaturely meaning of this term when it is predicated of God). It is 
important to note here that Thomas’ assumption that the term applies to God in an 
analogous sense does not follow with any logical necessity. In fact, one could just as 
easily draw the opposite conclusion, i.e., given the infinite qualitative difference between 
creatures and God, coupled with the fact that the divine infinity is by definition beyond 
our ken, it follows that we have no basis for analogous predication between creatures and 
God.  Rather, we should conceive of all predication from the finite creaturely domain to 
                                                                            
261 John Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings: A Selection (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 1987)., p. 19. 
262 Anthony Kenny, Medieval Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007)., p. 140. 
263 Thomas, ST, 1. Q. 13, a. 5—emphasis mine. 
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the infinite as purely equivocal in nature. This was essentially the position Maimonides 
espoused in his Guide.264 Given his knowledge of Maimonides’ theory of equivocal 
predication, one wonders whether Thomas ever lost any sleep over the specter of 
equivocity, which haunts any claim of analogy between finite creature and infinite Cause. 
 Nevertheless, even if we grant the cogency of the analogia entis, there remains a 
further problem with this doctrine, namely, that it appears to be inconsistent with the 
divine simplicity. As we have seen, Thomas’ theory of analogy functions to stabilize the 
predication of creaturely attributes to the divine nature. Yet, according to his account of 
divine simplicity, the divine nature must be free of all multiplicity, composition, and 
distinctions.265 However, divine attributes such as knowledge, omnipotence, providence, 
Triunity, et al., are all distinct, determinate ontological attributes, even when they are 
predicated in an analogous sense. This naturally provokes the question of how the simple, 
infinite ground of being can be said to possess attributes that entail distinctions and 
multiplicity. Following Augustine, Thomas sought to avoid the apparent inconsistency 
between the divine simplicity and the divine attributes by claiming that all of the divine 
attributes are essentially one with the Divine being. Thomas writes,  
All perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. 
Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that 
perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term ‘wise’ 
applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man’s essence, and distinct 
from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we apply it to 
                                                                            
264 Although “pure equivocity” was the official position of Maimonides with respect to divine predication, 
he was not necessarily consistent in implementing his official doctrine of pure equivocity throughout the 
Guide, as we saw above. 
265 See ST, 1. Q. 3, a. 7. 
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God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or 
existence.266  
 Consequently, on Thomas’ view, the divine attributes do not introduce 
distinctions or multiplicity to God, since they are identical with the divine essence. The 
conceptual coherence of this position, however, is far from obvious. On the one hand, 
Thomas predicates numerous, distinct positive attributes (knowledge, will, justice) of the 
divine nature in an analogous sense. On the other hand, Thomas claims these attributes do 
not add anything distinct to God—they are one with the divine essence, which is “in no 
way composite” but “is altogether simple.”267 Not unlike Augustine’s account of the 
divine simplicity, Thomas does not demonstrate or explain how it is that numerous 
distinct divine attributes can be identical with the absolutely simple divine essence—
rather, he stipulates that this is so. 
 In order to clarify why this position is conceptually problematic, it is useful to 
consider Thomas’ discussion of the unity of God in question 11 of the Prima Pars. Here 
he considers the question of whether the attribute “One” adds anything to being, thereby 
violating the simplicity of Ipsum esse. Thomas’ response harkens back to his discourse on 
negative theology: he argues that the term “One” is not a proper ontological attribute of 
God. God does not “possess” the property of oneness; rather, the term “One” functions as 
a negation when attributed to God. Thomas writes, “‘One” does not add any reality to 
‘being’; but is only a negation of division.”268 Thus, the term “One” is not an ontological 
attribute but a negation that functions to underscore the unity and simplicity of being-
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268 Thomas, ST, 1. Q. 11, a. 1. 
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itself. Given this understanding of the way the attribute “One” is predicated of God—i.e. 
as a negation—we can appreciate the coherence of Thomas’ claim that the attribute 
“One” does not add anything distinct to the divine nature. 
 However, this is does not appear to hold true when it comes to many of the other 
divine attributes, such as knowledge, omnipotence, providence, or justice. These 
attributes function not as negations, but rather as positive ontological attributes. By the 
phrase “positive ontological attribute” I mean to say that a given attribute (e.g., 
knowledge) introduces a distinct ontological capacity or characteristic to the divine 
nature, i.e., a positive ontological attribute is synthetic rather than analytic in nature. 
Crucially, it is perfectly conceivable to think of the divine being without the positive 
attribute of knowledge, or justice—one need look no further than Plotinus’ Enneads. In 
contrast, it is very difficult indeed to conceive of Ipsum esse without the idea of the 
negative attribute of oneness. And if someone were to argue either that 1) the negative 
attribute of oneness does not apply to Ipsum esse, or 2) the attribute of oneness does in 
fact add some distinct ontological characteristic to Ipsum esse, then the burden of proof 
would be on them to demonstrate how this is so.  
 Here it may be useful to consider this issue in light of Kant’s distinction between 
analytic and synthetic propositions. The propositions “being-itself is one,” or “Oneness is 
an attribute of being-itself,” are analytic statements: that is, the predicate “one” or 
“oneness” does not add anything distinctive to the subject (being-itself); rather it simply 
clarifies a defining characteristic of the subject (i.e., its lack of multiplicity). In contrast, 
the proposition “knowledge is an attribute of being-itself” is a synthetic statement: the 
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predicate “knowledge” introduces a substantive property to the subject that is not already 
contained within the definition of the subject. Consequently, the proposition that the 
attribute of oneness is identical with the divine nature appears to be a coherent analytic 
statement, whereas the proposition that the attribute of knowledge is identical with the 
divine essence is conceptually wooly at best.  
 Things only get fuzzier when we consider the fact that Thomas argues for 
numerous, distinct divine attributes in the Prima Pars. If we consider these attributes in 
light of the divine simplicity—which asserts that the divine attributes are identical with 
the divine essence—then it must follow that all of the divine attributes are in fact one in 
the same. Yet, the fact that the positive divine attributes are different from one another is 
difficult to gainsay: e.g., the divine knowledge refers to what God knows, whereas the 
divine omnipotence refers to God’s limitless power. That these attributes are distinct is 
made clear by the fact that we can imagine God possessing the attribute of knowledge 
without the attribute of omnipotence. Similarly, we can imagine God possessing the 
attribute of omnipotence without the attribute of justice, and so forth. Thus, the 
proposition that the divine attributes are identical with the divine nature appears to suffer 
from a prima facie coherence problem.269 
                                                                            
269 In a chapter on the doctrine of divine simplicity entitled, “Simplicity,” Brian Davies addresses the 
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Philosopher Alvin Plantinga has pointed out this problem in his 1980 Aquinas 
lecture entitled Does God Have a Nature?270  For Plantinga, however, the real problem 
with the divine simplicity is the way in which this doctrine appears to undermine the idea 
of God as a person. While he grants that Thomas explicitly affirms the reality of person-
like divine attributes in the ST, Plantinga contends that in attempting to unite these 
attributes with the concept of an absolutely simple divine essence, Thomas effectively 
vitiates the personal nature of the divine attributes. On Plantinga’s view, the image of 
God that results from Thomas’ account of the divine simplicity looks more like an 
abstract, metaphysical principle than a person: 
If God is identical with each of his properties, then, since each of his properties is a 
property, he is a property—a self-exemplifying property…this view is subject to a 
difficulty both obvious and overwhelming. No property could have created the world; 
no property could be omniscient, or, indeed, know anything at all. If God is a property, 
then he isn’t a person but a mere abstract object; he has no knowledge, awareness, 
power, love or life. So taken, the simplicity doctrine seems an utter mistake.271 
We need not follow Plantinga in his conclusion that the doctrine of the divine 
simplicity is  “an utter mistake” in order to appreciate his point about the conceptual 
tension between the person-like divine attributes and the abstract idea of an utterly simple 
ontological principle.  
In his 1989 book On a Complex Theory of a Simple God: An Investigation in 
Aquinas’ Philosophical Theology, philosopher Christopher Hughes argues in a somewhat 
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similar vein that the concept of an utterly simple divine nature, though a coherent idea in 
its own right, does not cohere with what Thomas says about the divine attributes, the 
doctrine of the Trinity, and the doctrine of the Incarnation.272 On Hughes’ reading, there 
are two incompatible models of God in the Summa: the Neoplatonic view of God as the 
utterly simple ontological unity that grounds the finite world, and the Christian view of a 
personal, Triune God who is incarnated in the person of Jesus Christ. Although he finds 
Thomas’ synthesis of these view to be “unworkable,” Hughes proposes that Thomas’ 
doctrine of God could be rendered coherent by jettisoning, or significantly weakening his 
“full-strength conception of the divine simplicity,” as laid out in the ST.273  
Philosopher Eleonore Stump takes exception to both of the foregoing critiques, and 
argues that Thomas’ account of the divine simplicity is in fact coherent, if in a rather 
counterintuitive way. Stump’s position turns upon a distinction that Thomas makes in one 
of his commentaries on Boethius between esse (being) and id quod est (that which is); the 
former is an abstract, universal principle, whereas the latter is a concrete particular.274 
Thomas argues—per the doctrine of the divine simplicity—that the divine nature is the 
great exception to the otherwise universal disjunction between being and beings: “esse 
itself and id quod est must be one and the same…this one sublime simple is God 
himself.”275 In an attempt to resolve the prima facie incoherence of this position, Stump 
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promulgates the idea of “quantum metaphysics” with respect to the divine nature.276 
Stump contends that the bewildering logic of the divine simplicity is analogous to 
the paradoxical nature of the wave-particle duality of light theory stemming from quantum 
physics, wherein light is understood to be both a particle and a wave, depending on the 
method of observation. What motivates Stump to draw this intrepid analogy between the 
nature of phenomena at the quantum level and the nature of ultimate reality is a deep 
theological conviction, namely that, “there is something false about conceiving of it [i.e., 
the divine nature] either as esse alone or as id quod est alone.”277 
Consequently Stump concludes that, understood in light of quantum metaphysics, 
“it is acceptable to say that God is esse, provided that we understand that this claim does 
not rule out the equally true claim that God is id quod est, an entity, a concrete 
particular.”278  Regardless of whether one finds Stump’s analogy between quantum physics 
and the ontology of God to be sound, it is undoubtedly an ingenious way of making sense 
of confounding logic of the divine simplicity. 
As this brief review of some of the secondary literature makes clear, the 
conceptual coherence of Thomas’ doctrine of the divine simplicity—wherein the positive 
divine attributes are said to be identical with the utterly simple divine essence—is an 
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open question. This is quite significant, because it is this doctrine—together with the 
analogia entis—that provides the conceptual foundation for the preservation of 
anthropomorphic divine attributes (e.g., knowledge) in Thomas’ doctrine of God. 
 
Conclusion 
We began this chapter by considering the anti-anthropomorphic, deeply apophatic 
onto-theological vision of Plotinus’ Enneads. We went on to consider the way in which 
this framework was appropriated and significantly altered by Augustine, Maimonides, 
and Thomas in their attempts to formulate a metaphysically robust conception of the 
divine nature that also cohered with the core insights of their religious traditions. 
Accordingly we have seen the way in which these figures promote—to varying degrees—
an “attenuated anthropomorphic” view of the ontology of God: they deny many 
anthropomorphic characterizations of the divine, while simultaneously preserving some 
anthropomorphic attributes of God (e.g., intellect, will, etc.)  
One of the central issues foregrounded in our analysis is the centrality of religious 
language in the question concerning whether certain attributes are befitting (theoprepes) 
of the divine nature. As we have seen, this issue is especially pronounced in the writings 
Maimonides and Thomas. In his Guide Maimonides essentially argues that all attributes 
are unbefitting of God insofar as they are predicated of God univocally or analogously. 
On this view, it is only by predicating attributes of God in a purely equivocal manner that 
we elude gross anthropomorphism. And as we saw, many scholars contend that 
Maimonides himself was unable to abide by a purely equivocal account of the divine 
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attributes. Thomas, on the other hand, rejected both univocal and equivocal predication 
with respect to the divine attributes. He dismissed univocal predication on the grounds of 
gross anthropomorphism, and he saw equivocal predication as a theological non-starter, 
as purely equivocal attributes cease to deliver any information whatsoever about the 
character of the divine. Thus, caught between an anthropomorphic rock and an apophatic 
hard place, Thomas adopted the middle path of analogous predication. In affirming an 
analogy between the being of creatures and the being of God, Thomas’ concept of the 
analogia entis represents an instance of attenuated anthropomorphism par excellence.  
Another important issue that surfaced in our analysis is the concept of the divine 
simplicity. At the outset of this chapter we saw Plotinus argue that the nature of the One 
is of necessity characterized by its perfect unity and absolute simplicity. Here the concept 
of the divine simplicity refers to the fact that the divine nature contains no composition, 
parts, or attributes. Thus, for Plotinus, the divine simplicity is essentially apophatic—it is 
a negation of the very possibility of divine attributes. In contrast, Augustine, Maimonides 
and Thomas all reconfigure the idea of the divine simplicity to refer to the unity of the 
divine attributes with the divine essence. Thus, all three figures (each in his own way) 
assert that the positive attribute of the divine intellect is in fact identical with the divine 
essence. There is some irony in this reconfiguration. Whereas Plotinus denied that the 
One could be identified with Nous (or the intellect) on the grounds that this would violate 
the divine simplicity, the “attenuated anthropomorphic” heirs of Neoplatonism 
reconfigured the concept of the divine simplicity so as to support the idea that divine 
nature is identical with various positive attributes, such as intellect. 
  143 
In the next chapter, we explore several figures within the onto-theological 
tradition who, in different ways, retrieved the anti-anthropomorphic vision of Plotinus. 
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Chapter Three: Neoplatonic Onto-theology as a Battle against Anthropomorphism 
 
Introduction 
As we saw in chapter two, some of the most influential theological appropriations of 
Neoplatonic onto-theology—such as that of Augustine and Thomas—significantly 
tempered the apophatic, stridently anti-anthropomorphic thrust of Plotinus’ thought. In 
the present chapter we explore several figures from the opposite side of the divide, what I 
term the “anti-anthropomorphic” branch of the Neoplatonic onto-theological tradition: 
Meister Eckhart, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and Paul Tillich. Each of these figures 
articulated a unique approach to the paradoxical theological task of speaking of that 
which by definition is beyond language. What they share in common is their 
thoroughgoing anti-anthropomorphism with respect to the divine nature. More 
specifically, Eckhart, Schleiermacher, and Tillich are united in affirming that the divine 
nature must transcend all creaturely attributes—including that of intellect and agency. In 
this respect, these figures represent a radical return to the anti-anthropomorphic, 
apophatic roots of Neoplatonic onto-theology.  
3.1 Meister Eckhart on the Nothingness of Godhead 
 Dominican theologian and preacher Meister Eckhart was born around 1260 CE in 
Thuringia, Germany. Little is known of his early life, though we know he joined the 
Dominican order at a young age. Eckhart clearly excelled in his studies, as he eventually 
went on to become a lecturer in theology at the University of Paris (where Thomas had 
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lectured and written decades earlier) while he was still a young man, circa 1293.279 This 
was a time of great intellectual and political discord between the Dominican and 
Franciscan orders, both of which vied for ascendency within the world of Catholicism. 
One of the key debates of this period concerned the legitimacy of philosophy in the 
service of theological inquiry. For the most part, Dominicans valorized philosophy as an 
essential resource for theological discourse, whereas the Franciscans tended to have a 
more skeptical view of the value of philosophy. From his earliest writings, Eckhart was 
unequivocal about his Dominican stance on the essential role of philosophy for theology. 
Eckhart argued that the wisdom of the Greek philosophers is in many respects on par 
with the wisdom of the Christian tradition, even going so far as to claim that, “Moses, 
Christ, and the Philosopher [i.e., Aristotle] teach the same thing, differing only in the way 
they teach...”280 
 In both his theological treatises and sermons, Eckhart displays a tendency to 
formulate his philosophical and theological positions in a stark, radical fashion. In this 
sense, Eckhart’s corpus represents a great foil to the circumspect and staid pages of 
Thomas’ Summa. Consider, for example, Eckhart’s sermon on John 4:23. He begins with 
the text’s statement that “the time shall come and now is, when true worshippers shall 
worship the Father in spirit and in truth…” and proceeds to ask: “What is truth?” Eckhart 
answers thus: “The truth is such a noble thing that if God were able to turn away from 
truth, I would cling to truth and let God go; For God is truth, and all that is in time, and 
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that God created, is not truth.”281 Surely most Dominicans would agree with the latter 
clause. The first claim however, was a truly radical statement for a Catholic theologian to 
make, both then and now. Elsewhere Eckhart proposes a subtle yet provocative reversal 
of Thomas’ famous definition of God (“God is Ipsum Esse”), stating instead that, 
“Existence is God (esse est deus).”282 The reversal of terms in Eckhart’s definition could 
be read as a privileging of the ontological reality of esse (being) over the religious 
category of “God.”  
 The theological corpus of Meister Eckhart is highly variegated in genre, style, and 
theological content. What’s more, some of Eckhart’s most forceful theological 
proclamations appear to contradict statements he makes elsewhere. For example, in 
several instances—most notably in his Latin Sermon XXIX and his vernacular Sermon 
9—Eckhart identifies God with the attribute of intellect: “Intellect is the temple of God. 
Nowhere does God dwell more properly than in his temple, in intellect.”283 In his other 
vernacular sermons however, Eckhart gives total priority to the absolute unity and 
ineffable simplicity of the divine nature, pointing toward the idea of a Divinity beyond all 
attributes. Indeed, in his Commentary on Exodus, Eckhart sounds more Plotinian than 
Dominican:  
Anyone who would see God himself through himself, that is, through his essence…would 
see a single perfection…this perfection would not be a particular perfection, but a single 
one that is above all. If the onlooker were to give a name to that which he sees and 
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through which and in which he sees, it would necessarily be the One…The One is not the 
name for wisdom, or power, and the other individual attributes but it is the One that is all, 
above all…284 
Many scholars have noted the deep tension—if not outright contradiction—
between Eckhart’s aforementioned claims about the divine intellect and his numerous 
statements regarding the absolute unity and ineffable simplicity of the divine nature.285 
However, the apparent inconsistency in Eckhart’s ontology of God may able to be 
reconciled in light of his all-important distinction between “God” and “Godhead.” We 
will have more to say about this in what follows. 
 During his final tenure as a lecturer in theology at the University of Paris (circa 
1311), Eckhart was introduced to the mysticism of the Beguines, most notably that of 
Marguerite Porete, who had recently been executed on charges of heresy.286 According to 
Bernard McGinn, Eckhart’s encounter with Porete’s mystical work The Mirror of Simple 
Souls led to a significant shift in the “intensity” of his later vernacular sermons.287 
 From beginning to end, Eckhart’s favored conceptual framework for conceiving 
of the divine was that of Neoplatonism. In this Eckhart is not unique among medieval 
theologians. What is unique is the extent to which he followed the radically apophatic, 
anti-anthropomorphic trajectory of Plotinus’ onto-theology. We see this apophaticism on 
full display in Eckhart’s claim that the infinite, ontological source of all finite being must 
be beyond the categories of being and non-being: “When we receive God in being, we 
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receive Him in His forecourt, for being is the forecourt of His dwelling.”288 Elsewhere 
Eckhart states: 
God works beyond being…He works in nonbeing: before there was being, God was 
working: He wrought being where no being was. Masters of little subtlety say God is 
pure being. He is as high above being as the highest angel is above a midge.289   
 It is helpful to contrast Eckhart with Thomas on this score. While Thomas 
undoubtedly has significant apophatic moments in the Summa, he never goes as far as to 
negate the identification of God with Ipsum Esse. Yet, Eckhart’s claim that God must 
transcend being (esse) is not without precedent in Christian thought; the 5-6th century CE 
Neoplatonic Christian mystic Pseudo Dionysius was arguably the first to articulate this 
Neoplatonic insight in a Christian idiom.290 However, Eckhart takes this line of apophatic 
reasoning a step further, arguing that the divinity beyond being and non-being cannot 
possibly be identified with attributes deriving from the realm of finite being.  
In many of his vernacular sermons Eckhart addresses these cerebral metaphysical 
issues head-on, preaching the gospel of anti-anthropomorphic, apophatic onto-theology: 
“The masters say God is a being, an intellectual being that knows all things. But we say 
God is not a being and not intellectual does not know this or that. Thus God is free of all 
things, and so He is all things.”291  
 Here we find a form of Christian apophaticism far more radical that of Thomas 
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and even Pseudo Dionysius.292 In his most radically apophatic sermons, Eckhart seeks to 
preserve within the Divine nature no attributes, characteristics, or ontological capacities 
whatsoever. Rather, the apophatic negation of divine attributions is the guiding principle. 
Eckhart states, 
Anything you see, or anything that comes within your ken, that is not God, just because 
God is neither this nor that. Whoever says God is here or there, do not believe him. The 
light that God is shines in the darkness. God is the true light: to see it, one must be blind 
and must strip from God all that is ‘something.’ A master says whoever speaks of God in 
any likeness, speaks impurely of Him. But to speak of God with nothing is to speak of 
Him correctly.293  
Later in this sermon, Eckhart writes of “the Divine Nothing”—a highly 
counterintuitive phrase that seems to gesture toward the featurelessness of the utterly 
simple divine nature.294 In another sermon Eckhart states: “They who are like nothing are 
Godlike. God’s being is like nothing: in it is neither image nor form.”295  
 In another radical move, Eckhart famously negates the traditional identification of 
God with the transcendental property of “the Good.” He writes, “whoever should say 
God is good would do Him as much injustice as if he called the sun black.”296 While 
Eckhart does not spell out his reasoning for this proclamation, we can plausibly infer that 
his reasoning was similar to that of Plotinus when he rejected the literal attribution of the 
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property of “Goodness” to the One: namely, that “Goodness” can only properly describe 
things within the domain of finite being. Elsewhere Eckhart states, “If I now say God is 
good, it is not true…Thus, too, if I say God is wise, it is not true: I am wiser than He. So 
too if I say God is a being, that is not true: He is…a superessential nothingness.”297  
 Eckhart’s mystical sermons present the reader with many theological quandaries. 
Chief among them is the fact that the anti-anthropomorphic, apophatic view God 
espoused in many of his sermons bares almost no resemblance whatsoever to the 
traditional Christian conception of God as a personal, loving reality that acts in the world. 
This is related to another puzzling aspect of Eckhart’s thought that was mentioned above, 
namely, that Eckhart identifies God with the intellect in some places, and explicitly 
denies this claim in other places. However, both of these issues can be resolved by 
considering them in light of Eckhart’s central distinction between “God” and “Godhead.” 
According to this view, the word “God” refers to the traditional Christian understanding 
of God as the good, all knowing, loving creator of the world. Accordingly, “God” 
possesses traditional attributes such as goodness, intellection, omnipotence, et al. In 
contrast, the “Godhead” is the infinite, utterly simple One—the ontological ground of all 
determinate being. And, like the Plotinian One, the Godhead is bereft of any attributes or 
characteristics. Accordingly, “God and Godhead are as different as heaven and earth,” as 
Eckhart puts the matter.298  
 As significant as this distinction is in Eckhart’s thought, he never fleshes it out in 
any systematic detail—a fact that is not altogether surprising, given that he never wrote a 
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treatise of systematic theology like Thomas’ Summas. In many places, the distinction 
between God and Godhead seems to suggest something like an ontological hierarchy 
within the divine reality, not unlike that of Plotinus. On this view, there are levels of 
divinity: at the uppermost level, there is the infinite, simple, featureless One—what 
Eckhart terms the Godhead. Beneath the highest level lies the determinate manifestation 
of this ultimate principle: for Eckhart this is the creator God; for Plotinus it is the Nous. 
In both cases, there exists a qualitative distinction between the indeterminate ultimate 
reality and its determinate manifestation. This logical movement from indeterminacy to 
determinacy—what Neoplatonists term “emanation”—is often referred to as Theogony or 
“God-birthing.” Bernard McGinn concisely summarizes Eckhart’s Theogony as follow: 
“The Godhead becomes God in the flowing out of creation…”299 
 It is in this sense that we may understand Eckhart’s claim that “God becomes and 
unbecomes,” whereas the Godhead is beyond being and nonbeing.300 Recall that God, for 
Eckhart, is determinate with respect to creation the world. The Godhead is the infinite, 
featureless ground of creation, the whence of all determinate being, the wellspring from 
which creation flows. Crucially, however, the Godhead is in no way an intentional, 
agential Creator. Eckhart writes, 
And why then do they not speak of the Godhead? Everything that is in the Godhead is 
one, and of that there is nothing to be said. God works, the Godhead does no work: there 
is nothing for it to do, there is no activity in it. It never peeped at any work. God and 
Godhead are distinguished by working and not-working.301 
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 Eckhart’s understanding of God as being conditioned by the act of creation is 
often formulated in a way that is both puzzling and provocative. Consider for example 
Eckhart’s claim that, “God becomes and unbecomes…God becomes when all creatures 
say ‘God’—then God comes to be.”302 On its face, this statement appears to suggest that 
God’s being is determined by the act of creatures conceiving of God qua creator. A less 
literal interpretation would be that God’s being qua creator comes into determinate being 
alongside creation. However one interprets this enigmatic statement, it is clear that 
Eckhart is pursuing a form of theological speculation that is untethered from the orthodox 
teachings of the Catholic Church. 
 Nowhere is this more apparent than in Eckhart’s treatment of the doctrine of the 
Trinity. Traditional Catholic teaching holds that the Divine nature, or Godhead, is a unity 
that is paradoxically comprised of three persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The 
persons of the Trinity are said to be distinct from each other, yet one in essence. Although 
Eckhart does not deny this doctrine (indeed, he regularly speaks of the persons of the 
Trinity in his sermons), he essentially subordinates the Trinity to the Godhead. As we 
have seen, Eckhart conceives of the Godhead as bereft of all characteristics, attributes, 
and features. And the persons of the Trinity clearly abrogate the unity and utter simplicity 
that, for Eckhart, characterizes the essence of the Godhead. In one particularly 
provocative sermon Eckhart writes, 
I intend to say something else that sounds even more astonishing. I say on the basis of 
solid truth, eternal truth, perpetual truth, that this same light (the spark of the soul) is not 
satisfied with the simple immobile divine being that neither gives nor takes. Further, it 
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wants to know where this being comes from. It wants to penetrate to the simple ground, 
the silent desert where distinction never gazed, where there is neither Father, nor Son, nor 
Holy Spirit.303 
 This sermon makes plain the radically apophatic and heterodox character of 
Eckhart’s thought. In his writings on the Godhead, Eckhart consistently resists all 
personal and anthropomorphic language in his attempt to gesture toward the infinite, 
featureless Divinity beyond being and non-being. Moreover, when Eckhart does attempt 
to describe the Godhead, he always favors impersonal concepts, symbols, and images, 
e.g., “the Divine Nothingness” and the “desert” of the Godhead.  
 In short, Eckhart’s apophatic conception of the Godhead amounts to one of the 
most consistently anti-anthropomorphic views of the divine nature in Christian thought. 
What is truly astonishing, however, is the extent to which Eckhart was willing to preach 
and publicly trumpet his radical and blatantly heterodox view of Divinity. Again and 
again in his mystical sermons Eckhart states that it is the Godhead alone that is deserving 
of our ultimate worship. This leads us to Eckhart’s concept of “breaking through” to the 
Godhead. The idea of “breaking through” to the Godhead refers to the mystical event of 
transcending the idea of God as a good, personal creator who loves, and acts in the world. 
In other words, “breaking through” to the Godhead is the event in which the 
aforementioned view of God as the ground of reality collapses, and one is confronted 
with the ultimate, barren ground of being—what Eckhart refers to as the “silent desert” of 
the Godhead. In one sermon, Eckhart describes the mystical event of “breaking through” 
                                                                            
303 Cited in Bernard McGinn, “The God beyond God: Theology and Mysticism in the Thought of Meister 
Eckhart,” The Journal of Religion 61, no. 1 (1981): 12. 
  154 
this way: “When I enter the ground, the bottom, the river and fount of the Godhead, none 
will ask me whence I came or where I have been. No one missed me, for there God 
unbecomes.”304  
 Remarking on this important element of Eckhart’s mystical theology, Bernard 
McGinn writes, “God unbecomes when the mystic is not content to return to the God who 
acts, but effects a ‘breaking-through’ to the silent, unmoving Godhead, one that brings all 
creatures back into the hidden source…”305 It is in this context that we can best 
understand one of Eckhart’s most oft-quoted sayings: “Therefore let us pray to God that 
we may be free of God that we may gain the truth and enjoy it eternally.”306 It seems 
reasonable to assume that the truth of which Eckhart is speaking here is the truth of 
“breaking through” from God (i.e., “freeing ourselves of God”) to the Nothingness of the 
Godhead. 
 One of the subtle yet significant aspects of Eckhart’s anti-anthropomorphic onto-
theology is the way in which this view overcomes the conceptual disjunction between 
theism and atheism—i.e., the belief in the existence of a God with certain person-like 
characteristics, or, on the other hand, the denial of the existence of such a divine 
reality.307 As McGinn has pointed out, Eckhart’s apophatic onto-theology involves a kind 
of “mystical atheism,”308 wherein the idea of God as a transcendent reality possessing 
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characteristics such as intelligence and goodness is denied for explicitly religious reasons. 
Eckhart’s view overcomes the opposition between atheism and theism insofar as his 
concept of the Godhead entails both atheistic and theistic aspects.309 In one sense, this 
view is atheistic, in that it denies the traditional theistic idea that ultimate reality is a 
personal, loving, creator God. At the same time, this outlook is fundamentally theistic in 
its affirmation of an ultimate reality that is the infinite source of all finite being. 
Furthermore, Eckhart contends that the highest human calling is to spiritually attune 
oneself to the impersonal divine reality of the Godhead. He writes, “Man’s highest and 
dearest leave-taking is if he takes leave of God for God.”310  
 But why does Eckhart believe we should take leave of God qua personal creator 
for the impersonal Godhead? In his most radical moments, Eckhart suggests that the 
loving, personal God of traditional Christian devotion amounts to something of a 
conceptual and spiritual idol. In other words, this view of God is in many ways a 
reflection of our own anthropocentric and anthropomorphic longings—it is what we most 
desire to be true of our world, our lives, and the nature of God. Eckhart puts the matter 
this way: 
Some people want to see God with their own eyes as they see a cow, and they want to 
love God as they love a cow. You love a cow for her milk and her cheese and your own 
profit. That is what all those men do who love God for outward wealth or inward 
consolation—and they do not truly love God, they love their own profit. I truly assert that 
anything you put in the forefront of your mind, if it is not God in Himself, is—however 
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good it may be—a hindrance to your gaining the highest truth.311  
 Eckhart presses this line of iconoclastic reasoning further still, exhorting his 
listeners to relinquish the idea of a loving, personal God in the name of the God beyond 
God. He writes, 
You should love God apart from loveworthiness: that is not because He is worthy of love, 
for God is not loveworthy, He is above all love and loveworthiness…Therefore you soul 
should be de-spirited of all spirit, she should be spiritless, for if you love God as He is 
God, as He is spirit, as He is person and as He is image—all that must go! 
—‘Well, how should I love Him then?’ 
—You should love Him as He is: a non-God, a non-spirit, a non-person, a non-image; 
rather as He is a sheer pure limpid One, detached from all duality…and in that One may 
we eternally sink from nothingness to nothingness. So help us God. Amen.312  
 Eckhart contends that to understand and engage with ultimate reality as it most 
truly is—i.e., the Godhead beyond all anthropomorphic attributes—necessarily requires 
the renunciation of some of our most basic anthropocentric longings. We must learn to 
love God “without a why,” as Eckhart puts it.313 On this view, the relinquishment 
anthropocentric desires for safety, protection, and spiritual fulfillment—what Freud 
identified as the motivational drives that lead humans to conceive of God in 
anthropomorphic terms in the first place—is a necessary condition for the possibility of 
mystical union between the self and ultimate reality. Eckhart thus admonishes his 
listeners: “You should wholly sink away from your youness and dissolve into His 
Hisness, and your ‘yours’ and His ‘His’ should become so completely one ‘Mine’ that 
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with Him you understand His uncreated self-identity and His nameless Nothingness.”314 
 The Eckhartian vision of mystical union between finite creature and infinite 
Godhead is undeniably bracing in its spiritual austerity and depth. It also naturally raises 
the question of how such an iconoclastic, anti-anthropomorphic theological and spiritual 
trajectory maps onto the broader traditions of Christian thought and practice. The crux of 
the issue here is not just the fact that Eckhart’s mystical writings run afoul of the 
orthodox teachings of the Catholic Church—this is undoubtedly true, as many of his 
teachings were condemned by Church officials near the end of this life.315 The deeper 
issue pertains to the practical problem that Eckhart’s mystical theology advocates the 
renunciation of just about everything that most Christian believers and theologians hold 
to be most true and most spiritually dear—all in the name of an impersonal, axiologically 
arid God beyond God. And while this anti-anthropomorphic onto-theology does succeed 
in avoiding the conceptual difficulties involved in attempting to predicate positive 
attributes of a simple, infinite divinity beyond being and non-being, it does so at a high 
cost. For, how many people would be motivated to work through the mystifying 
conceptual subtleties necessary to understand—never mind religiously engage with—an 
impersonal, and thus in many respects, practically irrelevant Divinity? Tertullian 
famously asked, “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” Here we might ask instead: 
“What has the arid desert of Godhead to do with the theological imaginary and spiritual 
needs of ordinary people?” On this matter, I would argue that Eckhart was perhaps less 
                                                                            
314 Eckhart., Ibid, Sermon 96, 463. 
315 Eckhart sought to defend himself against these charges; however, he did not live long enough to stand 
trial. See Eckhart, The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises and Defense (New York: Paulist Press, 
1981)., 71-81. 
 
  158 
realistic about the spiritual needs of ordinary people than was Maimonides.  
 We now turn to a theologian who sought to achieve a greater balance between a 
thoroughly anti-anthropomorphic view of God, on the one hand, and the traditional 
religious ideas and symbols that shape the religious imagination of most ordinary people, 
on the other. 
3.2 Schleiermacher on God as the Whence 
 The German philosopher and Reformed theologian Friedrich Daniel Ernst 
Schleiermacher (1768-1834) is considered to be the father of modern liberal theology. 
Beyond his seminal work in philosophy of religion and systematic theology, 
Schleiermacher also made significant contributions to biblical studies, epistemology, 
ethics, and hermeneutics. Among other achievements, he helped to found the University 
of Berlin, and was the first to translate the works of Plato into German.  
 As a philosopher, Schleiermacher was deeply influenced by Enlightenment 
figures such as Spinoza and Kant. However, he identified with the thought of Plato more 
than any other philosopher. Of Plato Schleiermacher wrote, “There is no author who has 
affected me as much and who has initiated me into the holiest of holies—not only of 
philosophy, but of all humanity—as this divine man.”316 I include Schleiermacher in the 
present chapter not because he self-identified as a Neoplatonist, but because of the way in 
which his apophatic, anti-anthropomorphic conception of the divine nature naturally 
aligns with the foremost themes of Neoplatonic onto-theology. 
In regards to his religious formation, Schleiermacher was profoundly shaped by his 
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early education in the Moravian schools, which taught a form of Christian pietism that 
was both fervent and rigid. Schleiermacher went on to study philosophy and theology at 
the University of Halle, despite the disapproval of his father, who served as a Reformed 
chaplain in the Prussian military. Over the course of his studies at Halle, 
Schleiermacher’s confidence in the orthodox beliefs of his adolescence steadily declined, 
eventually collapsing altogether. Nevertheless, an intense feeling of religious piety was 
never to leave him, nor did he reject the Christian religion as a whole. Schleiermacher 
provides a moving account of his spiritual journey in his first major work On Religion: 
Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (1799): 
Religion was the maternal womb in whose holy darkness my young life was nourished 
and prepared for the world still closed to it. In it my spirit breathed before it had 
discovered the world of external objects, experience, and scholarship. Religion helped me 
when I began to examine the ancestral faith and to purify my heart of the rubble of 
primitive times. It remained with me when God and immortality disappeared before my 
doubting eyes. It guided me into the active life. It taught me, with my virtues and defects, 
to keep myself holy in my undivided existence, and only through it have I learned 
friendship and love.317 
 Schleiermacher’s acute religious sensibility was part of what drew him to the 
avant-garde, poetic spirituality of German Romanticism as a young man. And, as the title 
suggests, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (hereafter: Speeches) was 
Schleiermacher’s attempt to bridge the divide between the powerful experiences of 
religious piety that formed him as a youth, and the intellectual and aesthetic world of his 
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Romantic friends—most of whom dismissed traditional religion as superstitious and 
repressive. The Speeches is thus an apologia on behalf of religion. Schleiermacher’s aim 
in writing it was to persuade his skeptical Romantic friends that religion couldn’t be 
simply reduced to its most superstitious or dogmatic instantiations. Rather, he contends 
that religion should be understood as a deeply personal, socially mediated, and 
aesthetically charged form of intuition (or experience) of the universe itself.  
In the Speeches, and throughout his theological career, Schleiermacher 
approaches the question of religion, God, and Christian faith by way of intuition, feeling, 
and experience, rather than metaphysical speculation or confessional elaboration on the 
traditional teachings of the church. Addressing religion’s cultured despisers, he asks: 
Do you feel this way about these systems of theology, about these theories of the origin 
and end of the world, about these analyses of the nature of an incomprehensible being, 
where everything amounts to cold argumentation and nothing can be treated except in the 
tone of an ordinary didactic controversy? In all these systems you despise you have 
accordingly not found religion and cannot find it because it is not there, and if it were 
shown to you that it were elsewhere, you would still not be capable of finding it and 
honoring it. But why have you not descended any more to the particular?318 
 The “particular” to which this passage refers is the individual feeling of religious 
experience, which is the very core of religion itself. The essence of religion, 
Schleiermacher writes, “is neither thinking nor acting, but intuition and feeling.”319 With 
this claim, he distances his position both from the scholastic valorization of the intellect 
in the medieval period, and Kant’s attempt to locate religion in the domain of practical 
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reason. And while Schleiermacher argued that it must be distinguished from metaphysics 
and ethics, he also held that religion nevertheless shares with these spheres of inquiry a 
common object, namely, the universe. He writes, “If you put yourselves on the highest 
standpoint of metaphysics and morals, you will find that both have the same object as 
religion, namely, the universe and the relationship of humanity to it.”320  
 Here we should note the subtle yet fundamentally anti-anthropomorphic nature of 
this view. Schleiermacher’s central claim in the Speeches is that the essence of religion 
can be defined and understood without any reference to a person-like divine being. While 
humans (anthropos) make up one side of this definition of religion (and may therefore 
introduce various forms of anthropomorphism to their religious intuitions), the logical 
object of religious experience is, for Schleiermacher, decidedly not human-like: it is the 
universe itself, or, alternatively, “the infinite.” “Religion,” he writes, “is the sensibility 
and taste for the infinite.”321 
 Though he defines religion primarily in terms of intuition and feeling in the 
Speeches, Schleiermacher does gesture—if only obliquely—toward the metaphysical 
conditions for the possibility of any religious experience whatsoever. “Everything finite 
exists only through the determination of its limits, which must, as it were, ‘be cut out of’ 
the infinite.”322 He goes on: “Thus to accept everything individual as part of the whole 
and everything limited as a representation of the infinite is religion.”323 The Neoplatonic 
element of this position is clear enough, although it is never explicitly stated. 
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 Another significant aspect of Schleiermacher’s thought is his essentially 
naturalistic interpretation of religion. In fact, the Speeches (1799) represents one of the 
earliest formulations of religious naturalism within the history of Christian thought. As 
we shall see in what follows, Schleiermacher’s religious naturalism goes hand in hand 
with his fundamentally anti-anthropomorphic conception of God.  
While the term “religious naturalism” has many definitions, I will follow Andrew 
C. Dole in defining Schleiermacher’s form of religious naturalism as a view that regards 
“religion as a phenomenon whose existence and characteristics can be accounted for by 
means of knowledge not of the supernatural but of the natural order.”324 Throughout the 
Speeches, Schleiermacher interprets religious experience exclusively in terms of natural 
phenomena, such as the self, intuition, feeling, the universe, and social groups. He writes, 
All these feelings are religion, and likewise all others in which the universe is one pole 
and your own self is somehow the other pole between which consciousness hovers. The 
ancients surely knew this. They called these feelings ‘piety’ and referred them 
immediately to religion, considering them its noblest part.325 
 Perhaps the most significant consequence of this account is that it eliminates one 
of the most common and intuitive explanations for religious experience, namely, 
supernatural agency in the form of a divine being. For Schleiermacher, however, the 
reality of religious experience necessitates neither the existence of a personal divine 
being, nor the existence of a supernatural realm as over and against the natural world. 
This is because the ultimate referent and wellspring of religious experience is the 
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universe itself (or “the infinite”). He writes, “…for me divinity can be nothing other than 
a particular type of religious intuition. The rest of the religious intuitions are independent 
of it and of each other. From my standpoint…the belief ‘No God, no religion’ cannot 
occur…”326 
 Crucially, Schleiermacher makes no attempt to disprove the idea of a personal 
divine being. Rather, he seeks to challenge two widespread assumptions concerning the 
relationship between religion and God. The first is the idea that the existence of a divine 
being is necessary in order to provide an explanation of religious experience. And, as 
we’ve seen, Schleiermacher maintains that it is the intuition of the infinity of nature that 
gives rise to all religious experiences and beliefs. Thus, according to this view, one need 
not posit the existence or agency of a divine being in order to account for the reality of 
religion or powerful religious experiences.  
The second assumption he seeks to overturn is the notion that a personal God (or 
divine being) is the sine qua non of religion. He writes, 
  If we immediately proceed to the highest concept, to that of a highest being, of a spirit of 
the universe that rules it with freedom and understanding, religion is still not dependent 
upon this idea. To have religion means to intuit the universe, and the value of your religion 
depends upon the manner in which you intuit it, on the principle that you find in its 
actions. Now if you cannot deny that the idea of God adapts itself to each intuition of the 
universe, you must also admit that one religion without God can be better than another 
with God.327 
  The idea of a personal God, far from constituting the essence of religious 
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experience and belief, is, for Schleiermacher, simply one type of religious intuition 
among others. More importantly, one can ascend to the heights of religious experience 
without this idea. In the third edition of the Speeches Schleiermacher expands on this 
point: “Suppose there is someone…who rejects the idea of a personal God…this rejection 
of the idea of a personal Deity does not decide against the presence of the Deity in his 
feeling…he might stand as high above a worshipper of the twelve gods whom you would 
rightly name after Lucretius, as a pious person at that stage would be above an 
idolater.”328 Here Schleiermacher seems to be gesturing towards something like Eckhart’s 
concept of the Godhead beyond God. 
Having sidelined the traditional causal role of a personal, supernatural divine 
being with respect to religious experience, Schleiermacher is left with an issue in need of 
explanation: namely, the fact that the logical object of religion—the universe, or the 
infinite—gives rise to contradictory religious intuitions and ideas (e.g., a personal divine 
being, and an infinite, impersonal universe). It appears then that the ultimate object of 
religious experience does not strongly influence the description of such experience: for 
some, the intuition of the universe gives rise to belief in a personal God, for others, it 
does not. Here one might question whether Schleiermacher has prematurely dismissed the 
causal role of a divine being vis-à-vis religious experience. For, if millions of people the 
world over have an intuition of the universe, and in doing so detect the reality of a divine 
being, it would seem that postulating the existence of a personal God is a more plausible 
explanation for this near-universal religious experience than the view that an impersonal 
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universe is the ultimate cause of such an intuition. 
 Schleiermacher rejects this line of reasoning, and essentially turns it on its head. 
On his view, the fact that millions of people the world over detect a divine being as a 
result of their intuition of the universe says more about the nature of human intuition and 
imagination that it does about the nature of the universe itself. For Schleiermacher, the 
proper explanation for anthropomorphic religious ideas lies in the subjective pole of 
religious experience—in human individuals, and how they interpret their religious 
intuitions—not in the nature of the logical object of such experience.  
 Reflecting upon the wide array of religious ideas that the human intuition of the 
universe gives rise to, Schleiermacher writes: 
Which of these intuitions of the universe we appropriate depends on our sense of the 
universe. This is the proper measure of our religiousness; whether we have a God as a part 
of our intuition depends on the direction of our imagination. In religion, the universe is 
intuited; it is posited as originally acting on us. Now if your imagination clings to the 
consciousness of our freedom in such fashion that it cannot come to terms with what it 
construes as originally active other than in the form of a free being, then imagination will 
probably personify the spirit of the universe and you will have a God.329 
 However, the idiosyncrasies of the individual’s imagination can just as easily tend 
toward the opposite direction, thereby giving rise to an alternative religious intuition of the 
universe: “If your imagination clings to understanding in such fashion that you always 
clearly see that freedom only has meaning in the particular and for the particular instance, 
then you will have a world and no God… you will not consider it blasphemy, I hope, that 
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belief in God depends on the direction of the imagination.”330 This is not to say that religious 
ideas (e.g., a personal God) are to be dismissed as illusions on the basis of their having 
originated in the human imagination. Schleiermacher clarifies this point in the 3rd, and 
decidedly less radical,331 edition of the Speeches: “by imagination, I do not mean anything 
subordinate or confused, but the highest and most original faculty in man. All else in the 
human mind is simply reflection upon it, and is therefore dependent on it.”332 
 This later qualification on the ineluctable role of the human imagination in human 
reasoning notwithstanding, the upshot of Schleiermacher’s account is nonetheless quite 
iconoclastic: the anthropomorphic personification of the universe that regularly occurs in 
religious experience can be explained as resulting from a tendency of the human 
imagination—what we today might call a cognitive tendency, or bias. Interestingly 
enough, Schleiermacher provides the same explanatory account for the opposite 
viewpoint: the anti-anthropomorphic conception of divinity as the infinite is also the 
result of the direction of the human imagination: “It therefore appears natural that the 
more like man God is conceived, the more easily another mode of presentation is set over 
against it. Hence, we have the idea of the Highest Being, not as personally thinking and 
willing, but exalted above all personality, as the universal, productive, connecting 
necessity of all thought and existence.”333  
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 On this account, the anti-anthropomorphic view of God derives from the human 
imagination’s aversion to the conceptual incoherence involved in the attribution of 
person-like attributes to the infinite ground of the finite. Schleiermacher summarizes this 
point as follows: “Recoil from the obscurity of the indefinite thought [i.e., an impersonal 
God] is the one tendency of the imagination, recoil from the appearance of contradiction 
in transferring forms of the finite to the Infinite is the other.”334 
 In face of the fraught theological divide over religious anthropomorphism 
Schleiermacher advocates for a hermeneutic of charity. “Nothing seems to me less fitting 
than for the adherents of the former view to charge with godlessness those who, in dread 
of this anthropomorphism, take refuge in the other, or for the adherents of the latter view 
to make the humanness of the idea of God a ground for charging the adherents of the 
former with idolatry, or for declaring their piety void.”335  
 Schleiermacher’s plea for mutual tolerance between these opposing views 
notwithstanding, the fact remained that the traditional anthropomorphic view of God had 
long enjoyed ascendency in Western culture, whereas the anti-anthropomorphic view was 
a minority position. Accordingly, one of the primary goals of the Speeches is to establish 
that anthropomorphic conceptions of God are in fact optional with regards to religion: 
“The usual conception of God as one single being outside of the world and behind the 
world is…only one manner of expressing God, seldom entirely pure and always 
inadequate.”336 Schleiermacher closes his second speech with the famous remark, “in 
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religion, therefore, the idea of God does not rank as high as you think.”337  
 When considering the above quotation, it is important to recall that 
Schleiermacher’s intended audience in the Speeches was the intellectually elite, “cultured 
despisers” of religion. He was under no illusion about the fact that for most religious 
individuals the idea of a personal God is indeed the sine qua non of religion. And, young 
pastor that he was, Schleiermacher no doubt also perceived that his anti-anthropomorphic 
understanding of religion as “the taste for the infinite” would be of little interest to or 
practical use for most ordinary individuals of his day.338 
 In his magnum opus The Christian Faith (1821-1822)—also known as the 
Glaubenslehre—Schleiermacher addressed a different audience altogether: seminary 
students. One of his main goals in writing this massive work of systematic theology was 
to help young religious professionals and aspiring theologians interpret the traditional 
texts and teachings of the Christian faith in a way that was intellectually responsible to 
and consistent with the developments in human knowledge that had taken place since the 
Reformation. In a published correspondence with his friend Dr. Lücke entitled “On the 
Glaubenslehre,” Schleiermacher wrote of the need for a new form of theology—a 
Christian dogmatics that would refuse to pit ancient doctrines against the advances in 
knowledge from the sciences. He writes:  
There are those who can hack away at science with a sword, fence themselves in with 
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weapons at hand to withstand the assaults of sound research and behind this fence 
establish as binding a church doctrine that appears to everyone outside as an unreal ghost 
to which they must pay homage if they want to receive a proper burial. Those persons 
might not allow themselves to be disturbed by the developments in the realm of science. 
But we cannot do that and do not want that.339 
 Schleiermacher goes on to propose an alternative relationship between theology 
and the natural sciences, what he terms “the eternal covenant.” He writes, “Unless the 
Reformation from which our church first emerged endeavors to establish an eternal 
covenant between the living Christian faith and completely free, independent scientific 
inquiry, so that faith does not hinder science and science does no exclude faith, it fails to 
meet adequately the needs of our time.”340 The Glaubenslehre was Schleiermacher’s 
attempt to construct a system of Christian theology that would uphold and safeguard this 
eternal covenant.  
 More importantly for the purposes of our inquiry, the Glaubenslehre presents one 
of the most consistently apophatic and anti-anthropomorphic doctrines of God in the 
history of Protestant theology. At the same time, Schleiermacher’s system turns on a 
hermeneutical principle that bridges the theological chasm between a fundamentally anti-
anthropomorphic view of God and the anthropomorphic narratives and representations of 
God that predominate in the biblical texts, church doctrines, and religious imagination of 
most believers. 
 As he did in the Speeches, Schleiermacher gives priority to religious experience in 
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his interpretation of the Christian faith and Church doctrine. In the Glaubenslehre, 
however, the essence of religious experience (or piety) is given a new formulation, what 
Schleiermacher terms “the feeling of absolute dependence.” He defines this feeling as: 
…the self-consciousness which accompanies all our activity, and therefore, since that is 
never zero, accompanies our whole existence, and negatives absolute freedom, it itself 
precisely a consciousness of absolute dependence; for it is the consciousness that the 
whole of our spontaneous activity comes from a source outside of us in just the same 
sense in which anything towards which we should have a feeling of absolute freedom 
must have proceeded entirely from ourselves.341  
 As in his previous definition of religion (“the intuition of the universe”), this new 
conception of religious piety (the “feeling of absolute dependence”) consists of two 
poles: the self-consciousness of the individual and that upon which the individual—and, 
indeed, all things—absolutely depends. Schleiermacher identifies this phenomenon as 
God. He writes, “The common element in all howsoever diverse expressions of piety, by 
which these are conjointly distinguished from all other feelings…is this: the 
consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in 
relation with God.”342 Crucially, the object of religious experience (i.e., the source of the 
feeling of absolute dependence) is not identified with universe—a significant departure 
from Schleiermacher’s earlier view. This departure is due to the modification of the 
definition of religious experience itself. In defining religious piety as the feeling of 
absolute dependence—as opposed to “the intuition of the universe”—Schleiermacher 
suggests a total asymmetry between the subjective and objective pole of religious 
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experience. It follows that the object of this religious experience cannot be nature itself, 
since we experience some degree of freedom in relationship to the natural world; as much 
as we depend on the world and are influenced by natural occurrences in it, we also 
possess the capacity to influence the world in turn through our own actions. Therefore, 
our dependence on the world is momentous but not absolute: we ourselves are part and 
parcel of the world, and can control some aspects of our relationship to it.343 
 Moreover, it is not just the individual, but also the natural world itself, which, qua 
finite and conditioned, exists in asymmetric (or, “absolute”) dependence upon an infinite, 
unconditioned reality. Schleiermacher uses the felicitous phrase “the Whence” to capture 
the idea of an ontological source upon which all things depend. On this view, the Whence 
is understood to be the proper referent of the word “God.” 
As regards the identification of absolute dependence with ‘relation to God’ in our 
proposition: this was to be understood in the sense that the Whence of our receptive and 
active existence, as implied in this self-consciousness, is to be designated by the word 
‘God,’ and that this is for us the really original signification of that word…344 
 Here we may note the unspoken yet nevertheless apparent Neoplatonic onto-
theology that underpins Schleiermacher’s system.345 As the Whence of the feeling of our 
dependent, conditioned existence—and, by extension, the existence of all conditioned 
things—God is the infinite, unconditioned ground of finite, conditioned being. Moreover, 
Schleiermacher’s apposite term “Whence” suggests the ineffability of its object. Perhaps 
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more so than many other terms for ultimacy, e.g., “the One,” “Being-itself,” the concept 
of the Whence carries within it a subtle apophatic element—it points beyond itself, 
beyond the horizon of finite being, to an ever-present yet ultimately unknowable source. 
Although the ontological element of Schleiermacher’s conception of God is somewhat 
subdued in the opening section of the Glaubenslehre, we will see this theme developed 
further in his discussion the Divine attributes.  
 Closely connected to his definition of piety as the feeling of absolute dependence 
is Schleiermacher’s famous notion of “the fundamental dogmatic form.” This idea is 
introduced in his discussion of the traditional dogmatic propositions of the Christian faith 
with which systematic theology concerns itself, and more importantly, the way in which 
these dogmatic statements are to be interpreted. Schleiermacher defines dogmatic 
propositions as a subset of Church doctrines that are distinguished by the fact that they 
aspire to “the highest possible degree of definiteness,” as opposed to doctrines that are 
rhetorical or poetic in nature.346 
Prior to the appearance of Schleiermacher’s Glaubenslehre, it was often assumed 
as a matter of course that dogmatic assertions referred to the nature of God, salvation 
history, or the creation of the world. One of Schleiermacher’s most important 
contributions to the discipline of systematic theology was his subtle yet momentous claim 
that determining the proper referent of dogmatic propositions is in fact a matter of 
theological interpretation. What’s more, Schleiermacher proposes the far-reaching idea 
that the actual referent of a given dogmatic statement may or may not be included within 
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the proposition itself. For example, the proposition “God is Goodness itself,” could be 
interpreted straightforwardly as referring to the axiological nature of ultimate reality. Yet, 
the proposition could also be interpreted as a report on human religious experience—i.e., 
as an individual’s feeling about the divine goodness.  
Crucially, Schleiermacher adduces three distinct forms of traditional dogmatic 
propositions: 
All propositions which the system of Christian doctrine has to establish can be regarded 
either as descriptions of human states, or as conceptions of divine attributes and modes of 
action, or as utterances regarding the constitution of the world; and all three forms have 
always subsisted alongside of each other.347 
Despite his acknowledgement that all three forms have always been a part of 
Christian dogmatics, Schleiermacher famously demotes the latter two forms (i.e., 
statements about the Divine nature and action, and statements about the constitution of 
the world). He does so on the grounds that the latter dogmatic forms involve claims that 
fall under the domain of science—either the science of metaphysics or the natural 
sciences.348 Thus, in an effort to preserve the “eternal covenant” between theology and 
the sciences, Schleiermacher relegates the second and third dogmatic forms and elevates 
the first.349 This leads to what is perhaps Schleiermacher’s most original—and 
controversial—contribution to the discipline of systematics: his claim that all dogmatic 
propositions can be interpreted as referring to states of human consciousness, as opposed 
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to their ostensible objects (i.e., the nature of God, God’s action in the world, etc.). This is 
Schleiermacher’s famous “fundamental dogmatic form.” 
Hence we must declare the description of human states of mind to be the fundamental 
dogmatic form; while propositions of the second and third forms are permissible only in 
so far as they can be developed out of propositions of the first form; for only on this 
condition can they be really authenticated as expressions of religious emotions.350 
Schleiermacher extends this radical theological paradigm shift beyond the realm 
of dogmatic propositions (i.e., those doctrines that aim at “the highest degree of 
definiteness”) to include Christian doctrine tout court. Consequently, the Glaubenslehre 
treats all traditional doctrines of the Church as conceptual reflections upon and 
elaborations of the experience of the religious community. “Christian doctrines,” 
Schleiermacher writes, “are accounts of the Christian religious affections set forth in 
speech.”351 This amounts to something of a Copernican revolution in systematic theology.  
Schleiermacher’s fundamental dogmatic form has especially important 
consequences for the doctrine of God and the problem of religious anthropomorphism. 
As we saw in chapter one, the debate over religious anthropomorphism classically turns 
on the question of which divine attributes are taken to be unbefitting of God. 
Schleiermacher’s system sidesteps this approach altogether by refusing to grant the 
(usually unstated) premise that any of the traditional divine attributes refer in some sense 
to the divine nature itself.352 As a result of this move, Schleiermacher also circumvents 
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the classic debate over divine predication—i.e., the question of whether the divine 
attributes are predicated of God univocally, analogically, or equivocally. Indeed, the 
fundamental dogmatic form reverses the direction of the arrow of predication altogether: 
the divine attributes refer not to God, but rather to the human experience of absolute 
dependence. Thus Schleiermacher opens his treatment of the divine attributes as follows:  
All attributes which we ascribe to God are to be taken as denoting not something special 
in God, but only something special in the manner in which the feeling of absolute 
dependence is to be related to Him.353 
 In his effort to battle the problem of religious anthropomorphism, Schleiermacher 
saw fit to deny “the speculative character of the content of all the divine attributes to be 
affirmed in Christian doctrine, just for that reason and in so far as they are manifold.”354 
The fundamental dogmatic form thus functions to encircle the divine nature with an 
apophatic barricade beyond which no positive attributes are permitted. This guarantees 
that the doctrine of God is as free from anthropomorphic attributes as is possible in the 
human enterprise of discourse about the Divine. Crucially, however, the positive 
attributes of God are not thereby prohibited from theological discourse all together. The 
sheer bulk of the Glaubenslehre attests to the fact that there is a great deal to be said 
about the religious significance of the divine attributes and modes of action when these 
are interpreted in light of the fundamental dogmatic form.  
In this respect, the Glaubenslehre is a notably practical work of systematic 
theology. As a seminary professor and pastor, Schleiermacher was well aware of the fact 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
explications of the Divine causality, which itself is another way of identifying God as the Whence of 
absolute dependence. I will further explicate this point in what follows. 
353 Schleiermacher, Ibid., § 50, 194. 
354 Schleiermacher, Ibid., §50, 195. 
  176 
that an apophatic, anti-anthropomorphic view of God presents serious practical problems 
for the church theologian, just as highly anthropomorphic views of God create conceptual 
problems for the philosophically inclined systematic theologian. Perhaps most 
significantly, an anti-anthropomorphic view of God appears to stand in direct opposition 
to the religious anthropomorphism that prevails within the biblical text and church 
tradition that the theologian and pastor are charged to interpret—not to mention the 
religious imaginary of the community to which they address themselves. Herein lies the 
genius of Schleiermacher’s fundamental dogmatic form: it functions to protect the divine 
nature from anthropomorphic attributions while simultaneously preserving the religious 
significance of the traditional divine attributes—understood as reports on the Christian 
experience of absolute dependence. The fundamental dogmatic form thus ensures that 
traditional views of God and accounts of divine action in the world are not simply tossed 
overboard on the grounds of anthropomorphism. Rather, Schleiermacher’s fundamental 
form also functions to open the space for a theological interpretation of the religious 
meaningfulness of these beliefs for laypersons.  
Interestingly enough, despite his insistence upon the primacy of the fundamental 
dogmatic form in the introduction to the Glaubenslehre, Schleiermacher was unable to 
confine himself to this form in the remainder of his system. In fact, the all-important 
concept of piety as “the feeling of absolute dependence” hinges upon an onto-theological 
postulation that abrogates the strictures of the description of human states of 
consciousness. In his treatment of the doctrine of creation, Schleiermacher notes that the 
religious value of the feeling of absolute dependence is legitimate only insofar as there is 
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in fact an ontological Whence upon which all finite being depends in an asymmetric, 
absolute sense. Conversely, if it were the case that the universe—or any entity therein—is 
eternal or self-grounded then the feeling of absolute dependence would be illusory. 
…It is quite clear that our feeling of absolute dependence could not refer to the universal 
condition of all finite being if anything in it…were independent of God or ever had been. It 
is just as certain that if there could be anything in the whole of finite existence as such 
which entered into it as its origin independently of God, then because it must exist in us too, 
the feeling of absolute dependence could have no truth even in relation to ourselves.355 
While Schleiermacher does not employ the terminology of Neoplatonism here, 
the onto-theological similarities are clear enough. Schleiermacher conceives of the 
Whence in terms of the ontological ground of the whole of finite being, which he 
associates with “the divine causality.”356 On this view, the dependent character of the 
finite world—i.e., the view that nothing within the domain of finite being is self-caused—
necessitates an eternal act of ontological grounding, or creation. It is to this eternal 
ontological act that the concept of the divine causality and its corollary concept of creatio 
ex nihilo refer.357 All other Divine attributes treated in the Glaubenslehre are interpreted 
as either 1) descriptions of the feeling of absolute dependence, or 2) conceptual 
elaborations on the divine causality, all of which are ultimately coextensive with this 
concept.  
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The doctrine of God articulated in the Glaubenslehre is thus wholly exhausted by 
the concept of the divine causality. For example, the classic attribute of the divine 
eternality is interpreted as referring to “the absolutely timeless causality of God, which 
conditions not only all that is temporal, but time itself as well.”358 The divine 
omnipresence is taken to refer to the “absolutely space-less causality of God, which 
conditions not only all that is spatial, but space itself.”359 Similarly, the attribute of the 
divine omnipotence refers to the fact that “the entire system of Nature…is founded upon 
divine causality, which as eternal and omnipresent is in contrast to finite causality; 
and…that the divine causality, as affirmed in our feeling of absolute dependence, is 
completely presented in the totality of finite being.”360 The divine omniscience—clearly 
one of the more anthropomorphic of the classic divine attributes—is construed in terms 
of the vital, non-physical nature of divine causality, or the “absolute spirituality of the 
divine Omnipotence.”361 Here Schleiermacher notes that many traditional accounts of the 
divine omniscience involved introducing “the imperfections of our [human] 
consciousness” to the divine nature.362 In opposition to this traditional tendency, 
Schleiermacher issues a subdued exhortation against religious anthropomorphism: “But 
we may reasonably hesitate to transfer such things from ourselves to God.”363 
 In summary, none of the aforementioned “divine attributes” introduce any distinct 
ontological attribute, capacity, or characteristic to the divine nature. Rather, for 
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Schleiermacher, all of the classic divine attributes ultimately amount to different ways of 
speaking about the divine causality.364  
 Schleiermacher’s doctrine of God is consistently anti-anthropomorphic and, by 
my lights, does not appear to suffer from any prima facie coherence problems. 
Nevertheless, some of the dogmatic propositions that he goes on to expound in later parts 
of his system create serious coherence problems with respect to his doctrine of God. The 
most salient example of this phenomenon is found in Schleiermacher’s account of the 
person of Christ and the incarnation. This section of the Glaubenslehre also represents 
another instance of Schleiermacher’s inability to confine his dogmatic propositions to the 
strictures of his favored fundamental dogmatic form. Famously, Schleiermacher’s 
Christology centers on the “God-consciousness” of the person of Jesus. By “God-
consciousness,” he means the degree to which an individual’s self-consciousness is in 
relation with God by way of the awareness or feeling of the absolute dependence. 
Schleiermacher claims that what made the person of Jesus religiously exemplary and 
utterly singular was his possession of a perfect God consciousness. That is to say, Jesus 
was at all times and to the greatest degree possible aware of the absolute dependence of 
himself and the world upon God. Consequently, Schleiermacher promulgates “the 
conviction which is common to all Christians, that no more perfect form of the God-
consciousness lies in front of the human race, and that any new form would simply be a 
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retrograde step.”365  
Crucially, Schleiermacher does not construe the above proposition as “an account 
of the Christian religious affections,” i.e., as referring to the fact that Christian believers 
experience Jesus as having possessed a perfect God-consciousness. Rather, the above 
proposition represents a first-order claim about the historical person of Jesus and the 
perfect state of his consciousness vis-á-vis the feeling of absolute dependence. Moreover, 
Schleiermacher rejects out of hand the possibility that another human individual could 
ever equal or surpass the God-consciousness realized in the person of Jesus. The serious 
consideration of such a possibility marks the boundary, or “the end” of Christian faith, 
according to Schleiermacher.366  
The postulation of Jesus’s perfect God-consciousness as a singular event in the 
history of the human species naturally provokes the question of how such an event could 
be said to occur within the natural order without invoking the idea of some form of 
supernatural intervention—a conceptual move that would seem to compromise 
Schleiermacher’s notion of the “Eternal covenant” between science and Christian 
dogmatics. As it happens, his treatment of the doctrine of the incarnation, or “the 
appearance of the Redeemer,” is the clearest moment in the Glaubenslehre where 
Schleiermacher self-consciously introduces a theological claim that threatens to 
undermine the “Eternal covenant” for which he so passionately advocated.367 
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Schleiermacher touches on the difficulty posed by the doctrine of the incarnation 
early on in the introduction to the Glaubenslehre. Here he claims that the incarnation 
must be understood as “neither an absolutely supernatural nor an absolutely supra-
rational thing.”368 His first point is that an absolutely supernatural account of the 
incarnation would vitiate the humanity of Christ: “as certainly as Christ was a man, there 
must reside in human nature the possibility of taking up the divine into itself, just as did 
happen in Christ.”369 It follows that the appearance of the Redeemer cannot be 
“absolutely supernatural” if the full humanity of Jesus is to be preserved.370  
Yet, given that the reality of sin (the forgetfulness of absolute dependence on 
God) is a feature of the human condition for Schleiermacher, it is difficult to account for 
the historical appearance of a perfect God-consciousness without reference to something 
beyond the natural causal processes of the world.371 Moreover, if the ability to achieve a 
perfect God-consciousness is in fact a natural capacity of human nature then this fact 
would seem to render unsupportable Schleiermacher’s dogmatic claim that Jesus is 
definitively unique and singular in possessing a perfect state of God-consciousness, and 
that no other individuals are capable of achieving this state or surpassing Jesus in this 
respect. Schleiermacher’s commitment to the singular and definitive historical event of 
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Jesus’ perfect God-consciousness forces his hand so to speak on the question of whether 
the appearance of the Redeemer can be understood as a strictly natural phenomenon. His 
position appears to require reference to some force beyond natural historical processes in 
order to stabilize his Christological assertions. And while Schleiermacher is overt in his 
claim that the appearance of the Redeemer is in some sense supernatural or “miraculous,” 
he nevertheless tries to hedge on the type of supernaturalism that is associated with this 
doctrine. He rejects the traditional view of the incarnation as an instance of God 
supernaturally intervening in human history in early 1st century Palestine. Instead, he 
argues that the supernatural condition for the possibility of the appearance of the 
Redeemer in history consists of a divine act occurring outside of human history 
altogether.  
Consequently, Schleiermacher claims that the perfect God-consciousness of Jesus 
“cannot be explained by the content of the human environment to which He belonged, 
but only by the universal source of spiritual life in virtue of a creative divine act in which, 
as an absolute maximum, the conception of man as the subject of the God-consciousness 
come to completion.”372 From this it follows that “the actual implanting” of the 
possibility of a perfect God-consciousness, “must be purely a divine and therefore eternal 
act.”373  
In summary, Schleiermacher’s formulation of the doctrine of the incarnation 
consists of two poles: the natural and the supernatural. He recapitulates his position as 
follows: “In this whole matter we posit, on the one side, an initial divine activity which is 
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supernatural, but at the same time a vital human receptivity in virtue of which alone that 
supernatural can become a natural fact of history.”374  
  Whatever the merits and deficits of Schleiermacher’s doctrine of the incarnation 
may be, it clearly creates an acute coherence problem with respect to his doctrine of God. 
As we have seen, Schleiermacher’s account of God as the Whence of the feeling of 
absolute dependence is stridently apophatic and anti-anthropomorphic. The most he will 
say of the Whence is that it is best understood by way of the Divine causality—which 
isn’t saying much, beyond the fact that God is the ontological ground of finite being. Yet, 
his account of the appearance of the Redeemer hangs upon an eternal divine act, which 
implies that God intentionally created the possibility of the historical realization of a 
perfect God-consciousness in the human species. This logically entails that intentionality 
and agency are ontological characteristics of the divine nature; i.e., the nature of God is 
such that God is capable of knowing, planning, and acting according to God’s purposes.  
As we have seen above, Schleiermacher never explicitly predicates the attributes 
of intentionality and agency of the divine nature.375 Yet, the reality of these divine 
attributes is presupposed in his aforementioned account of the supernatural origin of the 
appearance of the Redeemer. It is precisely the apophatic silence surrounding the concept 
of the Whence throughout the Glaubenslehre that opens up the space for conceptually 
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ambiguous statements about the supernatural provenance of the incarnation vis-à-vis an 
eternal divine act.  
In the final analysis, Schleiermacher’s stated account of the divine nature in the 
Glaubenslehre is consistently anti-anthropomorphic (i.e., the traditional anthropomorphic 
divine attributes are all either rejected or reinterpreted in a non-anthropomorphic way). 
Nevertheless, he also smuggles into his Christology an anthropomorphic divine act, 
which does not cohere with his aforementioned doctrine of God. Interestingly enough, the 
conceptual problems that result from pairing together an anti-anthropomorphic view of 
God with an exclusivist Christology can be observed in the thought of the last figure 
under discussion in this chapter: Paul Tillich. 
3.3 Tillich on God as the Unconditioned Ground of Being 
The German-American Lutheran theologian and philosopher Paul Tillich was 
born in Starzeddel, Germany in 1886. His father was a Lutheran pastor in Berlin, and the 
influence of the Lutheran tradition was to have a lasting impact on Tillich. At University, 
Tillich focused his studies on nineteenth century German Idealism, eventually going on 
to earn a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Breslau in 1911. Shortly 
thereafter he earned a licentiate in theology from the University of Halle. In an unusual 
move, Tillich chose to write both of his doctoral dissertations on the nineteenth century 
German philosopher F.W.J. Schelling.376 The onto-theological language that 
characterizes Tillich’s theology owes much to Schelling, whose thought was deeply 
influenced by the mystical traditions of Neoplatonism, especially that of the German 
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mystic Jacob Boehme (1575-1624). Tillich’s famous definition of God as the “Ground of 
Being” in the first volume of his Systematic Theology is essentially a footnote to 
Schelling, who conceived of the divine nature as the infinite ground of all finite being--an 
infinite ground which itself is groundless. Hence Schelling often referred to God as the 
“non-ground” or “Ungrund.”377 On this view, the divine nature is the infinite 
“Unconditioned” reality that conditions the finite world. In his early work in philosophy 
of religion and theology, Tillich regularly invoked Schelling’s definition of God as “das 
Unbedingte” or, “the Unconditioned.”378 
 The influence of Schelling on Tillich’s intellectual development was second only 
to his experience as a Lutheran chaplain during the First World War. Tillich ministered to 
soldiers in the trenches from 1914 until the War’s end in 1918. His first-hand experience 
of the horrors of human warfare marked a turning point in Tillich’s life, what he referred 
to as a “personal kairos”379 The experience also served as an unforgiving touchstone for 
the adequacy of his philosophical and theological beliefs. Perhaps most significantly, 
Tillich’s view of God shattered against the hellish realities of war. Despite his 
Schellingian language about the “Unconditioned” ground of being, the young Tillich 
appears to have held an “attenuated anti-anthropomorphic” view of God—i.e., he had 
understood God to be both infinite and personal. However, the senseless death and horror 
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of the war utterly destroyed the idea of a personal God for Tillich.380 
Yet, amidst the senseless carnage and despair of the trenches, Tillich found 
existential consolation and a sense of spiritual vitality in reading Nietzsche’s Thus Spake 
Zarathustra.381 Nietzsche’s influence on Tillich was, perhaps somewhat 
counterintuitively, a deeply theological one. Nietzsche’s philosophy helped Tillich to 
reinterpret his own encounter with the abyss of despair and meaninglessness—along with 
the collapse of his belief in a personal God—as existentially profound experiences of 
confronting the vertiginous depth dimensions of human life. Tillich took the subsequent 
step—one that is arguably implicit in Nietzsche’s thought as well—of interpreting the 
experience of encountering the existential depths of life as a fundamentally religious 
experience.382 
After the war, Tillich set out to reconstruct a theology that could provide 
existential meaning and spiritual depth without invoking the anthropomorphic idea of a 
personal God. Tillich presents his doctrine of God in part two of the first volume of the 
ST, entitled “Being and God.” Already in the terse title of this section we may observe the 
correlational method of question and answer. Like Heidegger, Tillich sees being as the 
fundamental question of the human situation. And Tillich maintains that the theological 
answer that correlates to the question of being is the reality of God as the unconditioned 
ground of being. He defines the question of being first in terms of the ontological 
question “What is being itself?” This question naturally evokes the ontological depth 
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dimension of the human situation from which the question of being is raised. Thus, the 
question of being gives rise to the “metaphysical shock” at the possibility of nonbeing. 
This “metaphysical shock” leads to a more existentially loaded form of the question of 
being: the question is no longer “What is being itself?” but “Why is there something; why 
not nothing?”383 Implicit within the “why” of this question is existential concern about 
the meaning of being for the one who asks the ontological question. And for Tillich, the 
existential question of the meaning of being is the question of “ultimate concern” par 
excellence. 
Up until this point, Tillich’s account of the question of being and ultimate concern 
is in many respects similar to Heidegger’s description of human existence in Being and 
Time, wherein Dasein (human being) is characterized by “thrownness” into temporal 
being, and “care” concerning Dasein’s “ownmost possibility,” namely, nonbeing (or, 
death).384 The conceptual chasm that separates Heidegger from Tillich is the latter’s 
claim that the question of the meaning of being falls within the proper domain of 
theology. The basic upshot of this view suggests that a great many philosophers—
including Heidegger—ought to be baptized as theologians. Tillich takes this line of 
reasoning further still, arguing that, “every creative philosopher is a hidden 
theologian…He is a theologian in the degree to which his existential situation and his 
ultimate concern shape his philosophical vision.”385 Of course, most philosophers—
especially Heidegger—would roundly reject Tillich’s audacious claim that they are in 
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fact theologians in philosopher’s clothing. 
Nevertheless, Tillich maintains that the only adequate answer to the question of the 
meaning of being is a theological answer. The fundamental issue is whether a given 
theological answer is adequate to the ontological depth of the question. For Tillich, the 
only theological answer that is adequate to the question of the meaning of being is the 
reality of God as the ground of being. He further suggests that all other conceptions of 
God are susceptible to vanishing into the infinite depths of the ontological question. 
Referring to the ontological shock at the possibility of nonbeing Tillich writes, “Whenever 
this state is experienced and this question is asked, everything disappears in the abyss of 
possible nonbeing; even a god would disappear if he were not being-itself.”386 Differently 
stated, any conception of God that could potentially dissolve into the abyss of nonbeing is 
a conditioned God—i.e., conditioned either by being or nonbeing. And, “a conditioned 
God is no God,” according to Tillich.387 He appears to have in mind here the idea of God 
as a personal being—a theological answer to the question of being that, for Tillich, 
vanished into the abyss of nonexistence during the first World War.  
Tillich goes on to express this point in more explicitly ontological terms. He 
argues that the concept of God as a personal reality that exists, relates to, and acts within 
the world is vulnerable to “disappearing into the abyss of nonbeing” precisely because 
this view places God under the ontological category of existence. And if one can attribute 
existence (or being) to God, then is also possible to deny this attribution. To assert the 
existence of God is ipso facto to open up the logical space for the denial of God’s 
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existence.  
Moreover, Tillich understands this idea of God to be idolatrous. This is because 
the categories of existence and being are only properly predicated of entities or beings. 
Consequently, any “God” that exists would necessarily be a being among other beings—
regardless of whether it be the supreme or “most perfect being.” Hence Tillich’s claim 
that “when applied to God, superlatives become diminutives: they place him on the level 
of other beings while elevating him above all of them.”388 To identify an existent being—
no matter how perfect or supreme—with God is to elevate a conditioned entity to the 
level of the infinite and the unconditioned. For Tillich, this is the very definition of 
idolatry. Whether one worships a stone, a wooden statue, or a divine personal being 
makes little difference on this outlook: in each case, something conditioned is treated as 
though it were unconditioned.  
Tillich maintains that the only proper referent for the word God is a reality that is 
beyond being and non-being, namely, the unconditioned ground of being, or being-
itself.389 Accordingly, Tillich claims that, “however it is defined, the ‘existence of God’ 
contradicts the idea of a creative ground of essence and existence. The ground of being 
cannot be found within the totality of beings.”390 This in turn leads to one of the most 
memorable statements in the ST: “God does not exist. He [sic] is being-itself beyond 
essence and existence. Therefore, to argue that God exists is to deny him.”391 Later in 
volume one, Tillich reiterates this point, stating that, “it is as atheistic to affirm the 
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existence of God as it is to deny it. God is being-itself, not a being.”392 
Of course, Thomas would agree with Tillich that God is not a being, but rather 
ipsum esse. The crucial difference is that Tillich’s ontology of God does not include any 
ontological attributes, such as capacities for intentionality, or agential action in the world. 
For Tillich, God is being-itself—full stop. Unlike Thomas, Tillich felt no need to qualify 
this claim with analogies that stabilize the meaningfulness of attributing to God 
characteristics belonging to the realm of creatures. Just as Thomas rejected the concept of 
univocal predication on the grounds of anthropomorphism, Tillich rejects Thomas’ 
account of the analogia entis on the grounds that this doctrine functions to preserve 
anthropomorphic attributes in the ontology of God, and, in doing so, introduces 
incoherence to the divine nature by predicating attributes of that which by definition is 
beyond all characteristics, distinctions, and conditions. It is important to note, however, 
that Tillich’s goal is not to eradicate anthropomorphic religious language from 
theological discourse. On the contrary, Tillich maintains that theology cannot function 
without such language. Accordingly, he follows Schleiermacher’s program of 
interpreting anthropomorphic religious ideas in a way that preserves the religious value 
and spiritual meaningfulness of these ideas while at the same time rejecting the 
metaphysical validity of anthropomorphic ideas with respect to the ontology of God.  
This leads us to Tillich’s conception of religious symbols, which plays a central 
role in his theology as a whole, and especially in his doctrine of God. Tillich understands 
religious language to be ineluctably symbolic in nature. This view follows directly from 
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the central claim of the onto-theological tradition within which Tillich is situated, namely 
that God is the infinite ground of finite being. Implicit in this claim is the idea that there 
is an infinite qualitative difference between God and the finite world. “God as the ground 
of being infinitely transcends that of which he is the ground,” Tillich writes.393 From this 
it follows that creatures have no access to the ground of being except by way of finite 
being. In other words, the infinite is experienced only in and through the realm of 
finitude. Religious language is therefore the attempt to utilize aspects of finite being in 
order to point toward and engage with infinite being-itself. Tillich writes, “Religious 
symbols are double-edged. They are directed toward the infinite which they symbolize 
and toward the finite through which they symbolize it. They force the infinite down to 
finitude and the finite up to infinity. They open the divine for the human and the human 
for the divine.”394 
But what is it about religious language that makes it essentially symbolic in 
nature? Tillich defines symbols in contrast with signs. Signs are arbitrary and 
conventional form of reference, whereas symbols are in some sense connected to their 
object. “The sign bears no necessary relation to that to which it points, the symbol 
participates in the reality of that for which it stands.”395 Religious language is therefore 
fundamentally symbolic because it not only refers to its logical object, but also 
exemplifies participation in its object. In the second volume of the ST he explicates this 
point as follows: 
A religious symbol uses the material of ordinary experience in speaking of God, but in 
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such a way that the ordinary meaning of the material used is both affirmed and denied. 
Every religious symbol negates itself in its literal meaning, but it affirms itself in its self-
transcending meaning. It is not a sign pointing to something with which it has no inner 
relationship. It represents the power and meaning of what is symbolized through 
participation. The symbol participates in the reality which is symbolized.396  
Religious symbols exemplify participation in the reality they symbolize in two 
basic ways. First, religious symbols, like many other human symbols, represent our 
existential participation in some reality. For example, to display an American flag outside 
one’s home is a symbol that exemplifies one’s existential participation in the object 
symbolized, i.e., the United States of America. Existential participation here refers not to 
the fact that one happens to exist and thus in some broad sense participate in a given 
country (which is true of every citizen, regardless of whether they display a flag) but 
rather that one’s participation in this country is a matter of significant existential concern 
for them. Tillich distinguishes between symbols of existential human concern and 
religious symbols by way of his concept of ultimate concern. On this view, religious 
symbols are not exhausted by traditional religious symbols (e.g., God as a King, Lord, the 
rock of our salvation, the symbol of the cross, etc.). Rather, religious symbols may also 
include whatever symbols are connected to our ultimate concern. It follows that the 
American flag could be a religious symbol for some. 
Tillich’s account of religious symbols is not merely descriptive however: the 
concept of ultimate concern functions as a theological norm in Tillich’s system. As we 
have seen, he maintains that the only reality worthy of our unconditional concern is that 
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which is itself unconditional, namely, the ground of being. Thus, to elevate a symbol such 
as the flag—which symbolizes the conditioned reality of a nation—to the level ultimate 
concern would be a form of idolatry on this view. Tillich regularly cited the example of 
the German nationalism leading up to the rise of Nazi socialism as an example of how 
symbols of existential concern often become deeply destructive, or “demonic.”  
Furthermore, Tillich argues that traditional religious symbols can become 
idolatrous and sometimes even demonic when they are taken literally. Consider for 
example the traditional symbol of God as “Father.” On the one hand, this symbol brings 
the divine human relationship down to the level of the finite realm of human 
relationships. “But at the same time, Tillich observes, “this human relationship is 
consecrated into a pattern of the divine-human relationship. If ‘Father’ is employed as a 
symbol for God, fatherhood is seen in its theonomous, sacramental depth.”397 At its best 
then, the symbol of God as “Father” exemplifies human participation in what is ultimate: 
human beings exist in an asymmetric, dependent—or “theonomous”—relationship with 
God, just as a child exists in an asymmetric, dependent relationship with a father. Taken 
as a religious symbol, “Father” points toward our dependence on God.  
However, as most 21st century readers would be quick to point out, the symbol of 
“God the Father” is highly destructive when taken literally to mean that God is in some 
sense more like a male than female, or that certain stereotypical masculine characteristics 
are somehow more divine than female characteristics.398 Thus Tillich writes, “It must be 
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acknowledged that the two central symbols, Lord and Father, are stumbling blocks for 
many people because theologians and preachers have been unwilling to listen to the often 
shocking insights into psychological consequences of the traditional use of these 
symbols.”399 He goes on to underscore the fact that all religious symbols are “two-sided.” 
“On one side, they are determined by the transcendent reality they express; on the other 
side, they are influenced by the situation of those for whom they point to this reality.”400  
The second sense in which religious symbols participate in the reality they 
symbolize refers to the fact that religious symbols, like all aspects of finite being, 
ontologically participate in the ground of being. Here Tillich draws upon—and 
fundamentally reinterprets—the Catholic doctrine of the analogia entis. On his reading, 
what the doctrine of analogy got right was its affirmative answer to the basic question of 
natural theology, i.e., “Can any aspect of finite being serve as the basis for knowledge of 
the divine being?” In his own response to this question, Tillich deploys an idiosyncratic 
account of the analogia entis:  
Can a segment of finite reality become the basis for an assertion about that which is 
infinite? The answer is that it can, because that which is infinite is being-itself and 
because everything participates in being-itself. The analogia entis is not the property of a 
questionable natural theology which attempts to gain knowledge of God by drawing 
conclusions about the infinite from the finite. The analogia entis gives us our only 
justification of speaking at all about God. It is based on the fact that God must be 
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understood as being-itself.401 
As Tillich signals to the reader, his conception of the analogia entis is markedly 
different from that of Thomas and the long tradition of interpretation surrounding this 
doctrine in Catholic theology. The only significant similarity between the two accounts of 
analogy is, as intimated above, that both views assert the possibility of gaining some 
knowledge of God by way of finite being. Compared with the Catholic doctrine of 
analogy, however, Tillich’s account appears deflationary: he seizes on the claim that the 
world of finite being can in fact bring human beings to an understanding of the ground of 
being, but beyond this, there is no metaphysical knowledge to be gained from drawing 
analogies between the finite creature and the infinite creator.  
Nevertheless, Tillich’s interpretation of the analogia entis is deeply sacramental. 
On his view, predicates and concepts derived from the finite realm of creatures do in fact 
connect us to God in virtue of their ontological participation in the ground of being. The 
divine attributes that the analogia entis traditionally stabilized are, for Tillich, 
participatory symbols rather than ontological descriptions of the being of God. And like 
all religious symbols, they connect our own human ultimate concerns to the ultimate 
depth dimension of reality. For Tillich, it is the unconditioned ground of being itself that 
elicits our ultimate concern, along with the irrepressible human impulse to symbolize 
one’s ultimate concern. Religious symbols therefore place us in relationship with the 
depth dimension of being, with the ground of our ultimate concern—even when these 
symbols are distortive of the actual ontological character of the logical object of ultimate 
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concern. 
Tillich points out that, “any concrete assertion about God must be symbolic, for a 
concrete assertion is one which uses a segment of finite experience in order to say 
something about him.”402 There is, however, one all-important exception to this claim. 
Tillich maintains that there is in fact a non-symbolic, metaphysical assertion about God 
that serves as the basis for all other claims about God: namely, the proposition that God is 
being-itself. 
The statement that God is being-itself is a non-symbolic statement. It does not point 
beyond itself. It means what is says directly and properly; if we speak of the actuality of 
God, we first assert that he is not God if he is not being-itself. Other assertions about God 
can be made theologically only on this basis…theologians must make explicit what is 
implicit in religious thought and expression; and, in order to do this, they must begin with 
the most abstract and completely unsymbolic statement which is possible, namely, that 
God is being-itself.403 
Thus, the proposition that “God is being-itself” is not only a non-symbolic 
statement about God—it is the only non-symbolic assertion one can make about God. 
Tillich proclaims that, “after this has been said, nothing else can be said about God as God 
which is not symbolic…therefore, if anything beyond this bare assertion [God is being-
itself] is said about God, it no longer is a direct and proper statement, no longer a concept. 
It is indirect, and it points to something beyond itself. In a word it is symbolic.”404 With 
this assertion, Tillich effectively expels all traditional religious anthropomorphic attributes 
(e.g., capacities for divine knowledge and providential action in the world) from his 
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ontology of God. True, these ideas survive as religious symbols, but they no longer 
function as veridical descriptions of the ontology of God.  
Interestingly, Tillich changes his position on the matter of non-symbolic 
theological language over the course of the ST, moving away from his modified 
conception of the analogia entis toward a more apophatic approach. This is seen most 
notably in the introduction to the second volume, where Tillich once again takes up the 
question of the possibility of a non-symbolic statement about God. Here however, he is 
no longer prepared to claim that the proposition “God is being-itself” is a non-symbolic 
statement. Tillich writes, “the question arises…as to whether there is a point at which a 
non-symbolic assertion about God must be made. There is such a point, namely, the 
statement that everything we say about God is symbolic. Such a statement is an assertion 
about God which itself is not symbolic.”405  
Here we see Tillich—onto-theologian par excellence—clearly backing away from 
the preeminence of ontological language with respect to the divine nature. And yet, he 
continues to refer to God as “being-itself” throughout volumes two and three of the ST. 
At first blush, this may appear to be an inconsistency on Tillich’s part. Indeed, one might 
ask: “why doesn’t Tillich follow through on the apophaticism inherent in his claim that 
‘everything we say about God is symbolic,’ and jettison the ontological description of 
God as being-itself all together?” While there is a clear inconsistency between the claim 
in volume one (that the proposition “God is being-itself” is the only non-symbolic 
assertion about God) and the claim in volume two (that the only non-symbolic assertion 
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about God is that “everything we say about God is symbolic.”), it does not follow from 
this that Tillich is contradicting himself when he proceeds to refer to God as “being-
itself” in the remaining pages of the ST. Indeed, if we take Tillich at his word in the 
introduction to volume two, he has simply (and silently) reconsidered and rescinded the 
claim in volume one that the statement “God is being-itself” is non-symbolic. It does not 
follow from this that his continued use of the term “being-itself” to refer to God is 
inconsistent with the aforementioned claim in volume two—it simply means that this 
statement (“God is being-itself”) is now to be interpreted symbolically.  
 Moreover, the claim concerning the possibility of non-symbolic language for 
God in volume two can be understood as a clarification and deepening of the theological 
trajectory of his claim on this topic in volume one. In both cases, Tillich is attempting to 
place the divine nature beyond the categories of being and non-being. In volume one, he 
attempted to do so by designating the concept of “being-itself” as the best candidate for a 
non-symbolic, ontological description of God on the grounds that this concept (being-
itself) is meant to refer to a reality beyond being and non-being, existence and non-
existence. Yet, by the time he began writing volume two of the ST, Tillich had clearly 
moved to a more apophatic position. The theological trajectory remained the same 
(attempting to speak of the unconditional), but he now saw, as Schleiermacher had also 
intuited, that ontological categories such as “being-itself” can become reified when used 
in a literal, or non-symbolic fashion—regardless of the fact that such categories are 
deployed precisely in order to avoid the reification of the unconditional. The problem 
with claiming that being-itself serves as a literal description of God is that this position 
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veers toward idolatry by Tillich’s own definition: something finite and conditioned—in 
this case, the human concept of “being-itself”—is identified with the infinite and 
unconditioned. 
Thus, Tillich came to appreciate the necessity of apophatic silence regarding the 
divine nature a se. As a result, he reconfigured the category of “being-itself” from a 
literal description of the divine nature to a symbolic account of the divine nature. It is 
important to note however, that Tillich did not see all human symbols of God as existing 
on a level playing field—by no means. The fact that Tillich persisted in referring to God 
as being-itself throughout the remaining sections of the ST is a clear indication that he 
understood this symbol to be among the most adequate human symbols available for 
speaking of the unspeakable reality of the unconditioned.  
Along with many other Neoplatonic onto-theologians, Tillich’s account of 
concepts and symbols of God implies that these ideas fall along a spectrum of theological 
adequacy. As we saw above, the concept of God as a personal being falls on the far (i.e., 
least adequate) end of this spectrum for Tillich. The symbol of God as Father would 
likely fall somewhere closer to the middle, due to its powerful existential and spiritual 
resonances and deeply ambiguous practical consequences. What is clear to any reader of 
the ST is that the concept of “being-itself” falls on the most adequate side of the spectrum 
for Tillich. While it may not amount to a literal description of the divine nature after all, 
it is among the most adequate symbols one can employ in attempting to characterize the 
divine nature before the inevitable lapse into apophatic silence—the surrendering of all 
language in the name of honoring the unconditional reality of God. 
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It is important to emphasize that although Tillich rejects anthropomorphic 
symbols of God when they are construed literally (i.e., as ontological descriptions of the 
divine nature), he does not renounce anthropomorphic religious symbols. Quite the 
opposite: Tillich understood that if systematic theology were to banish anthropomorphic 
symbols, it would thereby destroy all meaningful continuity with the religious tradition 
that it is meant to serve. Tillich, it must be remembered, wrote as a systematic theologian 
of the Christian church. Hence the opening line of the ST: “Theology, as a function of the 
Christian church, must serve the needs of the church.”406 Accordingly, he saw the task of 
the theologian to be that of generating critical reflection upon and ontological 
interpretation of the traditional symbols of the Christian church. “Theology,” Tillich 
writes, “has neither the duty nor the power to confirm or to negate religious symbols. Its 
task is to interpret them according to theological principles and methods.”407 
Towards the end of volume one of the ST, Tillich takes up the issue of personal 
symbols of God. For Tillich, the fundamental question with respect to personal symbols 
of God is not whether these symbols refer to a personal being—he could not have been 
more explicit in his negative answer to this question. Rather, the question of personal 
symbols of God pushes into much more complicated and ambiguous theological territory. 
Tillich focuses his discussion of this topic around several key questions: To what extent 
can the human expression of ultimate concern transcend personal categories? Can a non-
personal reality truly suffice as the object of one’s ultimate concern? To what extent 
should we conceive of the ground of being as personal in some sense? 
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First, it is important to recall that on Tillich’s view, it is the reality of God qua the 
unconditioned ground of being that provokes the perpetual human drive to create 
religious symbols; such symbols are a response to the ontological depth dimension of the 
world. Given that religious symbols are the products of human beings expressing their 
ultimate concern, it is not surprising that these symbols are freighted with 
anthropomorphic elements. In fact, Tillich suggests that we cannot symbolize our 
encounter with the unconditional except by way of personalizing symbols. He writes, 
The person-to-person relationship between God and man is constitutive for religious 
experience. Man cannot be ultimately concerned about something which is less than he 
is, something impersonal. This explains the fact that all divine powers—stones and stars, 
plants and animals, spirits and angels, and every single one of the great mythological 
gods—possess a personal character. It explains the fact that actually there is a struggle for 
a personal God in all religions, a struggle which resists all philosophical attacks.408  
 Tillich therefore acknowledges that the personal element is constitutive of 
religious symbols: human beings are persons, and their relationship with all aspects of the 
world—including the ontological depth dimension of the world—is unavoidably personal 
in nature. Tillich also recognizes the anthropomorphic drive to conceive of God in 
personal terms is so strong for most humans that such beliefs are often immune to 
philosophical critique. In other words, personal conceptions of God are not going 
anywhere just because philosophers and theologians question their metaphysical 
adequacy. 
 At the same time, Tillich maintains that anthropomorphic conceptions of God— 
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when taken literally as ontological descriptions of ultimate reality—are not only false, but 
also idolatrous. Like Schleiermacher, Tillich’s system strikes a balancing act with respect 
to religious anthropomorphism: anthropomorphic conceptions of God must be rejected 
with respect to the ontology of God, and affirmed with respect to the human experience 
of and relationship with the divine. Consequently, one of the tasks of systematic theology 
is to help individuals interpret their personal religious symbols in a non-idolatrous way; 
that is, to come to a symbolic understanding of religious symbols. Tillich writes, 
That which is the ultimate concern of a person cannot be less than a person, although it 
can be and must be more than personality. Under these circumstances, the theologian 
must emphasize the symbolic character of all concepts which are used to describe the 
divine act of self-revelation, and he must try to use terms which indicate that their 
meaning is not categorical.409  
Differently stated, the task of the systematic theologian is to help correct the 
human impulse to adopt literalized anthropomorphic symbols of God. The theologian 
must affirm the religious and spiritual value of these symbols as genuine existential 
responses to the depth dimension of being, while at the same time denying that these 
symbols accurately describe the divine nature. 
 This leads to Tillich’s somewhat confusing consideration of the question of 
whether God—understood as the ground of being—can be said to be in any way 
personal. Tillich writes, 
The solution of the difficulties in the phrase ‘personal God’ follows from this. ‘Personal 
God’ does not mean that God is a person. It means that God is the ground of everything 
personal and that he carries within himself the ontological power of personality. He is not 
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a person, but he is not less than personal.410  
The first claim in this passage is straightforward enough: on Tillich’s account, 
God is not a being; it follows therefore that God cannot be a person. However, the 
subsequent lines in this passage are more conceptually slippery. Tillich’s claim that God 
“carries within himself the ontological power of personality” is especially ambiguous. 
This claim could be interpreted to mean that being-itself is in some fundamental sense a 
personal reality. On this reading, one could argue that God is not a personal being, but as 
the ground of being “he is not less than personal.” In other words, the ground of being 
contains within itself a personal element. Recall that in chapter two we saw Thomas 
make a similar conceptual move with his claim that the divine attributes are one with the 
divine essence.  
Tillich’s language in the passage above is somewhat elliptical, and it does open 
itself up to the foregoing line interpretation. However, this interpretation—viz., that the 
ground of being possesses the ontological attribute of (or capacity for) personhood—is at 
loggerheads with virtually everything else Tillich says about the divine nature throughout 
the ST.  
More importantly, Tillich’s claim that God contains within God’s self “the 
ontological power of personality” falls under the purview of his categorical 
pronouncement in volume one that the only non-symbolic statement about God is “God is 
being-itself,” and that “after this has been said, nothing else can be said about God as 
God which is not symbolic.”411 Accordingly, the above claim must be taken as a symbolic 
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statement rather than an ontological description of the divine nature. Understood in this 
light, Tillich’s statement that God “carries within himself the ontological power of 
personality” can be interpreted to mean that God, as the unconditioned ground of being, 
is the ontological condition for the possibility of personhood. Tillich concludes his 
excursus on the issue of personal symbols of God with the following statement: 
“‘Personal God’ is a confusing symbol.”412 A theological understatement if ever there 
was one.  
The ambiguities within the foregoing passage notwithstanding, Tillich’s onto-
theological account of God is consistently anti-anthropomorphic throughout the ST. 
However, there are other elements of his system that sit awkwardly with his conception 
of God. This is especially evident with respect to his Christology. Like Schleiermacher, 
Tillich makes significant claims about the absolute uniqueness of the person of Jesus 
Christ that appear to be difficult to support in light of his view of God as a non-
intentional, non-agential infinite reality. Let us briefly consider this aspect of his thought. 
In the Systematic Theology volume II, entitled “Existence and the Christ,” Tillich 
formulates a unique Christology, which centers on the idea of Jesus as the bearer of the 
“New Being.” By this Tillich means that the person of Jesus embodies “the undistorted 
manifestation of essential being within and under the conditions of existence.”413 Finite 
existence, on this account, is characterized by “estrangement” from the ground of being; 
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and this estrangement is exemplified by realities such as ambiguity, anxiety, hubris, 
loneliness, meaninglessness, etc.414 The significance of Jesus as the Christ is that he was 
a finite individual who overcame estrangement from the infinite ground of being, and 
hence brought about the “New Being” under the conditions of finite existence. It is in 
bringing about the New Being that the person of Jesus is revelatory and salvific: “Where 
there is revelation there is salvation. Revelation is not information about divine things; it 
is the ecstatic manifestation of the Ground of Being in events, persons, and things. Such 
manifestations have shaking, transforming, and healing power. They are saving events in 
which the power of the New Being is present.”415 
If Tillich had said nothing else on the matter of Jesus, revelation, and the New 
Being, his position would have been more modest, and I would argue, more tenable. 
Indeed, the forgoing passage on the New Being could even be utilized as a pathway for 
addressing the issue of religious pluralism. One could argue in this Tillichian vein that all 
of the world religions have at their basis an ecstatic manifestation of the ground of being, 
in which the power of the New Being is disclosed. On this account, Jesus would be one 
of many religious individuals—e.g., the Buddha—who can be understood as having 
overcome the conditions of estrangement, thereby bringing about the New Being in their 
particular cultural context. Of course, Tillich himself did not pursue this form of religious 
pluralism in his system (although his later writings suggest that he was moving toward a 
more pluralistic position with respect to world religions).416 
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Instead, Tillich promulgates a form of absolutist Christology in the second 
volume of the ST. Although his position does contain of a kind of ersatz religious 
pluralism, in which he allows that there can be salvific, revelatory events in other 
religious traditions, he nevertheless pronounces that Jesus Christ as the bearer of the New 
Being remains “the ultimate criterion of every healing and saving process.”417  Tillich 
writes, 
There is a history of concrete revelatory events in all periods in which man exists as man. 
It would be wrong to call that history itself the history of revelation…but it would be 
equally wrong to deny that revelatory events occur anywhere besides the appearance of 
Jesus as the Christ. There is a history of revelation, the center of which is the event Jesus 
the Christ; but the center is not without a line which leads to it (preparatory revelation) 
and a line which leads from it (receiving revelation).418 
He goes on to assert that, “wherever there is saving power in mankind, it must be judged 
by the saving power of Jesus as the Christ.”419  
This position naturally invites the question of how Tillich can ground an 
absolutist claim concerning the uniqueness and finality of the event of Jesus Christ as the 
bearer of the New Being without recourse to some form of divine supernatural agency 
that would providentially ordain such an event. For, if overcoming the conditions of 
estrangement is a possibility inherent within the human species, then on what basis could 
one claim that this possibility has been—and can only be—fully realized by one 
historical individual? On what basis can Tillich discount the possibility that another 
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individual—say, the Buddha—overcame estrangement under the conditions of existence 
in the same way that Jesus did?420  
Of course, the absolutist Christology that Tillich embraces is shared among 
myriad Christian theologians. Crucially, however, the vast majority of theologians 
espousing an absolutist form of Christology do so by enlisting the idea of God as an 
intentional, agential reality, and arguing that God intentionally revealed Godself through 
the incarnation in Jesus. Compared with most other theologians, Tillich’s account of the 
singular event of Jesus the Christ as the bearer of the New Being is astonishingly 
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underdetermined by his ontology of God. Indeed, virtually all theological claims of 
special revelation—not to mention a “final revelation”—hinge upon the idea of a divine 
revealer—that is, a personal God who providentially ordains the revelatory event. And 
Tillich’s ontology of God as the unconditioned ground of being does not appear capable 
of supporting such claims, as this view denies that God possesses the capacities for 
intentionality or providential action in the world. Consequently, Tillich’s central 
Christological assertion (i.e., the absolute uniqueness and finality of the incarnation of 
Jesus as the Christ as the bearer of the New Being) appears remarkably unstable without 
the support of a personal God to providentially ordain and authorize the event. 
While this in itself does not invalidate Tillich’s Christology, it does make evident 
a significant weakness of his theological system: Tillich’s anti-anthropomorphic onto-
theology is ill suited for supporting the type of Christological claims that he wishes to 
make. In summary, Tillich espouses a Christology that virtually begs for supernatural 
patronage, while simultaneously rejecting supernaturalism, and banishing intentionality 
and agency from the divine nature. Herein lies a significant incoherence within Tillich’s 
system.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have considered three figures within the tradition of Neoplatonic onto-
theology, each of whom formulated a radically anti-anthropomorphic conception of God, 
not unlike that of the Plotinian One.  
One significant finding that surfaced in our analysis of this tradition is the fact 
that an anti-anthropomorphic conception of the divine nature does not necessarily entail a 
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wholesale rejection of anthropomorphic images and symbols of God. Indeed, as we have 
seen in the foregoing analysis, Schleiermacher and Tillich take great pains to preserve the 
spiritual and religious meaningfulness of anthropomorphic religious language. Both 
figures espouse an anti-anthropomorphic view of God only with respect to the ontological 
status of religious anthropomorphic ideas. Neither Schleiermacher nor Tillich believed 
that theology can or should operate without anthropomorphic symbols. And both figures 
understand the theological interpretation of anthropomorphic religious symbols to be one 
of the primary tasks of systematic theology. 
Another important feature of this tradition that surfaced in this chapter concerns 
the theological viability of anti-anthropomorphic conceptions of God. While 
advantageous in some areas (e.g., in providing a conceptually coherent metaphysics of 
the divine nature), anti-anthropomorphic conceptions of God pose a significant problem 
in other religious domains. For example, it creates the practical religious problem of how 
an anti-anthropomorphic God could ever be made spiritually relevant to most religious 
people, the majority of whom worship and pray to God precisely because they conceive 
of God as personal, intentional, and providentially active in the world. This problem is 
especially apparent in the austere spirituality articulated in Eckhart’s mystical theology. 
The anti-anthropomorphic view also creates conceptual problems for systematic 
theologians who wish to make exclusivist or absolutist claims about their religious 
tradition. We saw this in the case of Schleiermacher and Tillich, both of whom make 
significant claims in the realm of Christology that appear inconsistent with their anti-
anthropomorphic conception of God. In summary, it seems that anti-anthropomorphic 
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views of God come at a high theological cost. 
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Chapter Four: Onto-theology as Conceptual Anthropomorphism 	
Introduction  
The fortunes of the onto-theological project have waxed and waned over the millennia 
since its inception in Ancient Greece. Only a few centuries after reaching its zenith 
during the high Middle Ages, the onto-theological tradition fell into a period of relative 
decline in the Enlightenment period. Then, in the early 19th century, just decades after 
Immanuel Kant had ostensibly put the final nail in the coffin of speculative metaphysics, 
the onto-theological project was resurrected and reconfigured in the movement of 
German Idealism.421 However, to say that the onto-theological project fell upon hard 
times during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries would be something of an 
understatement. Over the past half-century the term “onto-theology” has come to have 
almost exclusively negative connotations in the contemporary worlds of Continental 
philosophy and constructive theology. What’s more, many contemporary scholars 
contend that the onto-theological project of conceptualizing God by way of metaphysical 
concepts is an instance of conceptual anthropomorphism par excellence. According to 
this view, onto-theology is the hubristic attempt to comprehend God by imposing human 
all too human concepts and categories (e.g., “Being”) onto that which is Wholly Other. 
 The critique of onto-theology as a form of conceptual anthropomorphism has 
important historical antecedents in figures such as Martin Luther, Blaise Pascal , Søren 
Kierkegaard, and others. The present chapter will consider three of the most important 
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representatives of this critique in the 20th century. We begin with Swiss Reformed 
theologian Karl Barth’s critique of the underlying premise of the onto-theological project 
as such: the idea that extra-biblical ontological categories such as “being” should be 
given primacy in the formulation of the doctrine of God. We go on to consider twentieth 
century German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s philosophical critique of the onto-
theological project as it was initially adumbrated in his 1927 work Being and Time, and 
then more forcefully articulated in his well-known 1957 lecture entitled “The Onto-Theo-
Logical Constitution of Metaphysics.” Finally, we consider contemporary French 
philosopher Jean Luc Marion, and the critique of onto-theology presented in his 
influential work God Without Being. 
 
4.1 Karl Barth’s Theological Critique of the Onto-theological Project 
Karl Barth was born in Basel, Switzerland in 1886. His father served both as a 
Reformed minister and as a professor of theology. As a young man Barth followed in his 
father’s footsteps and attended university at Bern and Marburg to study theology and 
train for the ministry.422 At this time, most of the cutting-edge academic theologians in 
Europe were associated with the tradition of liberal theology, which had its roots in the 
innovative theological program of Friedrich Schleiermacher. Over the course of his 
university studies Barth was especially influenced by the lectures of the great liberal 
theologians Adolf von Harnack and Wilhelm Herrmann. Upon graduating, Barth served 
as a Reformed pastor in the small Swiss village of Safenwil.  
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The key turning point in Barth’s life and thought came at the onset of the First 
World War. It was then that Barth witnessed many of his former theology professors 
publicly endorse the war, along with a form of German nationalism that he could only 
regard as idolatrous. Barth’s profound disappointment at the moral failure of his former 
teachers led him to conclude that there was something rotten at the heart of liberal 
theology. As Barth later recalled, his former teachers “seemed to have been hopelessly 
compromised” by what he saw as a “failure in the face of the ideology of war.”423 This 
monumental moral failure suggested to Barth that, “their exegetical and dogmatic 
presuppositions could not be in order.”424 
 While still serving as a parish minister, Barth began to work out an alternative 
path for Protestant theology. The result was his 1918, The Epistle to the Romans (Der 
Römerbrief), a theological commentary on the Pauline epistle. In this groundbreaking and 
polemical book, Barth drew upon the categories of existentialist philosophy in his attempt 
to recover the Pauline vision of God breaking into human history in the person of Jesus 
Christ. Against the rationalism that characterized much of 19th century liberal theology, 
Barth insisted upon the Wholly Other God of the bible who, being utterly beyond the 
reach of human reason, can only be approached through the “unknowing” of faith:  
Faith…grips reason by the throat and strangles the beast. It effects the whole world and 
all that is in it is impotent to do. But how can faith do this? By holding on to God’s word 
and by accounting it right and true, however stupid and impossible it may appear. By this 
means did Abraham imprison his reason…And in the same fashion do all other believers 
who have entered the dark recesses of faith, throttle reason, saying: ‘Listen, Reason, thou 
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blind and stupid fool that understandest nought the things of God. Cease thy tricks and 
chattering; hold thy tongue and be still! Venture no more to criticize the Word of God. Sit 
thee down; listen to His words; and believe in Him.’ So do the faithful strangle the 
beast.425 
Barth’s Römerbrief was not just a departure from the main current of late 19th 
century European theology: it was an out-and-out assault on the Enlightenment-based 
rationalism that undergirded the tradition of liberal theology itself. In this regard, Barth 
was deeply influenced by Soren Kierkegaard’s existentialist philosophy of “the paradox 
of Christianity” and his attendant concept of the “leap of faith.” Recalling Kierkegaard’s 
influence on his Römerbrief, Barth writes, “What we found particularly attractive, 
delightful and instructive was his inexorable criticism…we saw him using it to attack all 
speculation which wiped out the infinite qualitative difference between God and man.”426 
In his later work Barth distanced himself from Kierkegaard, and became much 
more circumspect in his position regarding the role of philosophy in Christian theology. 
Many readers have interpreted Barth’s mature position as reflecting an antipathy to 
philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular. However, this interpretation is 
something of a caricature. In fact, Barth makes frequent use of philosophical categories 
throughout his theological oeuvre, including in his mature system, the Church 
Dogmatics. In a late essay entitled “The Gift of Freedom,” Barth appears to be 
responding to the aforementioned misreading of his work when he states that, “a free 
theologian does not deny, nor is he ashamed of, his indebtedness to a particular 
                                                                            
425 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London; New York: Oxford U.P., 
1968)., 144. 
426 Busch, Ibid., 116. 
  215 
philosophy or ontology.”427 As we shall see in what follows, Barth’s primary concern is 
not so much if one makes use of philosophical categories in one’s theology, but rather 
how one does so. 
In his massive magnum opus the Church Dogmatics, Barth mounts a theological 
attack on many of the core assumptions of traditional Neoplatonic onto-theology. Among 
these assumptions are the following: 1) that aspects of the divine nature can be known 
apart from special revelation; 2) that ontological principles such as “Being-itself,” or “the 
One,” should be given primacy in describing the divine nature; and 3) that the 
aforementioned ontological principles are inherently less anthropomorphic than personal 
categories and conceptions of the divine. In what follows, we will consider Barth’s 
dismantling of each of these key onto-theological assumptions in his Church Dogmatics. 
At the beating heart of the tradition(s) of Neoplatonic onto-theology, from 
Plotinus to Thomas to Tillich, there lies the fundamental conviction that some aspects of 
the divine nature can be known apart from special revelation. This perspective overlaps 
with the traditional discipline of natural theology, which assumes that human beings can 
gain some limited knowledge of God by way of pure reason, experience, and inferences 
from the natural world. Many theologians trace the concept of natural theology back to 
St. Paul’s epistle to the Romans, where he writes, “Ever since the creation of the world 
his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been understood and 
seen through the things he has made.” (Romans 1: 20 NRSV) 
In his Church Dogmatics, Barth effectively declares an all-out war against the 
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project of natural theology. He does so by promulgating a theology of revelation that 
gives absolute epistemic primacy to the revelation of God in the person of Jesus 
Christ.428According to this outlook, there is simply no other possible source for reliable 
information about God. The realities of human sin, hubris, and finitude fatally 
compromise all other sources of knowledge concerning the divine. 
Consequently, Barth banishes the storied tradition of natural theology at the outset 
of the Church Dogmatics, insisting that there can be no “point of contact” between the 
world and God apart from the revelation of God’s Word in Jesus Christ.429 He goes on to 
jettison—or in some cases, significantly refashion—many classic theological doctrines on 
the grounds that they presume (or entail) such a natural “point of contact” between God 
and the world. For example, Barth roundly rejects Augustine’s view that there are 
vestiges of the Trinity in the natural world (Vestigia Trinitatis), which all human 
beings—not just the faithful elect—can recognize.430 Similarly, he rules out many classic 
formulations of the doctrine of the Imago Dei (the idea that human beings bear the image 
of God) that identify certain anthropological features (e.g., the human capacity to reason) 
as representing the locus of the divine image in humankind. Against these traditional 
views, Barth maintains that the Imago Dei cannot refer to any anthropological feature of 
humankind that can be understood apart from the revelation of Jesus Christ.431 According 
to this Christocentric interpretation of the Imago Dei, human beings bear the image of 
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God only insofar as the person of Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh, has sought to bring 
humankind into relationship with God.432 
Most significantly, Barth denies that there exists in human nature a natural 
capacity to receive divine revelation, such as Calvin’s famous concept of the sensus 
divinitatus.433 Rather, for Barth, it is the grace of God alone (sola gratia) that provides 
humans with the capacity for receiving his Word: “Faith is not one of the various 
capacities of man, whether native or acquired. Capacity for the Word of God is not 
among these. The possibility of faith as it is given to man in the reality of faith can be 
understood only as one that is loaned to man by God, and loaned exclusively for use.”434 
Barth continues in the line of reasoning: 
The Word of God becomes knowable by making itself known. The application of what 
has been said to the problem of knowledge consists in stopping at this statement and not 
going a single step beyond it. The possibility of knowing the Word of God is God’s 
miracle on us just as much as is the Word itself…here again our concern is to realize that 
the mutual indwelling or union of the divine and human possibility, of man’s knowing 
and his being known by God, is an event in the freedom of man, and yet it cannot in any 
sense be regarded as its product, as the result of an intuition…if we have understood that 
the knowability of God’s Word is really an inalienable affirmation of faith, but that 
precisely as such it denotes the miracle of faith, the miracle that we can only recollect and 
hope for, then as a final necessity we must also understand than man must be set side and 
God Himself presented as the original subject, as the primary power, as the creator of the 
possibility of knowledge of God’s Word.435 
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This primacy-of-revelation viewpoint poses a stark question concerning the 
theological legitimacy of the onto-theological project. The severity of Barth’s opinion on 
this matter is made clear in his treatment of the Thomistic doctrine of the analogia entis 
(analogy of being), which, as we saw in chapter two, asserts a commonality between the 
being of finite creatures and the being of God. Barth famously begins the first pages of 
his Church Dogmatics with a damning proclamation against this doctrine. He writes, “I 
regard the analogia entis as the invention of Antichrist, and I believe that because of it it 
is impossible to ever become a Roman Catholic, all other reasons for not doing so being 
short-sighted and trivial.”436 
Barth’s famous invective is on full display in this passage. However, his 
theological critique of the analogia entis extends beyond the mere ad hominem. In his 
volumes on the Word of God (CD I.1 & I.2) and his subsequent volumes on the Doctrine 
of God (CD II.1 & II.2) Barth presents several key arguments on behalf of his position 
that the analogia entis can only ever lead theology astray. All of these arguments 
ultimately turn on the same theological principle: namely, that in presuming the 
knowability of God apart from his revelation in Jesus Christ, and in identifying God with 
the abstract concept of “being,” the analogia entis delivers knowledge of a metaphysical 
principle—not the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Thus, Barth writes of the analogia 
entis: “The knowability of God without His revelation is affirmed in the light of the being 
of God abstractly understood…such a knowability can easily be asserted of a being in 
abstracto. It was with this kind of being that Roman Catholic theology was dealing 
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(under the impression that it was dealing with God).”437 
Here we should pause to emphasize a point made above. Barth’s primary 
objection to the analogia entis—and by extension, Neoplatonic onto-theology as a 
whole—is not over the legitimacy of abstract philosophical concepts (e.g., Ipsum esse) in 
formulating the doctrine of God. Rather, it concerns the supposition that the philosophical 
concept of being can provide an epistemic window into the divine nature independent 
from divine revelation.438 Accordingly, Barth asks: 
How is it that Roman Catholic theology does not seriously and unambiguously 
investigate the being of the God who acts among us and towards us as His one true being, 
besides which there is no other? How is it that it abstracts from the fact that He is this 
God, i.e., the God who does these things, the God who condemns to death and leads from 
death to life, the God who loves us in incomprehensible mercy? Can we set all this aside 
in order first to consider the being of this God in itself and as such? Can we interpret the 
being of this God as one that has its own if supreme part in being in general, in an idea of 
being? Can we compare with that being, and therefore set against it, the certainly very 
modest part of all other being, and therefore our own part in being in particular? Can we 
say, therefore, that they belong together, that they are on the same plane?439 
Barth not only rejects the basic postulation of the analogia entis (i.e., that there 
exists a commonality between the being of God and the being of creatures), he also 
makes the categorical assertion that this doctrine inevitably leads to conceptual idolatry. 
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In this line of argumentation, and elsewhere in the Church Dogmatics (especially in his 
famous excursus on “Religion as Unbelief” in CD I/2), one can detect the influence of 
Ludwig Feuerbach on Barth’s thought: 
Quite apart from grace and miracle, has not man always had what is in relation to the 
being of the world the very ‘natural’ capacity to persuade himself and others of a higher 
and divine being? All idols spring from this capacity. And the really wicked and 
damnable thing in the Roman Catholic doctrine is that it equates the Lord of the Church 
with that idol…we reject this because it is a construct which obviously derives from an 
attempt to unite Yahweh with Baal, the triune God of Holy Scripture with the concept of 
being of…philosophy…It is in itself incorrigible. But we cannot allow that it says 
anything about God at all, or that it is one of the assertions which have to be made in the 
Christian doctrine of God.440 
Given the polemical tone that characterizes virtually all of Barth’s statements 
concerning the analogia entis, it is understandable that many scholars have argued that 
the Church Dogmatics is—or endeavors to be—entirely post-metaphysical in nature.441 
However, a more nuanced and capacious interpretation—one articulated by American 
Lutheran theologian Robert Jenson and historical theologian Timothy Stanley, among 
others—is that Barth’s Church Dogmatics replaces the storied tradition(s) of Neoplatonic 
onto-theology with a theological ontology of the being of God’s action in revelation.442 
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As Jenson puts it, Barth’s mature theology situates, “the historical event of Jesus’ 
existence in the place formerly occupied by changeless ‘Being.’”443 As we shall see in 
what follows, this interpretation appears to be more in line with Barth’s account of the 
divine nature as articulated in his Doctrine of God than that of the post-metaphysical 
reading. 
In the first volume of his Doctrine of God (CD II.1) Barth identifies the very 
being of God with the act or event of God’s revelation. “What does it mean to say that 
‘God is’? What or who ‘is’ God?” Barth asks. “If we want to answer this question 
legitimately and thoughtfully, we cannot for a moment turn our thoughts anywhere else 
than to God’s act in His revelation.”444 Barth goes on to spell out the fundamentally 
ontological character of his conception of the divine nature:  
We are dealing with the being of God; but with regard to the being of God, the word 
‘event’ or ‘act’ is final, and cannot be surpassed or compromised. To its very depths 
God’s Godhead consists in the fact that it is an event—not any event, not events in 
general, but the event of His action, in which we have a share in God’s revelation.445 
Here we see the way in which the post-metaphysical reading of the Dogmatics 
fails to capture the fact that Barth does in fact espouse an ontology of God. Granted, it is 
a highly unique—if not entirely idiosyncratic—form of ontology: one that gives totally 
epistemic priority to God’s self-revelation in Christ. It is, as Timothy Stanley argues, a 
“theological ontology.”446 At this point a philosopher might protest that the notion of a 
“theological ontology” does not meet the traditional  definition of an ontology, e.g., an 
                                                                            
443 Jenson, Ibid., 140. Cited in Stanley, Ibid., 159. 
444 Barth, CD, II/1, 261. 
445 Barth, CD, II/1, 263—italics Barth’s. 
446 See Stanley, Ibid., Ch. 5. 
  222 
inquiry into being qua being. From this perspective, Barth’s “theological ontology” 
would be better understood as a post-ontological (or post-metaphysical) theology of the 
divine nature--one that is entirely specified by the act and content of divine revelation 
rather than the exigencies of inquiry into being qua being. In other words, one could 
argue that there is nothing particularly ontological about Barth’s “ontology” of the divine 
nature.  
Regardless of whether or not the idea of a “theological ontology” should be 
regarded as a legitimate form of ontology, the concept does help us to better understand 
Barth’s injunction against the traditional Thomistic onto-theological conception of the 
divine nature. Barth writes, “When we know God as event, act and life, we have to admit 
that generally and apart from Him we do not know what this is. So then, when we know 
God as event, act and life, He is definitely something different—to be distinguished from 
what we are accustomed to understand by these view and concepts.”447 It follows for 
Barth that, “Actus purus is not sufficient as a description of God.”448 
To be fair, however, virtually none of the figures in the Neoplatonic traditions of 
onto-theology we have explored heretofore would disagree with the latter claim. 
Augustine and Thomas, for example, would argue that the Trinity, along with the 
traditional divine attributes (e.g., omniscience, omnipotence, etc.) must be included in 
any description of God that is worthy of consideration. Similarly, Plotinus, Eckhart, and 
Tillich would agree with Barth’s charge, albeit for different reasons: they would claim 
that any concept of God—whether it be “Actus purus,” “the One,” or “being-itself”—
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must ultimately be unsaid or negated in the name of the ineffability of the unconditioned 
divine nature.   
Barth, however, would likely be unimpressed by these apparent similarities. This 
is because his fundamental truck with Neoplatonic onto-theology is the presumption that 
abstract concepts (e.g. Actus purus) can move us in the right direction with respect to our 
understanding of the divine nature. Herein lies the true point of disagreement between 
Barth and Neoplatonic onto-theology: Barth does not grant the premise that ontological 
concepts are a legitimate starting point for theology. Thus when he says that “Actus purus 
is not sufficient as a description of God” he is not arguing that this idea is insufficient 
because it is an ontological abstraction that does not include the traditional divine 
attributes and the doctrine of the Trinity. Rather, Barth is saying that we must jettison the 
classic definition all together, because privileging an ontological concept in the doctrine 
of God functions to constrain which aspects of the biblical view of God will be included 
within a theological description of the divine nature. As a result, biblical representations 
of God that do not appear to cohere with the concept of Being-itself will be banished on 
the grounds of excessive anthropomorphism. Barth argues that this grossly distorts the 
picture of God that we encounter in divine revelation (and the biblical witness thereto) by 
forcing it into alignment with an ontological category, rather than formulating our 
ontology of God based solely upon the content of divine revelation.  
As we saw in chapters two and three, the traditions of Neoplatonic onto-theology 
share in common the fundamental conviction that conceiving of God by way of 
ontological principles (such as the One, or being-itself) functions to safeguard the divine 
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nature against excessive anthropomorphism—that is, anthropomorphic representations of 
God that are “unbefitting” of the divine. Barth not only rejects this premise, he essentially 
turns it on its head, arguing that unless we base our ontology of God entirely upon the act 
of divine revelation and the picture of God disclosed therein (i.e., Jesus Christ and the 
biblical witness to him), we will never have a chance at understanding the true nature of 
God. Onto-theology, on this view, is just human conjecture about ultimate things writ 
large upon the heavens.  
Here again we can detect the influence of Feuerbach in Barth’s theology. Like, 
Feuerbach, Barth conceives of metaphysical concepts such as “the Absolute,” or “being-
itself” as abstract forms of human projection, which are in principle no different from 
more concrete instances of human projection, such as the human-like gods of Hesiod and 
Homer. Moreover, Barth agrees with Feuerbach that the human enterprise of religion and 
metaphysics ultimately amount to hubristic (or, self-alienating, as Feuerbach would have 
it) exercises in anthropomorphic projection. The crucial difference between the two 
figures is that Barth conceives of divine revelation as a reality that is qualitatively distinct 
from human religion, whereas Feuerbach would argue that faith in divine revelation is 
just another manifestation of the universal religious impulse in human nature. 
One consequence of Barth’s preeminence-of-revelation view is that he appears to 
be more comfortable with embracing the anthropomorphic depictions of God found 
within the biblical tradition than are many theologians.449 What’s more, Barth argues that 
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some elements of these anthropomorphic representations should actually guide our 
understanding of the being of God. He writes that the “particularity of the divine event, 
act, and life is the particularity of the being of a person…indeed the peak of all happening 
in revelation, according to Holy Scripture, consists in the fact that God speaks as an I, 
and is heard by the thou who is addressed.”450 Barth goes on to assert that, “God is not 
something, but someone.”451   
Well aware of the fact that his position is at loggerheads with the traditional onto-
theological outlook of Augustine and Thomas, Barth directly addresses the question of 
whether the use of such personal language in describing the nature of God amounts to 
“excessive” anthropomorphism. He writes, 
To be person means to be subject, not merely in the logical sense, but also in the ethical 
sense: to be free subject, a subject which is free even in respect of the specific limitations 
connected with its individuality, able to control its own existence and nature both as 
particular form and also as living development, and also able to select new possibilities of 
existence and nature. If we consider what this implies, it will not occur to us to see in this 
personalizing of the concept of God’s Word a case of anthropomorphism. The doubtful 
thing is not whether God is person, but whether we are. Can we find among us even one 
man whom we can call this in the full and proper sense of the term? But God is real 
person, really free subject. And if it is true that this brings us up against His 
inconceivability, because we cannot think through this thought to a finish, it is also true 
that on hearing His Word we should not refuse to think this initial thought, to see Him as 
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metaphysical scheme, God’s being is in his action, and his actions are those of a person very much like us." 
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person precisely in His Word…precisely in His Word God is person.452 
Elsewhere in the Dogmatics, Barth shrewdly turns the tables on the classic 
philosophical critique of religious anthropomorphism, arguing that abstract concepts--qua 
projections of the human imagination--are just as anthropomorphic as are person-like 
attributes and concepts: 
It is evident that this very prejudice against what are in the narrower sense to be called 
anthropomorphisms can also provide a basis and occasion for the pitiful transition from 
theology to philosophy, or from the theology of revelation to natural theology. The 
further we move away from the witness of the Holy Scriptures to the sphere of general 
conjectures about God, so much the purer, we think is the air of thought, i.e., so much the 
less do we need the anthropomorphisms which are found to be particularly suspect. But if 
it lets itself be guided by its object, theology ought to try to evade these 
anthropomorphisms least of all. And there is an obvious error when it is said that they are 
particularly suspect…for spiritual—i.e., abstract—concepts are just as anthropomorphic 
as those which indicate concrete perception. The same is true…of concepts like 
the…substantia, existentia of God.453 
This endorsement of biblical anthropomorphism notwithstanding, Barth’s full-
fledged doctrine of God ultimately achieves a dialectic between the person-like images of 
God we encounter in the bible, on the one hand, and the unknowability of the divine 
nature a se, on the other. Barth takes great care to balance his assertion that God is a 
person with a strong emphasis on the hiddenness of the divine nature, which remains 
shrouded in darkness even amidst the revelatory act. On this account, God is 
simultaneously revealed and concealed in the Word made flesh.  
                                                                            
452 Barth, CD, I/1, 138-139—emphasis mine. 
453 Barth, CD, II/1, 222—emphasis mine. 
  227 
God gives Himself entirely to man in His revelation, but not in such as way as to make 
Himself man’s prisoner. He remains free in His working, in giving Himself…this 
freedom of His is the basis of the distinction of the essence of God as such from His 
essence as the One who works and reveals Himself. On this freedom rests the 
incomprehensibility of God, the inadequacy of all knowledge of the revealed God…the 
comprehensibility with which it is presented to us, primarily in Scripture…is a creaturely 
comprehensibility. It is absolutely and not just relatively different from the 
comprehensibility with which it exists for God Himself.454 
Barth emphasizes the divine hiddenness again in the first volume of his doctrine 
of God, writing: “God is known only by God. God can be known only by God…in faith 
itself we are forced to say that our knowledge of God begins in all seriousness with the 
knowledge of the hiddenness of God.”455 As Barth scholar Bruce McCormack has 
observed, the dialectic of the divine veiling and unveiling through God’s revelation in 
Christ is a theme that runs throughout the entirety of the Church Dogmatics.456 
It is noteworthy that even in his insistence upon the ultimate hiddenness of the 
divine nature, Barth takes great pains to distance his position from the apophatic strain of 
Neoplatonic onto-theology. This is because for Barth, the unknowability of the divine 
nature is not the result the finitude human cognition, which necessarily shatters upon the 
idea of an infinite, utterly simple divinity. On the contrary, for Barth, the divine nature 
remains concealed (and thus unknown) in the act of divine revelation for no reason other 
than that God deems it so. He elaborates on this point as follows: “We must not, 
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therefore, base the hiddenness of God on the inapprehensibility of the infinite, the 
absolute, that which exists in and of itself, etc. For all this in itself and as such…is the 
product of human reason in spite of and in its supposed inapprehensibility. It is not, 
therefore, identical with God and is in no way a constituent part of the divine 
hiddenness.”457  
The upshot of Barth’s account of the divine hiddenness is the rather striking 
notion that even the most radically apophatic branches of Neoplatonic onto-theology are 
guilty of conceptual anthropomorphism. Figures in this tradition may differ in the extent 
to which they kataphatically identify God with ontological concepts, or apophatically 
negate various attributes in the name of the divine mystery, but when all is said and done, 
they are affirming and negating human concepts of their own making. On Barth’s view, 
the only way for theology to escape the mirror maze of conceptual anthropomorphism is 
to give absolute primacy to the act and content of divine revelation.  
In the end, Barth’s theological critique of the onto-theological project leaves 
nothing salvageable in its wake. On his account, onto-theology is not only irremediably 
anthropomorphic--it is also a form of conceptual idolatry. That is to say: onto-theology is 
at base the conceptual veneration of a human idea. Regardless of whether his analysis is 
finally correct, it would be difficult to conceive of a more incisive and comprehensive 
theological critique of the onto-theological tradition than that of Barth’s. 
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4.2 Martin Heidegger’s Critique of “Onto-Theo-Logic” 
Perhaps the only figure who could be said to have done more than Barth to 
undercut the viability of the onto-theological tradition in the 20th century is German 
philosopher Martin Heidegger. 
Heidegger was born in the rural German village of Messkirch in 1889. He was 
raised in a devoutly Catholic family, and as a young man, Heidegger seriously considered 
the priesthood, but ultimately chose to study Catholic theology at The University of 
Freiburg.458 There he completed a dissertation on Neo-Thomism and Neo-Kantianism in 
1914, and went on to write his habilitationsschrift on the medieval scholastic 
metaphysician Duns Scotus, which was published in 1916.459 As philosopher John D. 
Caputo has observed, “Heidegger’s initiation into philosophy was clothed in the 
vestments of Catholicism.”460 
However, only a few years after completing his doctoral studies in scholastic 
metaphysics, Heidegger underwent a dramatic change both in regards to his religious 
orientation and his thought concerning the relationship between theology and philosophy. 
In a 1919 letter to Engelbert Krebs, a former mentor and professor of dogmatic Catholic 
theology at the University of Freiburg, Heidegger explained this sea change: 
The past two years in which I struggled for a fundamental clarification of my 
philosophical position and put aside all specialized academic tasks have led to 
conclusions I would not be able to hold and teach freely, were I bound to a position 
outside of philosophy...Epistemological insights extending to a theory of historical 
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knowledge have made the system of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to 
me...461 
He does not mention it in this letter, but it was also during this transition period 
that Heidegger converted to the Lutheran Church.462 Exactly what led Heidegger to 
abandon the Catholic tradition is a matter upon which Heidegger scholars continue to 
speculate.463 But regardless of what ultimately caused this radical break, its ramifications 
on his subsequent thought were immense. From this point forward, Heidegger would 
conceive of theology and philosophy as diametrically opposed forms of inquiry--
essentially repudiating the synthesis between Greek philosophy and revealed theology 
that constituted the heart of medieval scholasticism. More importantly, this period marks 
the provenance of Heidegger’s vehement opposition to the onto-theological identification 
of God with the concept of being. As we shall see, Heidegger’s disdain for the onto-
theological project would remain a mainstay of his thought throughout the various phases 
of his life’s work.  
It is in respect of these transformations that John D. Caputo considers the 
aforementioned 1919 transition to be the first major “turn” in Heidegger’s thought. He 
writes, 
with the turn from Catholicism to Protestantism, the philosophical interests of the young 
thinker shifted from the questions of logic, to those of history, from pure (Husserlian) 
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phenomenology to what he called the ‘hermeneutics of facticity’ (i.e. concrete life), and 
from dogmatic theology to the theology of the New Testament. He took his lead not from 
scholastic theologians like Aquinas, Scotus, and Suarez but from Pascal, Luther, and 
Kierkegaard, who in turn led him back to Augustine and Paul.464 
Caputo’s analysis provides a helpful correction to a common misunderstanding of 
the “early Heidegger,” which interprets the young philosopher’s first so-called “turn” as 
an atheistic abandoning of religious faith in favor of a post-religious form of 
existentialism. Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, Heidegger’s own account 
of his transition from Catholic theology to philosophy is chock full of religious, and, 
more specifically, Lutheran language. Heidegger concludes his 1919 letter (supra) 
announcing his break with “the system of Catholicism” as follows: “I believe that I have 
the inner calling to philosophy and, through my research and teaching, to do what stands 
in my power for the sake of the eternal vocation of the inner man, and to do it for this 
alone, and so justify my existence [Dasein]and work ultimately before God.”465 
In 1923 Heidegger made a significant step toward fulfilling this “inner calling” 
when he accepted a professorship at the University of Marburg. And although his 
appointment was in the department of philosophy, Heidegger’s early lectures covered 
figures such as St. Paul, Augustine, Martin Luther, and Søren Kierkegaard.466 Over the 
course of the next four years Heidegger drew heavily upon these thinkers in his endeavor 
to rethink the tradition of Western metaphysics. In 1927 Heidegger presented his highly 
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original approach to fundamental ontology in his magnum opus, Being and Time. The 
book won Heidegger instant acclaim and ultimately went on to revolutionize 20th century 
continental philosophy.  
Heidegger’s primary aim in Being and Time was to recover the primordial 
meaning of the question of Being. On his view, the first and last Western philosophers to 
have truly grappled with the primordial question of Being were the pre-Socratic 
philosophers, such as Parmenides, Anaximander, and Heraclitus. Heidegger contends that 
the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle—along with the subsequent two millennia of 
Western ontology—effectively traded the primordial question of Being (“What is 
Being?” “Why are there beings instead of nothing?”) for an easier question, namely: 
“what is the most fundamental, or highest being?” In doing so, Western metaphysics 
essentially abandoned the primordial question of Being.  
Thus, in a subsection of the introduction to Being and Time entitled, “The Task of 
Destroying the History of Ontology,” Heidegger asserts that the primordial question of 
Being cannot be truly confronted in our modern age “until we have carried through the 
process of destroying the ontological tradition.”467 He goes on: 
If the question of Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this hardened 
tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments which it has brought about must be 
dissolved. we understand this task as one in which by taking the question of being as our 
clue, we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those 
primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of 
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Being…468  
The chief aim of Heidegger’s project of destroying the history of Western 
ontology is to retrieve and bring to the fore what he refers to as “the ontological 
difference” between Being and beings. The general thrust of the ontological difference is 
crystallized in his assertion that, “the Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity.”469 
Heidegger maintains that it is only in light of this crucial difference that the question of 
the meaning of Being can truly shine forth. Conversely, when the ontological difference 
is neglected or flouted, the result can only be confused philosophical speculation about 
the meaning of Being.  
The challenge of upholding the ontological difference is compounded by the fact 
that the concept of Being is famously difficult to define. A classic example of this 
difficulty can be seen in the opening of Hegel’s Logic, wherein Being, the most 
fundamental, universal, and abstract concept, is shown to be bereft of any determinate 
content whatsoever, and is therefore indistinguishable from nothing.470 For Hegel, the 
way in which the concept of Being naturally passes over into the idea of nothing is the 
most basic example of the dynamic logic of the dialectic. Heidegger essentially agrees 
that Being-itself is bereft of substantive characteristics, though he rejects Hegel’s claim 
that Being achieves a determinate character via the dialectic. In a later essay Heidegger 
remarks that, “What is strange in the thinking of Being is its simplicity. Precisely this 
keep us from it.”471 
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There is a very real sense in which for Heidegger Being-itself can only be 
approached apophatically. Indeed, the basic thrust of the ontological difference amounts 
to a negation: the Being of beings cannot be a being. Another apophatic aspect of the 
ontological difference is the way in which this distinction guards against the temptation 
to describe Being itself by way of beings. Although Being is only ever manifest to us 
through particular beings, Being-itself cannot be identified with the characteristics of 
beings. This is essentially Heidegger’s objection to Hegel’s ontology, wherein the 
question of Being ultimately culminates in the idea of an Absolute principle possessed of 
the entity-like characteristic of Mind or Spirit (Geist). In contrast, Heidegger insists that, 
“‘Being’ cannot indeed be conceived as an entity...nor can it acquire such a character as 
to have the term ‘entity’ applied to it. ‘Being’ cannot be derived from higher concepts by 
definition, nor can it be presented through lower ones.”472 
This leads to Heidegger’s famous distinction between the “ontic” and the 
“ontological.” “Ontic” discourse refers to any inquiry that concerns beings or entities. 
Alternatively,  “ontological” discourse refers to inquiry into the Being that is manifested 
in and through entities—inquiry into “the Being of beings”—as well as inquiry into “the 
meaning of Being in general.”473 
Heidegger dedicates the rest of Being and Time to understanding the meaning of 
Being by way of a phenomenological analysis of the Being of that entity whose nature it 
is to ask the ontological question in the first place, namely, human being, or “Dasein.”474 
According to Heidegger, human beings are “ontically distinctive” among all other beings 
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in that they comport themselves ontologically. That is to say, humans confront the 
question of the meaning of their own being and the question of Being itself (“What is 
Being?”).475  
Heidegger maintains something like an apophatic approach to the question of 
Being-itself, refusing to attribute any substantive content or characteristics to the nature 
of Being, even as he insists that we must seek to understand the meaning of Being as it is 
manifested in our own finite being (the German word “Dasein” literally means “being 
there”). The most he is willing to say about the nature of Being-itself is that it necessarily 
transcends the realm of entities and the characteristics thereof: 
Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of entities; yet it pertains to 
every entity. Its ‘universality’ is to be sought higher up. Being and the structure of Being 
lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess. Being 
is the transcendens pure and simple.476  
At first blush, this exposition is reminiscent of something one might read in 
Thomas’ Summas. The scholastic idiom notwithstanding, Heidegger’s account of the 
nature of Being qua Being in this passage is actually quite radical, and it places him at 
loggerheads with much of Western ontology, Thomas included. For, as much as Thomas 
grappled with the question of Being-itself in his Summas, Heidegger would likely point 
out that Thomas’ ontological questioning rapidly morphs into an inquiry into the nature 
of a transcendent reality that turns out to possess many of the characteristics of entities. 
The ontological question of Being is thus given an ontic answer. This is especially 
apparent if one considers Thomas’ concept of the analogia entis, which asserts an 
                                                                            
475 Heidegger, Ibid., 32. 
476 Heidegger, Ibid., 62—emphasis Heidegger’s. 
  236 
analogy between finite beings and the being of God (who is identified with Ipsum esse). 
As we saw in chapter two, the purpose of analogous predication is to stabilize the 
attribution of characteristics belonging to the realm of finite entities (creatures) to the 
realm of the infinite (Being-itself). If we contrast this view with Heidegger’s claim 
(supra) that, “Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every possible 
character which an entity may possess” it becomes clear that Heidegger’s account of the 
nature of Being is far more simple—and radical—than that of Thomas. And as much as 
Thomas may have stressed the idea of the divine simplicity, the ontology that ultimately 
emerges from the Summa Theologiae looks less like an ontological principle that 
transcends all entity-like characteristics and more like a Supreme Being—an infinite 
Agent that thinks, acts, and loves in a way that is analogous to finite beings.  
Thomas thus provides a good example of Heidegger’s problem with the entire 
history of Western ontology from Plato to Hegel: No sooner do figures in this tradition 
raise the question of Being than they smother it with an ontic solution. Invariably, the 
nature of Being-itself is construed in terms of entity-like characteristics (as in Thomas), 
or the question of Being is answered in terms of a highest being (as in Aristotle). In each 
case, the ontological difference between Being and beings is contravened or simply 
neglected altogether.  
There is a sense in which Heidegger’s emphasis on the momentous importance of 
the ontological difference can be understood as a safeguard against anthropomorphic 
answers to the question of Being. The ontological difference serves as a check against 
any ontology that construes Being in the image of beings. And, as we have seen, 
  237 
Heidegger conceives of the history of Western ontology as the history of the 
transgression of the ontological difference--a history of anthropomorphic ontology, in 
other words. Accordingly, in a later lecture Heidegger flatly states: “Metaphysics is 
anthropomorphism—the forming and beholding of the world according to the image of 
the human person.”477 
However, Heidegger’s critique of onto-theology extends beyond the fact that 
(most of) its representatives are guilty of abrogating the ontological difference.478 In a 
manner somewhat reminiscent of Barth, Heidegger also repudiates the underlying 
premise of the onto-theological project: namely, that the question of Being is inextricably 
linked with the question of God and God’s nature, and vice versa. In direct opposition to 
the Medieval scholastic tradition in which he was trained, Heidegger insists that the 
question of God and the question of Being must be quarantined from one another.479  
Consequently, in the introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger essentially calls 
for Christian theology to release itself from its Babylonian captivity to the onto-
theological tradition. Following Kierkegaard, Heidegger claims that Christian theology, 
properly understood, should endeavor to provide a kind of phenomenology of faithful 
existence, rather than an ontological account of the divine nature. Theology, Heidegger 
maintains, should be a quest for “a more primordial interpretation of man’s Being 
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towards God, prescribed by the meaning of faith itself and remaining within it.”480 It is 
not clear whether Heidegger is referring to the rise of the existentially infused “Crisis 
theology” associated with Karl Barth when he goes on to observe that Christian theology, 
“is slowly beginning to understand once more Luther’s insight that the ‘foundation’ on 
which its system of dogma rests has not arisen from an inquiry in which faith is primary, 
and that conceptually this ‘foundation’ not only is inadequate for the problematic of 
theology, but conceals and distorts it.”481 Thus, on Heidegger’s view, the onto-theological 
project not only distorts the primordial ontological question of Being, it also provides a 
spurious and profane foundation for Christian faith. 
One of Heidegger’s most significant statements concerning the onto-theological 
project occurred in the context of a 1951 seminar in which a student posed the following 
question: “‘Is it proper to posit Being and God as identical?’”482 Heidegger’s response is 
worth quoting at length: 
Being and God are not identical and I would never attempt to think the essence of God by 
means of Being. Some among you perhaps know that I come from theology, that I still 
guard an old love for it and that I am not without a certain understanding of it. If I were yet 
to write a theology—to which I sometimes feel inclined—then the word Being would not 
occur in it. Faith does not need the thought of Being. When faith has recourse to this 
thought, it is no longer faith. This is what Luther understood. Even within his own church 
this seems to be forgotten. One could not be more reserved than I before every attempt to 
employ Being to think theologically in what way God is God. Of Being, there is nothing 
here to expect. I believe that Being can never be thought as the ground and essence of 
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God, but that nevertheless the experience of God and of his manifestedness, to the extent 
that the latter can indeed meet man, flashes in the dimension of Being, which in no way 
signifies that Being might be regarded as a possible predicate for God. On this point one 
would have to establish completely new distinctions and delimitations.483 
Heidegger went on to develop the ideas in this informal remark into a more 
thorough philosophical argument in his 1957 lecture entitled “The Onto-Theo-Logical 
Constitution of Metaphysics.” Unlike many of his other well-known essays that were 
based upon freestanding public lectures (e.g., “What is Metaphysics?” and “The Origin of 
the Work of Art”), “The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics” lecture 
occurred in the context of a university seminar on Hegel’s Science of Logic. This 
relatively short but highly influential work represents the locus classicus of Heidegger’s 
critique of the onto-theological project.  
The lecture begins with a brief overview of Hegel’s philosophical account of 
Being. Heidegger observes that although Hegel’s Logic begins with the idea of Being-
itself as fundamentally indeterminate in nature, Hegel ultimately conceives of Being as 
identical with Absolute Mind. Being is thus, “the absolute self-thinking of thinking. 
Absolute thinking alone is the truth of Being, ‘is’ Being.”484 
Next, Heidegger calls attention to the fact that Hegel identifies Being (understood 
as Absolute Thinking) with God. He writes, “If science [i.e., the science of metaphysics] 
must begin with God, then it is the science of God: theology. This name is taken here in 
its later meaning of theo-logy as statements of representational thinking about God...with 
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no reference to any creed or ecclesiastical doctrine.”485 Heidegger goes on to conclude 
that, “Western metaphysics...since its beginning with the Greeks has eminently been both 
ontology and theology…”486 
Heidegger is quick to clarify what he means by this sweeping statement. He 
writes, “it would be rash to assert that metaphysics is theology because it is ontology. 
One would say first: Metaphysics is theology, a statement about God, because the deity 
enters into philosophy.”487 In other words, Western metaphysics is not onto-theological in 
nature because it raises the primordial ontological question, but rather because it answers 
this question with an account of a highest being, namely God, or “the deity.” 
Heidegger continues by posing the following question: “How is it that the deity 
enters philosophy?” He answers that for Western metaphysics, “the deity can come into 
philosophy only insofar as philosophy, of its own accord and by its own nature, requires 
and determines that and how the deity enters into it.”488 The result of philosophy’s 
dictating the terms of the Divine reality is that, “The Being of beings is represented 
fundamentally, in the sense of the ground, only as causa sui. This is the Metaphysical 
concept of God.”489 Heidegger continues:  
Because Being appears as ground, beings are what is grounded; the highest being, 
however, is what accounts in the sense of giving first cause. When metaphysics thinks of 
being with respect to the ground that is common to all beings as such, then it is logic as 
onto-logic. When metaphysics thinks of beings as such as a whole, that is, with respect to 
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the highest being which accounts for everything, then it is logic as theo-logic.490  
      
Thus onto-theology conceives of God as the highest being that functions as the 
ground of all other beings. As we’ve seen above, the identification of Being with a 
being—even the highest being—is utterly anathema for Heidegger. However, in this 
lecture, Heidegger’s critique of this idea cuts in a new direction. Not only does he reject 
the onto-theological idea of God as a highest being that grounds all other beings (which 
obliterates the ontological difference), Heidegger also contends that this conception of 
God is religiously useless and spiritually moribund. Referring to the so-called “god of 
onto-theo-logic,” Heidegger observes that, “Man can neither pray nor sacrifice to this 
god. Before the causa sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music 
and dance before this god.”491 
Heidegger’s deeply Lutheran theological instincts are on full display in this 
argument. According to his outlook, the question of God concerns the individual, 
authenticity, and faith. The question of God does not, and should not involve ontological 
concepts, nor should it function as a solution to metaphysical questions (e.g. God as the 
solution to the problem of the One and the Many). Heidegger further argues that the onto-
theological conception of God actually functions to occlude the Divine reality. He thus 
concludes his critique of “onto-theo-logic” with the provocative claim that, “the god-less 
thinking which must abandon the god of philosophy, god as causa sui, is thus perhaps 
closer to the divine God. Here this means only: god-less thinking is more open to Him 
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than onto-theo-logic would like to admit.”492 
There is a certain irony in Heidegger’s critique. On his account, the “god” of 
onto-theo-logic (i.e., God as the highest being or causa sui) is an anthropomorphic 
conceptual idol. Human beings create this idea because they feel the need to postulate an 
ultimate ground for finite reality and yet cannot give up the idea that Being itself must 
ultimately be a lot like us. Hence the ontological reality that grounds all other beings is 
construed as a highest being who is intellective and active in a way analogous to finite 
beings. The ontological difference, which insists upon the infinite qualitative difference 
between Being and beings is thereby obliterated in the name of anthropomorphic onto-
theology. The irony is that this conceptual idol (the god of onto-theo-logic), which is of 
our own making, turns out to be completely worthless as a religious object. Heidegger’s 
critique could be summarized as follows: The “god” of onto-theo-logic is, like the golden 
calf of the Exodus narrative, an idol fashioned by human beings in order to satisfy 
human, all-too-human needs. Yet unlike the golden calf, the “god” of onto-theo-logic 
cannot even inspire people to dance and sing! It is an anthropomorphic conceptual idol, 
and a religiously useless one at that. Barth would no doubt agree with Heidegger on this 
point.  
It is worth pausing here to clarify that Heidegger’s foregoing critique does not 
logically extend to onto-theology as a whole. Rather, his 1957 critique targets only those 
onto-theological theories which conceive of God as “the highest being,” which functions 
to ground all other beings. Recall Heidegger’s aforecited statement that, “When 
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metaphysics thinks of beings as such as a whole, that is, with respect to the highest being 
which accounts for everything, then it is logic as theo-logic.”493 Regardless of whether 
Heidegger would endorse the onto-theology espoused by Plotinus, Eckhart, 
Schleiermacher, or Tillich, it is important to note that his 1957 critique does not make 
logical contact with their views, insofar as each of these figures explicitly denies that the 
Divine reality is a being, or a highest being. This point is worth emphasizing, because 
many contemporary philosophers and theologians utilize Heidegger’s aforementioned 
critique as if it applied to any and every conception of God that involves ontological 
categories. And while it is certainly possible to critique a figure like Tillich from a 
Heideggerian perspective, any such argument would first need to register the point made 
above—viz., that Tillich’s conception of God is not coterminous with the “god” of onto-
theo-logic—in order to be conceptually adequate.  
However, the fact that Heidegger’s aforementioned 1957 critique does not 
logically extend to the anti-anthropomorphic tradition of Neoplatonic onto-theology does 
not mean that this tradition would escape Heidegger’s overarching critique of the onto-
theological project. Indeed, Heidegger would likely reject the anti-anthropomorphic 
tradition of Neoplatonic onto-theology on the grounds that this tradition does not make 
religious faith the sole and absolute foundation of theology. Recall, for example, 
Heidegger’s famous remark expressing his decidedly Lutheran misgivings about the role 
of onto-theological concepts in theology: “If I were yet to write a theology—to which I 
sometimes feel inclined—then the word Being would not occur in it. Faith does not need 
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the thought of Being. When faith has recourse to this thought, it is no longer faith. This is 
what Luther understood.”494 Accordingly, although the anti-anthropomorphic tradition of 
Neoplatonic onto-theology remains untouched by Heidegger’s 1957 critique, it is 
nevertheless subject to what we might call Heidegger’s “Lutheran critique” of the onto-
theological project. As we saw above, this Lutheran critique was first expressed in Being 
and Time, and it remained a mainstay of Heidegger’s thought throughout his career. This 
critique can be summarized as follows: ontological concepts belong to the proper domain 
of philosophy—not to theology. Theology is distinctive from all other domains of inquiry 
in that it is grounded in divine revelation. Accordingly, the proper task of theology is to 
point the individual to faith in God’s self-revelation—not to engage in onto-theological 
speculation about the nature of God. 
As mentioned above, Heidegger’s critical writings on onto-theology were 
enormously influential. In many ways, his critique catalyzed the anti-metaphysical 
orientation that would characterize most continental philosophy of religion and theology 
during the latter half of the 20th century—an orientation that is still very much alive in 
the present day.  
 
4.3 Jean Luc-Marion on the Idolatry of Onto-theology 
Of the multitude of philosophers and theologians who were influenced by Martin 
Heidegger's critique of onto-theology, contemporary French philosopher Jean-Luc 
Marion has been among the most influential. Though he originally trained as a 
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philosopher, Marion’s work intentionally blurs the distinction between philosophy, 
phenomenology, and theology. He also writes as an unabashed Roman Catholic—a 
highly countercultural stance, given the predominantly secular zeitgeist of contemporary 
Europe. 
In his landmark 1991 book God Without Being, Marion presents an extended 
critique of the onto-theological project and its subordination of the God of Christian faith 
to the philosophical category of Being. In this sense, Marion’s position is very much in 
line with that of Barth. Both figures insist that divine revelation is the only means by 
which we can hope to attain a non-idolatrous understanding of God’s nature. However, in 
sharp contradistinction to Barth, Marion identifies his work as occupying—perhaps even 
transgressing—“the border between philosophy and theology.”495 
At the outset of GWB, Marion pauses to explain the book’s title. He writes, 
“under the title God Without Being we do not mean to insinuate that God is not, or that 
God is not truly God. We attempt to meditate on what F.W. Schelling called ‘the freedom 
of God with regard to his own existence.’”496 Differently stated, Marion’s objective is to 
dismantle the standard theological assumption that God must have (or be identified with) 
existence or Being.  
Yet, despite his main thesis (i.e., God does not have to be), Marion also sees fit to 
vindicate Thomas’s account of the divine nature from the charge of idolatrous onto-
theology. Marion argues that Thomas,  
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...does not chain God to Being because the divine esse immeasurably surpasses (and 
hardly maintains an analogia with) the ens commune of creatures, which are 
characterized by the real distinction between esse and their essence, whereas God, and He 
alone, absolutely merges essence with esse. God is expressed as esse, but this esse is 
expressed only of God, not of the beings of metaphysics.497  
As we shall see in what follows, this sympathetic reading of Thomas seems to ebb 
and flow throughout the course of the book. But for now, we may simply note that based 
upon the preceding account, Marion allows for the possibility that one can identify God 
with Being-itself without necessarily falling into the sin of idolatrous onto-theology. This 
of course leads to the question of which forms of onto-theology are susceptible to 
conceptual idolatry. As a phenomenologist, Marion endeavors to show his reader, rather 
than tell. 
Accordingly, Marion begins his critique of onto-theology with a 
phenomenological treatment of idolatry. On his account, the idol is a human creation that 
exists only insofar as it functions to satisfy human desire, what he terms “the gaze.” He 
writes, “The idol depends on the gaze that it satisfies, since if the gaze did not desire to 
satisfy itself in the idol, the idol would have no dignity for it...the gaze alone makes the 
idol, as the ultimate function of the gazable.”498 Marion underscores his claim that “the 
gaze alone makes the idol” by pointing out that the idols of ancient civilizations, many of 
which are currently housed in museums, are no longer functional “idols” in the 
phenomenological sense.499 They may be aesthetically alluring, and pique our curiosity, 
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but they are artifacts for those who encounter them—not idols. This is because such 
“idols” no longer exist in relationship with the human gaze that they were fashioned to 
satisfy. Apart from the presence of the human gaze, the “idol” becomes a mere artifact. 
Marion continues: 
The idol thus acts as a mirror, not as a portrait: a mirror that reflects the gaze’s image, or 
more exactly, the image of its aim and of the scope of that aim. The idol, as a function of 
the gaze, reflects the gaze’s scope...the idol masks the mirror because it fills the 
gaze...because it offers to the gaze its first visible, the idol itself remains an invisible 
mirror.500  
Marion goes on to extend his analysis of the idol to the realm of conceptual idols. 
Here he suggests that, no less than idols fashioned from wood, stone, or gold, human 
concepts too can function as an “invisible mirror” of human desire. Marion contends that 
the reality of conceptual idolatry is nowhere more pervasive than in human discourse 
about the Divine: 
The concept consigns to a sign what at first the mind grasps with it...but such a grasp is 
measured not so much by the amplitude of the divine as by the scope of a capacitas, 
which can fix the divine in a specific concept only at the moment when a conception of 
the divine fills it, hence appeases, stops, and freezes it. When a philosophical thought 
expresses a concept of what it then names ‘God,’ this concept functions exactly as an 
idol.501  
The last line of this passage is sweeping and contentious in a way that is 
reminiscent of the rhetoric of Barth. It also appears to signal a potential inconsistency on 
Marion’s part: whereas in the introduction to GWB he sought to qualify his critique of 
                                                                            
500 Marion, Ibid., 12. 
501 Marion, Ibid., 16—italics mine. 
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onto-theology (i.e., in exempting Thomas’ identification of God with Being-itself from 
the charge of idolatrous onto-theology), he now appears to claim that any philosophical 
conceptualization of God must necessary function as an idol. So which is it?  
Like Barth, the essence of Marion’s critique of onto-theology hinges upon divine 
revelation. Accordingly, Marion can absolve Thomas of the charge of conceptual idolatry 
precisely because the doctrine of God laid out in the Summa is in fact rooted in divine 
revelation.502 In the absence of divine revelation, however, Marion insists that, “the 
measure of the concept comes not from God but from the aim of the gaze.”503 Differently 
stated, onto-theology—sans divine revelation—is by definition an idolatrous form of 
conceptual anthropomorphism. He drives home this point by citing Feuerbach’s 
observation that, “it is man who is the original model of his idol.”504 
Marion goes on to contrast the reality of the idol with that of the icon. The first, 
seemingly innocuous point to observe about religious icons is that they do not fall from 
heaven. Icons are not typically included with other religious phenomena (e.g., sacred 
texts) that are deemed to possess a divine origin. Rather, icons share the same provenance 
as idols--both are artifacts fashioned by a human artificer. The key difference is that 
unlike the idol, the icon does not exist in order to fulfill the human desire to possess, 
manipulate, or circumscribe the divine. In other words, the icon is not fashioned in order 
to satisfy “the gaze.” The icon, Marion writes, “does not result from a vision but 
provokes one...Whereas the idol results from the gaze that aims at it, the icon summons 
                                                                            
502 In contrast to the famous “five ways” or proofs for the existence of God articulated the outset of the 
Summa, Thomas’ doctrine of God takes its bearings from revealed truths about the divine nature that we 
could not otherwise know, such as the Triune nature of God. 
503 Marion, Ibid., 16 
504 Marion, Ibid., 16—italics Marion’s. 
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sight in letting the visible...be saturated little by little with the invisible.”505 There is thus 
a self-transcending element that is essential to the nature and function of the icon. Icons 
are fashioned so as to disrupt the human desire to possess the divine and instead force the 
human gaze to look upward, as it were, beyond the visible components of the icon to the 
invisible, infinite reality that it symbolizes. Marion writes, “the icon summons the gaze to 
surpass itself by never freezing on a visible, since the visible only presents itself here in 
view of the invisible. The gaze can never rest or settle if it looks at an icon...the icon 
makes visible only by giving rise to an infinite gaze.”506 
Marion’s phenomenological account of the idol and icon in connection with the 
problem of conceptual idolatry is one of his most significant contributions to 
contemporary philosophy of religion. As we shall see below, much of the remaining 
argument in GWB is an elaboration on and radicalization of Heidegger’s critique in “The 
Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics.” 
Marion begins by echoing Heidegger’s claim that metaphysics determines the 
conditions under which the Deity enters philosophical discourse: “The advent of 
something like ‘God’ in philosophy therefore arises less from God himself than from 
metaphysics, as destinal figure of the thought of Being. ‘God’ is determined starting from 
and to the profit of that of which metaphysics is capable, that which it can admit and 
support.”507 In other words, onto-theology subsumes God under a human conceptual 
scheme. Moreover, Marion points out that the onto-theological project typically construes 
God ontically, that is, as a being. “The thought that thinks Being as such cannot and must 
                                                                            
505Marion, Ibid., 17. 
506 Marion, Ibid., 18. 
507 Marion, Ibid., 34. 
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not apprehend anything but beings, which offer the path, or rather the field of a 
meditation, of Being. Any access to something like ‘God,’ precisely because of the aim 
of Being as such, will have to determine him in advance as a being.”508 
Marion’s principal move in GWB is to question the priority of the concept of 
Being in theological discourse altogether. He frames this fundamental question as 
follows: 
is it self-evident that God should have to be, hence to be as a being (supreme, plural--
however one wants) in order to give himself as God? How is it that Being finds itself 
admitted without question as the temple already opened (or closed) to every theophany, 
past or to come? ...Undoubtedly, if ‘God is, he is a being; but does God have to be?...does 
not the search for the ‘more divine god’ oblige one, more than to go beyond onto-theo-
logy, to go beyond ontological difference as well, in short no longer to attempt to think 
God in view of a being, because one will have renounced, to begin with, thinking him on 
the basis of Being?509 
The question of whether God “has to be” is an intriguing theological move--one 
with important antecedents in figures such as Pseudo-Dionysius, Meister Eckhart, F.W.J. 
Schelling, Paul Tillich, et al. However, Marion’s argument in the foregoing passage 
erroneously implies that to think God on “the basis of Being” necessarily entails 
committing the ontic sin of reducing God to a being, who “has to be,” or exist. To see 
that this is mistaken, one need only consider Tillich, who, as we saw in chapter three, 
identifies God with Being-itself and explicitly—and consistently—rejects the idea that 
                                                                            
508 Marion, Ibid., 43. Elsewhere, Marion writes, “Being offers in advance the screen on which any ‘God’ 
that would be constituted would be projected and would appear—since, by definition, to be constituted 
signifies to be constituted as a being” (Marion, Ibid., 70). 
509 Marion, Ibid., 44-45. 
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God is an existent being.  
Despite the fact that his argument fails to register some of the important 
differences within the onto-theological tradition, we may nevertheless appreciate the fact 
that Marion’s primary objective in GWB is to formulate a theological alternative to this 
tradition. More specifically, Marion describes his project as an attempt to think God 
outside of the ontological difference between Being and beings.510 And although he stops 
short of claiming that thinking God by way of Being necessarily entails conceptual 
idolatry, Marion does claim that the only means by which theology can successfully 
overcome the problem of conceptual idolatry is to think God via the gift of revelation. In 
this regard, Marion’s theological affinities appear to be more in line with Barth than 
Thomas. He writes, 
God can give himself to be thought without idolatry only starting from himself alone: to 
give himself to be thought as love, hence as gift; to give himself to be thought as a 
thought of the gift. Or better, as a gift for thought, as a gift that gives itself to be 
thought...But, for thought, what is it to give itself, if not to love?511 
This leads to Marion’s genuine point of contention with Thomas. The crux of his 
objection is not that Thomas thinks God by way of Being, but that he elevates this 
concept over that of the Good and Love (“God is love”) as the preeminent Divine name. 
Marion writes, “The divine certainly did not await Saint Thomas to enter into 
metaphysics; but it is only with Saint Thomas that the [God] revealed in Jesus Christ 
under the name of charity find himself summoned to enter the role of the divine of 
                                                                            
510 Marion, Ibid., 45. 
511 Marion, Ibid., 49. 
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metaphysics, in assuming esse/ens as his proper name.”512 Differently stated, the onto-
theological project crowns the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob with the categories of 
Athens. The problem with this, from Marion’s perspective, is that in placing the concept 
of Being at the top of the hierarchy of Divine names, the God who reveals Godself as 
Love in the person of Christ is ipso facto subordinated to an ontological category. And 
ontological categories, like all categories, are human inventions. Here we come full circle 
to the problematic of the idol and the human gaze. 
Marion goes on to bewail the “inability of theological understanding...to envisage 
a properly Christian name” for the God who is revealed in the New Testament.513 On his 
view, such a Divine name would be “a name anterior to the Being of beings...hence also 
to every thought of Being as such.”514 Marion continues: “For a single path can yet open: 
if ‘God is charity, agape’ (1 John 4:8), can agape transgress Being? ...can it manifest 
itself without passing through Being…?”515 In other words, if the statement “God is 
Love” is the ultimate truth about the nature of God, does it not follow that the Divine 
Love must be prior to, or beyond Being? Marion formulates his positive thesis thusly: 
“Only love does not have to be. And [God] loves without being.”516 Elsewhere, Marion 
summarizes his position as follows: “If, to begin with, ‘God is love,’ then God loves 
before being, He only is as He embodies himself--in order to love more closely that 
which and those who, themselves, have first to be.”517 
                                                                            
512 Marion, Ibid., 82—brackets mine. 
513 Marion, Ibid., 82. 
514 Marion, Ibid., 82. 
515 Marion, Ibid., 82-83. 
516 Marion, Ibid., 138—brackets mine. 
517 Marion, Ibid., xx. 
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As noted above, the thesis of GWB draws upon an ancient motif within the 
apophatic and iconoclastic traditions of Christian theology. One of the hallmarks of these 
traditions is the dialectical tension between the apophatic negation of divine attributes 
and the kataphatic affirmation of the Divine reality beyond all naming.518 However, 
Marion’s argument sometimes appears to veer from the realm of genuine dialectical 
tension to that of conceptual incoherence. 
Most notably, there is the problem of the conspicuous copula in the statement 
“God is Love.” Clearly, the affirmation “God is Love,” implies the reality of God and the 
Divine Love. But is it conceptually coherent to affirm the reality of the Divine nature 
(“God is Love”), while simultaneously denying the ontological entailments of this 
statement  (e.g., “God loves without Being”)? To put it bluntly, the claim that the Divine 
Love is somehow prior to, “without,” or “beyond” Being appears to be incoherent, since 
nothing is apart from Being. Being is the ontological condition for the possibility of the 
reality of anything whatsoever.  
Marion himself is very much alive to the conceptual difficulties involved in his 
thesis that, “God loves without being.” In fact, at one point in the text, he appears to 
acknowledge the looming specter of conceptual incoherence:  
Do we not risk mistaking the clatter of words for the rigor of concepts? What game are 
we playing, in the end? Answer: we are attempting to play at/upon Being according to 
another game than of Being. Or again: we are attempting to make sport of Being by 
outwitting the rules it fixed for its own game. Or finally, to outwit Being, by making it 
                                                                            
518 Michael Sells refers to this dialectical tension as “the aporia of transcendence.” See his discussion of this 
topic in Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying, 2-13. 
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play a game other than its own. Precisely, the game of Being (and thus of the Being of 
beings) is played according to ontological difference...519 
Marion’s offering in this passage isn’t especially helpful in resolving the 
conceptual problems mentioned above. No sooner does he acknowledge the lurking threat 
of conceptual incoherence than he playfully unleashes a cascade of tropes (e.g., “to make 
sport of Being,” or, “to outwit Being”) that function to deflect rather than adequately 
address the problem at hand—namely, the questionable conceptual coherence of the 
claim that, “God loves without being.” 
 However, elsewhere in the text Marion appears to concede that conceptual 
incoherence may be the price one must pay for jettisoning the ontological difference. He 
writes, “to think outside of ontological difference eventually condemns one to be no 
longer able to think at all.”520 Regardless of whether or not this statement itself is true, it 
is a remarkably candid admission on his part. What’s more, it does not pose an 
insuperable problem for Marion’s project. For, according to his theological outlook, we 
should surrender the attempt to conceptualize the divine nature, as this human endeavor 
almost inevitably results in conceptual idols made in our own image. Indeed, it is in 
laying aside our metaphysical ambitions to think our way to the divine that we make 
ourselves empty for and receptive to the gift God’s revelation. Toward the end of GWB 
Marion summarizes his position as follows: “In short, theology cannot aim at any other 
progress than its own conversion to the Word, the theologian again becoming bishop or 
                                                                            
519 Marion, Ibid., 84. 
520 Marion, Ibid., 45. 
  255 
else one of the poor believers, in the common Eucharist.”521  
 In closing, it is worth pointing out that Marion’s critique of onto-theology in 
GWB is in many respects less conceptually sharp than that of Heidegger and Barth. 
Indeed, as we saw above, Marion’s argument in GWB is often—quite deliberately—
conceptually obscure. Part of this is a result of the philosophical genre within which 
Marion works: the argument in GWB employs a conceptually playful rhetorical style that 
is characteristic of much of twenty-first century postmodern philosophy. Yet, as we have 
seen, this ludic rhetorical style leads to non-trivial conceptual difficulties in his argument 
(e.g., the claim that, “God loves without being”), which can potentially distract the reader 
from his critique of onto-theology. Although Barth also utilizes a highly idiosyncratic and 
charged rhetorical style, his argument is much more conceptually sharp, as it is explicitly 
articulated against the backdrop of a remarkably consistent and coherent primacy-of-
revelation theology. In short, Barth’s critique of onto-theology is more conceptually 
clear—and damning—whereas Marion’s critique is more sportive in nature.  
At the same time, Marion’s critique of onto-theology is in many respects quite 
similar to that of Barth. For both thinkers, the onto-theological project involves the 
arbitrary veneration of the human category of Being as if this category somehow fell 
from the heavens—hence the charge of conceptual anthropomorphism. And Marion and 
Barth both contend that the only viable theological alternative to the conceptual 
anthropomorphism of onto-theology is to ground our understanding of God exclusively 
on the basis of divine revelation. 
                                                                            
521 Marion, Ibid., 158—italics Marion’s. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, we explored the critique of the onto-theology as a form of conceptual 
anthropomorphism as expressed by Barth, Heidegger, and Marion. The thread connecting 
these diverse thinkers is their shared conviction that ontological concepts such as Being 
are susceptible to the charge of conceptual anthropomorphism when applied to God. 
As we saw above, Barth contends that ontological concepts such as Being-itself 
are no less the product of the human imagination than any other attribute one may wish to 
predicate of God. On this view, ontological conceptions of the divine nature are not 
necessarily less anthropomorphic than other, more personal views of God--they are 
simply more abstract forms of anthropomorphism.  
Heidegger pointed out that the tradition of conceiving of God by way of the 
category of Being typically falls prey to the idolatry of onto-theo-logic: that is, construing 
God as a being, or the highest being. Following Luther, Heidegger also maintains that 
authentic religious faith does not require the idea of Being in order to conceive of the 
Divine. According this perspective, the onto-theological project is the hubristic attempt to 
think one’s way to God, rather than resting in Divine grace and trusting in Divine 
revelation.  
Marion essentially synthesizes these two perspectives, arguing that the onto-
theological project invariably leads to conceptual idolatry. On his view, to think God 
within the ontological difference between Being and beings is to confine the divine 
nature to the realm of human categories. In short, it is a form of conceptual 
anthropomorphism. Marion, like Barth, insists that the only way to guard against such 
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conceptual anthropomorphism is to dispense with onto-theological concepts, and instead 
surrender to God’s self-revelation. 
In summary, for Barth, Heidegger, and Marion, the onto-theological project is not 
an antidote to the human predisposition to anthropomorphism, but, rather, just another 
symptom of this inveterate tendency.   
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Chapter Five: The Bio-cultural Study of Religion and the Naturalness of Religious 
Anthropomorphism 	
Introduction: 
Thus far, we have examined religious anthropomorphism in philosophical and theological 
perspective. In chapters one and two, we also encountered several theories that pointed to 
the psychological (Hume, Feuerbach, and Freud) and social (Maimonides and Freud) 
dynamics that underlie the human predisposition to religious anthropomorphism. Up until 
very recently, such theories were largely speculative. However, as the scientific study of 
religion has burgeoned over the past twenty five years, the phenomenon of religious 
anthropomorphism has become an object of empirical investigation. In this chapter we 
will consider some of the most important accounts of religious anthropomorphism 
stemming from the bio-cultural study of religion (hereafter: BCSR). The BCSR is an 
emerging multidisciplinary field of scientific inquiry that investigates religious beliefs 
and behaviors from the perspectives of evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, 
cognitive science, neuroscience, anthropology, biological anthropology, sociology, and 
cultural evolution.522  
                                                                            
522 Unlike some of the better-known disciplines associated with the scientific study of religion, such as the 
sociology of religion, or the cognitive science of religion, the BCSR possesses the multidisciplinary virtue 
of synthesizing theoretical insights and empirical evidence from across the humanities and the natural 
sciences. In doing so, the BCSR avoids two unfortunate reductionistic tendencies that occur on both sides 
of the disciplinary divide within the modern academy: 1) the tendency to investigate the evolutionary 
development and biological substrates of human cognition and behavior without sufficient attention to the 
shaping realities of cultural embeddedness, and 2) the tendency to conceive of cultural phenomena as 
existing in a hermetically sealed realm that is somehow cut off from the biology and evolutionary history of 
our species. For an overview of the significant theoretical problems resulting from the first tendency, see 
Joseph Henrich and colleagues’ paper, “The Weirdest People in the Word?” (2010) Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 33, 61-135. For an account of some of the philosophical problems inherent to the second 
tendency with the humanities, see Edward Slingerland’s, What Science Offers the Humanities (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
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Before delving into the empirical findings from the BCSR, I should offer a brief 
comment on the rationale for dedicating an entire chapter to examining research from the 
natural sciences (viz., the BCSR) in the context of a study in philosophy of religion. First, 
it is important to note that as a scientific account of the evolutionary, cognitive, and 
cultural origins of anthropomorphic religious beliefs, the BCSR cannot directly establish 
anything regarding the first-order truth or falsity of such beliefs. To argue that the 
BCSR—in and of itself—could do so would be to fall prey to the so-called genetic 
fallacy. I will take up this issue in greater detail in section one of chapter six, which will 
provide an analysis of the philosophical import of the BCSR. For now, I will limit myself 
to indicating the potential philosophical payoff of investigating empirical findings from 
the BCSR: I maintain that when evidence from the BCSR is incorporated into a 
comparative philosophical argument, it can indirectly impact the relative plausibility of 
philosophical and theological hypotheses (e.g., those hypotheses within and around the 
traditions of Neoplatonic onto-theology explored in chapters two through four) in certain 
respects. It will be the burden of chapter six to demonstrate how this is so.  
Now we turn to exploring the evidence from the BCSR on anthropomorphic 
religious beliefs. One of the most important hypotheses to emerge from the BCSR is the 
claim that the predisposition to generate and adopt anthropomorphic religious 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
In contrast to this unfortunately common bifurcation of the sciences and humanities, the BCSR forges 
a bridge between cognition and culture in the academic study of religion. More specifically, the BCSR 
operates within the dual-inheritance theory of human evolution. According to this theory, the long 
evolutionary history of our species has been characterized by a bidirectional, causal relationship between 
genes and culture, with genetic evolution giving rise to biological capacities for culture, and cumulative 
cultural developments (e.g., fire and cooking) taking on a life of their own, and driving human genetic 
evolution in turn. The basic upshot of dual-inheritance theory is that any theoretical or scientific approach 
to the study of human beings that fails to take into account both biological and cultural systems of 
inheritance will be one-sided and reductionistic. 
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representations is maturationally natural for Homo sapiens. According to this theory, 
certain contours of the cognitive-emotional architecture of the human mind function to 
bias human individuals to effortlessly generate, adopt, and widely transmit beliefs 
concerning disembodied intentional agents, such as gods, ancestor spirits, ghosts, 
demons, bodhisattvas, etc. It is by virtue of the evolutionarily stabilized architecture of 
the human mind-brain, which is universal in our species, that religious beliefs and 
behaviors concerning disembodied, human-like agents occur in all known human cultures 
the world over. 
This hypothesis is typically expressed within what is known as the “religion as 
evolutionary by-product” theory in the scientific study of religion. This view contends 
that religious beliefs and behaviors are not themselves adaptations, but rather emerge out 
of and piggyback on other cognitive and behavioral mechanisms that were adaptive in the 
Pleistocene era environment in which our ancestors evolved (hereafter: the ancestral 
environment). 
Another important hypothesis stemming from the BCSR contends that a specific 
subclass of anthropomorphic religious representations that originally emerged as 
evolutionary by-products eventually became cultural adaptations during the early 
Holocene period and the attendant agricultural revolution. This view holds that certain 
types of religious beliefs were instrumental in helping our ancestors negotiate social 
challenges involved in the formation and maintenance of the earliest large-scale human 
civilizations. 
We begin this chapter with a brief overview the concept of maturational 
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naturalness. We will then explore the “religion as an evolutionary by-product” theory, 
with an eye to the central role of anthropomorphism in the religious representations under 
discussion. Finally, we consider recent research supporting the hypothesis that certain 
types of anthropomorphic religious beliefs are cultural adaptations. 
      
5.1. Maturational Naturalness  
Before delving into the evolutionary by-product theory of religious anthropomorphism, 
we need to unpack a key piece of terminology mentioned above: maturational 
naturalness. This concept is derived from philosopher and cognitive science of religion 
scholar Robert N. McCauley’s 2011 book Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not. 
McCauley defines maturational naturalness as referring to a certain class of cognitive-
behavioral abilities that come “naturally” to most humans by the age of five to seven 
years. The concept of maturationally natural cognition is grounded in the architecture of 
the human mind-brain, and the way in which this architecture constrains the processing of 
certain types of information, making certain beliefs and behaviors more easy, or “natural” 
to entertain and engage in than others.  
More specifically, McCauley nests his theory of maturational naturalness within 
the dual process theory of human cognition. The dual process model523 differentiates 
between to basic types of cognition: intuitive thinking and reflective thinking--sometimes 
referred to as system 1 and system 2, respectively.524 System 1 intuitive thinking is fast, 
automatic, (mostly) unconscious, and effortless, whereas system 2 reflective thinking is 
                                                                            
523 Jonathan St B. T. Evans and Keith Frankish, eds., In Two Minds: Dual Processes and beyond (Oxford ; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
524 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 1st pbk. ed (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013). 
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slow, controlled, conscious, and effortful.525 The idea of maturational naturalness is 
essentially an elaboration of the dual process model. McCauley dubs system 1 intuitive 
cognition as “natural,” and refers to system 2 reflective cognition as “unnatural,” as 
system 2 reflection demands a great deal more conscious effort and energy to engage in. 
For example, the cognitive capacity for facial recognition is “natural” in that it requires 
no conscious effort on the part of individuals. This ability “comes naturally” to (most) 
humans, despite the fact that it involves an incredibly complex feat of information 
processing. In contrast, the ability to perform a statistical analysis is “unnatural” because 
achieving even moderate proficiency in this domain demands a great deal of conscious 
effort on the part of the individual, along with an extended period of learning. 
McCauley divides “natural” system 1 intuitive cognition into two sub-categories: 
those cognitive-behavioral abilities that are maturationally natural, and those that become 
natural through extensive practice—what he refers to as “practiced naturalness."526 
Maturational naturalness refers to those fast, unreflective, automatic, effortless actions or 
cognitive abilities that we come to perform without ever having to be explicitly taught, 
such as babbling phonemes, chewing, or walking.527 Although we are not able to perform 
these abilities upon birth, we naturally come to acquire (as opposed to being taught) them 
within a specific stage of development (e.g. learning to chew and walk within the first 12 
to 24 months of life).  
Many human beings also possess abilities, such as reading, arithmetic, or driving 
                                                                            
525 Robert N. McCauley, Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 4. 
526 McCauley, Ibid., 5.  
527 McCauley, Ibid., 25. 
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a car, that are not naturally acquired by a certain stage of development, but rather must be 
obtained through continuous effort and education. Absent a rather long period of 
instruction by teachers, few if any humans will ever acquire the ability to read, write, play 
chess, or drive a standard transmission. The remarkable thing is that difficult abilities 
such as reading or driving a standard transmission can, over time, become natural, i.e., 
fast, unreflective, automatic, and effortless. This is what McCauley refers to as practiced 
naturalness. It is by virtue of practiced naturalness that most Westerners can drive a car 
while also reading the signs on the highway, while at the same time reflecting on 
complicated ideas streaming from the radio.  
In contrast, there are also cognitive behavioral abilities that are so demanding that 
they rarely become automatic or “natural,” even given extended periods of practice. 
Some of the best instances of “unnatural” cognitive-behavioral capacities derive from the 
realm of the natural sciences and mathematics. For example, many modern scientific 
theories (e.g., quantum physics, general and special relativity) require us to upend our 
maturationally natural intuitions about the nature of physical objects, space, time, and 
many other aspects of the natural world.  
As indicated by the title of his book, McCauley contends that religion is 
maturationally natural, whereas modern science is unnatural.528 But what is 
                                                                            
528 McCauley is careful to point out that his thesis (i.e., religion is maturationally natural) does not entail 
that humans evolved to be religious. In short, he adheres to the “religion as an evolutionary by-product” 
view. McCauley writes: “My case has not been that humans are naturally religious, but rather that their 
maturationally natural cognitive systems develop in ways that make people thoroughly receptive to 
religions, to their myths, to their rituals, and to their representations. Humans do not have natural mental 
dispositions to acquire religion. But they do have susceptibilities, based on maturationally natural 
dispositions of the mind, which exist for utterly unrelated reasons, that make them cognitively ready to leap 
at, swallow, and digest religious stories, actions, symbols, and settings like a hungry frog will leap at, 
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maturationally natural about beliefs involving invisible intentional agents (i.e., religious 
beliefs)? As we shall see in the following section, most of the cognitive-emotional 
mechanisms that cognitive scientists associate with the generation and transmission of 
anthropomorphic religious representations fall under the domain of maturationally natural 
cognition. Insofar as these cognitive mechanisms significantly contribute to the formation 
of anthropomorphic religious ideas, it follows that the capacity to generate such ideas will 
also be maturationally natural for most humans.  
With this overview of the concept of maturational naturalness in place, we now 
turn to several prominent theories of the naturalness of anthropomorphic religious ideas 
within the bio-cultural study of religion. While most of these theories were developed 
prior to (or independently of) McCauley’s theory of maturational naturalness, most can 
be rendered consist with—and are often improved by—this conceptual distinction. 
 
5.2 Religious Anthropomorphism as an Evolutionary By-product 
Anthropologist Stewart Guthrie was one of the first social scientists to interpret religion 
as a product not only of human culture, but more fundamentally, as a by-product of the 
evolved structure of human cognition.529 As early as 1980, Guthrie outlined a “natural” 
theory of religion that conceived of religious belief as founded upon the cognitive bias 
toward anthropomorphic thinking.530 He went on to present his fully developed cognitive 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
swallow, and (attempt to) digest a ball bearing that flies within reach through its visual field.” (McCauley, 
Ibid., 220) 
529 Although Guthrie does not employ the term “evolutionary by-product” in his early work, this view is 
implicit in his theory of anthropomorphism as a strategic perceptual strategy that likely conferred survival 
benefits for our ancestors, and was eventually expanded into the realm of disembodied intentional agents. 
530 Stewart Elliott Guthrie, “A Cognitive Theory of Religion,” Current Anthropology 21, no. 2 (April 
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theory of religion in his 1993 book Faces in the Clouds.  
In this landmark work, Guthrie defines anthropomorphism as “the attribution of 
human characteristics to nonhuman things or events.”531 Against many prominent social 
theorists who treat anthropomorphism as a negligible component of religion (e.g., 
Durkheim, Weber, Geertz, et al.), Guthrie maintains that anthropomorphism constitutes 
the very core of human religion. He even goes so far as to suggest that religion may be 
defined as “systematic anthropomorphism.”532 And in contrast to the traditional definition 
of religious anthropomorphism as the attribution of human-like characteristics to God (or 
the gods), Guthrie follows Hume in arguing that anthropomorphic religious ideas are the 
result of attributing human-like characteristics to the natural world. “Religion,” Guthrie 
writes, “consists of seeing the world as humanlike.”533  
     He goes on to speculate about the evolutionary origins of the inveterate human 
tendency toward anthropomorphic thinking. “I claim we anthropomorphize because 
guessing that the world is humanlike is a good bet. It is a bet because the world is 
uncertain, ambiguous, and in need to interpretation.”534 Guthrie distinguishes his position 
from the classic anthropomorphic projection critiques of Feuerbach and Freud by 
underscoring the potentially adaptive aspect of anthropomorphic thinking: 
“Anthropomorphism may be best explained as the result of an attempt to see not what we 
want to see or what is easy to see, but what is important to see: what may affect us for 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
1980): 181–94. 
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better or worse.”535 For humans living in the ancestral environment, the most important 
phenomena in the environment were agents, such as predators, prey, potential partners 
and protectors.536 Thus, interpreting ambiguous phenomena in the environment as agent-
like would have been the safest bet for our ancestors. This interpretive bet would have 
also turned up false positives a good deal of the time. Guthrie provides the example of a 
hiker mistaking a boulder in the distant woods for a bear. However, from an evolutionary 
fitness point of view, it’s better for the hiker to mistake a boulder for a bear and later 
come to realize that she was mistaken than it is for her to interpret a sleeping bear as a 
boulder and wind up as lunch.537 Indeed, it is much more common for humans to be 
startled by something that appears to be an agent (e.g., a rope that we mistake for a snake) 
than it is for us to be startled by an agent that we casually mistook for an inanimate object 
(a snake that we mistake for a rope). 
In summary, Guthrie’s argument is that human beings are cognitively predisposed 
to over-detect agency in the environment.538 Although his account in Faces in the Clouds 
does not provide evidence for the evolutionary development of this cognitive bias, it is 
not difficult to conceive of how such a bias could have been adaptive for our ancestors: 
humans living in the ancestral environment who were cognitively predisposed to over-
detect agency in the ambiguous environment were likely wrong much of the time, but 
they would have survived these false positives, and thus would have enjoyed more 
reproductive opportunities than those lacking this predisposition. Indeed, individuals in 
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the ancestral environment who lacked this cognitive bias (those who were likely to 
interpret a sleeping bear as a boulder, or the rustling in a nearby bush as the result of the 
wind) were likely wrong often enough so as to be wiped out from the gene pool via 
predation. Thus, it seems highly plausible that a cognitive bias to over-detect agency in 
the environment would have paid-off for our ancestors in terms of reproductive fitness 
(provided that this bias is associated with a genetic representation that could be selected 
for by natural selection). If we consider this possibility in light of the fact that 
anthropomorphic thinking and imagery recur in all known human cultures,539 it seems 
likely that a cognitive bias to detect agent-like phenomena in the environment was an 
adaptive perceptual strategy for our ancestors. 
Undoubtedly, Guthrie’s argument in Faces in the Clouds is speculative. This is in 
large part due to the fact that Guthrie formulated his basic thesis in the 1980’s—long 
before the field of “the cognitive science of religion” came on the academic scene. Yet, 
fortuitously enough, the basic thrust of Guthrie’s hypothesis—i.e., that human beings are 
cognitively predisposed to anthropomorphic thinking, and that anthropomorphism is 
central to most religious beliefs and behaviors the world over—has been borne out by 
nearly two decades of scientific research in the BCSR. 
 
Cognitive Mechanisms and Religious Anthropomorphism 
Not long after the publication of Faces in the Clouds, scholars in the fields of cognitive 
science and evolutionary anthropology began formulating new theories that specified the 
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evolved cognitive mechanisms and cognitive templates underlying anthropomorphic 
religious representations. Drawing upon Guthrie’s hypothesis that anthropomorphism is a 
perceptual strategy that was likely adaptive for our ancestors, cognitive psychologist 
Justin L. Barrett hypothesized a cognitive mechanism that biases human perception to 
detect agency in the environment. He dubbed this cognitive mechanism the 
“Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device (HADD).540 Echoing Guthrie, Barrett argues 
that such a cognitive mechanism probably would have been adaptive in the Pleistocene 
environment in which our ancestors evolved: “If you bet that something is an agent and it 
isn’t, not much is lost. But if you bet that something is not an agent and it turns out to be 
one, you could be lunch.”541 
An important negative consequence of this cognitive bias is that we become prone 
to false positives, detecting ostensible agents where there are none. As Barrett observes, 
“HADD does not require an object acting to be present in order to detect agency.”542 
Accordingly, he notes that our agency detection device “suffers from some hyperactivity, 
making it prone to find agents around us, including supernatural ones, given fairly 
modest evidence of their presence. This tendency encourages the generation and spread 
of god concepts and other religious concepts.”543   
Barrett stops short of completely spelling out the logical implications of this 
hypothesis, which we could summarize as follows: Given the hypersensitivity of our 
agency detection device, and its fundamental role in the generation of god concepts and 
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religious beliefs, human beings would detect the presence of gods, spirits, and ancestors 
even in the absence of such putative supernatural realities. The idea of the HADD thus 
provides a natural explanation for religious beliefs and behaviors—that is, an explanation 
that does not rely upon assumptions about the reality of supernatural agents.  
Barrett’s research also focuses on a related cognitive mechanism called the 
“theory of mind mechanism” or ToMM.544 This cognitive mechanism allows human 
individuals to effortlessly generate inferences about the desires, beliefs, motives, plans, 
and feelings of other humans, just by observing their actions and facial expressions. 
ToMM allows us to “read minds,” so to speak. Cognitive science of religion scholar Todd 
Tremlin offers a helpful example of the way in which our ToMM operates in everyday 
life. Consider the following scenario: “A woman wearing a coat and carrying a purse 
walks into a kitchen. After scanning the countertops and even the floor, she quickly opens 
several drawers, rifles through their contents, and then closes them again. Finally, she 
throws her hands up into the air and walks out.”545 The large majority of humans do not 
need to spend a great deal of time and effort reflecting about what is going on in this 
scenario. Instead, our maturationally natural cognitive ToMM provides us with an almost 
instant, plausible inference: “she wanted something that she believed was in the kitchen 
and was frustrated when she couldn’t find it.”546  It is important to note that while this 
chain of inferences seems obvious to us, most other animals are not capable of drawing 
accurate inferences about the beliefs of their conspecifics, ostensibly because they lack a 
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ToMM. As Tremlin points out, a dog observing the scenario above would likely register 
only a woman moving around in the kitchen. A dog would not (as far as we know) 
automatically generate inferences about the intentions and goals that motivated her 
various actions in the kitchen.547 
Barrett describes how HADD and ToMM work together in our cognitive-
emotional engagement with the ambiguous environment: when faced with an ambiguous 
phenomenon such as a rustling bush, “HADD registers a nonreflective belief that the 
object is an agent, triggering ToM (sic) to describe the object’s activity in terms of 
beliefs, desires, and other mental states.”548 It is not difficult to see how HADD and 
ToMM could function to produce belief in disembodied intentional agents, such as 
ancestors spirits moaning in the wind, or evil spirits at work behind an unexpected 
ambiguous event such as a solar eclipse or natural disaster. Indeed, millions of modern- 
day humans detect the presence of disembodied intentional agents such as God when they 
encounter ambiguous events both miraculous (such as the sudden recovery of a sick 
child) and disastrous (such as a catastrophic Tsunami or Hurricane). 
Furthermore, research in the field of cognitive neuroscience has demonstrated a 
significant correlation between the brain regions associated with ToMM and the 
cognitive processing of anthropomorphic religious ideas. Recent neuroimaging studies 
have shown that when Western  individuals are asked to think about or pray to God in a 
lab setting, they utilize the same brain systems that are normally activated by thinking 
about the intentional states of others (e.g., the medial prefrontal cortex, and the temporo-
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parietal junction).549Humans thus appear to use their ToMM in order to understand both 
the minds of other human agents and the minds of disembodied agents, like God.  
If this hypothesis is correct, then we should expect that individuals on the autism 
spectrum—i.e., individuals with deficits in ToMM—will be less likely to adopt 
anthropomorphic religious ideas than individuals without such deficits. In fact, this is 
exactly what research in the BCSR has shown.550 In a 2012 study Ara Norenzayan and 
colleagues found a significant correlation between individuals with ToMM deficits and 
“religious disbelief.” This correlation persisted even when they controlled for factors like 
education, age, personality, and IQ.551 Norenzayan summarized their findings as follows: 
“People scoring high on the autism spectrum expressed lower levels of belief in a personal 
God, an association that was due to the lower level  of mentalizing among participants 
scoring high on the autism spectrum.”552 Clearly, there is a tight link between ToMM and 
the formation of anthropomorphic religious beliefs. 
BCSR scholar Ilkka Pyysiainen has proposed that another cognitive mechanism 
should be included alongside HAAD and ToMM in the study of the cognitive foundations 
of religious ideas: what he refers to as the cognitive bias toward “hyperactive 
teleofunctional reasoning” (HTR). This cognitive mechanism underlies the human 
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tendency, “to see objects as existing for a purpose.”553 The empirical evidence for this 
cognitive bias is incredibly robust. Boston University psychologist Deborah Kelemen has 
conducted numerous studies on the reasoning strategies of young children and concluded 
that most children—as well as adults—possess what she dubs a “promiscuous 
teleology.”554 In her experiments with seven and eight-year old children, Kelemen found 
that they consistently favored teleological explanations for natural, non-living objects, 
such as rocks. For example, when her child subjects were shown an image of a pointy rock 
and then prompted with the question: “why do you think the rocks are so pointy?” the 
majority tended to favor purposive, teleological explanations, such as “They were pointy 
so that animals wouldn’t sit on them and smash them,” as opposed non-purposive, 
physical explanations such as “They were pointy because bits of stuff piled up on top of 
one another for a long time.”555  
In another experiment, Kelemen and her colleague Cara DiYanni asked British 
children (ages six to seven) to answer questions about the origins of natural objects and 
artifacts. The results confirmed Kelemen’s theory that children are biased toward a 
“promiscuous teleological” reasoning.556 When the children in the experiment were asked 
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“Why did the first flood occur?” and “Why did the first ever bird exist?” they tended to 
prefer teleological explanations, such as “Someone made it,” over natural, non-purposive 
explanations.557 
Here we may note the overlap between the cognitive predisposition to 
“hyperactive teleofunctional reasoning” (HTR), and the cognitive mechanisms of HADD 
and ToMM. The idea that a natural object like a pointy rock was created purposefully 
(e.g., “someone made it”) clearly implies the idea of an intentional creator. HTR can thus 
recruit the deliverances of HAAD and ToMM in postulating an intentional agent who 
purposefully “makes” objects in the world. And in the same way that HADD and ToMM 
will produce inferences about the reality of agents and intentionality independent of any 
corresponding physical object (e.g., we infer the existence of an agent in the rustling bush 
without actually seeing a physical agent; we infer the existence of mental states without 
seeing them), children’s HTR mechanism will reliably trigger teleological explanations 
for natural objects without observing the physical agent/creator implied by such 
explanations. What’s more, once children are capable of effortlessly generating 
inferences about the purposive, creative activity of an intentional agent who is not 
physically present, it is only a short conceptual step from there to proceed to inferences 
about a purposive creator who is non-physical, or disembodied.  
Kelemen makes a case for this hypothesis in her 2004 article “Are Children 
Intuitive Theists?” She writes that, “around 5 years of age, children possess the 
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prerequisites to make advanced, distinctive attributions of mental states to nonnatural 
agents.”558 As indicated above, the tendency among children to instinctively adopt a 
“promiscuous teleology” equips them to postulate disembodied intentional agents (or 
“non-natural agents”) as the purposive creators of natural phenomena in the world. 
Although the reality of this bias does not legitimate the conclusion that, “all children are 
intuitive theists,” it does suggest that most children are cognitively predisposed to adopt 
anthropomorphic religious ideas involving disembodied intentional agents like God(s), 
given cultural exposure to such ideas. 
In focusing on certain supernatural beliefs that come naturally to young children, 
Kelemen’s research bolsters McCauley’s hypothesis that anthropomorphic religious 
beliefs are maturationally natural. The cognitive allure of intentional agent concepts 
activated by the maturationally natural mechanisms of HADD, ToMM, and HTR leads us 
to a related theory in the BCSR: that of “minimally counterintuitive beliefs.” 
 
Religious Anthropomorphism and the “Cognitive Optimum” 
In the early 1990s evolutionary anthropologist Pascal Boyer developed a cognitive theory 
of religion that focuses on cross culturally universal cognitive structures that both 
constrain and canalize the transmission of cultural representations, including religious 
beliefs.559 Drawing upon anthropologist Dan Sperber’s work on the epidemiology of 
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representations,560 Boyer proposes that certain cognitive structures allow human minds to 
draw rich inferences from phenomena, achieve similar representations among different 
minds, and to transmit ideas effectively to other minds. Contrary to the “Standard Social 
Scientific Model,” according to which the mind is more or less a blank slate that is 
inscribed by cultural inputs,561 this view maintains that the human mind possesses 
evolutionarily stabilized cognitive structures prior to any experience or cultural 
learning.562 Far from being the product of cultural learning, these cognitive structures—
what Boyer terms “cognitive templates”—are what make learning itself possible. Boyer 
contends that cognitive templates allow “the mind to go beyond the information 
given…to produce inferences on the basis of the information given.”563   
Boyer illustrates this idea with the example of a child who is shown a walrus for 
the first time. According to Boyer, the child will intuitively (or “naturally”) file this new 
concept “walrus” under the broad cognitive template “animal.” This allows the child to 
draw rich inferences about the walrus, inferences that go beyond what the child has 
actually observed about the walrus. For example, the child will be able to infer—without 
needing to be taught or shown—that walruses give birth to baby walruses, or that 
walruses need to eat, or that the movement of walruses is goal oriented rather than 
random.564  
 According to this theory, the human mind possesses a suite of similar cognitive 
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templates such as “person,” “plant,” “artifact,” and “natural (non-living),” which allow us 
to intuitively sort phenomena from various domains of the natural world. Boyer refers to 
these templates as “ontological categories,” as they form a general inventory of the basic 
types of things that we encounter in the natural environment. These templates amount to 
“having minitheories of certain kinds of things in the world.” 565 Such “minitheories” are 
guided by even more abstract inferential cognitive systems that are maturationally 
natural. These general inferential systems furnish human beings with “intuitive” beliefs 
about different domains of reality, such as objects in the physical world (“intuitive 
physics”), the array of living things in the world (“intuitive biology”) and the thoughts 
and intentions of other agents (“intuitive psychology”).566 Boyer also notes that there is 
little variation among these intuitive domains and templates across cultures.567 Moreover, 
many colorful psychological studies of infants responding to various stimuli designed to 
trigger (or violate) their “minitheories” of intuitive physics suggest that these cognitive 
templates are maturationally natural.568 In fact, research suggests that most infants 
possess such cognitive systems beginning as early as four months.569 
Boyer’s cognitive theory of religion focuses on the way in which certain types of 
cultural representations interface with our intuitive ontological categories. His central 
hypothesis is that certain religious representations succeed in being widely transmitted 
and recalled in human minds and cultures precisely because they depart from (or violate) 
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our intuitive ontological templates in ways that are attention-grabbing and memorable.  
Boyer employs the term “counterintuitive idea” to refer to those cultural 
representations that contradict one or several of our intuitive expectations about a given 
ontological domain of experience.570 He goes on to cite research studies showing that 
ideas that violate some of our intuitive ontological templates are more likely to be recalled 
when compared with ideas that do not involve any such violations.571 For example, 
evolutionary anthropologist Scott Atran has conducted research demonstrating that 
introducing a moderate number of counterintuitive elements to a story tends to make such 
stories more memorable than their mundane counterparts.572 Additional studies have 
demonstrated similar results.573 
According to Boyer, there are at least two basic ways to render an idea 
counterintuitive. The first is to violate one of the intuitive expectations that correspond to a 
given ontological category.574 For example, the counterintuitive idea of a ghost involves 
violating the physical expectations associated with the ontological category of a “person”: a 
ghost is essentially a person (i.e., an intentional agent) who is disembodied and can 
therefore pass through solid objects, which makes the idea attention-grabbing and 
memorable.575  
The second way to produce a counterintuitive idea is to transfer intuitive 
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expectations from one ontological category to another.576 Consider, for example, the idea 
of an Ent from J.R.R. Tolkien’s trilogy The Lord of the Rings. Ents are trees that possess 
intentionality and agential abilities. The idea of an Ent is thus a counterintuitive idea 
involving a transfer from the ontological template of “person” (capacities for 
intentionality and agency) to the ontological template of “plant” (a tree). It turns out that 
some of the most culturally widespread counterintuitive ideas involve violations or 
transfers in the domain of “intuitive psychology.” Indeed, across all human cultures there 
exist counterintuitive ideas about objects and events from virtually all ontological 
domains (e.g., mountains, rivers, forests, clouds, artifacts, etc.) that are identified as 
possessing intentionality. Here we may harken back to Guthrie's hypothesis that humans 
are cognitively biased to “anthropomorphize the world” by over-detecting human-like 
agency in the environment. 
The salience of anthropomorphic counterintuitive ideas leads us to the important 
concept of “minimally counterintuitive ideas” (henceforth: MCIs). MCIs may be defined 
as cultural representations that violate some—but not too many—of the expectations 
furnished by our intuitive ontological categories.577 Accordingly, the idea of a ghost or an 
Ent are “minimally counterintuitive” because while they involve one or two violations or 
transfers from one ontological template to another, they also preserve most of our other 
intuitive expectations. For example, a ghost may violate our expectations of a “person” 
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by being disembodied, but a ghost preserves most other expectations by being an 
intentional agent that possesses beliefs and motivations, is capable of goal directed 
behavior, and can perceive our actions.578 We can contrast this MCI with what be termed 
a “maximally counterintuitive idea,” i.e., an idea that violates too many of our intuitive 
ideas. An example of a such a “maximally counterintuitive idea” would be the idea of an 
infinite Ent that does not occupy a spatio-temporal location in the world. This idea 
violates too many of our intuitive ontological categories, and thus requires significant 
time and energy to entertain (if we even go to the trouble of entertaining the idea at all). 
Accordingly, MCI’s achieve what Boyer terms a “cognitive optimum”—they stick out 
from the other mundane conceptual representations enough to capture attention and be 
memorable, but they do not violate our intuitive expectations so much that they require 
excessive effort and reflection to comprehend.579  
Crucially, however, not all MCIs have the potential to become objects of religious 
devotion. In the BCSR, the famous example of a religiously impotent MCI is that of 
Mickey Mouse.580 This minimally counterintuitive idea involves a transfer from the 
“person” template to the “animal” template that upends our intuitive expectations in these 
domains and thus captures attention and becomes memorable. We can appreciate the 
“cognitive optimum” achieved in the MCI of Mickey Mouse when we set it alongside a 
more mundane, intuitive idea that utilizes the same ontological template (e.g., a mouse 
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that loves to nibble). Nevertheless, the MCI of Mickey Mouse is unlikely to ever stir 
human beings to religious devotion. This is because the MCI of Mickey Mouse lacks 
many of the salient characteristics the make for a robust idea of a “person,” i.e., being 
socially situated in a group, having social interests and concerns about the behavior of 
individuals in one’s group, violations of group values, etc.  
In contrast to MCIs such as Mickey Mouse, Boyer discusses another class of 
MCIs that he dubs “full-access agents.” These are MCI agents that have full-access to the 
thoughts, desires, and behaviors of people in a group—what he terms “strategic 
information.” Examples of full-access agents with strategic information include ancestor 
spirits, gods, demons, devas, bodhisattvas, etc.581 Boyer writes,  
what is ‘important’ to human beings, because of their evolutionary history, are the 
conditions of social interaction: who knows what, who is not aware of what, who did 
what with whom…imagining agents with that information is an illustration of mental 
processes driven by relevance. Such agents are not necessary to explain anything, but 
they are so much easier to represent and so much richer in possible inferences that they 
enjoy a great advantage in cultural transmission.582  
It is not surprising then that representations of full-access MCI agents such as 
gods, ancestor spirits, and demons recur across all known cultures, and enjoy a more or 
less stable conceptual profile. Indeed, Boyer’s cognitive theory of religion thus suggests 
that there are in fact a limited number of ways to formulate religious ideas that are likely 
to be successfully transmitted.583 While there are myriad ways to violate intuitive 
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expectations (e.g., consider the numerous MCIs found in children’s cartoons), only a 
small subset of violations or transfers across templates will result in an MCI that is likely 
to elicit existentially meaningful inferences on the part human individuals and groups. In 
short, it is only highly anthropomorphic, MCI agents with full access to strategic 
information that are likely to become the objects of religious belief.  
Here we should note the relationship between the conceptual profile of MCIs that 
are likely to become the objects of religious engagement and our cognitive-emotional 
predisposition to anthropomorphism: the most religiously successful MCIs are those 
involving MCI agents that resemble persons like us—persons with the abilities to “read 
minds” (ToMM), persons with vested interests in the behaviors, beliefs, desires, and 
fortunes of individuals in our group. According to Boyer’s theory, MCIs without a 
sufficiently anthropomorphic profile will fail to elicit rich inferences from individuals in 
a population, and are thus unlikely become widely transmitted as shared objects of 
religious commitment.584  
Accordingly, one might argue that MCIs such as Mickey Mouse are unlikely to 
become objects of religious engagement because they are not anthropomorphic enough. 
Or, to put the matter more precisely, MCIs like Mickey Mouse are anthropomorphic, but 
in a way that is socially and existentially irrelevant to adult individuals in a group. In 
contrast, gods, ancestor spirits, and demons are anthropomorphic in a way that is socially 
and existentially evocative, because their conceptual profile includes the most salient 
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aspects of the idea of a “person,” viz., someone with a vested interest in reading the 
minds of others in order to acquire strategic social information. 
 We can now appreciate the way in which the cognitive mechanisms that bias 
humans to over-detect intentional agents (HAAD, ToMM. and HTR) dovetail with 
Boyer’s blueprint of the cognitive profile of the types of MCIs (agents with full access to 
strategic information) that are likely to be widely transmitted across human minds and 
elicit religious devotion. 
 
5.3 Big Gods: Religious Anthropomorphism as a Cultural Adaptation 
Up until recently, the “religion as an evolutionary by-product” view was the only game in 
town in the scientific study of religion. However, research in the BCSR focusing on 
cultural evolution has produced powerful new theories that point toward the adaptive 
nature of certain types of religious beliefs, behaviors, and institutions. As we shall see in 
what follows, these theories typically maintain continuity with the religion as an 
evolutionary by-product view, incorporating this perspective into broader hypotheses on 
the way in which certain types of  religious beliefs and behaviors could have become 
culturally adaptive during certain stages of human evolution. 
One of the most compelling of these theories is the so-called “Big Gods” 
hypothesis of Ara Norenzayan and colleagues.585 This view contends that a specific 
subset of anthropomorphic religious representations—namely, omniscient, moralizing, 
“Big Gods”—were instrumental in helping our ancestors successfully scale up from the 
                                                                            
585 See Ara Norenzayan, Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2013. 
  283 
small-scale hunter-gatherer social environment that characterized most of our 
evolutionary history to the large-scale, anonymous civilizations that emerged in the 
Holocene period.586 According to the Big Gods hypothesis, certain types of 
anthropomorphic religious beliefs that originally emerged as by-products eventually 
became cultural adaptations as our ancestors confronted the challenges of living in new, 
hitherto uncharted social arrangements during the early Holocene.   
How did certain types of anthropomorphic religious beliefs become adaptive in 
this new social landscape? At first blush, the answer proffered by the Big Gods 
hypothesis appears somewhat simplistic: the idea of all-knowing, moralizing, Big Gods 
promotes cooperation and prosocial behavior. In order to better appreciate the 
explanatory value of this hypothesis, we need to briefly consider the phenomenon of 
human cooperation and the social challenges involved in our ancestors’ transition from 
small-scale hunter-gatherer societies to large-scale anonymous societies.  
Human cooperation in large, anonymous civilizations is something of a scientific 
conundrum. Although human cooperation is a complex phenomenon at all societal levels, 
scientists have developed compelling explanations for human cooperation in small-scale 
social arrangements. Most theoretical accounts of cooperation at this level point to two 
crucial mechanisms that underlie cooperation: that of kin selection and reciprocal 
altruism.   
Kin selection essentially amounts to a behavioral algorithm, commonly known as 
                                                                            
586 See Norenzayan, Ibid., ch. 1. 
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“Hamilton’s Rule,”587 which holds that individuals will tend to cooperate with and help 
other individuals to the degree to which they share genes, and to the extent to which the 
genetic benefits are likely to outweigh the costs of cooperative behavior. In other words, 
cooperating with and behaving “selflessly” toward genetic relatives is beneficial to the 
individual insofar as such behavior is likely to benefit the propagation of the genes shared 
between them and their relative. According to the logic of kin selection, cooperative 
behavior that may appear selfless at the level of the individual (e.g., I sacrifice time, 
energy, and resources to help my brother build a hut) is in fact “self-interested” (or 
“selfish”)588 at the genetic level, because engaging in such behavior is likely to benefit 
the genes that I share in common with my brother. The logic of kin selection explains 
cooperative behavior among numerous species, from bees to apes to humans.589 
The concept of reciprocal altruism explains cooperation between non-related 
individuals. The basic idea underlying this view is “You scratch my back, I’ll scratch 
yours.” According to this theory, individuals are likely to cooperate with and help other 
conspecifics to the degree to which they can trust that the favor will be repaid in the 
future.590 Reciprocal altruism works in small-scale, hunter-gatherer societies, where 
everyone knows everyone else, and, more importantly, everyone is constantly monitoring 
                                                                            
587 This rule takes its name from W.D. Hamilton, who first provided a mathematical formulation of the 
principle of kin selection. See W.D. Hamilton, (1964), “The genetical evolution of social behavior.” 
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7, 1-52. 
588 See Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene: 40th Anniversary Edition (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2016). 
589 See Dawkins, Ibid. The explanation for cooperative behavior furnished by kin selection is somewhat 
counterintuitive. If we consider the example above, the brother who helps build the hut likely does not do 
so with any conscious awareness of the fact that doing so helps (indirectly) promotes his genetic fitness. 
Rather, he likely helps build the hut on the basis of more psychologically basic moral intuitions, such as 
“that is just what good brothers do—they help one another.” 
590 See Robert Trivers, (1971) “The evolution of reciprocal altruism.” Quarterly Review of Biology, 46: 35-
57. 
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the behavior and reputation of everyone else in the group. As Norenzayan observes, 
“there is nothing evolutionarily puzzling about genetically unrelated individuals 
cooperating with each other, as long as these acts are mutually beneficial, individuals can 
track each other’s reputations over time, and cheaters are detected and socially excluded, 
or threatened with punishment.”591 
However, when we consider the emergence of cooperation in large-scale, 
anonymous societies, the mechanisms of kin selection and reciprocal altruism do not 
appear to be sufficient explanations. This is because in the context of large-scale 
societies, the underlying features that make these mechanisms work are considerably 
compromised. Most notably, the mechanisms related to our predisposition to engage in 
cooperative behavior with kith and kin are compromised. This is because, generally 
speaking, humans living in large-scale civilizations are regularly surrounded by 
strangers, rather than kith and kin. Hence, it is puzzling that cooperation ever emerged in 
such large-scale social contexts, because, by and large, cooperation is only adaptive when 
one cooperates with genetic relatives and individuals whose reputations one can track 
over time and from whom one can expect reciprocation in the future. Cooperating with 
strangers is risky, because there’s a good chance you’ll be taken advantage of—i.e., that 
the stranger with whom you cooperate will not reciprocate in the future. This is the great 
threat to human cooperation, the so-called “free rider problem”: it is in the interest of 
individuals to receive benefits from the cooperative behavior of others without ever 
reciprocating themselves.  
                                                                            
591 Norenzayan, Big Gods, 5. 
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In short, it pays to be selfish and freeride, provided you can get away with it. The 
last clause in this statement contains an important caveat, however. No one likes to be 
taken advantage of, and humans possess a species-wide predisposition to punish free 
riders severely, either through reputational damage or physical violence. Freeriding is 
thus a high-risk behavior, because if freeriding behavior is detected, harsh punishment is 
virtually inevitable. And here we come back to the puzzle of cooperation in large scale 
societies: it is much easier to get away with freeriding in large-scale anonymous societies 
than it is in small-scale societies. Given the benefits and relatively low costs associated 
with antisocial behavior in large scale societies, the question becomes: why cooperate 
with strangers if you’re likely to be taken advantage of? Moreover, why not freeride 
yourself? 
Contemporary psychology has shed considerable light on the conditions that tend 
to both facilitate and impede human cooperation. Norenzayan cites numerous 
psychological experiments demonstrating that when subjects are asked to play 
cooperative economic games with strangers, cooperation soars when individuals can 
track the reputations of other players.592 This allows them to selectively choose who to 
cooperate with based on the likelihood of reciprocation. Furthermore, the tendency to 
freeride (i.e., to received benefits from the group without contributing in return) is 
dramatically reduced when individuals can punish other players for freeriding.593 
However, in the real world context of large-scale societies, monitoring and 
                                                                            
592 See Norenzayan, Ibid., 5. 
593 See Norenzayan, Ibid. 
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punishing the antisocial behavior of individual citizens is itself a costly activity.594 
What’s more, even with the cultural evolution of effective mechanisms for monitoring 
and punishing antisocial behavior, such as policing institutions, it is impossible to police 
all behavior in a large, anonymous population. If we return to the conundrum of the 
emergence of human cooperation in large scale societies during the agricultural 
revolution, it becomes clear that the free rider problem couldn’t have been solved by the 
development of policing institutions alone.595 Indeed, even the most effective policing 
institutions could not have evolved quickly enough to keep large groups together if there 
were not additional cooperation inducing mechanisms already in place.596 
Norenzayan summarizes the puzzle of large-scale human cooperation as follows: 
“With ever-greater chances of encountering strangers, genetic relatedness subsides 
geometrically, and without extra safeguards, reciprocal altruism also rapidly reverts to 
selfishness. Neither kin selection nor reciprocal altruism can explain the rise of large 
cooperative societies.”597 Thus, if neither kin selection nor reciprocal altruism can explain 
the emergence of large-scale cooperation, and if effective policing institutions were not 
the progenitors of large-scale societies but rather the cultural products of such societies, 
                                                                            
594 For a helpful account of the high costs associated with third party punishment, see Dominic Johnson and 
Oliver Krüger, “The Good of Wrath: Supernatural Punishment and the Evolution of Cooperation,” Political 
Theology 5, no. 2 (2004): 157–73. 
595 See Dominic Johnson, God Is Watching You: How the Fear of God Makes Us Human (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), 33 ff. 
596 It is important to note that policing institutions are absent in virtually all small-scale societies; in other 
words, they are the products are large scale societies. Accordingly, our ancient ancestors did not first invent 
policing institutions that would punish antisocial behavior in large scale societal contexts and then proceed 
to scale up in size. Rather, human societies grew in size and complexity, and over time the societies that 
held together were those that developed effective third-party punishment mechanisms and eventually 
invented policing institutions.  
597 Norenzayan, Big Gods, 6. 
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then what could have kept our ancestors cooperating with one another as they scaled up 
into ever larger, more anonymous groups? 
Enter the Big Gods hypothesis. Norenzayan and other scholars in the BCSR argue 
that belief in omniscient, moralizing Gods who monitor behavior, and punish antisocial 
behavior could have been one of the key factors that allowed our ancestors to persist in 
prosocial cooperative behavior as they scaled up in group size and societal complexity 
during the agricultural revolution. 
How could belief in Big Gods promote cooperation among strangers? It turns out 
that belief in Big Gods involves two key ingredients that militate against the free rider 
problem: namely, the monitoring and punishing of antisocial behavior.598 Norenzayan 
identifies the importance of social monitoring as one of the key principles of the Big 
Gods hypothesis. He summarizes this principle with the dictum: “Watched people are 
nice people.” On this view, the idea of supernatural monitoring likely took off for our 
ancestors because of the way in which it taps into human concerns about everyday social 
monitoring of behavior. Norenzayan writes, 
The trial-and-error processes of cultural evolution stumbled on supernatural monitoring, 
a principle that piggybacks on preexisting capacities for social monitoring. If watched 
people are nice people, watchful deities—Big Eyes in the Sky—could encourage 
cooperation, even when no one is watching. Being watched by morally involved agents—
whether human or superhuman—is therefore one key reason why religion encourages 
                                                                            
598 If we harken back to the previous section of this chapter, we will note that Big Gods (i.e., omniscient, 
moralizing Gods) fit Boyer’s profile of MCI agents with full access to strategic social information.Whereas 
the strict “religion as evolutionary by-product” view focuses on the fact that such MCIs are “catchy” (i.e., 
likely to be widely transmitted within a population), the Big Gods hypothesis argues that this type of 
religious belief promotes prosocial, cooperative behavior. 
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cooperation.599 
There is an impressive and growing body of evidence supporting the hypothesis 
that belief in omniscient, moralizing Gods who monitor human behavior tends to promote 
cooperation among strangers. Norenzayan reviews numerous psychological studies 
demonstrating that when individual subjects are primed with “Big God” ideas they are 
more generous and cooperative in anonymous economic games, and less likely to 
cheat.600 
Given the prosocial effects of such anthropomorphic religious beliefs, the Big 
Gods hypothesis contends that this subclass of MCIs was selected for by cultural 
evolution. Norenzayan summarizes his theory as follows: “Belief in certain kinds of 
supernatural watchers—Big Gods—is an essential ingredient that, along with ritual and 
other interlocking sets of social commitment devices, glued together total strangers into 
ever-larger moral communities as cultural evolution gained pace in the past twelve 
millennia.”601  
Another important component of the Big Gods hypothesis concerns the idea of 
intergroup competition. Drawing on the work of evolutionary theorist Peter Turchin,  
Norenzayan observes that the history of our species has been characterized by “endemic” 
intergroup competition, “including constant warfare that led to the preferential cultural 
survival of some groups but not others.”602 He continues: “This observation brings us to 
the idea that prosocial religions, with their group-beneficial norms that suppress 
                                                                            
599 Norenzayan, Big Gods, 23. 
600 See Norenzayan, Ibid., Ch. 3. 
601 Norenzayan, Ibid., 10.  
602 Norenzayan, Ibid., 147. 
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selfishness and increase social cohesion, outcompeted their rivals. There are good reasons 
to think that this process has been driven by cultural—rather than genetic—evolution.”603  
Regarding the latter point, Norenzayan points out that cultural evolution—unlike 
most instances of genetic evolution in our species—often develops at a rapid pace. 
Furthermore, significant variation between human groups is far more pronounced at the 
cultural level (e.g., social norms) than at the genetic level. Consequently, if cultural 
norms and behaviors can develop and spread rapidly (both within and between groups), 
and certain differences at the cultural level can confer significant advantages on a given 
group, then intergroup competition will tend to accentuate the differences in cultural 
norms and practices, favoring one group at the expense of others. This process is 
described as “cultural group selection.”604  
In some cases, for one group to “outcompete” another group could entail group A 
extirpating group B from a desirable territory via warfare or genocide. In other cases, 
groups may be said to “outcompete” other groups with respect to their cultural products, 
norms, and practices. In this instance, group A outcompetes group B insofar as group B 
adopts the cultural norms, practices, or products of group A. Even if group B is not 
conquered by group A, it has nevertheless been “outcompeted” with respect to the 
relevant cultural phenomenon.  
The importance of intergroup competition for the Big Gods hypothesis is 
encapsulated in Norenzayan’s dictum that “Religious groups cooperate in order to 
                                                                            
603 Norenzayan, Ibid. 
604 Norenzayan, Ibid. 
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compete.”605 Philosopher and BCSR scholar F. Leron Shults has coined the term 
“sociographic prudery” to refer to the idea that thousands of years of intergroup 
competition has biased human beings to over-protect their in-group and to be wary of—if 
not hostile toward—out-groups.606  
More specifically, many BCSR scholars contend that certain religious beliefs—
including but not limited to Big Gods—are cultural adaptations that likely helped some 
groups scale up in size at the expense of others during the early Holocene era. BCSR 
scholars Scott Atran and Joseph Henrich provide a compact summary of this theory: 
Religious beliefs and practices, like group beneficial norms, can spread by competition 
among social groups in several ways, including warfare, economic production, and 
demographic expansion. Such cultural representations can also spread through more 
benign interactions, as when members of one group preferentially acquire behaviors, 
beliefs, and values from more successful groups.607  
An additional, more indirect line of evidence supporting the hypothesis that Big 
Gods were a cultural adaptation comes from the anthropological literature on the types of 
religious ideas that tend to predominate in small-scale hunter-gatherer societies. Although 
anthropomorphic religious representations (such as ancestor spirits, ghosts, evil spirits, 
etc.) exist in all known small-scale societies, it turns out that widespread belief in 
omniscient, moralizing Gods (i.e., Big Gods) is mostly confined to large-scale 
civilizations. As Norenzayan points out, “a startling fact about the spirits and deities of 
                                                                            
605 Norenzayan, Ibid., 147. 
606 F. LeRon Shults, Theology after the Birth of God: Atheist Conceptions in Cognition and Culture, 
Radical Theologies (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 27-30. 
607 Scott Atran and Joseph Henrich, “The Evolution of Religion: How Cognitive By-Products, Adaptive 
Learning Heuristics, Ritual Displays, and Group Competition Generate Deep Commitments to Prosocial 
Religion,” in Biological Theory, STM Titles 5 (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2010), 25. 
Cited in Norenzayan, Ibid., 148. 
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foraging and hunter-gatherer societies is that most of them do not have wide moral 
concern.”608 
According to the Big Gods hypothesis, we do not find widespread belief in 
omniscient, moralizing Gods in small-scale societies because these societies never 
confronted a social environment wherein such cultural ideas would have become 
adaptive. They did not need “Big Gods” to inspire cooperation and prosocial behavior, 
ostensibly because the mundane mechanisms of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and 
limited third party punishment were sufficient to galvanize prosocial behavior.  
A fascinating analog to the “Big Gods” hypothesis in the BCSR is Dominic 
Johnson’s supernatural punishment theory. In contrast with Norenzayan’s perspective, 
which advocates for the adaptiveness of certain religious beliefs at the level of cultural 
evolution, Johnson argues that belief in moralizing, punishing supernatural agents could 
have been a genetic adaptation for our ancestors. Johnson summarizes his hypothesis as 
follows: 
Humans may gain a fitness advantage from a bias in which they tend to assume that their 
every move (and thought) is being watched, judged, and potentially punished by 
supernatural agents. Although such a belief would be costly because it constrains 
freedom of action and self-interested behaviors, it may nevertheless be favored by natural 
selection if it helps to avoid an error that is even worse: committing selfish actions or 
violations of social norms when there is a high probability of real-world detection and 
punishment by victims or other group members. Simply put, supernatural beliefs may 
have been an effective mindguard against excessively selfish behavior--behavior that 
                                                                            
608 Norenzayan, Ibid., 7. 
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became especially risky and costly as our social world became increasingly transparent 
due to the evolution of language and theory of mind.609 
Thus, on Johnson’s account, certain types of religious representations  (i.e., those 
involving supernatural agents who punish) comprise a complex package of evolutionary 
by-products, genetic adaptations, and cultural adaptations. Of course, if this view is 
correct then one would expect to find widespread belief in supernatural punishment in all 
human cultures. Hence, part of the difference between Johnson’s supernatural 
punishment theory and the Big Gods hypothesis comes down to the way in which one 
interprets the anthropological literature on the religious beliefs of small-scale societies. 
Johnson’s theory suggests that in focusing on a narrow class of anthropomorphic 
religious representations (Big Gods), Norenzayan and colleagues may have 
underestimated the significance of beliefs concerning punishing supernatural agents in 
small scale societies. In his recent book God is Watching You, Johnson argues that 
although belief in “Big Gods” may not be a cross cultural universal, there is good 
evidence suggesting that belief in supernatural punishment is indeed universal in all 
human cultures.610 
 
Conclusion 
At present, scholars continue to debate whether religious beliefs and behaviors are best 
understood as an evolutionary by-product, a package of by-products and cultural 
                                                                            
609 Dominic Johnson, (2009) The error of God: Error management theory, religion, and the evolution of 
cooperation. In Games, Groups and the Global Good, ed. S.A. Levin, pp. 169-180. Berlin: Springer-
Verlag, 169-170. Cited in Norenzayan, Big Gods, 135. 
610 Dominic Johnson, God is Watching You: How the Fear of God Makes Us Human (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 57 ff. 
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adaptations, or a larger combination of by-products, cultural adaptations, and genetic 
adaptations. These questions lie at the heart of the BCSR, which is a thriving and 
dynamic research program. Accordingly, our analysis in this chapter represents only a 
snapshot of this rapidly developing field of inquiry.  
Nevertheless, there is mounting evidence that certain types of anthropomorphic 
religious representations (namely, omniscient, moralizing Gods) promote prosocial, 
cooperative behavior. This makes it quite plausible that such beliefs became adaptive 
during the scaling up of human societies during the early Holocene. But regardless of 
whether certain types of religious representations turn out to be cultural adaptations, 
genetic adaptations, or a combination of both, the past 25 years of research in the BCSR 
provides overwhelming evidence that human beings are cognitively and emotionally 
predisposed to generate, adopt, and transmit anthropomorphic religious ideas. In short, 
religious anthropomorphism is maturationally natural for Homo sapiens. 
This claim naturally elicits the following question: How does evidence from the 
BCSR on the maturational naturalness of religious anthropomorphism impact the 
philosophical evaluation of the issue of religious anthropomorphism in general, and the 
evaluation of the divide within Neoplatonic onto-theology over the issue of religious 
anthropomorphism in particular? The following chapter will seek to provide an answer 
to this question. 
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Chapter Six: Reevaluating Neoplatonic Onto-theology in Light of the Bio-cultural 
Study of Religion 
 
Introduction 
To what extent—if at all—does the BCSR impact the philosophical evaluation of 
metaphysical and theological claims within and around the traditions of Neoplatonic 
onto-theology? It is the task of this chapter to answer this question. In the first section of 
this chapter I consider two perspectives on the philosophical import of the BCSR, and 
situate my own position in contrast to these views. In section two I mount a comparative 
philosophical argument that integrates evidence from the BCSR and demonstrates the 
way in which this evidence negatively impacts the relative plausibility of the attenuated 
anthropomorphic view in Neoplatonic onto-theology, without thereby decisively 
undercutting the plausibility of this position. This argument constitutes the central 
philosophical claim of this dissertation. In the third section, I explore the way in which 
the BCSR illuminates the relative strengths and weaknesses of Neoplatonic onto-theology 
as a practical strategy for resisting religious anthropomorphism, and as a socially viable 
theological perspective. Here I argue that although the BCSR surfaces some important 
weaknesses of Neoplatonic onto-theology as a whole, it also indicates that the anti-
anthropomorphic wing of this tradition is weaker than the attenuated view in terms of its 
practical usefulness—both as a strategy for resisting anthropomorphism, and as a socially 
viable theological viewpoint in general. In the fourth section, I demonstrate the way in 
which the BCSR erodes the plausibility of certain aspects of the critique of the onto-
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theological project as a form of conceptual anthropomorphism as expressed by Karl Barth 
and others. 
6.1 The Philosophical Import of the BCSR: A Pragmatic Middle Path 
The question of the philosophical import of the scientific study of religion is a 
controverted one. While a full treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this chapter, I 
will briefly consider two perspectives on this topic, and locate my own position in 
contrast to these approaches.  
The first position we will consider claims that the philosophical import of the 
BCSR is essentially negligible—that is to say, the evolutionary, cognitive, and cultural 
science of religious beliefs and behaviors does not have a significant impact on 
traditional questions in philosophy of religion (e.g., questions concerning the existence of 
God, the nature of God, how humans can ever make knowledge claims about the divine, 
etc). In what follows, I will refer to this perspective on the philosophical import of the 
BCSR as the “negligible import view.” 
This perspective is to some extent a reaction against a popular and rather 
tendentious interpretation of the philosophical import of the scientific study of religion. 
This interpretation is exemplified by so-called “New Atheists” such as scientist Richard 
Dawkins and philosopher Daniel Dennett, who often write as if it were a given that the 
philosophical import of the scientific study of religion is atheistic—i.e., that supernatural 
agents such as Gods, ghosts, and demons are mere cognitive illusions. Consider, for 
example, Dawkins’ assertion in his book The God Delusion that a properly scientific 
view of the natural world leads to the conclusion that there “almost certainly is no 
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God.”611 What’s more, Dawkins writes as if this atheistic conclusion directly follows 
from the evolutionary by-product theory of religion in the BCSR. He states, “The general 
theory of religion as an accidental by-product—a misfiring of something useful—is the 
one I wish to advocate."612In what follows I will refer to this perspective as the “atheistic 
import view.” 
Reformed Christian philosophers613such as Alvin Plantinga, Kelly James Clark, 
and BCSR scholar Justin L. Barrett are quick to point out the philosophical weakness of 
the atheistic import view. Perhaps the greatest weakness of this position is that it depends 
upon assuming the truth of metaphysical naturalism a priori. The atheistic view silently 
assumes as a premise that disembodied forms of intentionality and agency do not exist—
because the methodological naturalism of the natural sciences rules-out such ideas—and 
then proceeds to argue as if identifying the biological mechanisms (e.g., the cognitive 
mechanism of ToM) that underlie religious beliefs somehow establishes the fact that 
supernatural objects of these beliefs are illusory. Thus, the atheistic import view involves 
making the specious philosophical leap from a descriptive scientific account of the 
structure and tendencies of the human mind-brain to the large-scale metaphysical claim 
that the nature of reality is such that it does not include disembodied forms of agency and 
intentionality—and thus supernatural beliefs are cognitive illusions. As the 
                                                                            
611 See Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 2006). 
612 Dawkins, Ibid., 188. 
613 Here I’m referring to the so-called “Reformed epistemology” school in contemporary philosophy, 
which was inaugurated by Calvinist philosopher Alvin Plantinga. Several figures working out of the 
Reformed epistemology school have addressed issues surrounding the philosophical import of the BCSR. 
See for example, Schloss in Bulbulia 2008, Barrett 2004, 2007, & 2011, and Clark & Barrett 2011. In his 
2011 book Naturalism, Theism, and the Cognitive Study of Religion: Religion Explained? philosopher Aku 
Visala’s make an argument that is very much in line with the Reformed school on the question of the 
philosophical import of the BCSR. 
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aforementioned Reformed philosophers never tire of observing, the BCSR provides a 
scientific account of religious beliefs and behaviors; as such, it tells us nothing about the 
metaphysical truth or falsity of these beliefs. On this point, I am in complete agreement 
with the school of Reformed philosophy. 
In their lengthy article entitled “Reidian Religious Epistemology and the 
Cognitive Science of Religion,” BCSR scholar Justin L. Barrett and Reformed 
philosopher Kelly Clark take this point a step further and argue that the philosophical 
import of the BCSR is essentially negligible—that is to say, the BCSR does not pose a 
significant philosophical challenge to belief in supernatural realities such as traditional 
theistic conceptions of God.  
Barrett and Clark’s argument embraces the reliabilist epistemology expressed by 
Thomas Reid and later Alvin Plantinga, wherein one is prima facie justified in holding 
“common sense” beliefs to be rational until these beliefs are rationally defeated. In his 
book God and Other Minds, Plantinga applied this form of epistemological reliabilism to 
the philosophy of religion.614 There he famously argued that belief in God properly 
belongs to the domain of everyday common-sense beliefs to which we are prima facie 
justified in holding to be rational, such as belief in the reality of the external world, and 
belief in other minds. Plantinga refers to this class of common-sense beliefs as “properly 
basic” beliefs.615 On this view, we are epistemically justified in our belief in God to the 
same degree that we are justified in our belief in other minds—both beliefs are properly 
                                                                            
614 Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God, (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
615 See Plantinga, Knowledge and Christian Belief, (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2015). 
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basic.616 
Barrett and Clark leverage this argument in their account of the philosophical 
import of the BCSR; they argue that the BCSR poses a philosophical challenge to belief 
in God to the same degree that it poses a challenge to our belief in other minds. After all, 
both of these “properly basic” beliefs are supported by our hyperactive theory of mind 
mechanism (TOMM), and we lack direct empirical access both to the minds of other 
humans and to the existence of God. The strength of this argument derives from the quite 
plausible assumption the most people believe in the reality of other minds, and consider 
this belief to be rational. Accordingly, Barrett and Clark argue that belief in God—just 
like belief in other minds, and other properly basic beliefs—should be treated as 
“innocent until proven guilty.”617 And, as indicated above, the BCSR is incapable of 
proving or disproving anything in regards to the metaphysical reality of God. Hence the 
philosophical import of the BCSR is negligible.  
When we consider Barrett and Clark’s contention that the BCSR does not pose a 
significant philosophical challenge to religious beliefs, it is import to call attention to the 
fact that their argument sets the bar extremely high in terms of what constitutes a 
significant philosophical challenge. They essentially argue that the BCSR does not pose a 
significant challenge to belief in God because it does not constitute “a defeater” for the 
rationality of this belief.618 In other words, the philosophical import of the BCSR is 
                                                                            
616 Plantinga’s conception of God is decidedly not Neoplatonic--he believes God is more like a person than 
an ontological principle. See his Aquinas lecture, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 1980). 
617 Kelly James Clark, and Justin L. Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive Science 
of Religion,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 79 (3), 2011: 649. 
618 See Barrett and Clark, Ibid., 671. 
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negligible because it does not prove that belief in God is rationally unjustifiable. 
This leads us back to the crucial role that the idea of properly basic beliefs plays 
in this argument. In stipulating that belief in God is properly basic, Barrett and Clark 
explicitly reject the notion that belief in God should be treated as a hypothesis.619 This is 
a significant, and I would argue, highly questionable philosophical position. This is 
because when beliefs are treated as fallible hypotheses they are, at least in principle, 
subject to critique and correction. Indeed, I would argue that the “rationality” accorded to 
a given hypothesis is justified to the extent that the hypothesis in question has been 
subject to extensive critique and correction and has either withstood such criticism or has 
been refined in light of corrective feedback. 
In contrast, when beliefs are stipulated to be properly basic, they are ipso facto 
granted relative immunity from critique and correction, insofar as they are deemed to be 
“innocent until proven guilty.” This sets an incredibly high epistemic standard for 
correction—namely, proof (or, a “deafeator”). Moreover, this high epistemic standard for 
correction can function to provide a refuge for confirmation bias. As the psychological 
literature on confirmation has shown, the demand for proof essentially allows one to 
effortlessly and indefinitely deflect criticism and opposing arguments, because when the 
epistemic bar is raised to the utmost level (i.e., proof), it is always possible to cavil with 
the claim that a given criticism, counter argument, or body of evidence falls short of 
decisive proof. Similarly, the reliabilist philosopher can easily dismiss a highly plausible 
                                                                            
619 Barrett and Clark write, “we do not take other persons or the external world as hypotheses that explain 
some data. And we do not accept other persons or external world beliefs on the basis of hypothetical 
reasoning with appeals to simplicity. In fact, we do not reason to them at all. We just believe them with full 
conviction.” (Barrett and Clark, Ibid., 661).  They then argue that God beliefs should be treated the same--
i.e., as properly basic rather than as a hypothesis.  
  301 
philosophical argument on the grounds that it does not constitute a defeator for the 
rationality (or prove the irrationality) of a given properly basic belief.620  
Indeed, we see this at work in Barrett and Clark’s argument on the negligible 
philosophical import of the BCSR. They summarize their argument as follows:  
Our sustained Plantinga-Reid reflection on natural belief in God and epistemic defeaters 
was intended to show that belief in God...could be prima facie justified unless or until the 
belief is rationally defeated. Without assuming God’s nonexistence, which would beg the 
relevant epistemic question at the outset, we critically considered whether or not various 
explicit forms of the [BCSR] objection constitute such defeaters. We argued that they do 
not.621 
Here I want to be clear: I am in agreement with Barrett and Clark about the fact 
that the BCSR is not capable of providing a defeator for the rationality of belief in God. 
However, as a pragmatist, I lalso reject the epistemic foundationalism undergirding their 
project of securing rational entitlement to “properly basic beliefs,” as well as the 
philosophical value of “defeators” as epistemic criteria. Consequently, although I agree 
                                                                            
620 In his 1991 book How We Know What Isn’t So, psychologist Thomas Gilovich provides an excellent 
overview of the cognitive-emotional dynamics of confirmation bias. Gilovich observes that, “we tend to 
use different criteria to evaluate propositions or conclusions we desire, and those we abhor. For 
propositions we want to believe, we ask only that the evidence not force us to believe otherwise—a rather 
easy standard to meet, given the equivocal nature of much information. For propositions we want to resist, 
however, we ask whether the evidence compels such a distasteful conclusion—a much more difficult 
standard to achieve” (Gilovich, Ibid., 83-84). 
 Accordingly, when we are confronted with ideas that conflict with our deeply held beliefs and 
intuitions we instinctively raise the bar for epistemic warrant to almost impossibly high standards—we 
demand decisive proof; we ask, “Must I believe this?” This stance allows us to persist in maintaining our 
preferred beliefs, since it is always possible to cavil at any body of evidence provided by one’s opponent. 
 Similarly, when we encounter ideas that confirm our preexisting beliefs we instinctively lower the 
bar for epistemic warrant to almost comically low standards—essentially asking: “Can I believe it?” 
Unsurprisingly the answer to this question is almost always an enthusiastic “yes!” This is because it’s 
almost always possible to find a single instance of confirmatory evidence for a given hypothesis, no matter 
how wild or bizarre. 
621 Barrett and Clark, Ibid., 671—brackets mine. 
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that the BCSR does not provide a defeator for the rationality of belief in God, I reject 
Barrett and Clark’s claim that it follows from this fact that the philosophical import of the 
BCSR is negligible with respect to religious belief. I will have more to say about this 
below.    
Let us now consider an alternative perspective on the question of the 
philosophical import of the BCSR. In his 2014 book Theology After The Birth of God: 
Atheist Conceptions in Cognition and Culture, philosopher and BCSR scholar F. Leron 
Shults makes a detailed philosophical argument on behalf of the thesis that the BCSR 
undercuts the plausibility of anthropomorphic religious hypotheses in a decisive manner. 
In what follows, I will refer to this position as the “decisive import” view of the BCSR. 
At first blush, Shults’ thesis does not appear to be all that different from the New 
Atheist account: he contends that anthropomorphic religious beliefs are false positives 
that derive from our evolutionarily stabilized cognitive-emotional and coalitional biases. 
Shults zeroes in on two biases in particular, what he dubs “anthropomorphic 
promiscuity,” and “socio-graphic prudery.” The former refers to our evolutionarily 
stabilized bias to over-detect agency (via HAAD), which regularly leads to beliefs about 
disembodied intentional agents or realities. The latter refers to our cultural bias to “over-
protect our in group.”622 
Shults maintains that the dynamics of anthropomorphic promiscuity and 
sociographic prudery are mutually reinforcing—that is, the detection of and ritual 
engagement with coalitional favoring supernatural agents naturally promotes the 
                                                                            
622 Shults, Theology After The Birth of God: Atheist Conceptions in Cognition and Culture (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 38. 
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cohesion and protection of the coalition, and coalitional cohesion in turn promotes the 
continued detection of and ritual engagement with group relevant supernatural agents. 
Consequently, Shults dubs the mechanisms of anthropomorphic promiscuity and 
sociographic prudery as “theogonic mechanisms” (or “God-birthing mechanisms”), as 
they provide a compelling scientific answer to the question “Where do Gods come 
from?” The answer to this question spelled out in Theology After The Birth of God is as 
follows: gods are born in human cognition via evolved biases to over-detect intentional 
agency, and the gods are borne culturally by way of biases to overprotect our 
coalitions.623 In short, the gods are human inventions. 
What separates Shults’ argument from the atheistic import view is the fact that he 
makes a detailed philosophical case on behalf of his atheistic perspective. Furthermore, 
Shults explicitly acknowledges the fact that the BCSR can neither prove nor disprove 
anything about the metaphysical status of anthropomorphic religious beliefs. Crucially 
however, Shults insists that this is not the end of the story when it comes to the 
philosophical import of the BCSR: although the BCSR cannot prove or disprove the 
reality of supernatural agents, it can undercut the plausibility of such beliefs.624   
Central to Shults’ theory is the conviction that we must treat religious beliefs as 
hypotheses. This is in keeping with the fallibilist epistemological approach of American 
pragmatism, which eschews the supposed necessity of establishing foundational 
epistemic premises, synthetic a priori truths, or properly basic beliefs, and instead treats 
all beliefs as fallible hypotheses.  
                                                                            
623 Shults, Ibid., chapter 1. 
624 Shults, Ibid., 80. 
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Shults argues that when evidence from the BCSR is integrated into a pragmatic 
philosophical evaluation of anthropomorphic religious ideas as fallible hypotheses (or 
“abductions”), the result is that the plausibility of such hypotheses is decisively undercut. 
In the same way that modern science has decisively undercut the plausibility of 
hypotheses such as “ether” or bodily “humors,” so too, the BCSR decisively undercuts 
the plausibility of hypotheses about supernatural agents by demonstrating the mutually 
reinforcing cognitive and coalitional biases that produce such beliefs.625 And in the same 
way that the natural sciences do not disprove the existence of ether or bodily humors, the 
BCSR does not disprove the reality of supernatural agents. Nevertheless, the plausibility 
of these hypotheses is comprehensively eroded in light of the scientific account. Shults 
notes that the sciences 
...do not provide deductive logical arguments that disprove the existence of gods or 
inductive evidence that invalidates claims about their causal relevance, but they do offer 
powerful abductive and retroductive arguments that render their existence implausible. It 
makes more sense to think that shared imaginative intercourse with supernatural agents 
emerged over time as naturally evolved hypersensitive cognitive tendencies led to 
mistaken perceptions that slowly became entangled within erroneous collective 
judgements about the extent of the social field.626 
 
Limitations of space preclude a detailed analysis of Shults’ pragmatic 
philosophical account of modes of inference and his use of “retroductive” inference. This 
component of Shults’ argument is, I think, relatively uncontroversial. The philosophically 
                                                                            
625 Shults, Ibid., 156. 
626 Shults, Ibid., 15. 
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controversial aspect of Shults’ argument is the conclusion he draws on the basis of these 
modes of inference, and, most importantly, the degree of epistemic confidence with 
which he holds his conclusion. As indicated in the passage quoted above, Shults 
maintains that the BCSR erodes the plausibility of supernatural beliefs. He also argues 
that the naturalistic account of these beliefs stemming from the BCSR provides us with 
sufficient warrant to retroductively infer that disembodied forms of intentionality and 
agency (such as gods, ancestor spirits, or ghosts) do not exist. In short, Shults is 
convinced that the philosophical import of the BCSR is decisive—it provides us “with 
adequate warrant for letting the gods go.”627 
What is most important for our purposes here is to note the fact that Shults 
embraces a fallibilist, pragmatic approach to philosophy of religion and theology, and yet 
also—somewhat counterintuitively from my perspective—exhibits an extremely high 
degree of epistemic confidence that the BCSR decisively undercuts the plausibility of all 
religious beliefs involving disembodied forms of agency and intentionality. I say this is 
counterintuitive because on a fallibilist pragmatic approach to inquiry, an extremely high 
degree of epistemic confidence is something that can occur, but when it does, it is usually 
in relation to empirically validated hypotheses—not metaphysical hypotheses.  
 
A Pragmatic Middle Path 
I find both the “negligible import” view and the “decisive import” view to be 
unsatisfactory, and I locate my own pragmatic position on the philosophical import of the 
                                                                            
627 Shults, Ibid., 92. 
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BCSR between these two perspectives. I will have more to say about the pragmatic 
philosophical framework within which my argument operates presently. First I want to 
register what I take to be the philosophical insufficiencies of the aforementioned 
positions on the philosophical import of the BCSR. 
Against the “negligible import” camp, I contend that stipulating belief in God to 
be a properly basic belief rather than a fallible hypothesis is philosophically arbitrary as 
best; at worst, this protective epistemological position creates a refuge for confirmation 
bias. Here I am in full agreement with Shults. Furthermore, I maintain (pace Barrett and 
Clark) that the philosophical import of the BCSR is nontrivial for beliefs concerning God. 
Indeed, when the evidence from the BCSR is incorporated into a comparative 
philosophical evaluation of hypotheses about the nature of God or ultimate reality, it can 
in fact damage the plausibility of these hypotheses in certain respects, and provide one 
with reasons for giving rational assent to one hypothesis as over and against another.  
Against the “decisive import” camp, I fail to see how the philosophical import of 
the BCSR is strong enough to decisively undercut the plausibility of all hypotheses 
involving disembodied forms of intentionality and agency. My own position is that the 
BCSR has a negative impact on the plausibility of supernatural ideas, but it by no means 
decisively undercuts the plausibility of these ideas.  
I contend that the philosophical import of the BCSR is strongest when it is 
integrated into a comparative philosophical evaluation of competing hypotheses—in our 
case, hypotheses about the nature of God or ultimate reality. Yet, even in this 
comparative context, I maintain that the philosophical import of the BCSR is significant, 
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but not decisive. As I will argue in the following section, when we integrate evidence 
from the BCSR into a comparative philosophical evaluation of the traditions of 
Neoplatonic onto-theology, the result is that it damages the relative plausibility of the 
attenuated anthropomorphic tradition, but not decisively—the attenuated 
anthropomorphic view of the divine nature remains a valid candidate for rational assent.  
In fact, the very idea that evidence about the evolved architecture of human 
cognition could provide us with sufficient evidence to decisively undercut the plausibility 
of a philosophically refined hypothesis about ultimate reality strikes me as extreme. In 
this respect, my pragmatist instincts are decidedly more conservative than those of Shults. 
They incline me to believe that decisively undercutting the plausibility of large-scale, 
nuanced hypotheses is a phenomenon that is largely confined to the natural sciences. 
When it comes to sophisticated hypotheses about the nature of ultimate reality (such as 
those discussed in chapters two and three), I don’t see how we could ever be in the 
position to decisively rule out one or the other—the aforementioned cognitive liabilities 
of the attenuated view notwithstanding. 
This is not to backpedal in terms of my critique of the “negligible import” view—
as indicated above, I will attempt to demonstrate in the following section that the BCSR 
can meaningfully impact the plausibility of philosophical and theological hypotheses.  
Before delving into my central philosophical argument, I should offer some brief 
remarks on the pragmatic philosophical framework that informs the argument. As 
mentioned in the introduction, I view the present study as a work in “religious 
philosophy,” as conceived by Wesley J. Wildman in his 2010 Religious Philosophy as 
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Multidisciplinary Comparative Inquiry: Envisioning a Future for the Philosophy of 
Religion.628 Rather than attempt to provide an abbreviated overview of this approach to 
philosophical inquiry, I will limit myself to commenting on two of the major 
philosophical virtues of this approach, and then in the remaining sections of this chapter I 
will seek to demonstrate the philosophical value of the aforementioned approach by 
implementing it in a multidisciplinary comparative inquiry around the BCSR and the 
traditions of Neoplatonic onto-theology. 
First, a pragmatic, multidisciplinary comparative approach to philosophical 
inquiry is fundamentally hypothetical and fallibilist with respect to human knowledge. As 
such, this philosophical approach conceives of all ideas, principles, and beliefs—from the 
rules of logic, to the laws of nature, to metaphysical models of ultimate reality—as 
fallible hypotheses that are subject to correction.629 The pragmatic approach thus 
dispenses with the supposed necessity of foundational knowledge claims, synthetic a 
priori truths, and properly basic beliefs. Moreover, it rejects the ideal of epistemic 
certainty as a normative criterion for philosophical inquiry. In stark contrast to the 
reliabilist epistemology explored above, which effectively renders a certain class of 
beliefs (so-called “properly basic beliefs”) less vulnerable to correction than others, the 
pragmatic approach refuses to grant any beliefs or knowledge claims special immunity 
from external criticism and correction. Indeed, a fallibilistic hypothetical approach to 
human knowledge and inquiry entails that all knowledge claims and ideas should be 
                                                                            
628 See Wesley J. Wildman, Religious Philosophy as Multidisciplinary Comparative Inquiry (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2010); see also the pragmatic, multidisciplinary approach to inquiry in the 
humanities promoted in Edward Slingerland’s, What Science Offers the Humanities: Integrating Body and 
Culture, 2008. 
629 See Wildman, Ibid., ch. 6. 
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equally vulnerable to correction,630 regardless of how “basic” or indubitable they may 
seem to us. In this sense the pragmatic approach possesses the built-in potential to 
significantly mitigate confirmation bias, whereas epistemic reliabilism provides shelter 
for confirmation bias with regards to properly basic beliefs. The comparative argument in 
the subsequent section will also surface the philosophical virtues of the quintessential 
pragmatist move of eschewing epistemic certainty as a normative criterion for 
philosophical inquiry. 
Second, unlike many other philosophical approaches to human knowledge, the 
aforementioned pragmatic, multidisciplinary comparative approach is remarkably 
compatible with insights from evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, and 
cognitive neuroscience concerning the evolutionarily stabilized capacities, structures, and 
liabilities of our cognitive-emotional apparatus. At the very least, the aforementioned 
pragmatic approach is much better suited to incorporating insights from the evolutionary 
and cognitive sciences than the reliabilist epistemology of Reid and Plantinga explored 
above. This is because the idea of assuming the rationality of a certain class of beliefs 
(properly basic beliefs) a priori sits awkwardly with an evolutionary account of human 
cognition. From the perspective of natural selection, human cognition need only produce 
beliefs that work well enough to allow individuals to pass along genes into the next 
generation. Accordingly, evolution could have equipped human brains with myriad 
                                                                            
630 To be clear, I do not mean to imply that all hypotheses are somehow equally vulnerable to being 
contested or rendered implausible. There are of course very real differences in the domains of human 
knowledge, and hypotheses about empirical phenomena that can be readily observed in a laboratory setting 
are clearly much easier to correct and contest in light of evidence than are hypotheses about the nature of 
ultimate reality. Rather, my claim above refers to the basic pragmatic intention regarding human inquiry: 
namely, that all human knowledge claims should be, in principle, subject to correction, and should be tested 
by way of all available resources. 
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beliefs that were “good enough” from the perspective of natural selection, but this by no 
means guarantees the overall epistemic reliability of our cognitive faculties. After all, 
natural selection will actually favor irrational beliefs to the degree that they confer a 
reproductive advantage on the individual holding them. 
Accordingly, the idea of presuming the rationality of a certain class of beliefs 
seems highly questionable from an evolutionary perspective. Interestingly enough, 
Plantinga takes the idea of the evolution of human cognition in an apologetic direction. 
Instead of interpreting the evolutionary account of the foibles of human cognition as 
evidence that might pose a challenge to the plausibility of epistemological reliabilism, 
Plantinga turns the tables on the evolutionary perspective and argues that a naturalistic 
account of the evolution of human cognition itself is questionable, since evolution by 
itself—unaided by the supernatural direction of God—would not likely produce an 
epistemologically reliable cognitive apparatus (i.e., one that delivers mostly true beliefs). 
Plantinga writes: “I argue that it is improbable, given naturalism and evolution, that our 
cognitive faculties are reliable. It is improbable that they provide us with a suitable 
preponderance of true belief over false.”631 On Plantinga’s reliabilist account, denying the 
reliability of human cognition (in the sense required by his reliabilist epistemology) is 
self-defeating, since it is by way of our ostensibly truth-tending cognitive faculties that 
we come to understand the idea of the evolution of human cognition in the first place.  
Yet, the epistemological crisis that Plantinga tries to induce here rapidly dissolves 
as soon as one recognizes the following points: 1) this epistemic crisis hinges entirely 
                                                                            
631 Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), xiv.  
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upon assuming the necessity of his reliabilist epistemological criteria, and 2) that 
epistemological reliabilism as a whole is entirely optional. Indeed, one can still speak 
intelligibly about the relative reliability of our cognitive faculties without assuming this 
particular epistemological framework. Once we give up on the reliabilist criteria, it 
becomes relatively clear that we actually don’t need to worry about being certain that our 
cognitive apparatus provides us with “a suitable preponderance of true belief over false.” 
We need only look around us to see that however riddled with false beliefs our cognitive 
apparatus may be, it has worked well enough to catapult our species into global 
dominance; our cognitive apparatus works well enough to allow us to discover cures for 
infectious diseases, and to send some of our fellow primate conspecifics to the moon and 
back. So the pragmatist simply doesn’t feel any of the epistemic anxiety that Plantinga 
thinks they should. For the pragmatist, the question of the reliability of our cognitive 
faculties is an empirical question—it is not something that we must establish a priori. 
Thus, according to this radically post-foundationalist philosophical perspective, we do 
not need to secure an epistemic foundation for inquiry in the form of synthetic a priori 
truths or properly basic beliefs in order to proceed with philosophical inquiry into the 
reliability of our cognitive faculties.632 For the pragmatist, all inquiry rests upon a flotilla 
of hypotheses: we grab ahold of one to get ourselves above water, and then if it proves 
                                                                            
632 Here I follow nineteenth century American Pragmatist Charles Peirce, who rejected epistemological 
foundationalism in all of its forms and instead advocated for a view of human knowledge as fundamentally 
hypothetical in nature. See Peirce’s “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man,” in The 
Essential Peirce, vol. 1, ed. Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1992). 
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insufficient, we simply jump over to another.633 There are no foundations to be had, 
nothing solid reaching down to the ocean floor to offer stability and certainty, and the 
remarkable thing is that human inquiry can stay afloat nonetheless. 
Moreover, the prospect that our cognitive faculties might produce a 
preponderance of false beliefs is not an insurmountable problem for the pragmatist, 
because even if this is so, the fact still remains that our cognition works well enough most 
of the time to allow for astonishing intellectual and cultural achievements, such as that of 
modern science. Furthermore, our cognitive faculties work well enough to allow us to 
become aware of some of the serious liabilities of our cognitive apparatus. For example, 
the human cognitive apparatus works well enough to have allowed human beings to 
invent the social organization and norms of inquiry necessary for the development of 
modern science. And some of the scientific disciplines, such as cognitive psychology, 
work well enough to help us discover the fact that we are far are less rational than we 
should be as a result of the distorting reality of confirmation bias. And in learning about 
the way in which confirmation bias skews interpretive and evaluative judgements, we can 
work to attempt to mitigate its impact as best we can. Thus, the discovery of our 
cognitive predisposition to irrationality and other cognitive errors is actually promising 
for the pragmatist—it allows for the possibility of marshalling resources to better 
facilitate the detection and correction of our various cognitive liabilities.  
                                                                            
633 In his essay “Peirce as Non-Modernist,” pragmatic philosopher Robert C. Neville situates Peirce’s 
approach to philosophy inquiry in contrast to the Kantian legacy in modern philosophy. Neville observes 
that on Peirce’s view, “If a philosophy were looked at as a system, it would be hypotheses from side to 
side, top to bottom, near and far. Kant would object that there is no standpoint save a transcendental one 
from which the whole system can be judged. But Peirce’s answer...is that one can never question all the 
hypotheses at once.” Robert C. Neville, “Peirce as Non-Modernist,” in The Highroad Around Modernism, 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 28. 
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To sum up, the pragmatic approach of treating all beliefs as fallible hypotheses 
that are subject to correction is much better suited to integrating the account of human 
cognition stemming from the evolutionary and cognitive sciences. 
Having now briefly sketched the pragmatic philosophical framework undergirding 
the present study, I will implement this approach in a comparative philosophical 
evaluation of the traditions of Neoplatonic onto-theology. 
 
6.2 The Philosophical Import of the BCSR for the Divide within Neoplatonic Onto-
theology over the Question of Anthropomorphism 
In what follows we shall consider the various Neoplatonic onto-theological accounts of 
the divine nature explored in chapters two and three as metaphysical hypotheses about the 
nature of ultimate reality. For the sake of brevity, let us formalize the attenuated 
anthropomorphic onto-theological position with the acronym UROPP: Ultimate Reality is 
an Ontological Principle that is not less than Personal. In other words, the Ground of 
Being possesses the person-like attributes of intentionality and purposive agency.  
The anti-anthropomorphic view may be formalized with the acronym UROP: 
Ultimate Reality is an Ontological Principle—full stop. In other words, the Ground of 
Being is infinite and unconditioned, and thus bereft of all attributes, including 
intentionality or purposive agency.  
In construing these views as metaphysical hypotheses, we can sidestep the 
Kantian charge that human beings can never attain certain knowledge in the realm of 
speculative metaphysics, and instead consider the relative plausibility of two competing 
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hypotheses about the nature of ultimate reality (UROP and UROPP) in certain respects. 
The goal of philosophically evaluating the relative plausibility of competing hypotheses 
about ultimate reality is not to arrive at decisive proofs or certain knowledge, but rather to 
establish gradations of plausibility—possibly very subtle gradations or perhaps stronger 
gradations—that could be enlisted in the service of giving rational assent to one 
hypothesis over the other. In other words, this type of comparative philosophical 
evaluation could help someone articulate a reasoned account—as opposed to merely 
expressing a theological preference—for why they believe Thomas was closer to the truth 
with respect to the divine nature than was Plotinus (or vice versa). This is philosophically 
significant, because both Kantian, postmodern, and Buddhist philosophers contend (for 
different reasons) that the very idea of a rational process for deciding among competing 
metaphysical viewpoints is an illusion.634 
As I hope to demonstrate in what follows, one can indeed formulate a reasoned 
account for asserting that a given hypothesis about the nature of ultimate reality is more 
plausible than another in certain respects. Furthermore, the BCSR can meaningfully 
impact the comparative plausibility of such hypotheses. The central philosophical claim 
of this dissertation is that when evidence from the BCSR is incorporated into a 
comparative philosophical evaluation of the divide within Neoplatonic onto-theology 
                                                                            
634 In the Pali Canon, the Buddha refers to speculative metaphysical questions—such as whether the world 
is finite or infinite, or whether the universe is eternal or temporally caused—as “a thicket of views.” In 
contrast to the Kantian and postmodern critique of metaphysics, the Buddha’s critique was not primarily 
about the absence of a rational process for deciding between speculative metaphysical questions, but more 
about the fact that spending one’s life pondering such metaphysical ideas would not lead to final liberation. 
Such questions are, according to the Buddha, “beset by suffering, by vexation, by despair, and by fever, and 
it does not lead to...direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nibbāna.” The Middle Length Discourses of the 
Buddha: A Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya, (Sommerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 1995), 72 
Aggivacchagotta Sutta, 590. 
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over the question of anthropomorphism, it negatively impacts the relative 
plausibility of the attenuated anthropomorphic view (UROPP) compared to the 
anti-anthropomorphic view (UROP) with respect to religious anthropomorphism—
without thereby decisively undermining the plausibility of the attenuated (UROPP) 
hypothesis. In other words, evidence from the BCSR functions to tip the scales of 
plausibility, reducing the relative plausibility of the attenuated anthropomorphic view, but 
it does not tilt the scales to a major degree, so as to conclusively undercut the plausibility 
of the anti-anthropomorphic view.  
Differently stated, I am arguing that evidence from the BCSR—taken together 
with other comparative philosophical considerations—can furnish one with a non-
arbitrary reason for assigning greater plausibility to the Plotinian One as a hypothesis 
about the nature of ultimate reality than to Thomas’ account of Ipsum Esse. This in no 
way entails that there is in fact a One for the Many—only that Thomas’ account of the 
infinite divine nature is less plausible than that of Plotinus in certain respects. 
That being said, it is important to note that evidence from the BCSR does not 
distribute plausibility neatly, favoring all aspects of the anti-anthropomorphic view and 
negatively impacting the attenuated view in its entirety. Quite to the contrary. As I will 
demonstrate below, evidence from the BCSR negatively impacts other aspects of 
viewpoints within the anti-anthropomorphic tradition of Neoplatonic onto-theology. And 
in section 6.3 we will see that the BCSR reveals several practical strengths of the 
attenuated anthropomorphic view, along with several corresponding practical weaknesses 
of the anti-anthropomorphic view.  
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The Central Result of the BCSR  
As we saw in chapter five, there is overwhelming evidence from the BCSR that human 
beings are cognitively and emotionally predisposed to generate and adopt beliefs about 
disembodied intentional agents who are concerned with the behaviors of their group 
(recall Boyer’s notion of MCI agents with full access to socially strategic information). 
Crucially however, the cognitive mechanisms underlying these beliefs are hypersensitive, 
and thus prone to producing false positives. The upshot of this fact about human 
cognitive architecture is that human beings will naturally tend to generate, adopt, and 
widely transmit beliefs about disembodied intentional agents regardless of whether such 
agents actually exist or not. I will follow Wesley J. Wildman in referring to this finding 
as “the central result” of the BCSR.635  
The central result of the BCSR typically refers to religious beliefs about 
disembodied intentional agents of a mostly finite, or penultimate flavor: ancestor spirits, 
ghosts, demons, gods who vie for ascendency among a pantheon, etc. But the central 
result has a meaningful impact on more ultimate religious representations as well. 
This is because when human beings turn their attention to the speculative task of 
conceiving of the ontological source of finite being, they utilize the same cognitive 
apparatus that they employ while conceiving of more mundane phenomena. Accordingly, 
in the same way that most humans will naturally tend to generate beliefs about 
disembodied intentional agency when confronted with an ambiguous situation such as 
feeling the presence of a family member who recently died, so too, humans will naturally 
                                                                            
635 See Wesley J. Wildman, In Our Own Image: Anthropomorphism, Apophaticism, and Ultimacy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 82. 
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tend to generate beliefs about disembodied intentionality and purposive agency when 
confronted with an ambiguous conceptual issue, such as the ontological question “why is 
there something rather than nothing?” The central result gives us good reason to believe 
that the cognitive mechanisms of HAAD, TOM and HTR—which are maturationally 
natural and hypersensitive in our species—are all likely (though not destined) to be 
activated in the attempt to make sense of such a conceptually ambiguous question. If we 
further extrapolate to the onto-theological tradition, we can say that these cognitive-
emotional biases will predispose many—but clearly not all—philosophers and 
theologians to answer the ontological question along the following lines: “The reason 
why there is something rather than nothing is because the ground of being (or the One for 
the many) is an intentional (TOMM) agential (HAAD) reality that created finite reality 
according to its divine purposes (HTR).” 
Thus, the philosophical import of the central result for Neoplatonic onto-theology 
may be expressed as follows: human beings (including speculative philosophers and 
theologians) are highly predisposed—though not determined—to over-attribute the 
anthropomorphic attributes of intentionality, agency, and teleology (as a result of the 
hypersensitivity of TOMM, HAAD, and HTR) to reality and ultimate reality, regardless of 
whether the mundane reality or ultimate reality in question actually exists or possesses 
any such characteristics.  
The central result proves nothing metaphysically; however, it gives us good 
reason to be wary of conceptual models that involve the attribution of intentionality, 
agency, and purposiveness to ultimate reality, because the cognitive-emotional biases 
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underlying such attributions are hyperactive and thus prone to produce false positives.  
  
The Central Result Damages the Relative Plausibility of the Attenuated Anthropomorphic 
hypothesis (UROPP) 
As we saw in the foregoing section, religious philosophers rightly call attention the fact 
that central result of the BCSR is a scientific account of human cognitive architecture and 
as such, does not prove anything about the ontological inventory of reality (e.g., whether 
disembodied forms of intentionality and agency exist) or the nature of ultimate reality 
(whether ultimate reality is intentional and agential). However, it does not follow from 
this fact (i.e., that the central result does not prove anything metaphysically) that the 
central result cannot have a significant impact on the plausibility of metaphysical 
hypotheses concerning the nature of reality and ultimate reality. 
As I will demonstrate in what follows, the central result places significant 
pressure on an ancient conceptual weakness of the UROPP hypothesis. I will begin with a 
comparative philosophical analysis, which will disclose a significant conceptual liability 
of UROPP compared to UROP. I will then demonstrate the way in which the central 
result can impact a comparative philosophical evaluation of the relative plausibility of 
these hypotheses. 
Although not a philosopher by training, anthropologist and BCSR progenitor 
Stewart Guthrie does a good job of articulating the way in which the pervasive bias 
toward anthropomorphism that characterizes our species should warrant serious caution 
when it comes to evaluating human speculation about ultimate matters: 
  319 
When the things and events we interpret are simple and close to hand--saplings, wind 
sounds, or household pets--we can compare alternative interpretations and weed out 
anthropomorphism relatively easily. When the things and events encompass ‘ultimate 
conditions,’ the weeding becomes Herculean. Lacking a Hercules, we inhabit a world 
whose periphery is rankly overgrown...approaching that periphery, whose ‘ultimacy’ 
means its very resistance to analysis, we find our critical tools, such as science and 
philosophy, do not penetrate. When we press on nonetheless, we are thrown upon 
intuition: that is, upon hypotheses lacking alternatives. Such hypotheses typically posit 
human attributes. The resulting world is, in Nietzsche’s words, an ‘infinitely broken echo 
of an original sound, that of man...the manifold copy of an original picture, that of 
man.’636 
Guthrie’s point is well-taken—there are precious few resources for correcting 
human hypotheses about ultimate matters compared with the myriad resources (e.g., 
empirical evidence, controlled experimentation, replication of studies, etc.) that are 
available for correcting hypotheses about the natural world. As Immanuel Kant famously 
pointed out, the idea of God (or ultimate reality) is “supersensible,” and thus by 
definition, not an object of possible experience.637 We need not follow Kant in banishing 
the idea of God from the realm of knowledge altogether in order to appreciate the upshot 
of his point for our discussion here: human beings cannot make direct empirical 
observations of the divine nature and then corroborate their hypotheses about its various 
characteristics or lack thereof. Thus we do well to be wary of our anthropomorphic 
biases, especially when it comes to questions about ultimacy, given the fact that there is 
little in the way of potential feedback that could correct our hypotheses in this domain of 
                                                                            
636 Guthrie, Faces in the Clouds, p. 204.  
637 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, “The Transcendental Dialectic.” 
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inquiry. 
Yet, our study thus far has disclosed at least two significant sources of feedback 
that could potentially serve as a resource for correcting hypotheses about ultimacy: 
namely, that of logical inconsistency and conceptual incoherence.638 Surely, if ever there 
were a straightforward indication (or feedback mechanism) that our thinking about things 
has likely gone astray, it is the presence of potential logical inconsistency or conceptual 
incoherence. 
Figures as diverse as Plotinus, Hume, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Feuerbach, and 
Tillich have all pointed to a deep conceptual incoherence involved in the attribution of 
anthropomorphic characteristics to the infinite divine nature (i.e., the hypothesis 
UROPP). Furthermore, in chapter two we saw how the onto-theological views of 
Augustine, Thomas, and Maimonides spawned conceptual difficulties as a result of 
predicting attributes of the infinite, simple divine nature. For Augustine and Thomas, 
these difficulties were resolved by a means of a major reformulation of the idea of the 
divine simplicity, wherein the divine simplicity was retooled to allow for distinct divine 
attributes that were said to be identical with the divine essence. Yet, the conceptual 
coherence of this doctrine itself is highly questionable. Moreover, it does not explain how 
distinct attributes could be identical with the utterly simple, infinite divine nature—it 
simply stipulates that this is so. Here we should note that the Plotinian account (UROP) 
of the divine simplicity did not involve such conceptual problems. Plotinus never needed 
                                                                            
638 The criteria of conceptual coherence and logical consistency constitute the “rational side” of Alfred 
North Whitehead’s four-fold criteria for speculative philosophy: coherence, consistency, applicability, 
empirical adequacy. See Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: The Free 
Press, 1982), 3. 
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to square the circle in terms of explaining how the simple, infinite divine nature could be 
identical with distinct divine attributes—he simply avoided the problem altogether by 
refusing to predicate any attributes of the simple One. 
Here I should clarify: I am not arguing that the conceptual coherence problems 
inherent to the UROPP hypothesis amount to a defeater for this hypothesis. As we saw in 
our discussion of Thomas in chapter two, philosopher of religion Eleonore Stump argues 
that these conceptual issues are real, but ultimately resolvable challenges for the UROPP 
hypothesis. Consequently, Stump and others would reject the charge that the conceptual 
challenges involved in UROPP amount to full-blown conceptual incoherence.  
However, this does not pose a significant challenge to my argument. The fact that 
Stump and other proponents can deflect the charge of conceptual incoherence on this 
matter—essentially demanding, “Prove it! Prove that UROPP involves conceptual 
incoherence!”—is not very interesting from a comparative philosophical perspective. In 
fact, this protective stance leaves them vulnerable to the charge of confirmation bias.  
Accordingly, my argument in this section does not depend on being able to 
provide an apodictic proof that Plotinus, Fichte and others are correct about the 
conceptual incoherence involved in attributing intentionality to the infinite divine nature. 
Rather, the argument I want to make here hinges on a more basic point: Plotinus and 
others provide us with a reasoned account for the incoherence of the UROPP hypothesis, 
namely, that there is a prima facie conceptual incoherence involved in the predication of 
the attribute of intentionality—which entails contrasts (e.g., subject and object) and 
multiplicity (e.g., noesis and noema)—to the infinite, simple divine nature, which is, by 
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definition, bereft of contrasts and multiplicity.639 In contrast, proponents of UROPP never 
provide an explanation on behalf of the conceptual coherence of the idea that the divine 
attributes are identical with the infinite, simple divine essence. Rather, they simply assert 
that this idea is coherent. 
Accordingly, I contend that the charge of conceptual incoherence on this matter (i.e., 
the attribution of anthropomorphic capacities to the divine nature) amounts to a nontrivial 
conceptual liability of the UROPP hypothesis—even if it doesn’t amount to an apodictic 
proof, or a defeator for the coherence of this position. What’s more, this conceptual 
liability constitutes a fundamental distinction between UROP and UROPP.640 For unlike 
UROPP, the UROP hypothesis as expressed by Plotinus, Eckhart, Schleiermacher, and 
Tillich does not possess the liability of potential conceptual coherence problems with 
respect to anthropomorphic divine attributes, because this hypothesis is defined in large 
part by its refusal to predicate any ontological attributes to the divine nature.641  
Twentieth century American Process philosopher Charles Hartshorne was not 
                                                                            639	The problem here does not concern the logical incoherence of the idea of an intentional, agential divine 
being; rather, it concerns the incoherence of the idea that the divine is infinite and utterly simple on the one 
hand, while possessed of attributes involving contrasts and multiplicity, on the other. 
640 Recall that Augustine and Thomas saw fit to significantly reconfigure the Plotinian account of the 
divine simplicity as a means of solving the conceptual problem involved in predicating distinct attributes of 
the simple divine nature. For Plotinus, the divine simplicity was straightforward and clear: it referred to the 
featureless infinity of the One—i.e., it’s lack of attributes. Augustine and Thomas drastically reformulated 
the concept of the divine simplicity to refer to the idea that the divine nature did possess numerous 
attributes, but that they are one with the divine essence. 
641 The same argument applies to the Augustinian and Thomistic reformulation of the divine simplicity: 
unlike the Plotinian account of the divine simplicity, the Augustinian and Thomistic view harbors within it 
the potential of conceptual incoherence insofar as it introduces distinct attributes that are said to be of one 
essence with the divine nature. Regardless of whether or not this doctrine is coherent, the point is that the 
Plotinian account of the divine simplicity avoids any potential conceptual incoherence on this score, 
because Plotinus rejects all attributions to the utterly simple divine nature. Accordingly, the very possibility 
of there being conceptual problems with the UROPP account of the divine simplicity constitutes a 
weakness of this view compared with the UROP account of the divine simplicity.  
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theologically persuaded by Neoplatonic onto-theology in any of its forms. Nevertheless, 
he is worth bringing into our discussion here, not because he would necessarily support 
one of the aforementioned hypotheses over the other, but because he makes a powerful 
case on behalf of the fundamental importance of conceptual coherence and consistency as 
criteria for evaluating philosophical and theological ideas. In his 1964 book The Divine 
Relativity, Hartshorne bemoans the fact that over the history of Western philosophy and 
theology, these criteria have routinely been suppressed or finessed, often out of deference 
to tradition or “the divine mystery.” Hartshorne’s argument on this issue is worth quoting 
at length: 
the famous paradoxes, or contradictions...of metaphysics and theology are not, as is 
claimed, the inevitable result of human limitations, of the finite or relative or conditioned 
trying to understand the infinite or absolute or unconditioned, nor of the meaninglessness 
of the latter, but the natural yet avoidable result of haste and inattention to exact shades 
of meaning. These errors have unfortunately become habitual, partly through inertia, 
pride and opinion, or undue deference to tradition, partly through ecclesiastical tyranny—
to avoid another euphemism—and partly through a false humility which fears to offend 
or do injustice to deity by exerting our human powers of analysis to the utmost in regard 
to sacred matters. The humility is false, since to analyse, argue, infer--as theologians 
certainly did--and yet perform these operations carelessly or incorrectly can hardly be an 
appropriate way of honoring the creator of human reason. And if paradoxes are not 
accepted as sign that we are thinking badly, what sign would we recognize? The very 
people who choose the soft words, paradox and mystery, for what, so far as they have 
shown, are simply contradictions in their thinking, resort to harsher terms, absurdity or 
contradiction, do they not, when they meet with difficulties not essentially different in 
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systems which they oppose?642 
Notice the way in which Hartshorne's argument places conceptual pressure on the 
plausibility of the UROPP hypothesis and little to no pressure on UROP. Of course, it 
does not therefore establish the metaphysical superiority of UROP—indeed, Hartshorne 
himself was not compelled by this way of thinking about the divine nature. Nevertheless, 
Hartshorne’s argument forcefully points out that logical contradiction and conceptual 
incoherence are serious liabilities inherent to many traditional theological ideas, and that 
the criteria of coherence and consistency are unfortunately quite easy to finesse as a result 
of motivated reasoning, or out of undue deference to tradition.  
Again, this does not somehow establish the overall superiority of the hypothesis 
UROP. It only establishes that UROP could be said to be superior to UROPP in this one 
respect, namely, that the former does not possess the aforementioned conceptual liability 
that is inherent to the latter (i.e., the conceptual incoherence involved in predicating 
distinct attributes of the infinite, simple divine nature). As Hartshorne points out, 
conceptual coherence problems are not an inevitable feature of the philosophical and 
theological enterprise of conceptualizing the divine nature. The hypothesis UROP shows 
that within the Neoplatonic tradition, conceptual coherence problems deriving from 
anthropomorphic attributions to the divine nature are indeed avoidable.  
That being said, the fact remains that UROP is simply a non-starter for many 
philosophers and theologians due to its fundamentally nonpersonal conception of the 
divine nature. Accordingly, the price of conceptual challenges resulting from 
                                                                            
642 Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 4—italics mine.  
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anthropomorphic attributions to the divine nature is one that many are willing to pay. In 
fact, advocates of UROPP often argue that the impersonal nature of UROP constitutes a 
theological weakness of this hypothesis. Recall for example Eleonore Stump’s assertion 
that there is something fundamentally wrong about conceiving of the God as Ipsum Esse 
alone (i.e., UROP as opposed to UROPP).643 On Stump’s view, UROP provides a 
theologically deficient view of the divine nature.  
In fact, one could even enlist research from the BCSR in support of the argument 
that UROP is a deficient account of the divine insofar as it does not involve divine 
attributes undergirded by many of our hypersensitive maturationally natural cognitive-
emotional tendencies, and is counterintuitive to such an extreme degree that most humans 
will be incapable of making sense of it intellectually. Even among those who are driven 
to invest the time and intellectual training that is required in order to make sense of 
UROP, the majority will still be left wondering why such an idea has any religious or 
theological value compared with UROPP (never mind more traditional anthropomorphic 
ideas of God such as Karl Barth’s view of God as being more like a person than a 
principle).  
This point constitutes a non-trivial weakness of UROP, at least in respect to the 
social viability of this hypothesis. The question of whether this also constitutes a 
theological weakness depends largely on the personality, values, and theological 
assumptions of the individual who is evaluating these hypotheses. For someone like 
                                                                            
643 Stump asserts that, “there is something false about conceiving of [the divine nature]...as esse alone.”  
Eleonore Stump, “God’s Simplicity,” in Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump, eds., The Oxford Handbook of 
Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)., 141—brackets mine. 
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Stump, the idea of an impersonal God is clearly a non-starter theologically, as this idea 
does not readily comport with traditional orthodox theological doctrines (e.g., the 
doctrines of the incarnation and resurrection of Christ). Alternatively, a philosopher who 
is persuaded by Schleiermacher's concept of the “fundamental dogmatic form” (wherein 
all Christian doctrines are interpreted as theoretical reflections on the Christian 
experience of absolute dependence) would wholeheartedly disagree with Stump’s 
assumption that UROP is a theological non-starter.  
Evidence from the BCSR can both shed light on many of the intuitions 
undergirding this philosophical and theological debate. The BCSR does not directly 
impact the first order truth of onto-theological hypotheses; nevertheless, it can provide 
empirical evidence about the types of religious ideas that tend to appeal to most 
individuals, and illuminate the cognitive-emotional and cultural dynamics that underlie 
these preferences. We will explore this topic in more detail in section 6.3. 
Returning to the main topic of this section, let us now consider the foregoing 
comparative philosophical evaluation of UROP and UROPP in light of the BCSR. The 
chief philosophical claim of this dissertation is that the central result of the BCSR 
damages the plausibility of UROPP and its attribution of anthropomorphic features to the 
divine nature compared to the competitor hypothesis UROP. It does so by exposing 
additional, empirically validated cognitive liabilities inherent to the anthropomorphic 
attributions that separate UROPP from UROP.  
 I have argued above that the anthropomorphic attributions involved in the 
hypothesis UROPP possess the conceptual liability of introducing conceptual 
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incoherence to the ontology of the divine nature, whereas the more parsimonious 
hypothesis UROP does not possess this liability. The central result indicates that there 
are significant cognitive liabilities (the hypersensitive mechanisms of HAAD, 
TOMM, and HTR) that underwrite the conceptual liabilities inherent to the 
hypothesis UROPP. Consequently, when we consider the status of these 
anthropomorphic attributions in light of the central result of the BCSR—which 
warns us to be wary of precisely these forms of anthropomorphism, as the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying them are hypersensitive and prone to produce false 
positives—the result is that the plausibility of UROPP is significantly (though not 
decisively) damaged in comparison to the competitor hypothesis UROP in this 
respect. In contrast, the central result does not negatively impact the plausibility of 
UROP in this respect, as this hypothesis does not involve the attribution of maturationally 
natural anthropomorphic capacities (intentionality, agency, purposiveness) to ultimate 
reality.  
 
A hypothetical philosophical debate over the divide within Neoplatonic Onto-theology 
Having now provided a formal argument on behalf of my central thesis, I want to 
illustrate in greater detail the way in which the central result of the BCSR could 
meaningfully impact a comparative philosophical debate over the divide within 
Neoplatonic onto-theology on the question of anthropomorphism (i.e., UROPP vs. 
UROP).  
 Consider the following hypothetical debate between two religious philosophers: 
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one a Thomistically inclined advocate of the UROPP hypothesis, the other an advocate of 
the UROP hypothesis as expressed by Plotinus. Let us imagine that our Plotinian 
philosopher makes the first move, arguing that UROP is the most elegant, parsimonious 
hypothesis about the nature of ultimate reality. She proceeds to employ Occam's Razor to 
argue that UROPP multiplies entities--in this case, anthropomorphic attributes—
needlessly. After all, the Plotinian One provides an elegant solution to the problem of the 
One and the Many without necessitating the attribution of intentionality and purposive 
agency to the divine nature. Accordingly, our Plotinian philosopher argues that UROP is 
superior to UROPP insofar as it provides the most elegant, parsimonious solution to the 
problem of the One and the Many. 
Unsurprisingly, this argument fails to convince our Thomistically inclined 
philosopher. He counters that UROPP does not in fact violate Occam’s Razor: although 
UROPP does involve multiplying entities (the attributes of intentionality, agency, etc.), it 
does not do so needlessly. In fact, these ontological attributions to the divine nature do 
crucial explanatory work: the hypothesis that ultimate reality is an infinite personal 
reality possessed of intentionality functions to provide ontological grounding for the 
finite reality of human consciousness. After all, the reality of consciousness is one of the 
great outstanding philosophical problems in Western thought. Our Thomistic philosopher 
goes on to point out that the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness is so baffling and 
mysterious that that many otherwise skeptical contemporary philosophers and 
intellectuals contend that human beings will never be capable of solving it.644 On the 
                                                                            
644 See Colin McGinn “Can we solve the problem of consciousness?” in The Nature of Consciousness: 
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other side of the spectrum, some philosophers and neuroscientists essentially dismiss the 
reality of consciousness a priori, and then claim to have solved the hard problem by 
identifying the neurological correlates for various human mental states.645 In short, the 
hard problem of consciousness demands a robust, ontological explanation, and such 
robust explanations are decidedly rare in the contemporary world of philosophy of mind. 
Accordingly, our Thomistic philosopher argues that Thomas’ onto-theological hypothesis 
of UROPP, coupled with his concept of the analogia entis, provides an elegant and 
powerful ontological explanation for the mysterious reality of consciousness: 
consciousness exists because finite human consciousness is analogously instantiated--to a 
more perfect and infinite degree—in the nature of ultimate reality itself. Our Thomist 
philosopher also points out that UROP fails to provide such a robust ontological 
explanation for the reality of consciousness.   
In response, our Plotinian philosopher observes that the philosophical task of 
providing a satisfying explanation for consciousness does not necessitate the hypothesis 
that ultimate reality is an infinite ontological principle possessed of consciousness. She 
notes that philosophers such as Alfred North Whitehead have articulated compelling 
metaphysical accounts of the reality of consciousness (in the form of di-polar monism) 
without appealing to the UROPP hypothesis.646 She also argues (in good Plotinian form) 
that predicating anthropomorphic attributes such as consciousness (regardless of whether 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Philosophical Debates, ed. Ned Block et al. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1997), ch. 15. 
645 See for example the Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1991); 
see also Patricia Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain (Cambridge, 
Mass: MIT Press, 2006). 
646 See Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality.  
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such attributes are predicated univocally or analogously) to infinite Being-itself 
introduces conceptual problems to this hypothesis by abrogating the divine simplicity.  
Our Thomist philosopher naturally counters the latter claim with an account of the 
Augustinian and Thomistic reformulation of the divine simplicity, wherein the divine 
attributes are said to be identical with the divine essence. 
In response, our Plotinian philosopher argues that this move simply shunts the 
conceptual problem to another sphere: first, there was a coherence problem involved with 
the attribution of anthropomorphic attributes to the infinite divine nature; now it is the 
doctrine of the divine simplicity that poses serious coherence problems. For the doctrine 
entails two interconnected, contradictory propositions: 1) the divine nature is an infinite, 
utterly simple principle containing no discrete parts or components, and 2), the divine 
nature includes the classic divine attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, etc., which are 
identical with the divine essence. If proposition 1 is true, then proposition 2 does not 
follow. Similarly, logic dictates that if proposition 2 is true (i.e., the divine nature is 
possessed of divine attributes that are inherent to and identical with the divine essence) 
then proposition 1 must be false: the divine nature is ipso facto not utterly simple, since it 
includes distinct attributes (e.g., omniscience, omnipotence, etc.), the supposed identity 
of these attributes with the divine essence notwithstanding. One need only contrast this 
doctrine with the Plotinian view of the divine simplicity to see the point: the Thomistic 
account includes attributions to the divine nature, the Plotinian view rejects all such 
attributions. The idea that one can solve this issue by claiming that these attributes are 
somehow identical with the divine essence appears to be an instance of a philosophical 
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legerdemain—it does not explain how this remarkable, logic-defying claim can be so, 
rather it simply asserts that it must be so. Furthermore, the potential counterargument that 
the classic divine attributes are not in fact distinct also faces the charge of incoherence, as 
there is a straightforward and clear sense in which the divine attributes are logically 
distinct from one another (e.g., omnipotence is logically distinct from omniscience), as 
argued by Plantinga in his study of Aquinas’s account of the divine nature.647  
At this point, we have probably reached an impasse in our hypothetical 
philosophical debate. Our Plotinian philosopher feels as though the foregoing argument is 
a philosophical slam dunk—she may not be able to prove that there is a One for the 
many, but she feels confident that she has established the conceptual incoherence of the 
idea that the divine attributes are identical with the simple, infinite divine essence. The 
conceptual incoherence of this idea is clear as day. Well, for her anyway. 
Where our Plotinian philosopher sees clear-cut conceptual incoherence, our 
Thomistic philosopher sees the divine mystery and the limitations of human 
comprehension. Accordingly, he would reject the charge of incoherence, and simply 
point out that our inability to make complete conceptual sense of the unity of the divine 
attributes with the divine essence does not entail that this position is false--rather, it 
reveals the limitations of human knowledge. To bolster this position, he might draw upon 
Eleonore Stump’s concept of “quantum theology” (discussed in chapter two): just as most 
humans struggle to conceive of how light can be both a particle and a wave, so too, we 
cannot fully comprehend how the divine attributes can be identical with the simple divine 
                                                                            
647 See Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have A Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), 47. 
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nature.  
Now imagine that our Plotinian philosopher decides to do some reading in the 
BCSR and learns about the central result. She could now introduce a new argument to 
this ancient philosophical and theological debate. She could argue that the central result 
damages the plausibility of the UROPP hypothesis and thus provides one with good 
reason to assent to the UROP hypothesis, as this view provides a more parsimonious 
solution to the problem of the One and the Many and does not entail the conceptual and 
cognitive liabilities of the UROPP view.  
She could further argue that the central result significantly undermines the 
plausibility of Stump’s concept of “quantum theology” and the attendant analogy 
between quantum physics and the UROPP hypothesis. Her argument might go something 
like this: Stump’s analogy turns on the idea that the account of the divine simplicity 
stemming from the UROPP hypothesis is similar to the wave-particle duality of light 
theory in quantum physics in that both hypotheses are seemingly incoherent and defy full 
rational comprehension. Ingenious as it may be, Stump’s analogy is philosophically 
dubious. The problem with her analogy becomes clear when we ask a basic question of 
both hypotheses: namely, What leads human beings to formulate such highly 
counterintuitive, seemingly incoherent hypotheses?  
In the case of the hypothesis from quantum physics that light has both a particle-
like and wave-like properties, the answer is relatively clear-cut and compelling: 
physicists formulated this bizarre hypothesis as a result of empirical experiments that are 
replicable by other scientists, and on the basis of expert consensus within the scientific 
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community.  
In the case of the doctrine of the divine simplicity stemming from the UROPP 
hypothesis, the answer is far from clear. However, the central result of the BCSR 
provides a compelling and potentially worrisome explanation: namely, that humans 
formulate highly counterintuitive, seemingly incoherent hypotheses about God—such as 
the idea that the infinite, utterly simple divine nature contains distinct attributes that are 
one with the divine essence--because they are cognitively and emotionally predisposed to 
overattribute intentionality, agency and purposiveness to reality and ultimate reality.  
Stump’s analogy between the UROPP hypothesis and quantum physics is 
dubious, not only because scientists can point to experimental evidence, replication of 
studies, and scientific consensus in order to support the highly counterintuitive, logic-
defying nature of the wave-particle duality hypothesis, but also because there is scientific 
evidence that points to serious cognitive liabilities inherent to the UROPP hypothesis. 
The central result shows us that there are maturationally natural cognitive mechanisms 
underlying the attribution of intentionality, agency and purposiveness to the divine 
nature. These mechanisms are hypersensitive and thus prone to producing false positives.  
Thus our Plotinian philosopher argues that the BCSR tips the scales of plausibility 
in the comparative evaluation, reducing the plausibility of UROPP. This is because the 
UROPP hypothesis possesses two liabilities: 1) the conceptual liability involved in the 
Thomistic account the divine simplicity, and 2) the cognitive liability about which the 
central result of the BCSR warns (i.e. we are cognitively and emotionally predisposed to 
overattribute anthropomorphic capacities to the world and to the divine). In contrast, the 
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UROP hypothesis possesses neither of these liabilities. When we consider this point 
together with the fact that the UROP hypothesis provides a more elegant, parsimonious 
solution to the problem of the One and the many, we have three good reasons for 
assigning greater plausibility to the UROP hypothesis compared to UROPP. 
Of course, the central result of the BCSR will not decisively resolve the debate 
between our Thomist and Plotinian philosophers. But this fact does not pose a significant 
problem, because as I mentioned in section one, the decisive resolution of metaphysical 
debates of this sort is not the goal of this inquiry. Rather the goal of the argument above 
and of the foregoing hypothetical debate was to try to demonstrate that, although debates 
about the nature of ultimate reality may not be resolvable in a decisive manner, they may 
in fact be rationally tractable—tractable in the sense that comparative philosophical 
analysis of competing metaphysical hypotheses can surface gradations of plausibility in 
certain respects. Moreover, the BCSR can make a meaningful impact in such debates.  
In summary, when we shift our theoretical aspirations away from decisively 
resolving philosophical and theological debates about the nature of ultimacy and instead 
focus on establishing gradations and respects of plausibility, the philosophical import of 
the BCSR becomes quite apparent: The BCSR introduces a novel and substantive 
philosophical consideration to a timeworn debate. As we’ve seen, the central result of the 
BCSR negatively impacts the plausibility of UROPP, and has little to no impact on the 
plausibility of UROP. In other words, the BCSR provides the Plotinian advocate of 
UROP with a novel argument against the competitor hypothesis UROPP. This 
consideration likely will not convince our Thomist philosopher, but it does call attention 
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to an additional cognitive liability inherent to his position with which he must contend. 
 
The Central Result damages the plausibility of certain aspects of the Onto-theological 
systems of key figures within the Anti-Anthropomorphic tradition  
It was argued above that the central result of the BCSR does not negatively impact the 
relative plausibility of anti-anthropomorphic hypothesis (UROP), insofar as this account 
of the divine nature does not involve any of the maturationally natural forms of religious 
anthropomorphism about which the central result warns us to be wary. Yet, some figures 
within the anti-anthropomorphic tradition of Neoplatonic onto-theology make use of 
these maturationally natural forms of anthropomorphism elsewhere in their systems. 
Consequently, if we expand the scope of our inquiry from hypotheses about the nature of 
ultimate reality itself (UROP and UROPP), it quickly becomes clear that the central result 
negatively impacts aspects of the thought of figures in the anti-anthropomorphic camp as 
well. 
For example, the Plotinian hierarchy of being articulated in the Enneads places 
mind or Nous at the penultimate level of reality. Plotinus maintains that Nous is the first 
hypostasis—or determinate manifestation—of the One, and thus a fundamental feature of 
reality as a whole. The central result of the BCSR gives us good reason to be skeptical of 
this aspect of Plotinus’ metaphysics, for the same reasons explored above: namely, our 
theory of mind mechanism (TOMM) is hypersensitive. We are thus prone to over-
attribute intentionality to our experience of the world—even in our experience of 
speculating on the fundamental components of reality as a whole.  
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Again, we must emphasize that the central result tells us nothing about the way 
things are in terms of metaphysical truth. It may turn out to be the case that there is no 
One for the many. Or, it may turn out to be the case that there is One for the many, but 
that the first determinate manifestation of the One is space-time rather than Nous. Or, it 
could be the case that Plotinus was right, and there is a One for the many, and the first 
hypostasis of the One is Nous. But whatever the case may be in terms of ultimate truth, 
the central result of the BCSR gives us good reason to question the plausibility of this 
aspect of Plotinus’ metaphysical system. That is to say, the central result negatively 
impacts the plausibility of—without decisively undercutting—the hypothesis that the first 
determinate manifestation of ultimate reality is a disembodied form of consciousness 
(Nous). 
As we saw in chapter three, Meister Eckhart was deeply influenced by Plotinus’ 
apophatic onto-theology. It is thus not surprising that Eckart seems to suggest something 
like an ontological hierarchy in his central distinction between God and Godhead. As 
mentioned above, Eckhart never explicated his distinction between God and Godhead in 
any systematic detail, so it is not entirely clear how we should interpret this highly 
suggestive onto-theological distinction. That being said, to the extent that Eckhart’s view 
entails the idea that beneath the level of ultimate reality (Godhead) there exists a personal 
God possessed of intentionality and purposive agency, the central result gives us reason 
to question the plausibility of this idea. Again, the BCSR proves nothing metaphysically 
or theologically. However, the central result does damage the plausibility of this aspect of 
Eckhart’s thought. 
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The BCSR negatively impacts the plausibility of the exclusivist Christological claims of 
Schleiermacher and Tillich 
Findings from the BCSR can also negatively impact the plausibility of other claims made 
by figures in the anti-anthropomorphic tradition. The exclusivist Christological claims 
made by Schleiermacher and Tillich are an excellent case in point. As argued in chapter 
three, these Christological claims are conceptually problematic in that they are incoherent 
with respect to the anti-anthropomorphic account of the divine nature (UROP) expressed 
by Schleiermacher and Tillich. Both Schleiermacher's supernatural account of the 
incarnation and Tillich’s claim that Christ represents the definitive expression of the New 
Being in history require--implicitly or explicitly--some form of disembodied 
intentionality, and purposive agency (and hence our old friends TOMM, HAAD, HTR) 
within the divine nature in order to make any metaphysical sense. And it is precisely 
these anthropomorphic capacities that are inconsistent with their espoused anti-
anthropomorphic ontology of the divine nature (UROP).  
Setting aside the incoherence of these Christological claims with respect to their 
anti-anthropomorphic viewpoints, it is important to note that the plausibility of these 
types of exclusivist theological claims has suffered significantly over the course of late 
modernity. In the early twentieth century, German historian and theologian Ernst 
Troeltsch famously called attention to the special pleading involved in claims on behalf 
of the exclusive or absolute truth of Christianity in the context this history of religion.648 
The exclusivist Christological assertions of Schleiermacher and Tillich involve the same 
                                                                            
648 See Ernst Troeltsch, The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2005). 
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type of implausible special pleading.  
In the latter half of the twentieth century, sociologists of religion began to 
illuminate the sociological conditions that alter the plausibility structures within which 
religious claims to absolute or exclusive truth are interpreted. In his 1979 book The 
Heretical Imperative, Peter Berger argued that the pluralism inherent to the plausibility 
structures of globalized modernity functions to relativize (without thereby disproving) 
religious claims to exclusive, absolute truth.649It is worth noting here that later in life, 
Tillich began to come to grips with the relativizing forces of the plausibility structures of 
late modernity, and sought to rethink his theological system in light of his experiences of 
engaging in interreligious dialogue with other religious traditions. Had he lived longer, he 
may very well have revised the Christology in his Systematic Theology to be more 
compatible with his growing appreciation for religious pluralism.  
Nevertheless, the point of this section is to demonstrate the way in the BCSR 
impacts the plausibility of the exclusivist Christological claims that he and 
Schleiermacher did make in their respective theological systems. And when we consider 
these claims in light of the BCSR, their plausibility suffers further still. This is because 
the BCSR provides an empirically robust scientific explanation for why humans tend to 
adopt and promote exclusivist religious beliefs in the first place: namely, human beings 
are cognitively and emotionally predisposed toward “groupish” thought-patterns and 
behaviors in general, and group-specific MCI religious beliefs in particular. 
Biologist and neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky refers to the deeply ingrained bias 
                                                                            
649 See Peter Berger, The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation (New 
York: Doubleday, 1979). 
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toward groupish thinking as “Us/Them-ing.” Sapolsky provides extensive evidence from 
the fields of cognitive psychology and neuroscience that the human brain is wired to 
carve the world up into in-group (Us) and out-group (Them).650 He also points out that 
Us/Them-ing often involves cultural representations and values as much as it does 
behavior. Sapolsky writes: 
Us-Them-ing typically involves inflating the merits of Us concerning core values--we are 
more correct, wise, moral, and worthy when it comes to knowing what the gods 
want/running the economy/raising kids/fighting the war. Us-ness also involves inflating 
the merits of our arbitrary markers, and that can take some work—rationalizing why our 
food is tastier, our music more moving, our language more logical or poetic.651 
 
The exclusivist Christological claims of Schleiermacher and Tillich appear to fit 
Sapolsky’s definition of “Us-Them-ing.” Both figures assert that the central religious 
figure of their religious in-group (Jesus Christ) is superior to all other religious figures in 
all other world traditions. Moreover, both figures make this bold assertion without 
providing a comparative inquiry into the history of religions that might support their 
claims with evidence. 
Philosopher and BCSR scholar F. Leron Shults coined the term “sociographic 
prudery” to refer to the powerful cognitive-emotional bias toward Us-them-ing.652 Shults 
maintains that the bias toward sociographic prudery regularly functions in tandem with 
the cognitive-emotional bias toward “anthropomorphic promiscuity:” human beings are 
evolutionarily predisposed to over-detect agency in the environment and to over-protect 
their ingroups. Shults refers to these biases as “theogonic mechanisms,” in that they 
                                                                            
650 Robert Sapolsky, Behave: The Biology of Humans at our Best and Worst (New York: Penguin Press, 
2017), ch. 11.  
651 Sapolsky, Ibid., 393. 
652 Shults, Theology After the Birth of God, 27 ff. 
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predispose humans to adopt beliefs about supernatural agents that are preferentially 
interested in their in-group.653  
Furthermore, as we saw in our discussion of the Big Gods hypothesis in chapter 
five, groupish religious beliefs have also been highly culturally adaptive for our 
ancestors—they help promote cooperation in large groups, and, thus help groups compete 
against other groups.  Ara Norenzayan’s hypothesis that, “religious groups cooperate in 
order to compete” suggests that groupish, Us-Them-ing types of religious beliefs function 
to further reinforce and promote groupish, Us-Them-ing types of beliefs and behaviors 
toward out-groups.654  
Of course, the fact that the human bias toward Us-Them-ing (or sociographic 
prudery) is culturally adaptive does not in any way function to directly undercut the first-
order theological claims of Schleiermacher and Tillich concerning the nature of Christ. 
Nevertheless, the plausibility of their exclusivist Christological claims does suffer as a 
result of the evidence from the BCSR on the powerful cognitive-emotional and cultural 
biases toward this type of “Us-Them-ing.” 
The theogonic mechanisms described by Shults provide a possible explanation for 
why Schleiermacher and Tillich would see fit to promote a form of Christology that was 
so incompatible with their espoused anti-anthropomorphic ontology of God. On Shults’ 
model, the mutually reinforcing theogonic mechanisms of anthropomorphic promiscuity 
and sociographic prudery exert something like a gravitational force on the minds and 
hearts of most human individuals—it is hard to resist the pull of these biases, because the 
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forces of natural selection and cultural evolution have made them the evolutionary default 
for our species. Modern science is arguably one of the only “groups” that can be said to at 
least aspire to escape this gravitational nexus.655  
Thus, when we consider the exclusivist Christological claims of Schleiermacher 
and Tillich in light of the BCSR, this otherwise conceptually incongruous aspect of their 
respective systems becomes more understandable: having fought mightily to resist the 
temptation toward anthropomorphic promiscuity, Schleiermacher and Tillich were 
nevertheless unable to fully extricate their theological systems from the culturally 
adaptive gravitational pull of sociographic prudery. The need to make a clear-cut 
statement about why the central religious figure (Jesus Christ) of their in-group 
(Christianity) was superior to all other religious figures in all other religious traditions 
was simply too powerful to resist. Of course, we will never know whether this “need” 
was purely practical, largely personal, or perhaps some of both. Nevertheless, the BCSR 
illuminates the cognitive and coalitional biases that make sociographically prudish 
religious ideas and theological claims so difficult to resist. 
 
6.3 Evaluating the Practical Efficacy and Social Viability of Neoplatonic Onto-theology 
in Light of the BCSR 
In this section, we turn our focus from the philosophical import of the BCSR to the way 
in which evidence from the BCSR can impact a more practical evaluation of the efficacy 
and social viability of Neoplatonic onto-theology. First, we will evaluate the practical 
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effectiveness of the competing traditions of Neoplatonic onto-theology as strategies for 
resisting anthropomorphism. We will subsequently consider the overall social viability of 
these viewpoints as theological traditions. More specifically, we will evaluate the degree 
to which the two subtraditions of Neoplatonic onto-theology are in harmony with the 
currents of cultural evolution, and the degree to which they align with the basic 
psychological, emotional, and spiritual needs of most ordinary individuals.  
 
The BCSR and the Tragedy of Attenuated Anthropomorphic Tradition of Neoplatonic 
Onto-theology: Theological incorrectness  
Justin L. Barrett and other researchers in the BCSR have shown that most individuals 
who claim to hold “theologically correct” beliefs that involve an attenuated 
anthropomorphic view of the divine nature (e.g., traditional concepts of the divine 
eternality, impassibility, etc.) are nevertheless likely to resort to highly anthropomorphic 
ideas about God when they are asked to reason about God’s hypothetical activity in the 
context of a narrative scenario. 
 In a well-known experiment, Barrett and his colleagues carefully constructed 
several stories that included God as a character interacting with humans. These stories 
were specifically crafted so as to leave open conceptual “gaps” for the participants to fill 
in with their theological inferences (either reflective or intuitive). The study sought to 
discover which types of theological inferences would most often be enlisted to fill the 
gaps. 
One of the stories depicted a young boy swimming alone in swift river. They boy 
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catches his leg between two rocks in the riverbed and begins to panic for fear of 
drowning. As he struggles to free himself, the boy begins to pray to God to help him. The 
narrative then states that although God was busy answering another prayer from another 
part of the world when the boy started to pray, God soon responded by moving one of the 
rocks in order to free the boy’s leg. Given the carefully designed structure of the story, 
the way in which participants interpreted and responded to the story would reveal what 
kind of God concepts they instinctively utilize to make sense of a narrative scenario. For 
example, the story is ambiguous about whether God needed to finish attending to another 
prayer before turning his or her attention to the drowning boy, as would be the case if 
God were a lot like a person (i.e., a MCI agent). However, one could interpret the same 
story in a way that is consistent with the reflective, more counterintuitive belief that God 
is omniscient and is therefore capable of attending to an infinite number of things 
simultaneously. Prior to having participants read the stories, Barrett and his colleagues 
asked participants to state their theological beliefs. Then, after the participants read the 
stories, Barrett had them answer deliberately vague questions about the role of God’s 
action in the scenarios in order to elicit their intuitive theological inferences. 
The results of the study are both fascinating and troublesome for religious 
professionals and theologians. Barrett found that most participants espoused 
“theologically correct” reflective beliefs prior to reading the stories, i.e., they cited 
reflective beliefs that tended to match traditional maximally counterintuitive ideas about 
God’s omnipotence, omniscient, and omnipresence. Crucially, however, the same 
participants employed more intuitive, highly anthropomorphic (“theologically incorrect”) 
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ideas of God when trying to answer questions about God’s action in the story. Barrett 
notes, they “used a very anthropomorphic…understanding of God to make sense of the 
stories.”656 Thus individuals who claim to hold theologically correct views of the divine 
nature nevertheless automatically resort to highly anthropomorphic “theologically 
incorrect” conceptions of God when they are forced to answer theological questions on 
the spot. Furthermore, this fascinating result—namely, “theological incorrectness”—
persisted across a broad sample group: 
across all groups—believers or non-believers, Christians, Hindus, or Jews—everyone 
showed the same pattern of intrusion errors. They understood God as human-like in the 
stories, but denied that they believed God to be human-like in the same ways when asked 
directly. In the stories they incorrectly remembered God as being in one place, but when 
asked directly, they claimed that God was everywhere or nowhere. They incorrectly 
remembered God as doing one thing at a time, but claimed God could do any number of 
things at once when asked directly…participants explicitly denied all of these limitations 
on God in a direct questionnaire.657 
Barrett interprets the results of this study as follows: most people have two 
different sets of ideas about God: on the one hand, people often have reflective 
(“theologically correct”) ideas about God, which typically involve maximally 
counterintuitive ideas such as the divine infinity, omnipotence, omniscience, etc. On the 
other hand, people possess maturationally natural intuitive (“theologically incorrect”) 
ideas of God, which are highly anthropomorphic. These intuitive, theologically incorrect 
ideas of God achieve what BCSR scholar Pascal Boyer refers to as a cognitive optimum: 
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they violate one or two, but not many of our maturationally natural intuitions across 
different ontological domains and are thus attention-grabbing, memorable, and easy to 
transmit. Furthermore, “theologically incorrect” ideas of God typically fit the profile of 
the most intuitive and captivating type of religious representation, namely, an MCI agent 
with full-access to strategic information. Note how this intuitive idea of God easily maps 
onto the story Barrett told his participants. In contrast, although the maximally 
counterintuitive and “theologically correct” reflective idea of God as omniscient, 
omnipresent and omnipotent can be mapped on to the same story, doing so requires 
decidedly more cognitive effort, time, and  theoretical reflection. Hence, the large 
majority of the participants in the study who espoused theologically correct ideas at the 
outset of the experiment did not implement theological correct inferences in their real-
time answers to questions about God’s action in the narrative. 
The basic upshot of the phenomenon of “theological incorrectness” is this: even 
when maximally counterintuitive “theologically correct” beliefs are successfully 
transmitted within a population, the majority of individuals who supposedly hold these 
beliefs will be incapable of properly implementing them in their everyday thinking about 
God. Rather, they will automatically and instinctively resort to the highly 
anthropomorphic, “theologically incorrect” ideas to which they are cognitively and 
emotionally predisposed. Pascal Boyer refers to this phenomenon as “the tragedy of the 
theologian.658 
The import of the reality of “theological incorrectness” for our practical 
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evaluation of the effectiveness of the attenuated anthropomorphic tradition of 
Neoplatonic onto-theology as a strategy for resisting anthropomorphism is relatively 
straightforward: even when the maximally counterintuitive idea of God as Ipsum Esse is 
successfully transmitted within a population, it will tend to be misunderstood by most 
people. What’s more, this onto-theological concept will not successfully attenuate the 
instinctive anthropomorphic tendencies of ordinary individuals nearly as much as 
Thomas would have likely imagined. In this respect, the phenomenon of theological 
incorrectness provides empirical support for the claim of Feuerbach (explored in chapter 
one) that the aspects of the divine that matter most to ordinary people are precisely the 
human-like attributes of God. Indeed, evidence for the phenomenon of theological 
incorrectness gives us good reason to believe that most individuals who encounter the 
UROPP hypothesis will instinctively latch on to the anthropomorphic attributes (God as 
all-knowing and agential) and mostly ignore—or grossly misunderstand—the 
Neoplatonic elements (i.e., the concept of Being-itself, the divine simplicity, etc.).  
Thus, when we consider the attenuated anthropomorphic view of God (UROPP) 
with respect to its effectiveness as a practical strategy for resisting religious 
anthropomorphism in light of the BCSR, it appears that the very elements by which this 
view resists gross anthropomorphism—i.e., the ontological concept of Being-itself, the 
divine simplicity, the analogia entis etc.) are part and parcel of what make it maximally 
counterintuitive and therefore likely to be practically ineffective and routinely 
misunderstood.  
This fact would likely be quite troubling to the figures in the attenuated 
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anthropomorphic tradition of Neoplatonic ontology whom we discussed in chapter two. 
Recall, for example, that one of the factors that led Thomas to promote the idea of 
analogous prediction was the desire to avoid the gross anthropomorphism involved in 
univocal predication of attributes to the divine nature. Thomas thus employed analogy as 
a means of protecting the divine nature from gross anthropomorphism, while still 
including a more refined, attenuated account of the classic divine attributes. However, the 
BCSR suggests that the attenuated element of Thomas’ attenuated anthropomorphic view 
is likely to be utterly lost on most of people. The empirical evidence for the phenomenon 
of theological incorrectness lends plausibility to the following hypothesis: most people 
who encounter Thomas’ onto-theological conception of God will instinctively seize onto 
the idea that God is in some important sense personal, and proceed to take this idea in a 
far more anthropomorphic (and maturationally natural) direction than Thomas would 
have ever advocated. Thus, we could say that theological incorrectness is the tragedy of 
the attenuated anthropomorphic onto-theological tradition. Indeed, when we evaluate the 
practical efficacy of this tradition as a strategy for resisting anthropomorphism in light of 
the phenomenon of theological incorrectness, it becomes clear that the attenuated view is 
unlikely to attenuate anthropomorphism nearly as much as one might think if one were 
evaluating this viewpoint without the benefit of research from the BCSR. 
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The BCSR and the Tragedy of Anti-Anthropomorphic Neoplatonic Onto-theology: 
Theological Irrelevance 
When we consider the anti-anthropomorphic tradition of Neoplatonic onto-theology as a 
theoretical strategy for resisting religious anthropomorphism, there is a relatively clear 
sense in which this tradition may be said to be highly effective. As we’ve seen above, the 
central result of the BCSR gives us good reason to predict that certain maturationally 
natural forms of anthropomorphism are likely be activated and subsequently employed in 
the human attempt to conceptualize the nature of ultimate reality. Nevertheless, the anti-
anthropomorphic view of the divine nature (UROP) effectively resists all of these 
maturationally natural forms of religious anthropomorphism, as this viewpoint explicitly 
rejects the attribution of any ontological capacities or axiological characteristics to the 
divine nature. 
Accordingly, the tradition of anti-anthropomorphic Neoplatonic onto-theology 
(UROP) is highly effective as a strategy for resisting religious anthropomorphism—at 
least in principle. In practice, however, research from the BCSR suggests that this 
tradition is potentially even less effective as a practical strategy for resisting 
anthropomorphism than the attenuated anthropomorphic tradition (UROPP).  
This is because the anti-anthropomorphic view (UROP) is fundamentally 
misaligned with the types of religious representations that human beings are cognitively 
and emotionally predisposed to adopt and transmit. As we saw in the previous section, 
the UROPP hypothesis falls into the domain of a maximally counterintuitive religious 
representation: the concept enlists some of our maturationally natural intuitions, but 
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violates them to a maximal degree (e.g., UROPP asks us to conceive of God as 
intentional, agential and purposive, but unlike other intentional, agential, and purposive 
agents, it dictates that God is an infinite principle rather than a finite agent). 
In contrast, the UROP hypothesis does not enlist any of these maturationally 
natural cognitive-emotional tendencies in the service of anthropomorphic attributions. 
Accordingly, it is perhaps more accurate to describe this idea as absolutely non-intuitive 
rather than “maximally counterintuitive,” in order to signal the fact that this conceptual 
representation does not actually violate any of our maturationally natural intuitions—
rather, the UROP hypothesis aggressively resists them altogether. 
Here again we see the way in which the BCSR can impact a comparative 
evaluation of the divide within Neoplatonic onto-theology. The UROPP hypothesis is 
maximally counterintuitive so it will be more difficult to understand and widely transmit 
this hypothesis compared to minimally counterintuitive ideas of God, such as those found 
in the Biblical literature. Yet, because the UROPP hypothesis does preserve some 
maturationally natural anthropomorphic elements, it will still garner the attention of many 
individuals, even if the majority will misunderstand it or deploy it inconsistently. 
Yet, however great the tragedy may be for the theologian embracing the 
attenuated anthropomorphic view, the tragedy is greater still if one happens to belong to 
the anti-anthropomorphic tradition of Neoplatonic onto-theology. This is because the 
UROP hypothesis is absolutely non-intuitive—it actively contests all of the 
maturationally natural cognitive-emotional tendencies that are associated with “catchy” 
religious representations. If we imagine the onto-theological hypotheses under discussion 
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in this chapter as being located along a spectrum of conceptual intuitiveness, we would 
find the UROPP hypothesis located further away from the “cognitive optimum” of 
minimally counterintuitive beliefs than, say, the anthropomorphic depictions of God in 
the Bible. Crucially, however, we would find the UROP hypothesis located even further 
from the cognitive optimum, as it as requires us to imagine ultimate reality without the 
support of any maturationally natural intuitions. As a result, this conception of God is 
even more difficult to understand and transmit than the UROPP hypothesis.  
Moreover, individuals will be less motivated to understand and transmit UROP 
compared to UROPP, because the former hypothesis does not enlist any of the “catchy” 
religious intuitions about disembodied divine intentionality with full access to strategic 
information that are maturationally natural for our species. In contrast to these 
maturationally natural religious ideas, the idea of UROP may appear to many individuals 
to be a barren, abstract principle. How many ordinary individuals would be motivated to 
take the time and energy to transmit this idea, and for what purpose? My point here is 
this: religious anthropomorphism is the evolutionary default for our species. Accordingly, 
it takes motivation and energy to move individuals out of this default position to resist 
anthropomorphism. Any practical theological strategy must take this into account. 
UROPP gives people enough maturationally natural anthropomorphic elements to 
motivate them to at least engage with this attenuated anthropomorphic view of the divine 
(even if most are bound to misunderstand it). In contrast, the UROP hypothesis does not 
offer anything in the way of motivation that elicits the maturationally natural tendencies 
of our species. Accordingly, UROP will always be more difficult to promote and widely 
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transmit as a strategy for resisting anthropomorphism than UROPP. 
Thus, the great tragedy of the anti-anthropomorphic tradition of Neoplatonic onto-
theology (UROP) is not that it is fated to be perpetually misunderstood due to the reality 
of “theological incorrectness.” Rather, the tragedy of the anti-anthropomorphic tradition 
is that it is likely to be largely ignored altogether. For most ordinary people, the UROP 
hypothesis naturally elicits the question “Why bother?” That is to say, “Why bother 
engaging with the idea of an impersonal God beyond all comprehension?” Thus, despite 
the fact that the anti-anthropomorphic tradition is highly effective as a strategy for 
resisting anthropomorphism in principle, in practice, it is likely to be relatively 
ineffectual. Most religious individuals will find the hypothesis UROP to be 1) 
conceptually impenetrable, and 2) religiously useless, and thus 3) not worth the time and 
energy to attempt to understand. Consequently, we could say that the tragedy of the anti-
anthropomorphic onto-theologian is the prospect of theological irrelevance. I contend 
that this constitutes a significant practical weakness of the anti-anthropomorphic tradition 
compared to the attenuated anthropomorphic tradition.  
 
The attenuated anthropomorphic tradition (UROPP) is more in line with cultural 
evolution than the anti-anthropomorphic tradition (UROP) 
In chapter five we explored the “Big Gods” hypothesis of Norenzayan and colleagues, 
which argues that the idea of disembodied intentional agents that monitor and punish 
antisocial behavior is culturally adaptive. Furthermore, Norenzayan argues that this class 
of anthropomorphic religious ideas functioned to help our ancestors transition from 
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small-scale hunter-gatherer societies to large-scale, anonymous societies. We also 
considered the supernatural punishment hypothesis of Dominic Johnson, who argues that 
the idea of invisible intentional agents who monitor and punish behavior functions to 
motivate individuals to engage in prosocial behavior and could be not only culturally 
adaptive, but also genetically adaptive. 
As we saw in section 6.2, the attenuated anthropomorphic hypothesis UROPP 
preserves several anthropomorphic attributions to the divine nature, including 
intentionality and purposive agency, all of which are underwritten by maturationally 
natural cognitive tendencies. When we consider the UROPP hypothesis in light of the 
literature on the cultural evolution of religion, what becomes noteworthy is the fact that 
these anthropomorphic attributes are essential to the cognitive profile of “Big Gods.” In 
asserting that ultimate reality is an infinite personal reality that is in principle capable of 
knowing human behavior and capable of acting according to divine purposes, the UROPP 
hypothesis suggests something like a Big God—i.e., a disembodied reality that is capable 
of monitoring and punishing human behavior. Accordingly, UROPP includes the 
fundamental conceptual ingredients that make for a culturally adaptive conception of God 
(the maximally counterintuitive nature of this view notwithstanding). 
If we consider the anti-anthropomorphic tradition of Neoplatonic onto-theology in 
light of the cultural evolution of religion, it appears rather anomalous. Indeed, the UROP 
hypothesis appears to swim upstream against the currents of cultural evolution, insofar as 
this view rejects all of the divine attributes (intentionality, agency, humanly relevant 
moral concerns) that helped make certain religious representations (e.g., Big Gods) 
  353 
culturally adaptive for our ancestors. 
Accordingly, we might consider the anti-anthropomorphic tradition of 
Neoplatonic onto-theology (UROP) to be something like a non-adaptive cultural 
tradition. Unlike the UROPP hypothesis, which in many ways overlaps and coheres with 
the Big Gods hypothesis, the UROP hypothesis would have been relatively ineffective as 
a means of galvanizing human cooperation in large-scale civilizations in the past. The 
reason for this is clear enough: according to the Big Gods hypothesis, the God concepts 
that are most culturally adaptive are those that include the idea of divine monitoring of 
human behavior and divine punishment of anti-social behavior. The anti-
anthropomorphic tradition clearly runs afoul of these criteria for culturally adaptive 
religious ideas insofar as it conceives of the divine nature as utterly simple and bereft of 
intentionality, or purposive agency. In fact, the UROP hypothesis essentially dictates that 
God (or ultimate reality) does not monitor or punish human behavior because God cannot 
monitor or punish--because the divine is not an intentional, agential reality. The anti-
anthropomorphic tradition of Neoplatonic onto-theology thus appears to be significantly 
less adaptive from the perspective of cultural evolution compared to the attenuated 
anthropomorphic tradition.  
For now, we can leave aside the question of whether the UROP hypothesis could 
become culturally adaptive in a future cultural scenario659 and simply point out that the 
UROP hypothesis would not be nearly as effective as the UROPP hypothesis in helping 
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galvanize human cooperation in large-scale anonymous societies. Of course, the 
maximally counterintuitive nature of UROPP makes it possibly less culturally adaptive 
than more highly anthropomorphic views of God, in that UROPP is harder to understand 
and transmit. Nevertheless, when we confine our comparative analysis to UROP and 
UROPP, it is clear that the latter hypothesis is more in line with cultural evolution than 
the former. 
 
The attenuated anthropomorphic tradition (UROPP) is better suited to the psychological 
and spiritual needs of ordinary individuals than the anti-anthropomorphic tradition 
(UROP) 
In chapter one we considered Sigmund Freud’s critique of religious belief as an illusion 
based primarily upon infantile attachments and the fear of death. In the later part of the 
twentieth century, Freudian psychology as a whole came under scrutiny for its highly 
speculative, insufficiently scientific approach to the human mind and behavior, and 
Freud’s critique of religion is open to this criticism as well.  
Nevertheless, a growing body of research in the BCSR suggests that Freud was on 
to something in suggesting a close correlation between anthropomorphic theistic beliefs 
about a parent-like God, attachment instincts, and death anxiety.  
One of the best examples of this is the growing scientific literature on religious 
beliefs and behaviors and death anxiety. One salient example is a series of experiments 
conducted by BCSR scholar Scott Atran, which demonstrated that exposure to adrenaline 
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activating scenes of death reliably increased religiosity among test subjects.660 
The research around the psychological dynamics of religion and death anxiety 
continues to grow, most notably in the fruitful integration of the BCSR with “Terror 
Management Theory” (TMT). The basic hypothesis of TMT is that a significant amount 
human thought and behavior is devoted (consciously or unconsciously) to managing 
anxiety and fear around mortality.661In 2018, the journal Religion, Brain, & Behavior 
dedicated an entire issue to the latest research in TMT and the bio-cultural study of 
religion, including psychology of religion. While we do not have space here to delve into 
this research in any detail, the main point to emphasize for our discussion here is this: 
there is mounting empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that anthropomorphic 
religious beliefs and behaviors function to help individuals manage anxiety and fear 
around the reality of death. In short, Freud’s intuitions about the correlation between 
death anxiety and religion have been borne out by contemporary scientific research. 
Another important example of this phenomenon can be seen in the work of 
evolutionary psychologist Lee Kirkpatrick. In his 2005 book Attachment, Evolution, and 
the Psychology of Religion, Kirkpatrick integrates attachment theory with an evolutionary 
by-product account of religion to formulate a compelling theory that anthropomorphic 
theistic beliefs (e.g., belief in monotheistic Gods) often constitute a type of supernatural 
attachment figure, which functions to help satisfy psychological needs for attachment that 
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persist throughout the individual's lifespan.662 Kirkpatrick’s account suggests that 
although Freud got many of the details wrong, he was correct in his instinct to diagnose 
anthropomorphic religious beliefs as driven by instinctive attachment needs. The 
evolutionary psychological perspective throws our attachment instincts into sharp relief: 
we humans are mammals, and unusual ones at that, insofar as we spend more time in a 
state of relative helplessness and vulnerability after birth than any other mammal. 
Accordingly, the need to feel secure attachment to a safe base (usually a parent figure) in 
our ambiguous environment is written deeply into our biology. This need for attachments 
also extends into adulthood, where it is often transferred from parent figures to friends 
and romantic partners. And Kirkpatrick convincingly argues that, for many people, the 
attachment figure morphs over time from a physical parent figure to a supernatural parent 
figure in the form of a personal God. 
When we consider the traditions of Neoplatonic onto-theology in light of the 
scientific literature on the relationship between religious belief and attachment figures 
and terror management in the face of death it becomes clear that this research illuminates 
some of the significant practical consequences of the divide within this tradition over the 
question of religious anthropomorphism.  
Perhaps the first point to make on this subject is that Neoplatonic onto-theology 
as a whole is not especially well suited to addressing the psychological needs of most 
ordinary people compared to more anthropomorphic conceptions of God, such as Karl 
Barth’s aforementioned view. This is in large part due to the fact that the ideas of God 
                                                                            
662 See Lee Kirkpatrick, Attachment, Evolution, and the Psychology of Religion, 2005. 
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within this tradition are highly counterintuitive and abstract. It is not difficult to see why 
abstract ontological principles make rather poor candidates for attachment figures, or why 
Barth’s radical claim that God is more truly personal than we are makes his theological 
perspective much more likely to elicit the attachment instincts of individuals than the idea 
that God is Ipsum Esse.663 However, as we have seen, the UROPP hypothesis does 
include some important person-like features (intentionality and purposive agency), which 
make this maximally counterintuitive idea a possible candidate for a supernatural 
attachment figure. It is also the case that these anthropomorphic features make UROPP a 
possible source of comfort in the face of death. For reasons discussed above, this 
maximally counterintuitive religious representation will always be more difficult to 
transmit and more difficult for ordinary people to engage with than religious beliefs 
involving highly anthropomorphic MCI agents. Nevertheless, UROPP could in principle 
function as an supernatural attachment figure, as we as a resource for terror management 
in the face of death (perhaps if only for the few theology students who are interested in 
dedicating the time and energy required to understand the idea in the first place). 
In contrast, UROP is a poor candidate for a supernatural attachment figure for 
reasons that are clear enough: an nonpersonal ontological principle bereft of 
intentionality and agency is not the sort of reality that could offer protection to an 
individual in the way required of a parent-like attachment figure. Similarly, UROP is not 
the sort of divine reality that could offer protection from death, or furnish hope for an 
                                                                            
663 “The doubtful thing is no whether God is person, but whether we are. Can we find among us even one 
man whom we can call in this full and proper sense of the term? But God is real person, really free 
subject.” Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, I/1, pp. 138-139—emphasis mine. 
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afterlife.  
Ironically, Meister Eckhart, one of the key figures in the anti-anthropomorphic 
tradition of Neoplatonic onto-theology, insisted that one must work to abandon one’s 
need for attachment and security in order to properly engage with ultimate reality as it 
most truly is. Eckhart used the term “gelassenheit”—commonly translated as 
“releasement” or “non-attachment”—to refer to the proper spiritual orientation of the 
individual who seeks union with ultimate reality (Godhead, for Eckhart).664 Here we may 
recall that in his vernacular sermons Eckhart exhorted his listeners to abandon their 
attachment to God as a person-like entity that could provide them with emotional and 
spiritual succor. Rather, Eckhart maintains that we must learn to love God “as He is: a 
non-God, a non-spirit, a non-person, a non-image; rather, as He is a sheer pure limpid 
One, detached from all duality.”665 
So much then for the idea of UROP as a supernatural attachment figure, or as a 
resource for terror management. Not only is it the case that the UROP hypothesis is ill-
suited for fulfilling the attachment needs of most individuals, it is also the case that many 
proponents of the UROP view maintain that overcoming one’s attachment needs in 
relation to ultimate reality is a necessary step in the cultivation of spiritual maturity. 
Yet, Eckhart’s ideal of spiritual maturity is simply unrealistic for most religious 
individuals. This is because, as Freud so clearly intuited, the psychological needs of most 
ordinary individuals—the need to feel secure and at home in the world, and the need to 
manage anxiety around the certainty of death—are often tightly woven into their spiritual 
                                                                            
664 See McGinn, The Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany, 116 ff. 
665 Eckhart, The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, 465. 
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needs. And as we’ve seen above, this intuition has been supported by research in the 
BCSR on the relationship between religious beliefs and behaviors and TMT, and 
supernatural attachment figures. 
In our chapter four we encountered Martin Heidegger’s argument that the God of 
onto-theology is religiously useless: “Man can neither pray nor sacrifice to this god. 
Before the causa sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music and 
dance before this god.”666 Research from the BCSR provides a powerful explanation for 
why it is the case that most humans cannot meaningfully engage with this conception of 
the divine—especially the God of anti-anthropomorphic Neoplatonic onto-theology. The 
BCSR suggests that a significant majority of religious individuals who hold 
anthropomorphic views of God do so because this idea fulfills important attachment 
needs for security and in order to manage terror and anxiety around death. As we’ve seen, 
the attenuated anthropomorphic view is less well-suited to fulfilling these psychological 
needs than more highly anthropomorphic views of God found in the biblical literature. 
Nevertheless, the anthropomorphic elements of this hypothesis render it relatively 
compatible with the psychological needs of most religious believers. In contrast, the anti-
anthropomorphic view is utterly misaligned with the psychological dynamics that drive 
and underwrite belief in God for most ordinary people. 
In summary, UROPP trumps the UROP hypothesis when it comes to social 
viability, past cultural adaptiveness, and meeting the psychological needs of most 
ordinary people. The UROPP hypothesis is less difficult to understand (even granted the 
                                                                            
666 Martin Heidegger, Identity and difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago, Ill.; London: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002).,72. 
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fact that it is maximally counterintuitive) than UROP; it does a better job engaging most 
people's psychological and spiritual needs, and has been (up until now, at least) better 
suited to supporting stable civilizations, as this hypothesis can in principle furnish the 
culturally adaptive ideas of supernatural monitoring and supernatural punishment of anti-
social behavior.667  
 
6.4 Reevaluating the critique of Neoplatonic onto-theology as a form of conceptual 
anthropomorphism in light of the BCSR 
In chapter four we explored the critique that the onto-theological project itself is a 
form of conceptual anthropomorphism. Evidence from the BCSR appears to be 
orthogonal to some aspects of this critique. Consider, for example, the charge made by 
Barth, Heidegger, and Marion that the onto-theological project is essentially idolatrous. It 
is difficult to see how evidence from the BCSR could impact this type of theological 
claim—at least as far as I can tell.  
There is, however, a key component of Barth’s critique of onto-theology as a 
form of conceptual anthropomorphism that is directly undermined by research from the 
BCSR. In what follows, I shall demonstrate the way in which findings from the BCSR 
render implausible Barth’s assertion that onto-theological concepts are just as 
anthropomorphic as the forms of religious anthropomorphism found in the Biblical 
                                                                            
667 Both Augustine and Thomas make use of the idea of supernatural punishment (see for example, 
Augustine, City of God, Books XIV and XXI; see also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Volume 5, 
IIIa QQ 88, 89, & 97). Although Maimonides supports the idea of supernatural monitoring and punishment 
as “necessary beliefs,” he explicitly rejects the idea that God actually monitors and punishes humans for 
sinful behavior.   
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literature. Let us begin by briefly revisiting Barth’s argument on this matter in the Church 
Dogmatics: 
It is evident that this very prejudice against what are in the narrower sense to be called 
anthropomorphisms can also provide a basis and occasion for the pitiful transition from 
theology to philosophy, or from the theology of revelation to natural theology. The 
further we move away from the witness of the Holy Scriptures to the sphere of general 
conjectures about God, so much the purer, we think is the air of thought, i.e., so much 
the less do we need the anthropomorphisms which are found to be particularly suspect. 
But if it lets itself be guided by its object, theology ought to try to evade these 
anthropomorphisms least of all. And there is an obvious error when it is said that they 
are particularly suspect…for spiritual—i.e., abstract—concepts are just as 
anthropomorphic as those which indicate concrete perception. The same is true…of 
concepts like the…substantia, existentia of God.668 
Contrary to Barth’s claim in the last part of this quote, research from the BCSR 
illuminates four crucial distinctions between these two types of conceptual 
representations (i.e., abstract ontological concepts and the anthropomorphic religious 
representations from the Bible). 
First, the BCSR reveals that the majority of the depictions of God in the biblical 
tradition belong to a class of anthropomorphic religious ideas known as “minimally 
counterintuitive beliefs.” Evidence suggests that anthropomorphic religious ideas 
involving minimally counterintuitive agents with full access to socially strategic 
information are especially “catchy” for our species. This is because this class of religious 
representations achieves what Pascal Boyer refers to as a “cognitive optimum:” they 
                                                                            
668 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/1, p. 222—emphasis mine. 
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minimally violate some—but not too many—of our maturationally natural intuitions.669 
These MCI beliefs are also “catchy” because they involve the highly alluring idea of an 
invisible agent with full access to socially strategic information. As a result, these 
conceptual representations are attention grabbing; they stick out in our memory, make for 
fascinating stories, and are easy to widely transmit in a population.  
In sharp contrast, abstract onto-theological concepts exist on the opposite side of 
the spectrum of human conceptual representations—they fall into the class of human 
concepts known as “maximally counterintuitive ideas.” Representations that belong to 
this class of human concepts are those that violate our maturationally natural intuitions to 
such a degree that they become very difficult to process cognitively. Most ideas in this 
class of human conceptual representations are so counterintuitive that they require years 
of education and training in order for individuals to be capable of understanding and 
correctly utilizing them. The onto-theology of Plotinus is an excellent case in point: the 
concept of the One beyond all prediction is very difficult to understand and transmit to 
others. In fact the ability to do so requires years of education. In contrast, one can easily 
teach small children about the anthropomorphic God depicted in the biblical literature. 
The idea of the Plotinian One on the other hand would be decidedly more difficult to 
teach successfully in a Sunday school classroom. 
A second difference between abstract onto-theological concepts and the 
anthropomorphic depictions of God in the biblical tradition is that the latter class of 
conceptual representations are maturationally natural for our species. As BCSR scholar 
                                                                            
669 See Pascal Boyer, The Naturalness of Religious Ideas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 
121. 
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and philosopher of science Robert McCauley argues in his book Why Religion is Natural 
and Science is Not, religious representations are maturationally natural for our species 
insofar as they minimally violate our maturationally natural cognitive intuitions, and 
trigger our maturationally natural cognitive biases (e.g., TOM, HAAD, HTR). 
Unlike statistical reasoning, understanding quantum physics, or contemplating the 
One beyond being and non-being, human beings do not require extensive training in 
order to understand, existentially engage with, and draw rich inferences about 
anthropomorphic religious ideas involving full access MCI-agents; rather, these ideas 
come naturally to us. Consequently, even young children are capable of drawing rich 
inferences from the apparent design of natural phenomena to the existence and creative 
activity of anthropomorphic MCI agents, such as traditional anthropomorphic 
conceptions of God. As psychologist Deborah Kelemen’s research has shown, young 
children will naturally tend to generate explanations for natural objects and natural events 
that involve MCI agents—and they do not require any training from a Sunday school 
teacher to be able to do so. 
McCauley does not appear to have much interest in theological ideas as first-order 
hypotheses about the nature or existence of ultimate realities (at least in his academic 
publications). Nevertheless, in Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not he sees fit to 
compare abstract theological idea to ideas deriving from modern scientific theories, such 
as quantum physics. Different as these types of conceptual representations may be, they 
both fall into the domain of conceptual representations that are maximally 
counterintuitive, require extensive training to understand, and are thus difficult to 
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transmit widely in a population. Consequently, McCauley maintains that abstract, 
“academic” theology is similar to contemporary science in that both theoretical 
disciplines are cognitively unnatural.670 
If we contrast the abstract onto-theological conception of the divine as Being-
itself with the anthropomorphic depictions of God in the Biblical tradition it becomes 
clear that the latter fall squarely into the class of religious ideas that are maturationally 
natural for our species, whereas the former conception of God falls into the domain of 
cognitively unnatural concepts. It follows that Barth’s attempt to draw a conceptual 
equivalence between the Biblical class of religious ideas about God and abstract onto-
theological concepts of the divine is a false equivalence par excellence.  
The third important difference between abstract ontological concepts (e.g., the 
Plotinian One) and the maturationally natural anthropomorphic religious ideas found in 
the biblical literature concerns the cognitive liabilities that are a feature of the latter class 
of conceptual representations. As we saw in section two, the central result of the BCSR 
shows that anthropomorphic religious beliefs concerning disembodied intentional, 
agential, purposive agents possess certain cognitive liabilities. This is because the 
cognitive-emotional mechanisms underlying these ideas (TOMM, HAAD, HTR) are 
hypersensitive, and thus prone to producing false positives. Of course, this is not to say 
that these mechanisms are somehow always unreliable, or always produce false 
positives—just that they are likely to misfire sometimes.  
In contrast, abstract onto-theological concepts such as the Plotinian One require 
                                                                            
670 Robert McCauley, Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011), Ch. 5. 
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that we contest more of our maturationally natural cognitive intuitions or biases.671 While 
this by no means guarantees that such ideas tend to produce veridical beliefs, it does 
indicate that this class of conceptual representations lacks the cognitive liabilities 
involved in maturationally natural anthropomorphic religious ideas. 
The fourth important distinction between abstract onto-theological concepts and 
the maturationally natural forms of anthropomorphism found in the Bible is that the latter 
class of conceptual representations are more adaptive from the perspective of cultural 
evolution. As we saw in our discussion of Philo and Origen in chapter one, the biblical 
literature is rife with anthropomorphic depictions of God monitoring and punishing both 
individuals and the people of Israel as a whole because of their sinful behaviors. Recall 
that the gross anthropomorphic elements of these narratives—especially the ideas of God 
changing God’s mind about meting out punishment, and God’s anger and wrath—posed a 
major problem for figures such as Philo, Origen, Augustine, and other scholars of that 
time. They saw the idea of divine wrath, and even the Biblical descriptions of divine 
punishment as running afoul of the criterion of theoprepes, or that which is unbefitting of 
the divine. This concept is fascinating in light of the BCSR—for it turns out the most of 
the activities that would be deemed grossly anthropomorphic and thus “unbefitting of the 
divine” according to this criterion are the very types of divine intentionality (monitoring 
behavior) and purposive agency (punishing bad behavior) that are most adaptive from the 
perspective of cultural evolution. 
                                                                            
671 Here I am exclusively referring to anti-anthropomorphic onto-theological concepts (UROP). 
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In contrast, abstract onto-theological concepts such as Being-itself672 are not 
culturally adaptive in this sense for reasons mentioned above: an impersonal ontological 
principle bereft of intentionality cannot monitor or punish human behavior. Thus, the idea 
of the Plotinian One is highly unlikely to inspire humans to cooperate, especially 
compared to the anthropomorphic representation of Yahweh as depicted in the Hebrew 
Bible.  
Of course, as we have seen in the case of the UROPP hypothesis, onto-theological 
concepts can possess the liabilities of hypersensitive cognitive mechanisms, and they can 
possess elements that are culturally adaptive if and only if these concepts (e.g, Being-
itself) are coupled with maturationally anthropomorphic attributions. Yet, even in this 
case, the difference between the anthropomorphic depictions of God in the Bible and 
UROPP is significant: the former view of God is highly culturally adaptive, as it involves 
the idea of supernatural punishment, and is minimally counterintuitive and maturationally 
natural, and therefore easy to transmit widely within a population. In contrast, the 
UROPP view is maximally counterintuitive and cognitively unnatural. As a result 
UROPP will be more difficult to transmit widely in a population and thus less adaptive 
from the perspective of cultural evolution—regardless of the fact that this hypothesis 
contains elements that are culturally adaptive (the idea that God monitors and punishes 
bad behavior).  
In summary, evidence from the BCSR directly undermines Barth’s assertion that 
                                                                            
672 I am referring only to the concept of Being-itself--not to the attenuated anthropomorphic view with its 
attribution of extraneous anthropomorphic capacities to Being-itself, and the attendant idea that the infinite 
divine nature is a personal reality that is concerned with human behaviors. 
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abstract onto-theological concepts are just as anthropomorphic as the forms of religious 
anthropomorphism in the Biblical tradition.673 Against Barth’s claim, the BCSR 
demonstrates that the latter class of conceptual representations are minimally 
counterintuitive, maturationally natural, possess significant cognitive liabilities, and are 
more adaptive in terms of cultural evolution. Abstract onto-theological concepts could 
not be more different: they are they are maximally counterintuitive (or, absolutely non-
intuitive), they are cognitively unnatural (as opposed to being maturationally natural), 
they do not (in and of themselves) possess the cognitive liability of actively enlisting 
hypersensitive cognitive mechanisms in the service of anthropomorphic attributions, and 
they have not been (in and of themselves) culturally adaptive in the past.674  
 
Reevaluating the critique of onto-theology as conceptual anthropomorphism in light of 
the BCSR 
While Barth, Heidegger, and Marion differ in the emphases of their critiques of onto-
theology, all three argue that onto-theological concepts essentially lead us astray when it 
comes to our thinking about God. And all three argue (in different ways) that the only 
alternative to the conceptual idolatry of onto-theology is to take our theological bearings 
from special revelation, and to embrace the ideas of God found within the biblical 
                                                                            
673 However, it does not follow from this that the BCSR directly undermines his critique as a whole. This is 
because the core of Barth’s critique of onto-theology ultimately turns on his preeminence of revelation 
perspective, and not only on the degree to which certain types of conceptual representations are deemed to 
be anthropomorphic.  
674 My parenthetical qualifications in this sentence are meant to register the fact that the class of onto-
theological concepts under discussion in this study—Neoplatonic concepts such as the One or Being-
itself—are conceptually independent of the extraneous anthropomorphic attributions which were eventually 
grafted onto them. These concepts stand all on their own, as it were, and do not require or entail any 
anthropomorphic elements.  
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tradition.  
The BCSR does not directly undercut this philosophical and theological 
argument. However, I contend that it does negatively impact the plausibility of this 
viewpoint.  
One way of summarizing the general argument of this chapter is that evidence 
from the BCSR provides one with non-arbitrary reasons for being wary of certain types 
of religious representations as over and against others. The cognitive liabilities of certain 
types of anthropomorphic religious representations (full-access MCI agents), coupled 
with the fact that such ideas have been highly adaptive in the past from the perspective of 
cultural evolution should, at the very least, give one pause when evaluating the virtues 
and liabilities of religious ideas as a whole. For the central result indicates that humans 
would generate and widely transmit ideas about anthropomorphic MCI agents even if 
such agents did not exist. Similarly, the upshot of the Big Gods hypothesis is that it 
would be culturally adaptive for human groups to generate, transmit, and preserve 
religious ideas concerning supernatural monitoring and punishment, even if such 
supernatural punishing agents did not actually exist.  
As I argued in the foregoing section, the idea of God deriving from the biblical 
narratives (which Barth champions) falls into the category of maturationally natural 
anthropomorphic religious representations that involve the idea of supernatural 
monitoring and punishment. The aforementioned liabilities of this class of religious 
representations proves nothing philosophically or theologically, but they do provide one 
with non-arbitrary reasons for questioning the plausibility of the critique that Barth, 
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Heidegger, and Marion advance against the onto-theological project. The basic claim of 
these figures is that the class of religious representations of which we should be most 
wary are not those maturationally natural anthropomorphic religious representations 
found in the biblical narrative, but rather abstract onto-theological categories. This 
argument appears to be significantly less plausible when we consider it in light of the 
BCSR. This does not mean that Barth and company are wrong with respect to their first-
order theological claims—just that their critique of onto-theology looks less compelling 
in light of what the BCSR tells us about the cognitive liabilities of the class of 
anthropomorphic religious representations that they promote over and against onto-
theological religious representations. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, we should note that the BCSR does not distribute plausibility neatly 
among the various philosophical and theological positions we’ve explored in the 
preceding chapters. The central result damages the relative plausibility of the attenuated 
anthropomorphic view compared to the anti-anthropomorphic view, yet, the BCSR also 
reveals several important practical weaknesses of the anti-anthropomorphic view 
compared to the attenuated view. As we just saw, the BCSR significantly undermines the 
plausibility of certain aspects of Barth’s critique of Neoplatonic onto-theology. Yet, as 
we saw in the section above, the BCSR can also be enlisted in support of Heidegger’s 
argument that onto-theology is of no practical religious use for most religious individuals.  
In this chapter I have tried to demonstrate that the philosophical import of the 
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BCSR is significant but not decisive. In section one I argued that the philosophical import 
of the BCSR is strongest when it is incorporated into a pragmatic comparative evaluation 
of competing hypotheses about the divine nature. In section two, I made a comparative 
philosophical argument that sought to demonstrate the way in which the central result of 
the BCSR negatively impacts the plausibility of the attenuated anthropomorphic view in 
Neoplatonic onto-theology (UROPP) compared to the anti-anthropomorphic view 
(UROP). In the third section I argued that the BCSR illuminates several practical 
weaknesses Neoplatonic onto-theology as a whole, and the anti-anthropomorphic view in 
particular. The BCSR suggests that UROPP is a less effective strategy for resisting 
anthropomorphism than one might otherwise think, and that UROP is even less effective 
from a practical perspective. The BCSR also suggests that UROP is weaker than UROPP 
when it comes to social viability, the currents of cultural evolution in past cultural 
contexts, and the ability to meet the psychological, emotional, and spiritual needs of most 
ordinary people. In the fourth section of this chapter, I sought to demonstrate the way in 
which evidence from the BCSR on the cognitive, emotional, and cultural dynamics of 
religious anthropomorphism erodes the plausibility of an important aspect of Barth’s 
critique of onto-theology. It was also argued that the BCSR negatively impacts the 
plausibility of the general critique of onto-theology as a form of conceptual 
anthropomorphism.  
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Conclusion 	
As we saw in chapter five, the BCSR endeavors to make sense of human religious 
beliefs and behaviors from the disciplinary perspectives of evolutionary biology, 
evolutionary psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and cultural evolution. One significant 
benefit of analyzing traditional philosophical and theological questions and ideas in light 
of the BCSR is the way in which the aforementioned scientific disciplines can shed new 
light on timeworn theoretical topics.  
We began this study with a broad overview of the problem of religious 
anthropomorphism in Western philosophy and theology, beginning in Ancient Greece 
and tracing this issue up to the Modern period. When viewed from the perspective of the 
history of Western philosophy and theology, the problem of religious anthropomorphism 
appears to be ancient—perhaps even as old as the inception of philosophy itself. Yet, 
considered from the vantage point of the BCSR, the so-called “problem of religious 
anthropomorphism” that emerged in Ancient Greece appears to be quite young. For the 
BCSR asks us to consider all human cultural representations and conceptual traditions 
against the backdrop of the millions of years of our species’ evolutionary history. 
What’s more, the problem of religious anthropomorphism appears to be relatively 
young even in the context the Holocene period during which some types of religious 
anthropomorphism became culturally adaptive for our ancestors as they transitioned from 
small scale hunter gatherer societies to increasingly large, anonymous civilizations. 
Consequently, what is remarkable from the perspective of the BCSR is the fact that 
religious anthropomorphism ever became a problem for our species in the first place. 
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Setting aside the issue of how and why religious anthropomorphism can come to 
pose a theoretical problem for human beings under certain cultural conditions,675 we can 
simply observe that the tradition of Neoplatonic onto-theology represents one of the most 
complex and concentrated attempts to negotiate the problem of religious 
anthropomorphism in all of Western thought. 
Moreover, when we consider Neoplatonic onto-theology in light of the BCSR, we 
gain a novel perspective on the debates within and around this tradition. With respect to 
the debate within the Neoplatonic onto-theology over the issue of anthropomorphism and 
the divine nature, we can see that the divide between the attenuated anthropomorphic 
view and the anti-anthropomorphic view in many ways hinges upon the issue of 
maturationally natural forms of religious anthropomorphism: the attenuated view 
preserves certain types of maturationally natural anthropomorphic ideas (e.g., the divine 
mind), whereas the anti-anthropomorphic view aggressively resists all forms of 
maturationally natural religious anthropomorphism with respect to the divine nature.  
Furthermore, I have argued that when evidence from the BCSR concerning the 
cognitive liabilities inherent to many forms of maturationally natural anthropomorphic 
religious ideas is integrated into a comparative pragmatic philosophical evaluation of the 
two aforementioned traditions of Neoplatonic onto-theology, it functions to negatively 
impact—without decisively undercutting—the relative plausibility of the attenuated 
anthropomorphic view compared to the anti-anthropomorphic view. This is 
philosophically significant, because most of literature on the philosophical import of the 
                                                                            
675 See Wesley J. Wildman’s 2017 In Our Own Image: Anthropomorphism, Apophaticism, and Ultimacy 
for a fasincating account of why and how human beings come to resist antrhopomrphic religious ideas.  
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BCSR involves one of two philosophical extremes, namely, the argument that the 
philosophical import of the BCSR is negligible with respect to belief in God, on the one 
hand, or, the argument that the philosophical import of the BCSR is decisively atheistic, 
on the other. My thesis suggests that the philosophical import of the BCSR lies between 
these two extremes: evidence from the BCSR can significantly impact—without decisively 
determining—the outcome of a comparative philosophical evaluation of hypotheses about 
the nature of God. 
The BCSR also negatively impacts the plausibility of the well-known critique that 
the onto-theological project as such constitutes a form of gross conceptual 
anthropomorphism. In chapter six I showed the way in which evidence from the BCSR 
can be incorporated into a comparative philosophical argument that essentially turns the 
tables on the aforementioned critique by indicating the way in which abstract onto-
theological concepts—such as the Plotinian One—actively resists the significant 
cognitive liabilities that underwrite maturationally natural anthropomorphic attributions. 
In contrast, figures such as Barth, Heidegger, and Martion—who critique onto-theology 
as a form of gross conceptual anthropomorphism—actively promote anthropomorphic 
religious ideas that are maturationally natural, and are supported by cognitive 
mechanisms that possess significant liabilities. Furthermore, the BCSR directly 
undermines Barth’s argument that abstract ontological concepts are just as 
anthropomorphic as the human-like depictions of God in the biblical literature.  
Finally, evidence from the BCSR also indicates the cognitive and social 
limitations of the traditions of Neoplatonic onto-theology. As I argued in chapter six, 
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evidence for the phenomenon of “theological incorrectness” suggests that the attenuated 
anthropomorphic tradition of Neoplatonic onto-theology is likely to be much less 
effective in attenuating anthropomorphic religious conceptions of God than one would 
otherwise believe in the absence of empirical evidence from the BCSR. I also argued that 
evidence from the BCSR helps us understand why the anti-anthropomorphic tradition of 
Neoplatonic onto-theology has been less socially viable than the attenuated 
anthropomorphic view. This is due to the fact that the anti-anthropomorphic view is much 
more difficult to process cognitively than the attenuated view, less in-line with the 
religious ideas that have proven culturally adaptive in past and present social contexts, 
and is less well-suited to meet the psychological and spiritual needs of most ordinary 
individuals at the present time. 
Before drawing this study to a close, it is worth mentioning an important issue 
that was briefly touched upon in chapter six: namely, the curious phenomenon of anti-
anthropomorphic religious representations in light of the BCSR. As I mentioned above, 
the anti-anthropomorphic tradition of Neoplatonic onto-theology appears to be something 
like a non-adaptive cultural tradition, as it actively resists all of the anthropomorphic 
religious representations that have made for highly culturally adaptive religious ideas, 
according to the “Big Gods” hypothesis. Indeed, when we consider the fact that the anti-
anthropomorphic tradition swims against the currents of cultural evolution (at least thus 
far in the history of our species), together with the fact that this viewpoint is “absolutely 
non-intuitive,” and thus extremely difficult to process cognitively (compared to 
maturationally natural religious representations), it seems puzzling that this tradition has 
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persisted for millennia in Western philosophy and theology. In short, when we consider 
the anti-anthropomorphic tradition of Neoplatonic onto-theology in light of the BCSR, 
this tradition appears to be quite anomalous.  
What is interesting, however, is that this tradition is not an anomaly. Indeed, anti-
anthropomorphic religious representations have emerged in virtually all of the major 
religious traditions of the world’s large-scale civilizations. Some of the earliest known 
instances of anti-anthropomorphic religious representations derive from South Asian 
traditions of thought, most notably in Buddhism,676 and in the Advaita Vedanta school of 
Hinduism.677 Anti-anthropomorphic religious ideas are also important features of East 
Asian religious traditions, especially as seen in Neo-Confucianism678 and Daoism.679  
The fact that anti-anthropomorphic religious representations recur in virtually all 
of the world’s major religious traditions is a phenomenon seldom discussed in the BCSR 
literature (at least at the present time). Accordingly, one could argue that this oversight 
amounts to a form of reductionism: up until the present, the BCSR has tended to reduce 
the complexity of human religion to anthropomorphic religious beliefs and related 
behaviors. 
What’s more, the fact that anti-anthropomorphic religious representations have 
persisted for millennia across the major religious traditions of the world seems to cry out 
for an explanation. Why have human beings in large scale civilizations continually 
                                                                            
676 See for example, Nāgārjuna et al., The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna’s 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
677 See for example, Sudhakshina Rangaswami, The Roots of Vedānta: Selections from Śaṅkara's Writings 
(New York: Penguin Books, 2012). 
678 See for example, Chou Tun-I’s “An Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate,” in Wing-Tsit 
Chan, ed., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1973), p. 463.  
679 See Laozi et al., Tao Te Ching (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 1993). 
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generated—and labored to transmit and preserve—anti-anthropomorphic religious 
representations that are so costly (in terms of the time and energy required to properly 
understand them), and so at odds with the currents of cultural evolution over the past 
several thousand years?  
 While any empirically adequate answer to this question must incorporate evidence 
from the BCSR, I contend that a theoretically satisfying answer to this question lies 
beyond the scope of the scientific study of religion. Instead, I maintain that this question 
belongs to the proper domain of religious philosophy, and I believe it represents a 
promising area of further inquiry for contemporary religious philosophers. Clearly my 
goal in this dissertation was not furnish an answer to the enigma of the persistence of 
anti-anthropomorphic religious ideas across traditions and time. Nevertheless, my hope is 
that the foregoing multidisciplinary comparative analysis and evaluation of the attenuated 
anthropomorphic and anti-anthropomorphic traditions of Neoplatonic onto-theology will 
make some contribution to this larger area of inquiry. 
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